On Deontic Truth and Values

IF 0.1 4区 哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY CRITICA-REVISTA HISPANOAMERICANA DE FILOSOFIA Pub Date : 2017-10-31 DOI:10.22201/iifs.18704905e.2017.181
J. Moreso
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引用次数: 2

Abstract

espanolEste articulo analiza la tesis del relativismo etico, tal y como se defiende en Alchourron y Bulygin 1983. En ese trabajo, los autores plantean, por una parte, una sugerente concepcion conforme a la cual considerar cuales son nuestras obligaciones es equivalente a pensar que hemos de hacer y, por otra, una concepcion relativista de la etica. Presentan tres objeciones a las concepciones constructivistas de la etica que no son relativistas: a) el argumento de la carga de la prueba, b) una version del dilema de Eutifron y c) el argumento del particularismo. En este articulo se presentan contraargumentos a estas objeciones tratando de mostrar que no son concluyentes y que, por lo tanto, queda un espacio para la objetividad en el ambito normativo. EnglishThis article analyzes the thesis of ethical relativism, as defended by Alchourron and Bulygin (1983). These authors offer, on the one hand, a suggestive conception according to which the question “what are our obligations?” is equivalent to thinking about what is to be done; on the other hand, they defend a relativist conception of ethics. They present three objections to constructivist accounts of ethics that are not relativist: a) the argument of the burden of the proof; b) a version of the dilemma of Euthyphro, and c) the argument of particularism. This article presents counterarguments to these objections in the attempt to show that they are not conclusive and that a space therefore remains for objectivity in the normative sphere.
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论道义真理与价值
本文分析了Alchourron和Bulygin在1983年提出的伦理相对主义理论。在这篇论文中,作者提出了一个具有启蒙性的概念,根据这个概念,考虑我们的义务是什么,就像思考我们必须做什么一样,另一方面,一个相对主义的伦理概念。他们对非相对论的建构主义伦理学概念提出了三个反对意见:a)举证责任的论点,b) Eutifron困境的一个版本,c)特殊主义的论点。本文对这些反对意见提出了反对意见,试图表明它们不是结论性的,因此在规范范围内仍有客观性的空间。这篇文章分析了Alchourron和Bulygin(1983)所捍卫的伦理相对主义的论点。这些authors offer, on the one hand, suggestive概念根据to which the问题“what are our义务?-这相当于思考要做什么;另一方面,他们提倡一种相对主义的伦理观念。他们对建构主义对非相对主义伦理的解释提出三个反对意见:a)证据负担的论点;version of the dilemma Euthyphro, (b)和c):《particularism触发。本文对这些反对意见提出了反对意见,试图表明它们不是结论性的,因此在规范范围内保留了客观性的空间。
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