Deaf legal theory: challenging the law's hearing bias.

Abstract

Bryan and Emery introduced a new concept in legal jurisprudence through which a critical examination of how the law deals with deaf people can be undertaken: deaf legal theory (DLT). They define it as "how the law seeks to frame Deaf people" and argue that legal systems should be reoriented to recognise and accommodate the unique perspectives and experiences of deaf people. Current legal systems are biased in favour of hearing people and these bias disadvantage deaf people in a variety of ways, including in their access to justice, employment, and education. The aim of this article is to advance Bryan and Emery's DLT by expounding its main arguments, situating it within its jurisprudential home of critical legal studies, considering the justification for its existence and providing a framework to apply it. The concept was introduced not within legal discourse but within Deaf Studies discourse and is therefore not yet widely known in legal scholarship. This article aims to bridge the gap between the two disciplines and firmly establish DLT as a legal theory in jurisprudence following which it can be applied to various legal subjects of intellectual enquiry.