{"title":"Belief game: Verifying smart contract functionality in player dynamic interactions","authors":"Xu Liu, Junwu Zhu","doi":"10.1016/j.jestch.2024.101913","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Smart contracts, being security-critical code, facilitate consensus among players and ensure secure and accurate value transfer, and formal verification is necessary to guarantee functional correctness of contracts. Game theory serves as one of the tools in formal verification by assessing whether the outcomes of contract executions meet the expected goals. While most studies employing game theory to verify smart contract functionality assume rational players, in practice, players may invoke and deploy smart contracts involving irrational behavior, casting doubt on the correctness of verification results. The aim of this study is to propose an alternative game model to verify smart contract functionality in dynamic player interactions where irrational behavior is involved. Specifically, a belief-based smart contract execution game (BSC-game) model was introduced, utilizing belief – the probability that a player believes in the irrationality of others – to capture how the irrational behavior of others affects a player’s contract execution decisions. Reasonable economic incentives were introduced to encourage honest behavior of players. Moreover, a computationally feasible method was designed to update players’ beliefs in large-scale dynamic smart contract executions. Theoretical analysis discloses the existence of equilibrium in the BSC-game, as well as the conditions for the number of faulty players within the system’s fault tolerance. We conducted the simulation experiments, and verified the business-oriented smart contract written in G language by the BSC-game model. The results further indicate that although players’ beliefs impact their decisions to execute contracts, reasonable economic incentives can motivate players to execute contracts honestly. This ensures that smart contract functionality aligns with expected goals, showing that the BSC-game model can verify and guarantee the correctness of contract functions. This new approach significantly contributes to bolstering smart contract security and credibility, positively influencing blockchain stability.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48609,"journal":{"name":"Engineering Science and Technology-An International Journal-Jestech","volume":"60 ","pages":"Article 101913"},"PeriodicalIF":5.1000,"publicationDate":"2024-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Engineering Science and Technology-An International Journal-Jestech","FirstCategoryId":"5","ListUrlMain":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2215098624002994","RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"工程技术","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"ENGINEERING, MULTIDISCIPLINARY","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
Smart contracts, being security-critical code, facilitate consensus among players and ensure secure and accurate value transfer, and formal verification is necessary to guarantee functional correctness of contracts. Game theory serves as one of the tools in formal verification by assessing whether the outcomes of contract executions meet the expected goals. While most studies employing game theory to verify smart contract functionality assume rational players, in practice, players may invoke and deploy smart contracts involving irrational behavior, casting doubt on the correctness of verification results. The aim of this study is to propose an alternative game model to verify smart contract functionality in dynamic player interactions where irrational behavior is involved. Specifically, a belief-based smart contract execution game (BSC-game) model was introduced, utilizing belief – the probability that a player believes in the irrationality of others – to capture how the irrational behavior of others affects a player’s contract execution decisions. Reasonable economic incentives were introduced to encourage honest behavior of players. Moreover, a computationally feasible method was designed to update players’ beliefs in large-scale dynamic smart contract executions. Theoretical analysis discloses the existence of equilibrium in the BSC-game, as well as the conditions for the number of faulty players within the system’s fault tolerance. We conducted the simulation experiments, and verified the business-oriented smart contract written in G language by the BSC-game model. The results further indicate that although players’ beliefs impact their decisions to execute contracts, reasonable economic incentives can motivate players to execute contracts honestly. This ensures that smart contract functionality aligns with expected goals, showing that the BSC-game model can verify and guarantee the correctness of contract functions. This new approach significantly contributes to bolstering smart contract security and credibility, positively influencing blockchain stability.
期刊介绍:
Engineering Science and Technology, an International Journal (JESTECH) (formerly Technology), a peer-reviewed quarterly engineering journal, publishes both theoretical and experimental high quality papers of permanent interest, not previously published in journals, in the field of engineering and applied science which aims to promote the theory and practice of technology and engineering. In addition to peer-reviewed original research papers, the Editorial Board welcomes original research reports, state-of-the-art reviews and communications in the broadly defined field of engineering science and technology.
The scope of JESTECH includes a wide spectrum of subjects including:
-Electrical/Electronics and Computer Engineering (Biomedical Engineering and Instrumentation; Coding, Cryptography, and Information Protection; Communications, Networks, Mobile Computing and Distributed Systems; Compilers and Operating Systems; Computer Architecture, Parallel Processing, and Dependability; Computer Vision and Robotics; Control Theory; Electromagnetic Waves, Microwave Techniques and Antennas; Embedded Systems; Integrated Circuits, VLSI Design, Testing, and CAD; Microelectromechanical Systems; Microelectronics, and Electronic Devices and Circuits; Power, Energy and Energy Conversion Systems; Signal, Image, and Speech Processing)
-Mechanical and Civil Engineering (Automotive Technologies; Biomechanics; Construction Materials; Design and Manufacturing; Dynamics and Control; Energy Generation, Utilization, Conversion, and Storage; Fluid Mechanics and Hydraulics; Heat and Mass Transfer; Micro-Nano Sciences; Renewable and Sustainable Energy Technologies; Robotics and Mechatronics; Solid Mechanics and Structure; Thermal Sciences)
-Metallurgical and Materials Engineering (Advanced Materials Science; Biomaterials; Ceramic and Inorgnanic Materials; Electronic-Magnetic Materials; Energy and Environment; Materials Characterizastion; Metallurgy; Polymers and Nanocomposites)