Orienting the 2021 Nuclear Posture Review

Abstract

With its March 2021 Interim National Security Strategic Guidance, the Biden administration set down its first markers on nuclear policy. On international nuclear diplomacy, it committed to “head off costly arms races and reestablish our credibility as a leader in arms control,” “pursue new arms control arrangements” “where possible,” “engage in meaningful dialogue with Russia and China on a range of emerging military technological developments that implicate strategic stability,” and “renew”US leadership of international nonproliferation diplomacy. This was in the context of a commitment “to elevate diplomacy as our tool of first resort.” On deterrence strategy, the administration committed to “reduce the role of nuclear weapons in our national security strategy, while ensuring our strategic deterrent remains safe, secure, and effective and that our extended deterrence commitments to our allies remain strong and credible.” This was in the context of commitments “to reinvigorate and modernize our alliances” and “to make smart and disciplined choices regarding our national defense.” The new administration now faces the challenge of turning these goals into a practical governance agenda: how should it do so? What can it reasonably expect to accomplish in four years or eight? What steps should it avoid? It has been urged to bold action by many, on the argument that “we are sleepwalking toward the nuclear precipice,” in part because “our strategies reflect old thinking.” How bold should it be?