拥挤网络中的寡头垄断定价

E. Melo
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引用次数: 0

摘要

本文研究了拥塞市场中每个企业所面临的需求都是随机的情况下的寡头垄断定价问题。特别地,我们考虑一个一般网络,其中每个环节都由一家公司拥有,该公司为了实现利润最大化而收费。在这种情况下,我们证明了纯策略价格均衡的存在性,其中延时函数被假设满足连续性、单调性和凸性。在此前提下,我们给出了如何计算无效率的边界,以及如何将结果应用于价格和产能竞争的研究。
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Oligopoly pricing in congested networks
In this paper we study the problem of oligopoly pricing in congested markets when the demand faced by every firm is stochastic. In particular, we consider a general network, where every link is owned by a firm which charges prices in order to maximize its profits. In this environment we show the existence of a pure strategy price equilibrium, where the latency functions are assumed to satisfy continuity, monotonicity and convexity. Given this existence result, we show how to compute bounds for the inefficiency and how the result can be adapted to study price and capacity competition.
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