The Case Against Nuclear Sharing in East Asia

Abstract

As the rise of Chinese power and North Korea’s nuclear development alter East Asia’s strategic landscape, American foreign policy analysts continue to look for innovative ways to bolster the security position of US allies in the region. MIT political scientists Eric Heginbotham and Richard Samuels highlight one potential option in a recent article in The Washington Quarterly, arguing that the United States should revitalize its alliances with Japan and South Korea by exploring “the wartime sharing of nuclear weapons,” which might involve “modifying hardware (e.g., certifying allied F-35s for nuclear delivery), acquiring new systems, and training air or naval crews in tactical nuclear strikes and command and control.” Similar proposals are not difficult to encounter in Washington’s policy community. One analysis calls for the “custodial sharing of nonstrategic nuclear capabilities during times of crisis with select Asia-Pacific partners, specifically Japan and the Republic of Korea [ROK].” Likewise, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Brad Roberts writes that “[a] more NATO-like nuclear umbrella makes good sense in Northeast Asia today.” Such arrangements “could be replicated in South Korea,” for example, “with US nuclear weapons permanently deployed there along with dual-capable fighter-bombers that would be flown by pilots from both countries.”