斯多葛主义中的道德知觉与实践知识

C. Pineda
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摘要

在1998年发表的一篇论文中,Ricardo Salles认为斯多葛学派的行动理论不能解释实践知识,即关于在特定情况下采取何种行动是合适的知识。本文的目的是提出解决这一问题的方法。为此,我认为斯多葛学派发展了一种道德知识的感性理论。根据这一理论,在物体、人和行为中实例化的道德属性是通过感知知道的。在解释了这一理论之后,我认为它使我们能够证明斯多葛学派将感知视为实践知识的来源。
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Percepción Moral y Conocimiento Práctico en el Estoicismo
In a paper published in 1998, Ricardo Salles argues that the Stoic theory of action cannot account for practical knowledge, i.e., knowledge about what action is appropriate to be carried out in certain circumstances. The aim of this paper is to propose a solution to this problem. For this aim, I argue that the Stoics developed a perceptual theory of moral knowledge. According to this theory, the moral properties instantiated in objects, people, and actions are known through perception. After explaining this theory, I argue that it allows us to show that the Stoics deemed perception as a source of practical knowledge.
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