Buddhaghosa’s Model of Temporality seen through the Prism of Bergson’s Duration

Abstract

The broad objective of this paper is to expound the model of temporal awareness as per Buddhaghosa and compare it with Bergson’s account of duration. As per Buddhaghosa, the notions of time, consciousness, and causation are inter-related. Accordingly, to understand the nature of temporal consciousness, it is required that a moment of consciousness is unpacked, its constituents analysed, and its structuring process penetrated, that is, how momentary mental events are related to each other in a way that leads to an experience of succession and duration. The paper is divided into three sections. The aim of the first section is to show that mental events, for Buddhaghosa, are not discrete, independent entities but are dependently originated. The aspect of dependent origination is further illustrated through paṭiccasamuppāda and paṭṭhāna. In the second section, the constitution of temporality as per Bergson is discussed. Henri Bergson too commit to the position that mental events, to start with, are not discrete, disconnected but rather are fused together in inter-penetrating causal relationships. So, the model of temporality of Bergson as the movement of fused consciousness states, as a heterogenous multiplicity as opposed to discrete multiplicity provides a helpful framework through which Buddhaghosa’s model of temporality can be interpreted. In the final section, Buddhaghosa’s model of time-consciousness is discussed by elucidating the structure of the momentary citta (consciousness). Further, the tension that prevails between the momentary and the durational level aspect of consciousness and between simultaneity and succession is discussed vis-à-vis temporal awareness. For Buddhaghosa, a case is made for the experience of duration as fundamental to consciousness, but which is grounded in, rather than opposed to, moments of consciousness. It is posited that, in Buddhaghosa, there is a construction of temporal experience but one that is not opposed with the real duration; unlike in Bergson, where a distinction seems to be made between the ultimate reality of duration when contrasted with the construction or projection of continuity based upon moments of consciousness.