Taiwan: What Could, Should and Will Australia Do?

Abstract

Australia was once famously described as “The Frightened Country”: a strategically anxious nation that sees more danger than opportunity emanating from the Asian continent to its north. Consistent with this characterization, Australian security practitioners and pundits alike have for several years now been warning of the prospects of a Taiwan conflict and its potential consequences for Australia. Three distinct positions have emerged as to how Canberra should respond to the growing risk of war. One camp calls for Australia to make clear its commitment to joining with the United States and others in defending Taiwan from a Chinese attack, with a view to deterring Beijing from ever taking this path. A second perspective maintains that Taiwan’s defense is not a vital Australian interest, and that Canberra should be candid with Washington and Taipei regarding this reality well in advance of hostilities erupting. A third school, and one associated most closely with Australia’s new Anthony Albanese-led Labor government, holds that talking up even the chances of conflict is illadvised. Instead, this camp argues, Canberra should adhere to the tried-andtrue approach of its American ally, maintaining a policy of “strategic ambiguity” regarding how it would respond in the event of a Taiwan conflict. The war in Ukraine has functioned as something of a Rorschach test in this sometimes heated Australian debate, with participants largely doubling down on the positions they held prior to the Russian invasion. Domestic politics have also been influential, as popular concerns on issues including Chinese