Pub Date : 2024-12-01Epub Date: 2024-11-27DOI: 10.1111/phc3.70008
Gabriel De Marco, Taylor W Cyr
In this paper-Part 2 of 3-we discuss one of the two main types of soft-line responses to manipulation cases, which we refer to as manipulator-focused views. Manipulator-focused views hold, roughly, that the reason that Victim lacks responsibility (or lacks full responsibility) is because of the way the action is related to the Manipulator. First, we introduce these views generally, and then we survey some detailed versions of such views. We then introduce cases of natural forces, often taken to be a problem for such approaches in general, followed by a discussion of various sorts of cases-accidental results, lucky manipulators, and parallel cases-that present challenges for some of the detailed versions of such views. We conclude with some thoughts about the prospects for manipulator-focused views going forward.
{"title":"Manipulation cases in free will and moral responsibility, part 2: Manipulator-focused responses.","authors":"Gabriel De Marco, Taylor W Cyr","doi":"10.1111/phc3.70008","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phc3.70008","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>In this paper-Part 2 of 3-we discuss one of the two main types of soft-line responses to manipulation cases, which we refer to as manipulator-focused views. Manipulator-focused views hold, roughly, that the reason that Victim lacks responsibility (or lacks full responsibility) is because of the way the action is related to the Manipulator. First, we introduce these views generally, and then we survey some detailed versions of such views. We then introduce cases of natural forces, often taken to be a problem for such approaches in general, followed by a discussion of various sorts of cases-accidental results, lucky manipulators, and parallel cases-that present challenges for some of the detailed versions of such views. We conclude with some thoughts about the prospects for manipulator-focused views going forward.</p>","PeriodicalId":40011,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy Compass","volume":"19 12","pages":"e70008"},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2024-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC11602641/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142773354","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-12-01Epub Date: 2024-11-27DOI: 10.1111/phc3.70009
Gabriel De Marco, Taylor W Cyr
A common style of argument in the literature on free will and moral responsibility is the Manipulation Argument. These tend to begin with a case of an agent in a deterministic universe who is manipulated, say, via brain surgery, into performing some action. Intuitively, this agent is not responsible for that action. Yet, since there is no relevant difference, with respect to whether an agent is responsible, between the manipulated agent and a typical agent in a deterministic universe, responsibility is not compatible with the truth of determinism. This paper introduces some key types of manipulation cases, the schema for a manipulation argument against compatibilism, the hard-line/soft-line categories of responses to manipulation arguments, and various issues that have become important in discussions of manipulation cases and arguments.
{"title":"Manipulation Cases in Free Will and Moral Responsibility, Part 1: Cases and Arguments.","authors":"Gabriel De Marco, Taylor W Cyr","doi":"10.1111/phc3.70009","DOIUrl":"10.1111/phc3.70009","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>A common style of argument in the literature on free will and moral responsibility is the Manipulation Argument. These tend to begin with a case of an agent in a deterministic universe who is manipulated, say, via brain surgery, into performing some action. Intuitively, this agent is not responsible for that action. Yet, since there is no relevant difference, with respect to whether an agent is responsible, between the manipulated agent and a typical agent in a deterministic universe, responsibility is not compatible with the truth of determinism. This paper introduces some key types of manipulation cases, the schema for a manipulation argument against compatibilism, the hard-line/soft-line categories of responses to manipulation arguments, and various issues that have become important in discussions of manipulation cases and arguments.</p>","PeriodicalId":40011,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy Compass","volume":"19 12","pages":"e70009"},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2024-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC11601998/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142751974","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Gratitude is a pervasive, if often overlooked, aspect of our daily lives. At its core, it is a response to being benefitted. Yet, several philosophical puzzles surround this ostensibly ordinary emotion. This article is an overview of the major philosophical debates concerning gratitude. We start with personal gratitude, i.e., gratitude directed to an agent for something they have done. We consider what personal gratitude consists in. We then consider its normativity, i.e., when it is fitting, owed, a directed duty, or a virtue. We then turn to impersonal gratitude, i.e., gratitude for something without gratitude to any agent for it. We consider the normativity of this attitude, i.e., when it is fitting. We end by considering whether personal gratitude and impersonal gratitude are two species of the same genus—as their names suggest—or whether they are distinct attitudes.
{"title":"Gratitude: Its Nature and Normativity","authors":"Max Lewis","doi":"10.1111/phc3.13015","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phc3.13015","url":null,"abstract":"Gratitude is a pervasive, if often overlooked, aspect of our daily lives. At its core, it is a response to being benefitted. Yet, several philosophical puzzles surround this ostensibly ordinary emotion. This article is an overview of the major philosophical debates concerning gratitude. We start with personal gratitude, i.e., gratitude directed <jats:italic>to</jats:italic> an agent for something they have done. We consider what personal gratitude consists in. We then consider its normativity, i.e., when it is fitting, owed, a directed duty, or a virtue. We then turn to impersonal gratitude, i.e., gratitude for something without gratitude to any agent for it. We consider the normativity of this attitude, i.e., when it is fitting. We end by considering whether personal gratitude and impersonal gratitude are two species of the same genus—as their names suggest—or whether they are distinct attitudes.","PeriodicalId":40011,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy Compass","volume":"74 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2024-08-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142190302","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Conventionalism about personal identity over time is the view that personal identity is in some sense dependent on our beliefs, desires, social practices, or language use (collectively: on our “conventions”). This paper provides an opinionated survey of the state of the art about personal identity conventionalism. First, it offers a taxonomy of possible types of conventionalism along four different axes and discusses weak vs. strong, private vs. public, doxastic vs. non‐doxastic, and realizer‐relative vs. assessor‐relative varieties of conventionalism. Second, it reviews the main sources of motivation for conventionalism about personal identity: methodological, epistemological, and normative motivations. Third, it maps out the place of conventionalism in logical space and distinguishes it from related philosophical theses: personal identity pluralism, indeterminacy about personal identity, revisionism, and self‐concern relativism. Finally, some potential avenues for future research are considered.
{"title":"Conventionalist Accounts of Personal Identity Over Time","authors":"David Mark Kovacs","doi":"10.1111/phc3.13016","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phc3.13016","url":null,"abstract":"Conventionalism about personal identity over time is the view that personal identity is in some sense dependent on our beliefs, desires, social practices, or language use (collectively: on our “conventions”). This paper provides an opinionated survey of the state of the art about personal identity conventionalism. First, it offers a taxonomy of possible types of conventionalism along four different axes and discusses weak vs. strong, private vs. public, doxastic vs. non‐doxastic, and realizer‐relative vs. assessor‐relative varieties of conventionalism. Second, it reviews the main sources of motivation for conventionalism about personal identity: methodological, epistemological, and normative motivations. Third, it maps out the place of conventionalism in logical space and distinguishes it from related philosophical theses: personal identity pluralism, indeterminacy about personal identity, revisionism, and self‐concern relativism. Finally, some potential avenues for future research are considered.","PeriodicalId":40011,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy Compass","volume":"152 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2024-08-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141929719","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
According to anti‐exceptionalism about logic (AEL), logic is not as exceptional in terms of its epistemology and subject matter as has been conventionally thought. Whereas logic's epistemology has often been considered distinct from those of the recognised sciences, in virtue of being both non‐inferential and a priori, it is in fact neither. Logics are justified on the basis of similar mechanisms of theory‐choice as theories in the sciences, and further the sources of evidence which inform these theory choices are (at least) not wholly a priori. In this first part of a two‐part entry on AEL, we trace these epistemological elements of AEL back to Quine's naturalism and evidential holism, but then highlight important differences between the motivations and commitments of Quine's version of AEL and those within the contemporary literature. This demonstrates the need to assess contemporary anti‐exceptionalist positions on their own merits, rather than treating them as mere reincarnations of Quine's evidential holism.
{"title":"Anti‐Exceptionalism about Logic (Part I): From Naturalism to Anti‐Exceptionalism","authors":"Ben Martin, Ole Thomassen Hjortland","doi":"10.1111/phc3.13014","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phc3.13014","url":null,"abstract":"According to <jats:italic>anti‐exceptionalism about logic</jats:italic> (AEL), logic is not as exceptional in terms of its epistemology and subject matter as has been conventionally thought. Whereas logic's epistemology has often been considered distinct from those of the recognised sciences, in virtue of being both <jats:italic>non‐inferential</jats:italic> and <jats:italic>a priori</jats:italic>, it is in fact neither. Logics are justified on the basis of similar mechanisms of theory‐choice as theories in the sciences, and further the sources of evidence which inform these theory choices are (at least) not wholly <jats:italic>a priori</jats:italic>. In this first part of a two‐part entry on AEL, we trace these epistemological elements of AEL back to Quine's naturalism and evidential holism, but then highlight important differences between the motivations and commitments of Quine's version of AEL and those within the contemporary literature. This demonstrates the need to assess contemporary anti‐exceptionalist positions on their own merits, rather than treating them as mere reincarnations of Quine's evidential holism.","PeriodicalId":40011,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy Compass","volume":"45 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2024-08-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141929716","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Any account of Spinoza's understanding of attribute must be able to satisfy his definition criterion; that is, it must coherently accommodate the elements involved in his definition of attribute as “what the intellect perceives of a substance as constituting its essence” (E1d4). But this is not enough. There are several available readings that satisfy this criterion and are mutually incompatible. To know what Spinoza means we must supplement his definition criterion with a criterion aiming at consistency with other principles in his system. With the definition and consistency criteria in the backdrop, the aim of this paper is to offer a critical overview of the current state of the debate on Spinoza's theory of attributes.
{"title":"Spinoza's theory of attributes","authors":"Antonio Salgado Borge","doi":"10.1111/phc3.13013","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phc3.13013","url":null,"abstract":"Any account of Spinoza's understanding of attribute must be able to satisfy his definition criterion; that is, it must coherently accommodate the elements involved in his definition of attribute as “what the intellect perceives of a substance as constituting its essence” (E1d4). But this is not enough. There are several available readings that satisfy this criterion and are mutually incompatible. To know what Spinoza means we must supplement his definition criterion with a criterion aiming at consistency with other principles in his system. With the definition and consistency criteria in the backdrop, the aim of this paper is to offer a critical overview of the current state of the debate on Spinoza's theory of attributes.","PeriodicalId":40011,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy Compass","volume":"21 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2024-08-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141929718","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Agent causation, roughly stated, is the view that an agent can stand in direct causal relation to (at least some subset of) her actions. Although agent causation has had a patchy reputation throughout much of contemporary analytic philosophy, it is now considered by many to be a viable theoretical option in various domains in action theory. That said, agent‐causalists continue to grapple with a number of important issues. This paper focuses on one such issue—namely, how to integrate motivating reasons into a picture of agent causation. More specifically, I canvass a number of options for the agent‐causalist, focusing in particular on various causalist accounts, and flagging various problems along the way. I conclude with some brief considerations about how to move forward.
{"title":"Agent Causation and Motivating Reasons","authors":"Joseph Martinez","doi":"10.1111/phc3.13012","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phc3.13012","url":null,"abstract":"Agent causation, roughly stated, is the view that an agent can stand in direct causal relation to (at least some subset of) her actions. Although agent causation has had a patchy reputation throughout much of contemporary analytic philosophy, it is now considered by many to be a viable theoretical option in various domains in action theory. That said, agent‐causalists continue to grapple with a number of important issues. This paper focuses on one such issue—namely, how to integrate motivating reasons into a picture of agent causation. More specifically, I canvass a number of options for the agent‐causalist, focusing in particular on various causalist accounts, and flagging various problems along the way. I conclude with some brief considerations about how to move forward.","PeriodicalId":40011,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy Compass","volume":"23 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2024-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141885490","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Recent work in quantum gravity has prompted a re‐evaluation of the fundamental nature of spacetime. Spacetime is potentially emergent from non‐spatiotemporal entities posited by a theory of quantum gravity. Recent efforts have sought to interpret the relationship between spacetime and the fundamental entities through a mereological framework. These frameworks propose that spacetime can be conceived as either having non‐spatiotemporal entities as its constituents or being a constituent part of a non‐spatiotemporal structure. I present a roadmap for those interested in exploring the role of composition in understanding the emergence of spacetime. I establish a taxonomy based on four crucial parameters that should be considered when constructing potential mereological models. Subsequently, I connect these models to a range of perspectives found in current literature, with the aim of pinpointing areas that require further exploration. Finally, I identify three potential challenges facing mereological models of spacetime emergence, rooted in issues of mereological harmony, the distinction between continuous and discrete spacetime, and the implications of quantum superposition.
{"title":"Mereological Models of Spacetime Emergence","authors":"Jessica Pohlmann","doi":"10.1111/phc3.13003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phc3.13003","url":null,"abstract":"Recent work in quantum gravity has prompted a re‐evaluation of the fundamental nature of spacetime. Spacetime is potentially emergent from non‐spatiotemporal entities posited by a theory of quantum gravity. Recent efforts have sought to interpret the relationship between spacetime and the fundamental entities through a mereological framework. These frameworks propose that spacetime can be conceived as either having non‐spatiotemporal entities as its constituents or being a constituent part of a non‐spatiotemporal structure. I present a roadmap for those interested in exploring the role of composition in understanding the emergence of spacetime. I establish a taxonomy based on four crucial parameters that should be considered when constructing potential mereological models. Subsequently, I connect these models to a range of perspectives found in current literature, with the aim of pinpointing areas that require further exploration. Finally, I identify three potential challenges facing mereological models of spacetime emergence, rooted in issues of mereological harmony, the distinction between continuous and discrete spacetime, and the implications of quantum superposition.","PeriodicalId":40011,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy Compass","volume":"47 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2024-07-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141772589","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The concept of bias is pervasive in both popular discourse and empirical theorizing within philosophy, cognitive science, and artificial intelligence. This widespread application threatens to render the concept too heterogeneous and unwieldy for systematic investigation. This article explores recent philosophical literature attempting to identify a single theoretical category—termed ‘bias’—that could be unified across different contexts. To achieve this aim, the article provides a comprehensive review of theories of bias that are significant in the fields of philosophy of mind, cognitive science, machine learning, and epistemology. It focuses on key examples such as perceptual bias, implicit bias, explicit bias, and algorithmic bias, scrutinizing their similarities and differences. Although these explorations may not conclusively establish the existence of a natural theoretical kind, pursuing the possibility offers valuable insights into how bias is conceptualized and deployed across diverse domains, thus deepening our understanding of its complexities across a wide range of cognitive and computational processes.
{"title":"Varieties of Bias","authors":"Gabbrielle M. Johnson","doi":"10.1111/phc3.13011","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phc3.13011","url":null,"abstract":"The concept of <jats:italic>bias</jats:italic> is pervasive in both popular discourse and empirical theorizing within philosophy, cognitive science, and artificial intelligence. This widespread application threatens to render the concept too heterogeneous and unwieldy for systematic investigation. This article explores recent philosophical literature attempting to identify a single theoretical category—termed ‘bias’—that could be unified across different contexts. To achieve this aim, the article provides a comprehensive review of theories of bias that are significant in the fields of philosophy of mind, cognitive science, machine learning, and epistemology. It focuses on key examples such as perceptual bias, implicit bias, explicit bias, and algorithmic bias, scrutinizing their similarities and differences. Although these explorations may not conclusively establish the existence of a natural theoretical kind, pursuing the possibility offers valuable insights into how bias is conceptualized and deployed across diverse domains, thus deepening our understanding of its complexities across a wide range of cognitive and computational processes.","PeriodicalId":40011,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy Compass","volume":"94 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2024-07-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141772590","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Must reasons be able to feature in our deliberation? Proponents of a deliberative constraint on reasons endorse an affirmative answer to this question. Deliberative constraints enjoy broad appeal and have been deployed as premises in support of a variety of controversial philosophical positions. Yet, despite their uses, deliberative constraints have not received systematic philosophical attention. This entry aims to fill this gap in the literature. First, I sketch what's at stake in the debate over whether a deliberative constraint is true. Then, I offer a taxonomy of the different versions of a deliberative constraint. Finally, I assess some of the arguments for and against a deliberative constraint.
{"title":"The deliberative constraint on reasons","authors":"Conner Schultz","doi":"10.1111/phc3.13010","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phc3.13010","url":null,"abstract":"Must reasons be able to feature in our deliberation? Proponents of a deliberative constraint on reasons endorse an affirmative answer to this question. Deliberative constraints enjoy broad appeal and have been deployed as premises in support of a variety of controversial philosophical positions. Yet, despite their uses, deliberative constraints have not received systematic philosophical attention. This entry aims to fill this gap in the literature. First, I sketch what's at stake in the debate over whether a deliberative constraint is true. Then, I offer a taxonomy of the different versions of a deliberative constraint. Finally, I assess some of the arguments for and against a deliberative constraint.","PeriodicalId":40011,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy Compass","volume":"162 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2024-07-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141742762","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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