Sophia最新文献

The broad objective of this paper is to expound the model of temporal awareness as per Buddhaghosa and compare it with Bergson’s account of duration. As per Buddhaghosa, the notions of time, consciousness, and causation are inter-related. Accordingly, to understand the nature of temporal consciousness, it is required that a moment of consciousness is unpacked, its constituents analysed, and its structuring process penetrated, that is, how momentary mental events are related to each other in a way that leads to an experience of succession and duration. The paper is divided into three sections. The aim of the first section is to show that mental events, for Buddhaghosa, are not discrete, independent entities but are dependently originated. The aspect of dependent origination is further illustrated through paṭiccasamuppāda and paṭṭhāna. In the second section, the constitution of temporality as per Bergson is discussed. Henri Bergson too commit to the position that mental events, to start with, are not discrete, disconnected but rather are fused together in inter-penetrating causal relationships. So, the model of temporality of Bergson as the movement of fused consciousness states, as a heterogenous multiplicity as opposed to discrete multiplicity provides a helpful framework through which Buddhaghosa’s model of temporality can be interpreted. In the final section, Buddhaghosa’s model of time-consciousness is discussed by elucidating the structure of the momentary citta (consciousness). Further, the tension that prevails between the momentary and the durational level aspect of consciousness and between simultaneity and succession is discussed vis-à-vis temporal awareness. For Buddhaghosa, a case is made for the experience of duration as fundamental to consciousness, but which is grounded in, rather than opposed to, moments of consciousness. It is posited that, in Buddhaghosa, there is a construction of temporal experience but one that is not opposed with the real duration; unlike in Bergson, where a distinction seems to be made between the ultimate reality of duration when contrasted with the construction or projection of continuity based upon moments of consciousness.

This article describes the ultimate ground of reality, Brahman, as a single power unfolding in concert in all things. It uses counterfactual argumentation to imply that a cosmos must consist of telic causal orders or manifested ‘powers’ as its most granular building block – and that they must be unified into a single whole. It is based on an argument for a single causally-conditioning substrate of all things recorded in India’s classical Sāṃkhya Kārikā and Brahma Sūtras; this was used by scholastic Vedāntic thinkers including the non-dualist Śaṃkara and the ‘transformationist’ Bhedābheda thinker Śrīnivāsa. It takes up arguments for satkārya, the pre-existence of a thing’s various transformations in potentio within its substrate, and employs them to paint a picture of reality as an ordered yet entangled pattern of causal trajectories. These manifest as the changing world we know. While Vedānta’s main motivation for making the arguments was to prove monism, this conception of an ‘immanent cause’ of all was also seen as divine. We see how this accords with moves in contemporary analytic philosophy to shift away from a broadly Humean model of constant conjunctions (reminiscent of key Buddhist approaches) toward a Neo-Aristotelian ‘metaphysics of powers’. But we also indicate how it may go further than most modern powers-metaphysicians in proposing a deeper connection between powers and what it is for there to be a cosmos at all.

After the advent of the theory of special relativity, the existence of absolute time in nature was rejected within the society of physics. In recent decades, William Lane Craig has endeavoured to offer an interpretation of the empirical evidence that support the theory of relativity while maintaining the concept of absolute time. His interpretation, however, is based upon supernatural presuppositions due to which it cannot be accepted as a scientific argument. After explaining Craig’s view, we attempt to reconstruct his explanation for absolute time using the concept of general substantial motion of nature, well-known in Mulla Sadra’s philosophy as the most important approach in Islamic philosophy; thereby, proving general time for the natural world. Although Craig considers some evidence from modern physics in his reasoning for absolute time, here, after pointing to some evidence, it is discussed that the approach used here better bridges the gap that exists between the metaphysics and the physics of the argument.

In this paper, I will be discussing, through the lens of this paradox, the experiences of a Hindu devotee of God, the 16th-century poet Mirabai. I will map out some contours of this interaction that seems to be conceptually impossible and yet animates the devotional life. I will explore how Mirabai seeks to transgress, through her poetic expressions alternating with joy and sorrow, the finite realm and somehow contain the divine non-finite reality, namely, Krishna. As we will see, her attempts to engage with Krishna, her non-finite beloved, and generate a loving interaction between herself and Krishna often leads to the disappearance of Krishna which encases her in a spiral of deep suffering and lament. However, it is precisely this agony that enables her to gradually withdraw herself from the finite world and, in turn, immerse herself devotionally in Krishna. I will explore, in the final section, the nature of Mirabai’s devotional victory, and how these moments of suffering, in the experience of separation from Krishna (viraha-bhakti), are yet charged with a liberating power. This spiritual telos allows for a deep devotional connection to be established between her finite self and Krishna, a connection that cannot be articulated straightforwardly on the logical plane.

I find two lines of interpretation of the philosophical status of “Palamism” and “Barlaamism” in the Russian thought of the late 19th to early twentieth centuries. One of these lines links Palamism with Aristotelianism and nominalism, and Barlaamism with Platonism and realism. The other line, conversely, connects Palamism with Platonism and Barlaamism with nominalism. I trace in detail the development and transformation of these lines in the course of the Name-Glorifiers controversy of the 1910s. I show the impact of the academic Byzantine studies of that time on the course of the theological debate.

In recent years, there have been a number of philosophical publications focusing on spirituality. But even in pertinent philosophical texts it is rare to find attempts at shaping a workable definition of spirituality, despite the obvious need for a clear definition for the philosophical debate on spirituality. This paper addresses the major issues in shaping a satisfactory definition of spirituality: an understanding of spirituality as transcendence of critical reasoning, the broadness of the concept, the implications of various scholarly backgrounds and the challenge of avoiding a circular definition. It suggests a rough clustering of common approaches into ontological, ethical, and functional definitions and discusses their weaknesses. It is argued that an inclusive, metaphysically parsimonious, and stipulative definition is the best way to address typical difficulties and avoid weaknesses of common definitions. Finally, it proposes a definition based on meaning, a term that often appears in the discussion of spirituality. It is suggested that understanding meaning in the ordinary sense of the word might be a good starting point to arrive at a satisfactory definition of spirituality.

Even though we encounter a common exchange between the categories of God and Īśvara or the Brahman in both scholarly works and faith communities, there are deeper and irreconcilable differences in these absolutes from two different cultures. A naive approach to flatten the cultural horizons has engendered more confusion than has created a cultural harmony. Any cultural acceptance based on misconceptions is destined to fail and if we seek to ground cultural understanding, we have to acknowledge their underlying differences. This paper seeks to underscore the central difference in two cultures by examining their absolutes.

The article delves into two closely intertwined notions that have increasingly taken centre stage in Gianni Vattimo’s thought since the mid-eighties: secularisation and kenosis. The significance of these themes in Vattimo’s late work is such that, it is argued, it amounts to an actual Kehre, or turn. However, akin to Heidegger, Vattimo’s Kehre is not a radical break but a shift in research and reflection towards themes that, although already present in his philosophy, have assumed more distinctly religious nuances and have progressively developed up to the point where they have formed an organic perspective. The article traces this development, commencing with the notion of secularisation to then explore its interweaving with themes of emancipation and the violence of metaphysics. It concludes with a reflection on the central role of kenosis and its significance in Vattimo’s thought.

The article considers the central place the ideas of transcension and affective responsibility play in the thought of the Czech-Brazilian philosopher Vilém Flusser. From this, it outlines some of the intricacies of what can be termed a typically Flusserian ethics of alterity. In the process, it will be revealed that all of this leads Flusser curiously back to Hegel. The return to Hegel indicates, among other things, that any attempt to philosophize about the experience of otherness seems always to give the Swabian philosopher the last word.

When looked at under the perspective of hope, existential philosophers Albert Camus and Søren Kierkegaard are typically seen as inverted images of one another: Kierkegaard embraces hope, which for him is a religious sentiment that he describes at length in Fear and Trembling through the character of Abraham. Camus – on the other hand – rejects hope, seeing both Kierkegaard and Abraham as individuals who had committed what Camus terms a ‘philosophical suicide.’ Camus’ The Myth of Sisyphus can thus be understood as an answer to Kierkegaard’s Abraham: Sisyphus – unlike Abraham – is an individual who had accepted the absurd nature of the world, rejected hope, and thus achieved happiness. In my paper, I will argue that Camus’ criticism of Kierkegaard and of Abraham is not final – I will argue that Camus, in fact, sees hope as an existentially important phenomenon. I will show that Camus does not reject hope in The Myth of Sisyphus but that he merely temporarily suspends it, only to return to it in his later writings. The Myth of Sisyphus is therefore only one of the many ‘stages on life’s way,’ and I will argue that hope is an important aspect of human existence not only for Kierkegaard but also for Camus. That said, Camus’ understanding of hope will not be the same as Kierkegaard’s; hope will exist not in relation to God, but in a relationship with other human beings.