Security Concerns are Reasonable, Spheres of Influence are Not

Abstract

On February 24, 2022, Russian President Vladimir Putin ordered Russian troops to invade eastern Ukraine to carry out a “special military operation.” This latest war in Russia’s neighborhood recalls its annexation of Crimea in 2014 and its conflict with Georgia in 2008. Many believe that Russia is seeking to establish a sphere of influence in its backyard, with a view toward restoring some of the old influence of various elements of the Soviet Union and the Russian Empire. Since the outbreak of the war, Chinese officials have maintained a delicate balance between recognizing Ukraine’s territorial integrity as a sovereign nation and acknowledging Russia’s security concerns. This tightrope-walking strategy has generated much criticism in the Western world. Do Chinese officials and Chinese scholars support the concept of spheres of influence? Does a certain level of Chinese sympathy and understanding for Russia mean that China supports Russia’s efforts to create spheres of influence around it? As China’s power increases, will China seek spheres of influence in its own neighborhood? This paper lays out preliminary answers to these questions, first by examining the associations of the term “sphere of influence” in Chinese political rhetoric and how this view affects China’s visions of both Asian and global security. Next, I discuss the concept of a “security concern,” a phrase which many Chinese analysts tend to use, and how they view a case like the war in Ukraine through this lens. The essential takeaway here is the wisdom of selfrestraint. It is natural that a powerful country might have security concerns