Is history repeating itself?

Q4 Social Sciences IPPR Progressive Review Pub Date : 2022-12-13 DOI:10.1111/newe.12316
John Curtice
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Although the next general election could still be nearly two years away, it would seem as though history could well repeat itself.</p><p>To illustrate how the pattern of party support has changed, we use here the data collected by the 1996 BSA survey, conducted a year before Labour's landslide victory the following year, and that obtained by the most recent survey undertaken towards the end of 2021.</p><p>Peter Pulzer famously wrote in the 1960s that ‘class is the basis of British politics, all else is embellishment and detail’.6 Thirty years later, the picture was no longer that simple. Even so, as the lower half of table 1 shows, support for the Conservatives was still rather higher among those in managerial and more junior non-manual occupations than it was among those in semi-routine and routine – that is, working-class – manual occupations. The opposite was true of Labour who, despite wanting to improve its support among middle-class voters, in fact enjoyed the support of a little over half of those in working-class jobs.</p><p>Now, after a general election in 2019 in which Labour lost a number of working-class ‘Red Wall’ seats (and with the party at the time of our survey still much less popular overall than it was in 1996), the Conservatives are only marginally more popular among those in managerial and professional jobs than among those employed in working-class jobs. Equally, Labour is only a little more popular among the former than the latter. So far at least, Labour's attempts under Sir Keir Starmer to reverse the especially heavy loss of support the party has suffered at recent elections among ‘traditional’ working-class voters appears have borne only limited fruit. In fact, the only group whose pattern of support remains as distinctive now as it was in 1996 is the self-employed who remain more inclined than any other group to support the Conservatives.</p><p>The point emerges clearly from table 2. In this table we use the BSA's value dimensions to divide the public in both 1996 and 2021 into: (i) the one-third most left-wing, the one-third most right-wing and the one-third in the centre; and (ii) the one-third most liberal, the one-third most authoritarian and the one-third in between. For each group it shows the level of both Conservative and Labour support. As we might anticipate, although the relationship is far from perfect, those on the left who are more concerned about inequality are more likely to back Labour, while those on the right are more inclined to back the Conservatives. Moreover, in the case of the Conservatives this divide matters as much now as it did in 1996, although the difference in Labour support between now and then appears rather more marked among those on the left (a point to which we will return below).</p><p>Liberals and authoritarians have also long tended to differ somewhat in their political preferences.7 In 1996, the Conservatives were a little more popular among authoritarians, Labour among liberals. But the difference was not as big as that between those on the left and those on the right. Now, in contrast, the party politics of liberals and authoritarians are markedly further apart. Indeed, the difference between them is not far short of the gap between left and right. Whereas in the 1990s, electoral politics in Britain was largely a one-dimensional battle between left and right, now it appears to be a more complex two-dimensional contest in which the distinction between a more liberal and a more authoritarian perspective matters too.</p><p>It might, though, be thought that the two dimensions are but two sides of the same coin, that is, that many of those on the left tend to be liberal and those on the right tend to be authoritarian. This is not the case. In 1996, people's position on one dimension was wholly unrelated to their stance on another, and even now, the link is only a small positive one.8 Appealing to voters’ values is no longer simply a question of adopting an appropriate stance on the question of inequality, but also one of having a position on issues of social cohesion and diversity. Irrespective of where voters stand on the left–right spectrum, support for Labour is now much higher among liberals than it is among authoritarians.</p><p>At the same time, Labour also finds itself now facing greater competition for the support of both those on the left and social liberals. Both the Greens and the Scottish National Party (SNP) are much more popular overall now than they were in 1996 – and their support is greatest among those on the left and among social liberals. As many as 18 per cent of those on the left and 20 per cent of social liberals now support the Greens or a nationalist party, compared with an equivalent figure of just 7 per cent of those on the right and among authoritarians. 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Abstract

There is much that is remarkably similar about the circumstances in which the Labour Party in the UK finds itself now, and where it stood on the brink of its landslide success in 1997. The party has seemingly made itself more electable in the eyes of the electorate following a tack back towards the ideological centre of British politics. Then, in an imitation of what happened after Black Wednesday in September 1992, it has been propelled into a large polling lead after the incumbent government's reputation for economic competence was severely damaged as a result of losing the confidence of the financial markets. Although the next general election could still be nearly two years away, it would seem as though history could well repeat itself.

To illustrate how the pattern of party support has changed, we use here the data collected by the 1996 BSA survey, conducted a year before Labour's landslide victory the following year, and that obtained by the most recent survey undertaken towards the end of 2021.

Peter Pulzer famously wrote in the 1960s that ‘class is the basis of British politics, all else is embellishment and detail’.6 Thirty years later, the picture was no longer that simple. Even so, as the lower half of table 1 shows, support for the Conservatives was still rather higher among those in managerial and more junior non-manual occupations than it was among those in semi-routine and routine – that is, working-class – manual occupations. The opposite was true of Labour who, despite wanting to improve its support among middle-class voters, in fact enjoyed the support of a little over half of those in working-class jobs.

Now, after a general election in 2019 in which Labour lost a number of working-class ‘Red Wall’ seats (and with the party at the time of our survey still much less popular overall than it was in 1996), the Conservatives are only marginally more popular among those in managerial and professional jobs than among those employed in working-class jobs. Equally, Labour is only a little more popular among the former than the latter. So far at least, Labour's attempts under Sir Keir Starmer to reverse the especially heavy loss of support the party has suffered at recent elections among ‘traditional’ working-class voters appears have borne only limited fruit. In fact, the only group whose pattern of support remains as distinctive now as it was in 1996 is the self-employed who remain more inclined than any other group to support the Conservatives.

The point emerges clearly from table 2. In this table we use the BSA's value dimensions to divide the public in both 1996 and 2021 into: (i) the one-third most left-wing, the one-third most right-wing and the one-third in the centre; and (ii) the one-third most liberal, the one-third most authoritarian and the one-third in between. For each group it shows the level of both Conservative and Labour support. As we might anticipate, although the relationship is far from perfect, those on the left who are more concerned about inequality are more likely to back Labour, while those on the right are more inclined to back the Conservatives. Moreover, in the case of the Conservatives this divide matters as much now as it did in 1996, although the difference in Labour support between now and then appears rather more marked among those on the left (a point to which we will return below).

Liberals and authoritarians have also long tended to differ somewhat in their political preferences.7 In 1996, the Conservatives were a little more popular among authoritarians, Labour among liberals. But the difference was not as big as that between those on the left and those on the right. Now, in contrast, the party politics of liberals and authoritarians are markedly further apart. Indeed, the difference between them is not far short of the gap between left and right. Whereas in the 1990s, electoral politics in Britain was largely a one-dimensional battle between left and right, now it appears to be a more complex two-dimensional contest in which the distinction between a more liberal and a more authoritarian perspective matters too.

It might, though, be thought that the two dimensions are but two sides of the same coin, that is, that many of those on the left tend to be liberal and those on the right tend to be authoritarian. This is not the case. In 1996, people's position on one dimension was wholly unrelated to their stance on another, and even now, the link is only a small positive one.8 Appealing to voters’ values is no longer simply a question of adopting an appropriate stance on the question of inequality, but also one of having a position on issues of social cohesion and diversity. Irrespective of where voters stand on the left–right spectrum, support for Labour is now much higher among liberals than it is among authoritarians.

At the same time, Labour also finds itself now facing greater competition for the support of both those on the left and social liberals. Both the Greens and the Scottish National Party (SNP) are much more popular overall now than they were in 1996 – and their support is greatest among those on the left and among social liberals. As many as 18 per cent of those on the left and 20 per cent of social liberals now support the Greens or a nationalist party, compared with an equivalent figure of just 7 per cent of those on the right and among authoritarians. On either dimension, any decision to tack towards the centre now needs to balance the votes that might be gained against the trade-off of support that might potentially be lost on the left or among liberals, who may well feel they do have somewhere else they can go.

Of course, it might be thought that things have changed in the year or so since the most recent BSA survey was conducted. After all, at the end of October 2021, just as data collection for BSA 2021 was coming to an end, the Conservatives were ahead of Labour in the polls, much as they had been for most of the time since the 2019 general election. A year on, in contrast, after the fall and rise of two Conservative prime ministers in the wake of ‘partygate’ and financial turbulence on the markets, Labour was 25 points ahead. Surely this must mean that the pattern of party support has changed too?

In practice, however, this does not appear to be the case. On average, between October 2021 and October 2022, support for Labour (in terms of vote intentions) rose among those aged 65 and over by 13 points, from 22 per cent to 35 per cent. But it increased almost as much – by 12 points (from 50 per cent to 62 per cent) – among those aged 18–24.12 And while Labour support increased a little more among primarily manual ‘C2DE’ voters (by 19 points) than among primarily white-collar ‘ABC1’ voters (by 14 points), at 53 per cent the average level of support for the party among ‘C2DE’ voters was still little different from the 50 per cent registered among those in ‘ABC1’ occupations.13 Despite the dramatic rise in its support, Labour looks no more like a party that is especially successful at appealing to working-class voters than before, while the party does remain especially reliant on the backing of younger voters.

The polls do not carry the questions designed to measure people's values that appear each year on the BSA survey. However, given that how people voted in the 2016 EU referendum was strongly related to where people stood on the liberal–authoritarian dimension (and was unrelated to whether they were on the left or the right), we can use the relationship between how people voted in the EU referendum and their current vote intention as a proxy for the relationship between people's position on the liberal–authoritarian dimension and party support. This suggests that Labour continues to be more attractive to socially liberal Remainers than authoritarian Leavers. While, on average, support for Labour among those who voted Leave rose by 15 points (from 20 per cent to 35 per cent) between October 2021 and October 2022, it also rose by 15 points (from 45 per cent to 60 per cent) among those who voted Remain.

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历史会重演吗?
英国工党现在所处的环境与1997年几近压倒性胜利的情况有很多惊人的相似之处。在选民的眼中,该党似乎在向英国政治的意识形态中心回归后,更有可能当选。然后,就像1992年9月黑色星期三之后发生的事情一样,由于金融市场失去信心,现任政府在经济能力方面的声誉受到严重损害,民主党在民意调查中大幅领先。尽管离下一次大选还有近两年的时间,但历史似乎很可能会重演。为了说明政党支持的模式是如何变化的,我们在这里使用了1996年BSA调查收集的数据,该调查是在工党第二年取得压倒性胜利的前一年进行的,也是在2021年底进行的最新调查获得的。彼得·普尔泽在20世纪60年代曾写过一句名言:“阶级是英国政治的基础,其他一切都是点缀和细节。三十年后,情况不再那么简单了。即便如此,正如表1的下半部分所示,在管理类和较低级的非体力职业中,保守党的支持率仍然比在半常规和常规(即工人阶级)体力职业中高得多。与之相反的是工党,尽管工党想要提高其在中产阶级选民中的支持率,但实际上它得到了一半多一点的工人阶级的支持。现在,在2019年的大选中,工党失去了一些工人阶级的“红墙”席位(而且在我们进行调查时,该党的总体受欢迎程度仍远低于1996年),保守党在管理和专业工作人员中的受欢迎程度仅略高于工人阶级工作人员。同样,工党在前者中只比后者受欢迎一点。至少到目前为止,在Keir Starmer爵士的领导下,工党试图扭转该党在最近的选举中在“传统”工人阶级选民中遭受的严重损失,但似乎收效甚微。事实上,唯一一个支持保守党的模式与1996年一样独特的群体是个体经营者,他们比其他任何群体都更倾向于支持保守党。从表2中可以清楚地看出这一点。在这个表格中,我们使用BSA的价值维度将1996年和2021年的公众分为:(i)三分之一的最左翼,三分之一的最右翼和三分之一的中间;(二)三分之一最自由,三分之一最专制,三分之一介于两者之间。对于每个群体,它都显示了保守党和工党的支持水平。正如我们所预料的那样,尽管这种关系远非完美,但更关注不平等的左翼人士更有可能支持工党,而右翼人士更倾向于支持保守党。此外,就保守党而言,这种分歧现在和1996年一样重要,尽管工党在现在和那时之间的支持差异在左翼中显得更为明显(我们将在下面回到这一点)。长期以来,自由主义者和威权主义者在政治偏好上也倾向于有所不同1996年,保守党在威权主义者中更受欢迎,工党在自由主义者中更受欢迎。但这种差异没有左右两派之间的差异那么大。相比之下,如今自由主义者和威权主义者的政党政治分歧明显加大。事实上,他们之间的差别并不比左派和右派之间的差距差多少。而在20世纪90年代,英国的选举政治主要是左翼和右翼之间的一维斗争,现在它似乎是一个更复杂的二维竞争,其中更自由和更专制的观点之间的区别也很重要。然而,人们可能会认为这两个维度不过是同一枚硬币的两面,也就是说,许多左翼人士倾向于自由主义,而右翼人士倾向于威权主义。事实并非如此。在1996年,人们在一个维度上的立场与他们在另一个维度上的立场是完全无关的,即使是现在,这种联系也只是很小的正相关迎合选民的价值观不再仅仅是在不平等问题上采取适当立场的问题,而是在社会凝聚力和多样性问题上采取立场的问题。不管选民站在左右的哪个立场上,现在自由主义者对工党的支持远远高于威权主义者。与此同时,工党也发现自己在争取左派和社会自由主义者的支持方面面临着更大的竞争。 总的来说,绿党和苏格兰民族党(SNP)现在比1996年更受欢迎,他们在左翼和社会自由主义者中获得的支持最大。如今,多达18%的左翼人士和20%的社会自由派人士支持绿党或一个民族主义政党,而在右翼人士和威权主义者中,这一比例仅为7%。无论从哪个角度来看,任何向中间靠拢的决定现在都需要平衡可能获得的选票和可能失去左派或自由派支持的权衡,后者可能会觉得他们确实有别的地方可去。当然,人们可能会认为,自从最近一次BSA调查以来,情况已经发生了变化。毕竟,在2021年10月底,就在BSA 2021的数据收集即将结束时,保守党在民意调查中领先于工党,就像他们自2019年大选以来的大部分时间一样。相比之下,一年过去了,在经历了“党派门”和金融市场动荡之后,两位保守党首相的起落之后,工党领先了25个百分点。这肯定意味着政党的支持模式也发生了变化吧?然而,在实践中,情况似乎并非如此。平均而言,2021年10月至2022年10月,支持工党(投票的意图)享年65岁和13分,从22%降至35%。但它几乎一样——增加了12分(从50%到62%),其中18岁- 24.12,而工党支持增加更主要是手工C2DE的选民(19分)比主要是白领他们的选民(14分)在“C2DE”选民中,该党的平均支持率为53%,与在“ABC1”职业中登记的50%的支持率相差不大尽管其支持率急剧上升,但工党在吸引工薪阶层选民方面并不像以前那样成功,而该党确实仍然特别依赖年轻选民的支持。该调查不包括每年在BSA调查中出现的旨在衡量人们价值观的问题。然而,鉴于人们在2016年欧盟公投中投票的方式与人们在自由-威权维度上的立场密切相关(与他们是左派还是右派无关),我们可以利用人们在欧盟公投中投票的方式与他们当前的投票意愿之间的关系,作为人们在自由-威权维度上的立场与政党支持之间关系的代理。这表明工党对社会自由主义的留欧派比威权主义的脱欧派更有吸引力。虽然在2021年10月至2022年10月期间,脱欧派对工党的支持率平均上升了15个百分点(从20%升至35%),但留欧派的支持率也上升了15个百分点(从45%升至60%)。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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IPPR Progressive Review
IPPR Progressive Review Social Sciences-Political Science and International Relations
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期刊介绍: The permafrost of no alternatives has cracked; the horizon of political possibilities is expanding. IPPR Progressive Review is a pluralistic space to debate where next for progressives, examine the opportunities and challenges confronting us and ask the big questions facing our politics: transforming a failed economic model, renewing a frayed social contract, building a new relationship with Europe. Publishing the best writing in economics, politics and culture, IPPR Progressive Review explores how we can best build a more equal, humane and prosperous society.
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