Tax Transparency and Social Welfare: The Role of Government Commitment

Tax eJournal Pub Date : 2021-06-08 DOI:10.2139/ssrn.3862433
C. Furukawa
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Abstract

Although transparency has long been held as the key principle of taxation, recent behavioral public finance theory has shown that it may reduce social welfare as inattention can alleviate behavioral distortions. This paper extends this analysis by modeling inattention as a noise in the tax rate signal received by Bayesian citizens. In equilibrium, we find that transparency will improve social welfare by ensuring the government's ability to commit to a fairly low tax rate that is socially optimal. Moreover, this model yields new sufficient statistics formulas that inform whether a policy effort to ensure tax transparency is socially worthwhile.
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税收透明度与社会福利:政府承诺的作用
虽然透明度长期以来一直被认为是税收的关键原则,但最近的行为公共财政理论表明,它可能会减少社会福利,因为不注意可以减轻行为扭曲。本文通过将注意力不集中建模为贝叶斯公民接收到的税率信号中的噪声来扩展这一分析。在均衡状态下,我们发现透明度将通过确保政府有能力承诺一个社会最优的相当低的税率来改善社会福利。此外,该模型还产生了新的、充分的统计公式,用以说明确保税收透明度的政策努力是否具有社会价值。
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