Pub Date : 2023-06-20DOI: 10.29274/ews.2023.35.2.153
Jung-Joon Choi
In this article, I discuss China’s Gray Zone strategy, which involves increasing their naval power and using asymmetric tactics to become a rising maritime power. After examining this strategy, I then discuss the sources of conflict between South Korea and China, as well as our military’s response plan. The article also mentions that although South Korea and China established diplomatic relations in 1992, there are still many unresolved issues between two countries. Especially, issues such as the demarcation of the western sea border, development of the continental shelf, marine scientific research activities, and marine environmental conservation are still unresolved. Meanwhile, China is increasing its naval power and pursuing a Gray Zone strategy at sea using its Coast Guard(CCG) and Maritime Militia(PAFMM). Gray zone refers to the ambiguous middle ground between war and peace, and it refers to an indeterminate intermediate zone that does not belong to a specific area. China is pursuing a strategy that undermines the existing order by using gray zone operations in the maritime gray zones of countries with maritime territorial disputes and un-demarcated maritime boundaries in the East China Sea and South China Sea. By using non-military means, China is pursuing a “fait accompli” strategy through numerical superiority, gradualism, and repetitive activities while preventing the situation from escalating into armed conflict. China uses its Coast Guard and Maritime Militia as the main means of its gray zone strategy, which are essentially China’s second naval force and perform various missions on behalf of the People’s Liberation Army Navy. In Korea, there are many factors that cause conflicts with China in the ocean, such as the undefined Exclusive Economic Zone(EEZ) boundary and illegal fishing by Chinese vessels. China pursues a gray zone strategy to gain an advantageous position in future negotiations with Korea. Therefore, the Korean military must establish the following measures to protect its maritime interests. The response strategy below is based on a correct understanding of the gray zone strategy, which is part of China’s asymmetric strategy. First, in the event of a maritime dispute with China, governance should be established to integrate and operate available assets. Second, a cooperative system should be established to prevent accidental conflicts between Korea and China. Third, a naval forward base in the West Sea should be built to curb China’s eastward movement. Fourth, strategies should be sought to respond in conjunction with allies. Fifth, the military’s countermeasures and tactics for responding to the gray zone strategy should be developed.
{"title":"What Should Korean Military Do to Respond to China’s Gray Zone Strategy?: Focusing on Response to Asymmetric Approach at Sea","authors":"Jung-Joon Choi","doi":"10.29274/ews.2023.35.2.153","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.29274/ews.2023.35.2.153","url":null,"abstract":"In this article, I discuss China’s Gray Zone strategy, which involves increasing their naval power and using asymmetric tactics to become a rising maritime power. After examining this strategy, I then discuss the sources of conflict between South Korea and China, as well as our military’s response plan. The article also mentions that although South Korea and China established diplomatic relations in 1992, there are still many unresolved issues between two countries. Especially, issues such as the demarcation of the western sea border, development of the continental shelf, marine scientific research activities, and marine environmental conservation are still unresolved. Meanwhile, China is increasing its naval power and pursuing a Gray Zone strategy at sea using its Coast Guard(CCG) and Maritime Militia(PAFMM). Gray zone refers to the ambiguous middle ground between war and peace, and it refers to an indeterminate intermediate zone that does not belong to a specific area. China is pursuing a strategy that undermines the existing order by using gray zone operations in the maritime gray zones of countries with maritime territorial disputes and un-demarcated maritime boundaries in the East China Sea and South China Sea. By using non-military means, China is pursuing a “fait accompli” strategy through numerical superiority, gradualism, and repetitive activities while preventing the situation from escalating into armed conflict. China uses its Coast Guard and Maritime Militia as the main means of its gray zone strategy, which are essentially China’s second naval force and perform various missions on behalf of the People’s Liberation Army Navy. In Korea, there are many factors that cause conflicts with China in the ocean, such as the undefined Exclusive Economic Zone(EEZ) boundary and illegal fishing by Chinese vessels. China pursues a gray zone strategy to gain an advantageous position in future negotiations with Korea. Therefore, the Korean military must establish the following measures to protect its maritime interests. The response strategy below is based on a correct understanding of the gray zone strategy, which is part of China’s asymmetric strategy. First, in the event of a maritime dispute with China, governance should be established to integrate and operate available assets. Second, a cooperative system should be established to prevent accidental conflicts between Korea and China. Third, a naval forward base in the West Sea should be built to curb China’s eastward movement. Fourth, strategies should be sought to respond in conjunction with allies. Fifth, the military’s countermeasures and tactics for responding to the gray zone strategy should be developed.","PeriodicalId":84986,"journal":{"name":"Journal of East and West studies","volume":"423 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-06-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"84934255","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-06-20DOI: 10.29274/ews.2023.35.2.125
Kenneth William Wilson
The Putin regime has used comparisons with the 1990s to create political support and legitimacy for Vladimir Putin, by suggesting that life in Russia has become better since then because of Putin. Comparisons with the 1990s in absolute terms, however, fail to take account of the much more favourable structural conditions that have pertained since Putin came to power. This article avoids this problem by looking at Russia’s performance in the 1990s and thereafter in relative terms(i.e. in comparison with the other 14 states of the Former Soviet Union) rather than absolute terms. The analysis shows that Russia, in relative terms, has performed no better under Putin than in the 1990s, a finding that constitutes an indictment of Putin’s leadership rather than a legitimation of it.
{"title":"푸틴의 성과와 고난의 1990년대 재조명","authors":"Kenneth William Wilson","doi":"10.29274/ews.2023.35.2.125","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.29274/ews.2023.35.2.125","url":null,"abstract":"The Putin regime has used comparisons with the 1990s to create political support and legitimacy for Vladimir Putin, by suggesting that life in Russia has become better since then because of Putin. Comparisons with the 1990s in absolute terms, however, fail to take account of the much more favourable structural conditions that have pertained since Putin came to power. This article avoids this problem by looking at Russia’s performance in the 1990s and thereafter in relative terms(i.e. in comparison with the other 14 states of the Former Soviet Union) rather than absolute terms. The analysis shows that Russia, in relative terms, has performed no better under Putin than in the 1990s, a finding that constitutes an indictment of Putin’s leadership rather than a legitimation of it.","PeriodicalId":84986,"journal":{"name":"Journal of East and West studies","volume":"32 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-06-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"87493283","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-06-20DOI: 10.29274/ews.2023.35.2.33
Jihwan Hwang
This article evaluates the possibility of ‘Thucydides’s Trap’ between the U.S. and China through defensive realism. The possibility of U.S.-China conflict has been mainly discussed in the frame of offensive realism. It argues that if China’s rise continues, it will cause serious military conflict between the two. However, it is unclear whether the crisis will turn into an actual conflict. Defensive realism provides an alternative perspective. However, the interpretation by defensive realism in contrast to offensive realism has not been highlighted. Considering the importance of defensive realism, there is a theoretical gap for the most important global issue. Most realist explanations predict U.S.-China relations as serious conflicts, but defensive realism posits that it does not necessarily have to be pessimistic. This article draws the concepts of a state’s motivation and type, status quo, security dilemma, and grand bargain, reinterprets U.S.-China relations, and presents alternative policies.
{"title":"The United States and China Falling into the Thucydides’s Trap?: Learning from Defensive Realism","authors":"Jihwan Hwang","doi":"10.29274/ews.2023.35.2.33","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.29274/ews.2023.35.2.33","url":null,"abstract":"This article evaluates the possibility of ‘Thucydides’s Trap’ between the U.S. and China through defensive realism. The possibility of U.S.-China conflict has been mainly discussed in the frame of offensive realism. It argues that if China’s rise continues, it will cause serious military conflict between the two. However, it is unclear whether the crisis will turn into an actual conflict. Defensive realism provides an alternative perspective. However, the interpretation by defensive realism in contrast to offensive realism has not been highlighted. Considering the importance of defensive realism, there is a theoretical gap for the most important global issue. Most realist explanations predict U.S.-China relations as serious conflicts, but defensive realism posits that it does not necessarily have to be pessimistic. This article draws the concepts of a state’s motivation and type, status quo, security dilemma, and grand bargain, reinterprets U.S.-China relations, and presents alternative policies.","PeriodicalId":84986,"journal":{"name":"Journal of East and West studies","volume":"15 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-06-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"85679094","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-06-20DOI: 10.29274/ews.2023.35.2.85
Tae Yon Kim
The aim of this article is to give a diachronic analysis of the processes in which political opposition and government’s responses towards it have unfolded in Kazakhstan’s authoritarian regime. The first generation of political opposition in Kazakhstan was the social movements that were organized on the initiative of intelligentsia from the late Soviet period to the early 1990s and raised national and environmental issues. Nazarbayev’s government responded to this type of political opposition with repression and co-optation. The second generation of political opposition in the form of a profit-seeking party arose from the late 1990s to the early and mid 2000s. The responses of Nazarbayev’s government towards it were strong repression and offensive discourse. Since 2010s the third generation of political opposition in the new form of a mass protest has been rising up and Kazakhstan’s government has been responding to it with repression and offensive discourse as before. But the same way of responses as before in different conditions of state-society relations has not achieved the effect of stabilization of the regime.
{"title":"Political Opposition and Government’s Responses in Kazakhstan’s Authoritarian Regime","authors":"Tae Yon Kim","doi":"10.29274/ews.2023.35.2.85","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.29274/ews.2023.35.2.85","url":null,"abstract":"The aim of this article is to give a diachronic analysis of the processes in which political opposition and government’s responses towards it have unfolded in Kazakhstan’s authoritarian regime. The first generation of political opposition in Kazakhstan was the social movements that were organized on the initiative of intelligentsia from the late Soviet period to the early 1990s and raised national and environmental issues. Nazarbayev’s government responded to this type of political opposition with repression and co-optation. The second generation of political opposition in the form of a profit-seeking party arose from the late 1990s to the early and mid 2000s. The responses of Nazarbayev’s government towards it were strong repression and offensive discourse. Since 2010s the third generation of political opposition in the new form of a mass protest has been rising up and Kazakhstan’s government has been responding to it with repression and offensive discourse as before. But the same way of responses as before in different conditions of state-society relations has not achieved the effect of stabilization of the regime.","PeriodicalId":84986,"journal":{"name":"Journal of East and West studies","volume":"11 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-06-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"89810455","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-06-20DOI: 10.29274/ews.2023.35.2.5
Hyun-seok Yu
This thesis seeks to understand the causes of changes in the regional security landscape currently occurring in the Indo-Pacific region and analyze the impact of these changes on existing security systems in East Asia region. The US Indo-Pacific strategy which has been pursued in response to the rise of China and its challenges to US influence in the Indo-Pacific region, has precipitated the fundamental changes in the San Francisco System established in the Asia-Pacific region after World War II. The US-centered bilateral alliance network, which has been the backbone of the San Francisco system, continues to be maintained, but the US-led alliance system is reorganized in a way that allies are given new roles to respond to China’s multi-faced challenges. In addition, multilateral institutions, which has played a complementary role, seem to play a key role in the Indo-Pacific strategy along with bilateral alliance networks. Along with this, active cooperation and coordination with the off-shore security system symbolized by cooperation with NATO is also a significant departure from the existing San Francisco system. The emergence of a new security system in the Indo-Pacific region is bound to have a significant impact on the foreign strategies of major countries in the region, including Korea. Although this is a challenge for Korea’s foreign strategy the flourishing of minilateral cooperations also means that a space has been opened for Korea to play a meaningful role in minilateral cooperation in this region. The existing ASEAN-centered multilateral institutions which led regional cooperation in the East Asian region, is facing significant challenges. It was under pressure to find its place in the competition with newly emerging mini/multilateral cooperations and to improve ASEAN’s effectiveness and relevance itself.
{"title":"A Study of Regional Security Institution in East Asia: U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy and the Change of the San Francisco System","authors":"Hyun-seok Yu","doi":"10.29274/ews.2023.35.2.5","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.29274/ews.2023.35.2.5","url":null,"abstract":"This thesis seeks to understand the causes of changes in the regional security landscape currently occurring in the Indo-Pacific region and analyze the impact of these changes on existing security systems in East Asia region. The US Indo-Pacific strategy which has been pursued in response to the rise of China and its challenges to US influence in the Indo-Pacific region, has precipitated the fundamental changes in the San Francisco System established in the Asia-Pacific region after World War II. The US-centered bilateral alliance network, which has been the backbone of the San Francisco system, continues to be maintained, but the US-led alliance system is reorganized in a way that allies are given new roles to respond to China’s multi-faced challenges. In addition, multilateral institutions, which has played a complementary role, seem to play a key role in the Indo-Pacific strategy along with bilateral alliance networks. Along with this, active cooperation and coordination with the off-shore security system symbolized by cooperation with NATO is also a significant departure from the existing San Francisco system. The emergence of a new security system in the Indo-Pacific region is bound to have a significant impact on the foreign strategies of major countries in the region, including Korea. Although this is a challenge for Korea’s foreign strategy the flourishing of minilateral cooperations also means that a space has been opened for Korea to play a meaningful role in minilateral cooperation in this region. The existing ASEAN-centered multilateral institutions which led regional cooperation in the East Asian region, is facing significant challenges. It was under pressure to find its place in the competition with newly emerging mini/multilateral cooperations and to improve ASEAN’s effectiveness and relevance itself.","PeriodicalId":84986,"journal":{"name":"Journal of East and West studies","volume":"93 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-06-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"79436555","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-06-20DOI: 10.29274/ews.2023.35.2.59
young sang Lee, W. Kim
A revolution in military affairs(RMA) is expected to have a significant impact on militarized interstate disputes. Recent researches show that ballistic missiles, unmanned attack vehicles, and drones affect many aspects of militarized disputes. However, there is few research on the effect of the RMA on extended deterrence. In this study we analyze the effect of military surveillance technology on extended deterrence. In particular, we focus on the presence or absence of allies with reconnaissance satellites because reconnaissance satellite is a technology that can effectively alleviate uncertainty of information compared to other reconnaissance assets. Considering Fearon’s(1995) argument that wars occur because of uncertainty of information and commitment problem, reconnaissance satellites may be able to alleviate these problems with satellites characteristics such as high durability, stability, and few international legal restriction. Results of this study demonstrate that states having allies with reconnaissance satellites capabilities are less likely to be targeted in large scale militarized disputes with 100 or more casualties than states without having allies with reconnaissance satellites capabilities.
{"title":"Importance of Having Allies with Reconnaissance Satellites Capabilities for Successful Extended Deterrence","authors":"young sang Lee, W. Kim","doi":"10.29274/ews.2023.35.2.59","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.29274/ews.2023.35.2.59","url":null,"abstract":"A revolution in military affairs(RMA) is expected to have a significant impact on militarized interstate disputes. Recent researches show that ballistic missiles, unmanned attack vehicles, and drones affect many aspects of militarized disputes. However, there is few research on the effect of the RMA on extended deterrence. In this study we analyze the effect of military surveillance technology on extended deterrence. In particular, we focus on the presence or absence of allies with reconnaissance satellites because reconnaissance satellite is a technology that can effectively alleviate uncertainty of information compared to other reconnaissance assets. Considering Fearon’s(1995) argument that wars occur because of uncertainty of information and commitment problem, reconnaissance satellites may be able to alleviate these problems with satellites characteristics such as high durability, stability, and few international legal restriction. Results of this study demonstrate that states having allies with reconnaissance satellites capabilities are less likely to be targeted in large scale militarized disputes with 100 or more casualties than states without having allies with reconnaissance satellites capabilities.","PeriodicalId":84986,"journal":{"name":"Journal of East and West studies","volume":"10 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-06-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"83984296","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-03-20DOI: 10.29274/ews.2023.35.1.29
Seong-Ho Lim
This article evaluates the ranked choice voting(RCV) system Alaskan voters used in the 2022 mid-term elections. It examines the significances of the new electoral system in regards to American politics and also for other countries including South Korea. Following today’s central talking point on RCV, this article focuses on its depolarizing effect and pro-centrist trait. The process and result of 2022 Alaska elections, in which a moderate Democrat(Peltola) won a House seat and a moderate Republican(Murkowski) won a Senate seat, indicate a positive role of RCV in reducing polarized confrontations and promoting centrist moderation. The future of RCV, however, is far from optimistic, given some political obstacles against adopting it nationwide or worldwide.
{"title":"Depolarizing Effect of Ranked Choice Voting?: Implications of the 2022 Alaska Mid-term Elections","authors":"Seong-Ho Lim","doi":"10.29274/ews.2023.35.1.29","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.29274/ews.2023.35.1.29","url":null,"abstract":"This article evaluates the ranked choice voting(RCV) system Alaskan voters used in the 2022 mid-term elections. It examines the significances of the new electoral system in regards to American politics and also for other countries including South Korea. Following today’s central talking point on RCV, this article focuses on its depolarizing effect and pro-centrist trait. The process and result of 2022 Alaska elections, in which a moderate Democrat(Peltola) won a House seat and a moderate Republican(Murkowski) won a Senate seat, indicate a positive role of RCV in reducing polarized confrontations and promoting centrist moderation. The future of RCV, however, is far from optimistic, given some political obstacles against adopting it nationwide or worldwide.","PeriodicalId":84986,"journal":{"name":"Journal of East and West studies","volume":"70 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-03-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"91214117","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-03-20DOI: 10.29274/ews.2023.35.1.85
Jung Heui Park, J. M. Lee
This paper examines the regionalist voting behavior in the geographically adjacent Yeongnam-Honam border area, although the administrative districts at the metropolitan level are different. More specifically, this study aims to empirically verify the regionalist voting relaxation phenomenon in the Yeongnam-Honam border area, where emotional communication is possible through daily life sharing and various friendly exchanges. To do so, collective data are examined with counting data for each voting district for presidential and general elections held in Korea since 2000, and voter support patterns of regional dominant parties in the region are analyzed. As a result of the analysis of the collective data, First of all, it was possible to verify the regionalist voting relaxation phenomenon withdrawing from support for regional dominant parties in 15 of the 26 Eups and Myeons as the subject of analysis of the Yeongnam-Honam border area belonging to 9 Sis and Guns. Through this, it was validated that “Honam in Yeongnam, Yeongnam in Honam” actually exists. However, it was analyzed that this regionallist voting relaxation phenomenon did not affect between neighboring Eups and Myeons. Second of all, it was confirmed that the possibility that various friendly affairs and geographical or topographical influences could affect regionalist voting behavior. The intensity of relaxation phenomenon was strong in which exchanges such as sisterhood relationships and friendly activities between neighboring Eups and Myeons were held, or in areas without topographical obstacles such as mountains and rivers.
{"title":"Regionalist Voting Behavior in Administrative Border Areas: Focusing on the Yeongnam-Honam border area","authors":"Jung Heui Park, J. M. Lee","doi":"10.29274/ews.2023.35.1.85","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.29274/ews.2023.35.1.85","url":null,"abstract":"This paper examines the regionalist voting behavior in the geographically adjacent Yeongnam-Honam border area, although the administrative districts at the metropolitan level are different. More specifically, this study aims to empirically verify the regionalist voting relaxation phenomenon in the Yeongnam-Honam border area, where emotional communication is possible through daily life sharing and various friendly exchanges. To do so, collective data are examined with counting data for each voting district for presidential and general elections held in Korea since 2000, and voter support patterns of regional dominant parties in the region are analyzed. As a result of the analysis of the collective data, First of all, it was possible to verify the regionalist voting relaxation phenomenon withdrawing from support for regional dominant parties in 15 of the 26 Eups and Myeons as the subject of analysis of the Yeongnam-Honam border area belonging to 9 Sis and Guns. Through this, it was validated that “Honam in Yeongnam, Yeongnam in Honam” actually exists. However, it was analyzed that this regionallist voting relaxation phenomenon did not affect between neighboring Eups and Myeons. Second of all, it was confirmed that the possibility that various friendly affairs and geographical or topographical influences could affect regionalist voting behavior. The intensity of relaxation phenomenon was strong in which exchanges such as sisterhood relationships and friendly activities between neighboring Eups and Myeons were held, or in areas without topographical obstacles such as mountains and rivers.","PeriodicalId":84986,"journal":{"name":"Journal of East and West studies","volume":"15 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-03-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"91147963","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-03-20DOI: 10.29274/ews.2023.35.1.175
H. Lee, Hyun-Chool Lee
This paper analyzes the leadership of President Reagan, who is credited with winning the Cold War and restoring American pride, by focusing on his strategy for the collapse of the Soviet Union. Reagan pursued ‘peace through strength’ and implemented strategies to fulfill this vision, arguing that the existing policies of containment and détente were ineffective and deceptive. First, he cut off the flow of funds to the Soviet Union by blocking the flow of technology to the Soviet Union, sabotage operations through the supply of fake technology, and a strategy to depress international oil prices. Second, the Soviet-Afghan war and the development of the SDI were used as a “poison pill” to make the Soviets pour money into the country like water. Third, he supported democratization in Poland and Eastern Europe, and used human rights as a weapon in the public opinion war to pressure the Soviet Union into regime change. Finally, his leadership was marked by his ability to persuade the public as a great communicator. To be effective, a political leader must have a guiding ideology that is responsive to the times and historical calling. He was a leader who was able to adapt his approach to the changing political environment and demonstrated situational leadership, using both transactional and transformational leadership to achieve his goals. In other words, he had a sense of the times and was able to articulate a vision to the people. In this respect, President Reagan is a prime example of the importance of situational leadership.
{"title":"President Reagan’s Situational Leadership: Focusing on the strategy of the collapse of the Soviet Union","authors":"H. Lee, Hyun-Chool Lee","doi":"10.29274/ews.2023.35.1.175","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.29274/ews.2023.35.1.175","url":null,"abstract":"This paper analyzes the leadership of President Reagan, who is credited with winning the Cold War and restoring American pride, by focusing on his strategy for the collapse of the Soviet Union. Reagan pursued ‘peace through strength’ and implemented strategies to fulfill this vision, arguing that the existing policies of containment and détente were ineffective and deceptive. First, he cut off the flow of funds to the Soviet Union by blocking the flow of technology to the Soviet Union, sabotage operations through the supply of fake technology, and a strategy to depress international oil prices. Second, the Soviet-Afghan war and the development of the SDI were used as a “poison pill” to make the Soviets pour money into the country like water. Third, he supported democratization in Poland and Eastern Europe, and used human rights as a weapon in the public opinion war to pressure the Soviet Union into regime change. Finally, his leadership was marked by his ability to persuade the public as a great communicator. To be effective, a political leader must have a guiding ideology that is responsive to the times and historical calling. He was a leader who was able to adapt his approach to the changing political environment and demonstrated situational leadership, using both transactional and transformational leadership to achieve his goals. In other words, he had a sense of the times and was able to articulate a vision to the people. In this respect, President Reagan is a prime example of the importance of situational leadership.","PeriodicalId":84986,"journal":{"name":"Journal of East and West studies","volume":"20 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-03-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"80950977","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-03-20DOI: 10.29274/ews.2023.35.1.117
This study examines public opinion in European countries on the Russo-Ukrainian war and the EU’s sanctions against Russia. In particular, it investigates the different perceptions of issues related to the war in Ukraine in terms of security and economic implications and seeks to explain the differences in public opinions among European countries. Leading public opinions in Europe strongly condemn Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and agree to impose strong sanctions. However, there are different attitudes in public opinion depending on the expected economic damage and energy mix. Countries concerned about significant economic damage due to rising energy prices tend to prefer measures that take the economic impact into account rather than value-oriented hard-line responses. Additionally, countries with a high proportion of fossil fuel use also show the same tendency. On the other hand, countries that can endure economic damage and better respond to energy crises with a high share of renewable energy prefer a hard-line response. Countries with a favorable image of Russia have a relatively solid public opinion insisting on considering the economic situation, while countries with a pro-American tendency demand a hard-line response based on values. In terms of diplomacy and security, it was found that the more countries feel the security threat from the war, the more public opinion supports a value-centered policy stance and insists on military aid to Ukraine. In particular, the three Nordic countries, which have a long tradition of neutrality, judge Russia’s invasion of Ukraine as a threat to fundamental European values and are more in favor of military aid to Ukraine than other countries. This study provides significant implications for forecasting the EU’s response to Russia. For the EU to maintain a strong stance against Russia, it is essential to secure solidarity among the members. The EU will need to coordinate the different economic burdens of its Member States and fully reflect the varying security awareness of European countries on its common security and defense policy. These efforts are necessary to maintain a solid and coherent policy stance on the war in Ukraine.
{"title":"An Analysis of European Public Opinion on the Russo-Ukrainian War and its Determinants","authors":"","doi":"10.29274/ews.2023.35.1.117","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.29274/ews.2023.35.1.117","url":null,"abstract":"This study examines public opinion in European countries on the Russo-Ukrainian war and the EU’s sanctions against Russia. In particular, it investigates the different perceptions of issues related to the war in Ukraine in terms of security and economic implications and seeks to explain the differences in public opinions among European countries. Leading public opinions in Europe strongly condemn Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and agree to impose strong sanctions. However, there are different attitudes in public opinion depending on the expected economic damage and energy mix. Countries concerned about significant economic damage due to rising energy prices tend to prefer measures that take the economic impact into account rather than value-oriented hard-line responses. Additionally, countries with a high proportion of fossil fuel use also show the same tendency. On the other hand, countries that can endure economic damage and better respond to energy crises with a high share of renewable energy prefer a hard-line response. Countries with a favorable image of Russia have a relatively solid public opinion insisting on considering the economic situation, while countries with a pro-American tendency demand a hard-line response based on values. In terms of diplomacy and security, it was found that the more countries feel the security threat from the war, the more public opinion supports a value-centered policy stance and insists on military aid to Ukraine. In particular, the three Nordic countries, which have a long tradition of neutrality, judge Russia’s invasion of Ukraine as a threat to fundamental European values and are more in favor of military aid to Ukraine than other countries. This study provides significant implications for forecasting the EU’s response to Russia. For the EU to maintain a strong stance against Russia, it is essential to secure solidarity among the members. The EU will need to coordinate the different economic burdens of its Member States and fully reflect the varying security awareness of European countries on its common security and defense policy. These efforts are necessary to maintain a solid and coherent policy stance on the war in Ukraine.","PeriodicalId":84986,"journal":{"name":"Journal of East and West studies","volume":"27 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-03-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"89288466","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
京公网安备 11010802042870号
京ICP备2023020795号-1
扫码关注我们
求助内容：
应助结果提醒方式：