Linking the Death Penalty to Trade: Bureaucratic Politics among European Institutions

Abstract

For decades, the European Union (EU) has claimed to be a global champion of human rights and made many efforts accordingly both inside and outside the region. For many Europeans, linking human rights issues to internal and international trade has become as natural as linking the environment to trade. The death penalty is also a prominent human rights issue, and the EU calls for its universal abolishment. This study examines why and how the EU has connected the death penalty issue to its trade policy. Building upon the literature on issue linkages, this study categorizes the historical development of the linkage between the death penalty and trade in four different phases: recognition, integration, institutionalization, and expansion. It is argued that the linkage has been strengthened in terms of its “coerciveness” and “directness” over the past few decades. This study uses Graham Allison’s (1971) bureaucratic politics model to explain how and to what extent the internal politics among European institutions, particularly between the European Parliament and the European Commission, have determined the ways in which the two otherwise separate issues have been linked. The European Parliament is the main advocate of such a linkage and has successfully induced the European Commission to promote the abolishment of the death penalty through its commercial power despite its earlier objection. This study claims that the consequence of the death penalty–trade linkage is the empowerment