Brands’ Livestream Selling with Influencers’ Converting Fans into Consumers

IF 6.7 2区 管理学 Q1 MANAGEMENT Omega-international Journal of Management Science Pub Date : 2024-09-11 DOI:10.1016/j.omega.2024.103195
Baozhuang Niu , Yuyang Chen , Jianhua Zhang , Kanglin Chen , Yong Jin
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Abstract

Livestream selling is booming in the digital economy era. In practice, for the benefits such as consumer utility enhancement and the reduction of supply-preference mismatch, many brands are adapting their strategies to livestream selling, wherein some brands cooperate with top influencers to livestream as they can exert efforts to convert the fans into consumers. By contrast, some other brands choose to livestream by themselves to save the commission cost for the influencer, even at the expense of losing fan consumers. In this study, we characterize brands’ key tradeoffs between top influencer-livestream and self-livestream selling strategies. We find that a higher commission rate can incentivize the influencer to exert more efforts to convert fans, but also harms the brand by reducing the proportion of the livestream profit allocated to it and inhibiting it from transferring commission cost to consumers. Therefore, the brand may (not) be suggested to cooperate with the influencer when the commission rate is at a moderate (either low or high) level such that the twofold impacts of the commission rate are balanced (imbalanced). For consumers, their surplus may first decrease and then increase with the influencer commission rate. Our study deepens the understanding of the roles of top influencers and their fans in livestream e-commerce operations.
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品牌与 "影响者 "进行直播销售,将粉丝转化为消费者
在数字经济时代,直播销售正在蓬勃发展。在实践中,出于提高消费者效用、减少供需错配等方面的考虑,许多品牌都在调整自己的直播销售策略,其中一些品牌与顶级影响力者合作进行直播,因为他们可以努力将粉丝转化为消费者。相比之下,另一些品牌则选择自己进行直播,以节省影响者的佣金成本,甚至不惜失去粉丝消费者。在本研究中,我们分析了品牌在 "影响者直播 "和 "自己直播 "两种顶级销售策略之间的关键权衡。我们发现,较高的佣金率可以激励影响者更加努力地转化粉丝,但同时也会损害品牌,因为这会降低分配给品牌的直播利润比例,抑制品牌将佣金成本转移给消费者。因此,当佣金率处于一个适中(或低或高)的水平,使佣金率的双重影响达到平衡(不平衡)时,可能(不会)建议品牌与影响者合作。对于消费者来说,他们的盈余可能会随着影响者佣金率的提高而先降后升。我们的研究加深了对顶级影响力者及其粉丝在直播电商运营中的作用的理解。
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来源期刊
Omega-international Journal of Management Science
Omega-international Journal of Management Science 管理科学-运筹学与管理科学
CiteScore
13.80
自引率
11.60%
发文量
130
审稿时长
56 days
期刊介绍: Omega reports on developments in management, including the latest research results and applications. Original contributions and review articles describe the state of the art in specific fields or functions of management, while there are shorter critical assessments of particular management techniques. Other features of the journal are the "Memoranda" section for short communications and "Feedback", a correspondence column. Omega is both stimulating reading and an important source for practising managers, specialists in management services, operational research workers and management scientists, management consultants, academics, students and research personnel throughout the world. The material published is of high quality and relevance, written in a manner which makes it accessible to all of this wide-ranging readership. Preference will be given to papers with implications to the practice of management. Submissions of purely theoretical papers are discouraged. The review of material for publication in the journal reflects this aim.
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