Down the Methodological Rabbit Hole

Abstract

espanolEste articulo revisa cuestiones metodologicas que han guiado, moldeado y plagado las discusiones de la filosofia analitica del derecho. Explica brevemente los conceptos de analisis conceptual, definiciones analiticas y parecidos de familia, y sostiene que los casos centrales se usan de mas de una manera. Presenta criticas a esos conceptos y metodos, cuyos defectos se deben a la falta de un paradigma comun acerca del impacto de los contraejemplos. Explica sucintamente desiderata “metateoricos” y sostiene que, hasta la fecha, recurrir a estas normas no ha sido de tanta ayuda para la filosofia del derecho como algunos sugieren. Finalmente, el texto vuelve a la seleccion de conceptos preguntandose si la teorizacion legal es una empresa invariablemente “normativa”, y concluye que ciertas metodologias “normativistas”, como la interpretacion constructivista de Dworkin o la invocacion al caso central del punto de vista interno de Finnis, son innecesarias. EnglishThis article surveys methodological matters that shape, drive, and plague analytic legal philosophy. Section 2 briefly explicates conceptual analysis, analytic definitions, and family resemblance concepts. It also argues that central cases are used in more than one way. Section 3 presents criticisms of those concepts and methods, and suggests that some of these difficulties are due to the lack of a shared paradigm regarding a counterexample’s impact. Section 4 explains “metatheoretical” desiderata. It contends that, to date, legal philosophical appeals to such norms have not been as helpful as some suggest. Section 5 returns to the issue of concept selection by addressing whether legal theorising is an invariably “normative” enterprise. It argues that certain “normativist” methodologies, such as Dworkin’s constructive interpretation and Finnis’ appeal to the central case of the internal point of view, are unnecessary.