A Call to Arms: Kim Jong Un and the Tactical Bomb

IF 1.2 3区 社会学 Q2 INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS Washington Quarterly Pub Date : 2021-07-03 DOI:10.1080/0163660X.2021.1969089
A. Panda
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引用次数: 2

Abstract

Having declared his nuclear deterrent “complete” following the testing of three intercontinental-range ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and a thermonuclear device in 2017, North Korean leader Kim Jong Un has been overseeing a period of qualitative nuclear modernization and quantitative force expansion. North Korea’s nuclear forces continued to grow during the short-lived period of diplomacy with South Korea and the United States in 2018 and 2019. In January 2021, in reviewing the accomplishments of the five-year period following North Korea’s Seventh Party Congress in 2016, Kim alluded to “tactical nuclear weapons” among other significant accomplishments concerning his nuclear forces during that era. This was a notable statement. Traditionally, North Korea has referred to its nuclear capabilities euphemistically as “strategic” weapons. When references to tactical nuclear weapons (TNW) would appear in state media, they would reference US nuclear capabilities; North Korea has never acknowledged that the United States withdrew its last nuclear weapons from the Korean Peninsula in December 1991. Does Kim Jong Un intend to deploy tactical nuclear weapons? If so, how might these weapons manifest in the country’s existing nuclear forces and what challenges may arise for the United States and South Korea? This article examines North Korean claims to date concerning TNWs, explores the practical implications of these capabilities for Pyongyang’s strategy, and argues that these weapons are likely to be a component of the country’s growing nuclear force.
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武器的呼唤:金正恩与战术炸弹
在2017年测试了三枚洲际弹道导弹和一枚热核装置后,朝鲜领导人金正恩宣布其核威慑力量“完成”,他一直在监督一段质量上的核现代化和数量上的力量扩张时期。在2018年和2019年与韩国和美国短暂的外交期间,朝鲜的核力量继续增长。2021年1月,在回顾2016年朝鲜第七次党代会后五年的成就时,金提到了“战术核武器”以及他在那个时代核力量的其他重大成就。这是一个值得注意的声明。传统上,朝鲜委婉地将其核能力称为“战略”武器。当国家媒体提到战术核武器时,它们会提到美国的核能力;朝鲜从未承认美国于1991年12月从朝鲜半岛撤出了最后一批核武器。金正恩是否打算部署战术核武器?如果是这样的话,这些武器将如何在该国现有的核力量中表现出来,美国和韩国可能面临什么挑战?这篇文章考察了朝鲜迄今为止对TNW的说法,探讨了这些能力对平壤战略的实际影响,并认为这些武器很可能是该国日益增长的核力量的一个组成部分。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
2.90
自引率
5.90%
发文量
20
期刊介绍: The Washington Quarterly (TWQ) is a journal of global affairs that analyzes strategic security challenges, changes, and their public policy implications. TWQ is published out of one of the world"s preeminent international policy institutions, the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), and addresses topics such as: •The U.S. role in the world •Emerging great powers: Europe, China, Russia, India, and Japan •Regional issues and flashpoints, particularly in the Middle East and Asia •Weapons of mass destruction proliferation and missile defenses •Global perspectives to reduce terrorism Contributors are drawn from outside as well as inside the United States and reflect diverse political, regional, and professional perspectives.
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