A Fragile Equilibrium: Incentivizing Pakistan’s Regional Recalibration

Abstract

It makes sense that the United States has significantly downgraded relations with Pakistan since the withdrawal from Afghanistan. The anger in Washington toward Islamabad for its support of the Afghan Taliban during the US war was palpable and justified. Absent a need to rely on Pakistan to access Afghanistan to prosecute the war, and with the broader decline of counterterrorism as a priority, the US only sees the need for a minimum viable bilateral relationship. The US shift to near peer competition has exacerbated the distance as Pakistan’s close relationship with China—now the preeminent US national security concern—is juxtaposed with US efforts to foster closer ties with Pakistan’s rival, India, as a regional counterweight to China. But that calculation misses the mark. The United States actually needs to maintain a more robust relationship with Pakistan than it would currently like. And perhaps counter-intuitively, India needs the US to do so as well. Why? Since 2008, Pakistan has undertaken an overlooked shift in how it uses militant groups against India, constraining the scope and frequency of their attacks. Because the shift has been largely overlooked, there has been insufficient analysis of what has caused it and what is required to reinforce the change in both Washington and New Delhi. This change is tactical, and it is reversible. US pressure is critical to reinforcing Pakistan’s restraint and pressing for more change. If Pakistan returns to sponsoring or even simply permitting major terrorist attacks in India, it will distract India from its increasing focus on China and is