Referential Intentions

M. O’Rourke
{"title":"Referential Intentions","authors":"M. O’Rourke","doi":"10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199687305.013.3","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"This chapter presents a critical review of research on referential intentions, in the fields of philosophy, linguistics, and psychology, focusing both on what makes them referential and how they function as intentions. This project is distinctively philosophical—the concept referential intention combines elements of language with those of action, and a full account of it should blend theoretical work on reference in linguistics and the philosophy of language with theoretical work on intention in psychology and the philosophy of action. While such an account is beyond the scope of this chapter, the aim is to make progress toward it by outlining ways in which referential intentions are conceptually constrained by reference on the one side and intention on the other. The goal is to supply an overview of these states that does justice to their variety while introducing constraints on their implementation in semantic and pragmatic theories of natural language.","PeriodicalId":22888,"journal":{"name":"The Oxford Handbook of Reference","volume":"102 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2019-02-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"1","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"The Oxford Handbook of Reference","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199687305.013.3","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1

Abstract

This chapter presents a critical review of research on referential intentions, in the fields of philosophy, linguistics, and psychology, focusing both on what makes them referential and how they function as intentions. This project is distinctively philosophical—the concept referential intention combines elements of language with those of action, and a full account of it should blend theoretical work on reference in linguistics and the philosophy of language with theoretical work on intention in psychology and the philosophy of action. While such an account is beyond the scope of this chapter, the aim is to make progress toward it by outlining ways in which referential intentions are conceptually constrained by reference on the one side and intention on the other. The goal is to supply an overview of these states that does justice to their variety while introducing constraints on their implementation in semantic and pragmatic theories of natural language.
查看原文
分享 分享
微信好友 朋友圈 QQ好友 复制链接
本刊更多论文
引用的意图
本章对哲学、语言学和心理学领域的指称意图研究进行了批判性回顾,重点关注是什么使它们具有指称性,以及它们如何作为意图发挥作用。这个项目具有鲜明的哲学特色——指称意图这个概念将语言要素与行动要素结合起来,对它的全面阐述应该把语言学和语言哲学的指称理论工作与心理学和行动哲学的意图理论工作结合起来。虽然这样的解释超出了本章的范围,但目的是通过概述参考意图在概念上受到一方参考和另一方意图约束的方式来取得进展。我们的目标是提供这些状态的概述,在介绍自然语言的语义和语用理论对其实现的限制的同时,公正地对待它们的多样性。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
求助全文
约1分钟内获得全文 去求助
来源期刊
自引率
0.00%
发文量
0
期刊最新文献
Referential Intentions Reference and Referring Expressions in First Language Acquisition The Indefiniteness of Definiteness Reference as a Speech Act Contextual Influences on Reference
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
现在去查看 取消
×
提示
确定
0
微信
客服QQ
Book学术公众号 扫码关注我们
反馈
×
意见反馈
请填写您的意见或建议
请填写您的手机或邮箱
已复制链接
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
×
扫码分享
扫码分享
Book学术官方微信
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术
文献互助 智能选刊 最新文献 互助须知 联系我们:info@booksci.cn
Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。
Copyright © 2023 Book学术 All rights reserved.
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号 京ICP备2023020795号-1