Pub Date : 2019-02-13DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199687305.013.19
E. Krahmer, Kees van Deemter
This chapter offers a survey of computational research on Referring Expression Generation (reg). The main body of the text comes from an article that was published in the journal Computational Linguistics in 2012; the preamble places the survey in the context of later developments. The survey introduces the reg problem and describes early work in this area, discussing what basic assumptions lie behind it, and showing how its remit has widened over the years. It discusses some computational frameworks underlying reg, and demonstrate a recent trend that seeks to link reg algorithms with well-established Knowledge Representation techniques. Considerable attention is given to recent efforts at evaluating reg algorithms and the lessons that they allow us to learn. The chapter concludes with a discussion of what we still see as important aspects of the way forward in this area of computational research, focusing particularly on referring in larger and more realistic settings.
{"title":"Computational Generation of Referring Expressions","authors":"E. Krahmer, Kees van Deemter","doi":"10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199687305.013.19","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199687305.013.19","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter offers a survey of computational research on Referring Expression Generation (reg). The main body of the text comes from an article that was published in the journal Computational Linguistics in 2012; the preamble places the survey in the context of later developments. The survey introduces the reg problem and describes early work in this area, discussing what basic assumptions lie behind it, and showing how its remit has widened over the years. It discusses some computational frameworks underlying reg, and demonstrate a recent trend that seeks to link reg algorithms with well-established Knowledge Representation techniques. Considerable attention is given to recent efforts at evaluating reg algorithms and the lessons that they allow us to learn. The chapter concludes with a discussion of what we still see as important aspects of the way forward in this area of computational research, focusing particularly on referring in larger and more realistic settings.","PeriodicalId":22888,"journal":{"name":"The Oxford Handbook of Reference","volume":"41 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-02-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"87206717","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-02-13DOI: 10.1093/OXFORDHB/9780199687305.013.9
K. Heusinger
The semantic–pragmatic category ‘specificity’ is used to describe various semantic and pragmatic contrasts of indefinite noun phrases. This chapter will first provide a brief illustration of different linguistic means to express these contrasts in different languages. Second, it will categorize different types of specificity according to the semantic and pragmatic contexts in which they can be found. The standard tests for these different kinds of specificity are also discussed. In the third section a comparison is made between four families of theoretical approaches to specificity and the chapter concludes with the notion that specificity can be best understood by ‘referential anchoring’.
{"title":"Indefiniteness and Specificity","authors":"K. Heusinger","doi":"10.1093/OXFORDHB/9780199687305.013.9","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/OXFORDHB/9780199687305.013.9","url":null,"abstract":"The semantic–pragmatic category ‘specificity’ is used to describe various semantic and pragmatic contrasts of indefinite noun phrases. This chapter will first provide a brief illustration of different linguistic means to express these contrasts in different languages. Second, it will categorize different types of specificity according to the semantic and pragmatic contexts in which they can be found. The standard tests for these different kinds of specificity are also discussed. In the third section a comparison is made between four families of theoretical approaches to specificity and the chapter concludes with the notion that specificity can be best understood by ‘referential anchoring’.","PeriodicalId":22888,"journal":{"name":"The Oxford Handbook of Reference","volume":"2 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-02-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"88731185","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-02-13DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199687305.013.11
L. Clapp, M. Reimer, Anne Spire
This chapter presents a critical discussion of the problem of negative existentials in the tradition of analytic philosophy of language. Firstly, it presents the problem as a compelling argument in support of the counterintuitive conclusion that sentences such as ‘Pegasus does not exist’ cannot be used to make true and informative assertions. Then, seven influential proposals for solving the problem are considered, each of which is construed as a response to this argument. The proposals considered are Russell’s (1905) theory of descriptions, Quine’s (1948) prescribed elimination of names, Donnellan’s (1974) ‘historical block’ view, Kripke’s (1973/2013) ‘no such proposition’ view, Salmon’s (1998) fictional entities view, Braun’s (1993) gappy proposition view, and Katz’s (1990) pure metalinguistic descriptivism. Though the official stance with regard to these proposals is neutral, the chapter concludes with a brief reactive summary that endorses a general pragmatic approach to the problem.
{"title":"Negative Existentials","authors":"L. Clapp, M. Reimer, Anne Spire","doi":"10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199687305.013.11","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199687305.013.11","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter presents a critical discussion of the problem of negative existentials in the tradition of analytic philosophy of language. Firstly, it presents the problem as a compelling argument in support of the counterintuitive conclusion that sentences such as ‘Pegasus does not exist’ cannot be used to make true and informative assertions. Then, seven influential proposals for solving the problem are considered, each of which is construed as a response to this argument. The proposals considered are Russell’s (1905) theory of descriptions, Quine’s (1948) prescribed elimination of names, Donnellan’s (1974) ‘historical block’ view, Kripke’s (1973/2013) ‘no such proposition’ view, Salmon’s (1998) fictional entities view, Braun’s (1993) gappy proposition view, and Katz’s (1990) pure metalinguistic descriptivism. Though the official stance with regard to these proposals is neutral, the chapter concludes with a brief reactive summary that endorses a general pragmatic approach to the problem.","PeriodicalId":22888,"journal":{"name":"The Oxford Handbook of Reference","volume":"10 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-02-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"88664318","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-02-13DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199687305.013.10
Ezra Keshet, F. Schwarz
The de re/de dicto distinction describes the interaction of intensional operators and noun phrases in a sentence. The classic example ‘I want a sloop’ due to Quine (1956) contrasts two readings: a desire for a particular sloop (de re) and ‘relief from slooplessness’ (de dicto). The distinction is commonly discussed in connection with modal expressions, often construed as quantifiers over possible worlds, but entirely parallel phenomena arise for tenses, construed as quantifiers over times, and situations, combining possible worlds and time spans. This chapter provides a brief historical background of the de re/de dicto distinction and then lays out the basics of a traditional analysis in terms of scope. Next, challenges to such a theory are reviewed, as well as possible revisions to capture this problematic data. The last part of the chapter notes some loose ends and possible extensions.
de re/de dicto的区别描述了句子中内涵操作符和名词短语的相互作用。奎因(1956)的经典例子“我想要一艘单桅帆船”对比了两种解读:对一艘特定单桅帆船的渴望(de re)和“从懒散中解脱”(de dicto)。这种区别通常与情态表达有关，通常被解释为可能世界的量词，但完全平行的现象出现在时态中，被解释为时间和情境的量词，结合了可能世界和时间跨度。本章简要介绍了de re/de dicto区分的历史背景，然后在范围方面列出了传统分析的基础。接下来，对这种理论的挑战进行了回顾，以及可能的修订，以捕获这些有问题的数据。本章的最后一部分说明了一些松散的结尾和可能的扩展。
{"title":"De Re/De Dicto","authors":"Ezra Keshet, F. Schwarz","doi":"10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199687305.013.10","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199687305.013.10","url":null,"abstract":"The de re/de dicto distinction describes the interaction of intensional operators and noun phrases in a sentence. The classic example ‘I want a sloop’ due to Quine (1956) contrasts two readings: a desire for a particular sloop (de re) and ‘relief from slooplessness’ (de dicto). The distinction is commonly discussed in connection with modal expressions, often construed as quantifiers over possible worlds, but entirely parallel phenomena arise for tenses, construed as quantifiers over times, and situations, combining possible worlds and time spans. This chapter provides a brief historical background of the de re/de dicto distinction and then lays out the basics of a traditional analysis in terms of scope. Next, challenges to such a theory are reviewed, as well as possible revisions to capture this problematic data. The last part of the chapter notes some loose ends and possible extensions.","PeriodicalId":22888,"journal":{"name":"The Oxford Handbook of Reference","volume":"11 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-02-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"88689373","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-02-13DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199687305.013.4
A. Bezuidenhout
This chapter argues that referring is a joint accomplishment of the interlocutors involved in a conversation. This argument is built around two assumptions. Firstly, it is not words that refer but people who refer by using words in appropriate contexts. Referring is a kind of purposive linguistic action. Secondly, it is possible to perform a purposive action jointly. Two or more agents in coordination can do their part to bring about a joint accomplishment that would not be brought about by any of the individuals acting alone. There are cases of joint referring, where two or more interlocutors do their part to produce an outcome (referring) that would not result from the efforts of any of the individuals acting alone. Furthermore, all referring is a joint accomplishment and talk of individuals as referring (either in conversation or in thought) is parasitic on the idea of joint referring.
{"title":"Joint Reference","authors":"A. Bezuidenhout","doi":"10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199687305.013.4","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199687305.013.4","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter argues that referring is a joint accomplishment of the interlocutors involved in a conversation. This argument is built around two assumptions. Firstly, it is not words that refer but people who refer by using words in appropriate contexts. Referring is a kind of purposive linguistic action. Secondly, it is possible to perform a purposive action jointly. Two or more agents in coordination can do their part to bring about a joint accomplishment that would not be brought about by any of the individuals acting alone. There are cases of joint referring, where two or more interlocutors do their part to produce an outcome (referring) that would not result from the efforts of any of the individuals acting alone. Furthermore, all referring is a joint accomplishment and talk of individuals as referring (either in conversation or in thought) is parasitic on the idea of joint referring.","PeriodicalId":22888,"journal":{"name":"The Oxford Handbook of Reference","volume":"18 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-02-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"81680969","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-02-13DOI: 10.1093/OXFORDHB/9780199687305.013.14
A. Orvig
Young children’s use of referring expressions raises the issue of the intertwining of morphosyntactic, semantic, and pragmatic aspects of language acquisition. After presenting the milestones of the formal acquisition of referring expressions, this chapter presents the main results of research on child reference along two main lines: studies on the expression of arguments; and studies on determiners. Whereas studies in naturally occurring settings show a precocious competence in the use of referring expressions, studies on narratives and other experimental settings tend to show late mastery of referential values. Various factors can account for this paradox, including the conceptions of reference, the representation of the child’s cognitive development and of her involvement in dialogue, and more specifically the combined influence of the interlocutor’s discourse, of positioning, and of discourse genres and activities.
{"title":"Reference and Referring Expressions in First Language Acquisition","authors":"A. Orvig","doi":"10.1093/OXFORDHB/9780199687305.013.14","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/OXFORDHB/9780199687305.013.14","url":null,"abstract":"Young children’s use of referring expressions raises the issue of the intertwining of morphosyntactic, semantic, and pragmatic aspects of language acquisition. After presenting the milestones of the formal acquisition of referring expressions, this chapter presents the main results of research on child reference along two main lines: studies on the expression of arguments; and studies on determiners. Whereas studies in naturally occurring settings show a precocious competence in the use of referring expressions, studies on narratives and other experimental settings tend to show late mastery of referential values. Various factors can account for this paradox, including the conceptions of reference, the representation of the child’s cognitive development and of her involvement in dialogue, and more specifically the combined influence of the interlocutor’s discourse, of positioning, and of discourse genres and activities.","PeriodicalId":22888,"journal":{"name":"The Oxford Handbook of Reference","volume":"76 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-02-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"75148443","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-02-13DOI: 10.1093/OXFORDHB/9780199687305.013.13
Craige Roberts
This chapter considers a number of ways in which the understood reference of a definite noun phrase—definite description, pronoun, demonstrative, indexical, or proper name—may depend on the context in which it is uttered. Contextual influences are reflected in phenomena such as anaphora and familiarity presuppositions, descriptive incompleteness, domain restriction, dependence on a shifted perspective in intensional contexts resulting in de re, de dicto, and de se interpretations, and inclusion of context-sensitive predicates. Careful investigation of particular types of context dependence has played an important role in the evolution of semantic theories of these NP types over the past fifty years. But outstanding puzzles about how context influences reference pose challenges to the most influential current semantic theories of some NP types, including direct reference theories of indexicals and demonstratives, and rigid designator accounts of proper names.
{"title":"Contextual Influences on Reference","authors":"Craige Roberts","doi":"10.1093/OXFORDHB/9780199687305.013.13","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/OXFORDHB/9780199687305.013.13","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter considers a number of ways in which the understood reference of a definite noun phrase—definite description, pronoun, demonstrative, indexical, or proper name—may depend on the context in which it is uttered. Contextual influences are reflected in phenomena such as anaphora and familiarity presuppositions, descriptive incompleteness, domain restriction, dependence on a shifted perspective in intensional contexts resulting in de re, de dicto, and de se interpretations, and inclusion of context-sensitive predicates. Careful investigation of particular types of context dependence has played an important role in the evolution of semantic theories of these NP types over the past fifty years. But outstanding puzzles about how context influences reference pose challenges to the most influential current semantic theories of some NP types, including direct reference theories of indexicals and demonstratives, and rigid designator accounts of proper names.","PeriodicalId":22888,"journal":{"name":"The Oxford Handbook of Reference","volume":"31 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-02-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"77112406","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-02-13DOI: 10.1093/OXFORDHB/9780199687305.013.7
B. Abbott
In this chapter two kinds of theories of definite descriptions are reviewed: the first is Russell’s famous theory, which holds that the article the conveys unique satisfaction of the descriptive content associated with it. The second kind of theory is one which holds that the conventional import of the definite article is one of familiarity of some type. Following that, this chapter also reviews a number of serious problems for familiarity theories, arguing that those are sufficient to make such theories untenable. Finally, this chapter looks at cases where definite descriptions do convey familiarity, and attempts (not completely successfully) to explain those cases.
{"title":"Definiteness and Familiarity","authors":"B. Abbott","doi":"10.1093/OXFORDHB/9780199687305.013.7","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/OXFORDHB/9780199687305.013.7","url":null,"abstract":"In this chapter two kinds of theories of definite descriptions are reviewed: the first is Russell’s famous theory, which holds that the article the conveys unique satisfaction of the descriptive content associated with it. The second kind of theory is one which holds that the conventional import of the definite article is one of familiarity of some type. Following that, this chapter also reviews a number of serious problems for familiarity theories, arguing that those are sufficient to make such theories untenable. Finally, this chapter looks at cases where definite descriptions do convey familiarity, and attempts (not completely successfully) to explain those cases.","PeriodicalId":22888,"journal":{"name":"The Oxford Handbook of Reference","volume":"51 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-02-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"85140675","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-02-13DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199687305.013.3
M. O’Rourke
This chapter presents a critical review of research on referential intentions, in the fields of philosophy, linguistics, and psychology, focusing both on what makes them referential and how they function as intentions. This project is distinctively philosophical—the concept referential intention combines elements of language with those of action, and a full account of it should blend theoretical work on reference in linguistics and the philosophy of language with theoretical work on intention in psychology and the philosophy of action. While such an account is beyond the scope of this chapter, the aim is to make progress toward it by outlining ways in which referential intentions are conceptually constrained by reference on the one side and intention on the other. The goal is to supply an overview of these states that does justice to their variety while introducing constraints on their implementation in semantic and pragmatic theories of natural language.
{"title":"Referential Intentions","authors":"M. O’Rourke","doi":"10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199687305.013.3","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199687305.013.3","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter presents a critical review of research on referential intentions, in the fields of philosophy, linguistics, and psychology, focusing both on what makes them referential and how they function as intentions. This project is distinctively philosophical—the concept referential intention combines elements of language with those of action, and a full account of it should blend theoretical work on reference in linguistics and the philosophy of language with theoretical work on intention in psychology and the philosophy of action. While such an account is beyond the scope of this chapter, the aim is to make progress toward it by outlining ways in which referential intentions are conceptually constrained by reference on the one side and intention on the other. The goal is to supply an overview of these states that does justice to their variety while introducing constraints on their implementation in semantic and pragmatic theories of natural language.","PeriodicalId":22888,"journal":{"name":"The Oxford Handbook of Reference","volume":"102 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-02-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"75057388","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-02-13DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199687305.013.6
Nancy Hedberg, Jeanette K. Gundel, Kaja Borthen
There exist a range of different notions of referentiality in the literature. The cognitive status ‘referential’ on the Givenness Hierarchy means that the hearer can assign a unique representation to the speaker’s intended referent by the time the sentence is processed. This is distinct from definite referents, which are expected to be ‘uniquely identifiable’, a status that entails ‘referential’, on the basis of the definite noun phrase alone. In this chapter, it is argued that phrases that are ‘attributive’, as distinct from ‘referential’, in Donnellan’s 1966 sense are ‘referential’ in the Givenness Hierarchy sense, and are marked as such in languages that mark referentiality overtly via determiners or case marking. Furthermore, it is suggested that bare nominal phrases in languages that allow them are unspecified for referentiality, but that an implicature of non-referentiality for a bare nominal may be generated in languages that mark definiteness or referentiality morphologically.
{"title":"Different Senses of ‘Referential’","authors":"Nancy Hedberg, Jeanette K. Gundel, Kaja Borthen","doi":"10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199687305.013.6","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199687305.013.6","url":null,"abstract":"There exist a range of different notions of referentiality in the literature. The cognitive status ‘referential’ on the Givenness Hierarchy means that the hearer can assign a unique representation to the speaker’s intended referent by the time the sentence is processed. This is distinct from definite referents, which are expected to be ‘uniquely identifiable’, a status that entails ‘referential’, on the basis of the definite noun phrase alone. In this chapter, it is argued that phrases that are ‘attributive’, as distinct from ‘referential’, in Donnellan’s 1966 sense are ‘referential’ in the Givenness Hierarchy sense, and are marked as such in languages that mark referentiality overtly via determiners or case marking. Furthermore, it is suggested that bare nominal phrases in languages that allow them are unspecified for referentiality, but that an implicature of non-referentiality for a bare nominal may be generated in languages that mark definiteness or referentiality morphologically.","PeriodicalId":22888,"journal":{"name":"The Oxford Handbook of Reference","volume":"15 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-02-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"77724877","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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