廉价谈话游戏中的有效沟通

Behavioral and Quantitative Game Theory Pub Date : 2010-05-14 DOI:10.1145/1807406.1807466

Navin Kartik, J. Sobel

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引用次数: 10

摘要

本文通过对发送方策略施加单调性条件来研究廉价谈话博弈，然后应用弱劣势策略的迭代删除。这一过程在Crawford和Sobel(1982)均衡中进行选择，通常选择诱导行为数量最多的结果。其他改进，如NITS，选择相同的结果。它还预测，发送者将只使用相对较高的平衡信息来膨胀他们的通信。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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Effective communication in cheap-talk games

This paper studies cheap talk games by imposing a monotonicity condition on Sender strategies and then applies iterative deletion of weakly dominated strategies. This procedure selects among Crawford and Sobel (1982) equilibria, typically selecting the outcome with the maximal number of induced actions. Other refinements, such as NITS, select the same outcome. It also predicts that Senders will inflate their communication using only relatively high messages in equilibrium.

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Behavioral and Quantitative Game Theory

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