Pub Date : 2023-10-31DOI: 10.11606/issn.1981-9471.v17i2p90-133
André Luiz Cruz Sousa
{"title":"O justo cívico em Ethica Nicomachea V.6","authors":"André Luiz Cruz Sousa","doi":"10.11606/issn.1981-9471.v17i2p90-133","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.11606/issn.1981-9471.v17i2p90-133","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":185531,"journal":{"name":"Journal of ancient philosophy","volume":"66 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139308989","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-10-31DOI: 10.11606/issn.1981-9471.v17i2p71-89
Jaqueline Stefani
Este artigo investiga a possibilidade de questões morais possuírem a mesma natureza de ocorrências no mais das vezes (ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ) discutidas na Física, Metafísica e nos Analíticos, em contraste com as categorias de necessário sem mais e de acaso/acidente. Tal categoria (ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ) ora é aproximada daquilo que é necessário (necessidade sem mais), quando Aristóteles realça a exclusão do acaso/acidente da ciência, ora é afastada do necessário sem mais, quando busca especificar as diferenças entre essas categorias em termos das conclusões passíveis de serem obtidas em silogismos de ambos os tipos. O que parece é que as ações decorrentes de um caráter formado são ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ, podendo ser compreendidas no registro de um necessário hipotético, dado que o caráter é como uma “segunda natureza” do agente. Se tal hipótese for correta, ações decorrentes de um caráter formado não possuiriam estatuto de abertura aos contrários.
{"title":"Entre ética e ciência: necessidade e contingência na teoria da ação em Aristóteles","authors":"Jaqueline Stefani","doi":"10.11606/issn.1981-9471.v17i2p71-89","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.11606/issn.1981-9471.v17i2p71-89","url":null,"abstract":"Este artigo investiga a possibilidade de questões morais possuírem a mesma natureza de ocorrências no mais das vezes (ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ) discutidas na Física, Metafísica e nos Analíticos, em contraste com as categorias de necessário sem mais e de acaso/acidente. Tal categoria (ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ) ora é aproximada daquilo que é necessário (necessidade sem mais), quando Aristóteles realça a exclusão do acaso/acidente da ciência, ora é afastada do necessário sem mais, quando busca especificar as diferenças entre essas categorias em termos das conclusões passíveis de serem obtidas em silogismos de ambos os tipos. O que parece é que as ações decorrentes de um caráter formado são ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ, podendo ser compreendidas no registro de um necessário hipotético, dado que o caráter é como uma “segunda natureza” do agente. Se tal hipótese for correta, ações decorrentes de um caráter formado não possuiriam estatuto de abertura aos contrários.","PeriodicalId":185531,"journal":{"name":"Journal of ancient philosophy","volume":"236 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139309568","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-10-31DOI: 10.11606/issn.1981-9471.v17i2p29-43
Breno Zuppolini
Most interpretations of Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics believe that the term ‘ameson’ is used to describe the principles or foundations of a given system of justification or explanation as epistemically prior to or more fundamental than the other propositions in the system. Epistemic readings (as I shall call them) arguably constitute a majority in the secondary literature. This predominant view has been challenged by Robin Smith (1986) and Michael Ferejohn (1994; 2013), who propose interpretations that should be classified as non-epistemic according to the definition above. My aim in this article is purely negative. I intend to show that these non-epistemic interpretations are liable to serious objections and are in conflict with some important features of Aristotle’s theory of demonstration.
{"title":"Some remarks against non-epistemic accounts of immediate premises in Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics","authors":"Breno Zuppolini","doi":"10.11606/issn.1981-9471.v17i2p29-43","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.11606/issn.1981-9471.v17i2p29-43","url":null,"abstract":"Most interpretations of Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics believe that the term ‘ameson’ is used to describe the principles or foundations of a given system of justification or explanation as epistemically prior to or more fundamental than the other propositions in the system. Epistemic readings (as I shall call them) arguably constitute a majority in the secondary literature. This predominant view has been challenged by Robin Smith (1986) and Michael Ferejohn (1994; 2013), who propose interpretations that should be classified as non-epistemic according to the definition above. My aim in this article is purely negative. I intend to show that these non-epistemic interpretations are liable to serious objections and are in conflict with some important features of Aristotle’s theory of demonstration.","PeriodicalId":185531,"journal":{"name":"Journal of ancient philosophy","volume":"333 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139308918","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-10-31DOI: 10.11606/issn.1981-9471.v17i2p44-70
Rodrigo Romão de Carvalho
Ao longo da Metafísica e dos tratados de filosofia natural, Aristóteles toma os organismos vivos como os exemplos paradigmáticos de οὐσίαι (substâncias) naturais. No entanto, além dos organismos vivos, em certas passagens o filósofo menciona, também, as partes dos viventes e os elementos como exemplos de substâncias. Contudo, em outras passagens, Aristóteles parece considerar que as partes dos seres vivos e os corpos elementares não representariam, genuinamente ou propriamente, entidades substanciais. Por outro lado, em nenhum momento, o filósofo parece indicar expressamente os corpos homogêneos inanimados (metais e minerais), tratados no livro IV dos Meteorológicos, enquanto tipos de seres substanciais. Neste artigo, pretendo, então, examinar se as partes do vivente e os elementos poderiam, de fato, contar ou não como exemplares genuínos de substâncias naturais; e em que medida os corpos homogêneos inanimados, a despeito de não serem explicitamente citados na condição de entes substanciais, poderiam, a partir do exame de suas naturezas composicionais, sustentarem, de uma maneira estrita, o título de οὐσίαι naturais.
{"title":"O ponto de intersecção entre compostos naturais propriamente e não propriamente substanciais em Aristóteles","authors":"Rodrigo Romão de Carvalho","doi":"10.11606/issn.1981-9471.v17i2p44-70","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.11606/issn.1981-9471.v17i2p44-70","url":null,"abstract":"Ao longo da Metafísica e dos tratados de filosofia natural, Aristóteles toma os organismos vivos como os exemplos paradigmáticos de οὐσίαι (substâncias) naturais. No entanto, além dos organismos vivos, em certas passagens o filósofo menciona, também, as partes dos viventes e os elementos como exemplos de substâncias. Contudo, em outras passagens, Aristóteles parece considerar que as partes dos seres vivos e os corpos elementares não representariam, genuinamente ou propriamente, entidades substanciais. Por outro lado, em nenhum momento, o filósofo parece indicar expressamente os corpos homogêneos inanimados (metais e minerais), tratados no livro IV dos Meteorológicos, enquanto tipos de seres substanciais. Neste artigo, pretendo, então, examinar se as partes do vivente e os elementos poderiam, de fato, contar ou não como exemplares genuínos de substâncias naturais; e em que medida os corpos homogêneos inanimados, a despeito de não serem explicitamente citados na condição de entes substanciais, poderiam, a partir do exame de suas naturezas composicionais, sustentarem, de uma maneira estrita, o título de οὐσίαι naturais.","PeriodicalId":185531,"journal":{"name":"Journal of ancient philosophy","volume":"3 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139307083","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-10-31DOI: 10.11606/issn.1981-9471.v17i2p01-28
Terezis Christos
In this study, I attempt to shed light on whether some passages from the Platonic dialogue Cratylus that deal with language correspond to Karl Popper’s theory on the third world. Specifically, I attempt to prove that Plato’s third world contains both divine and human properties, something that is provided through language, that is, through the human rational and developing in objective terms construction. In the four subchapters of my study, I basically investigate the relationship between the thinking subject and the noumenon as well as the role of the coiner of names and the dialectician with respect to the scientific foundation of the names. The most important conclusion drawn is that according to Plato these two are responsible for connecting a thinking subject with a noumenon by adding objective certainty to the meaning of everything is said. I also investigate how Plato’s archetypal Ideas could be considered to be the third world.
{"title":"Linguistic (and Ontological?) encounters between Plato and Karl Popper","authors":"Terezis Christos","doi":"10.11606/issn.1981-9471.v17i2p01-28","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.11606/issn.1981-9471.v17i2p01-28","url":null,"abstract":"In this study, I attempt to shed light on whether some passages from the Platonic dialogue Cratylus that deal with language correspond to Karl Popper’s theory on the third world. Specifically, I attempt to prove that Plato’s third world contains both divine and human properties, something that is provided through language, that is, through the human rational and developing in objective terms construction. In the four subchapters of my study, I basically investigate the relationship between the thinking subject and the noumenon as well as the role of the coiner of names and the dialectician with respect to the scientific foundation of the names. The most important conclusion drawn is that according to Plato these two are responsible for connecting a thinking subject with a noumenon by adding objective certainty to the meaning of everything is said. I also investigate how Plato’s archetypal Ideas could be considered to be the third world.","PeriodicalId":185531,"journal":{"name":"Journal of ancient philosophy","volume":"21 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139306909","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-10-31DOI: 10.11606/issn.1981-9471.v17i2p134-161
Brian Andrew Lightbody
The Protagoras is the touchstone of Socrates’ moral intellectualist stance. The position in a nutshell stipulates that the proper reevaluation of a desire is enough to neutralize it.[1] The implication of this position is that akrasia or weakness of will is not the result of desire (or fear for that matter) overpowering reason but is due to ignorance. Socrates’ eliminativist position on weakness of will, however, flies in the face of the common-sense experience regarding akratic action and thus Aristotle was at pains to render Socrates’ account of moral incontinence intelligible. The key improvement Aristotle makes to Socrates’s model is to underscore that the conditioning of the akratic’s body plays a critical role in determining the power of one’s appetites and, accordingly, the capacity of one to resist the temptations these appetites present for rational evaluation. As Aristotle puts it, “For the incontinent man is like the people who get drunk quickly and on little wine, i.e., on less than most people.” (1151a 3-4). Aristotle presents what I shall call a somatic paradigm (i.e. the drunkard analogy) in order to tackle the problem of akrasia and it is this somatic solution that marks a significant improvement over Socrates’s intellectualist or informational model or so the tradition tells us. In this paper, I wish to push back on the above Aristotelian explanation. I argue that when one fully examines Socrates’ account of weakness of will that Aristotle’s solution is less effective than is traditionally thought. In fact, Socrates can bring Aristotle’s model into his own; just as Aristotle absorbs what is right about Socrates’s model, namely, that akratic action utilizes reason but to a limited degree, Socrates in Meno (77C-78A) develops his own somatic model of weakness of will that connects to the intellectualist paradigm of the Protagoras. To achieve this rapprochement between the two models, I zero in on the description provided by Socrates of those individuals who desire bad things knowing they are bad as “ill-starred” or “bad spirited” (κακοδαίμων ). The “bad-spirited” is the coward and, in contrast to Aristotle’s drunkard, becomes fearful quickly from little danger. This additional somatic component, when connected to Socrates’s position on akrasia in Protagoras adds a new twist to Socrates’s model in the following way: while no one wishes to be ill-starred such that more harm than good will befall one, one may become so as a result of the bad choices one knowingly makes. [1] “After him came Socrates, who spoke better and further about this subject, but even he was not successful. For he used to make the virtues into sciences, and this is impossible. For the sciences all involve reason, and reason is to be found in the intellectual part of the soul. So that all the virtues, according to him arise in the rational part of the soul. The result is that in making the virtues into sciences he is doing away with the nonrational part
{"title":"On Becoming Fearful Quickly: A Reinterpretation of Aristotle’s Somatic Model of Socratean akrasia.","authors":"Brian Andrew Lightbody","doi":"10.11606/issn.1981-9471.v17i2p134-161","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.11606/issn.1981-9471.v17i2p134-161","url":null,"abstract":"The Protagoras is the touchstone of Socrates’ moral intellectualist stance. The position in a nutshell stipulates that the proper reevaluation of a desire is enough to neutralize it.[1] The implication of this position is that akrasia or weakness of will is not the result of desire (or fear for that matter) overpowering reason but is due to ignorance. Socrates’ eliminativist position on weakness of will, however, flies in the face of the common-sense experience regarding akratic action and thus Aristotle was at pains to render Socrates’ account of moral incontinence intelligible. The key improvement Aristotle makes to Socrates’s model is to underscore that the conditioning of the akratic’s body plays a critical role in determining the power of one’s appetites and, accordingly, the capacity of one to resist the temptations these appetites present for rational evaluation. As Aristotle puts it, “For the incontinent man is like the people who get drunk quickly and on little wine, i.e., on less than most people.” (1151a 3-4). Aristotle presents what I shall call a somatic paradigm (i.e. the drunkard analogy) in order to tackle the problem of akrasia and it is this somatic solution that marks a significant improvement over Socrates’s intellectualist or informational model or so the tradition tells us. In this paper, I wish to push back on the above Aristotelian explanation. I argue that when one fully examines Socrates’ account of weakness of will that Aristotle’s solution is less effective than is traditionally thought. In fact, Socrates can bring Aristotle’s model into his own; just as Aristotle absorbs what is right about Socrates’s model, namely, that akratic action utilizes reason but to a limited degree, Socrates in Meno (77C-78A) develops his own somatic model of weakness of will that connects to the intellectualist paradigm of the Protagoras. To achieve this rapprochement between the two models, I zero in on the description provided by Socrates of those individuals who desire bad things knowing they are bad as “ill-starred” or “bad spirited” (κακοδαίμων ). The “bad-spirited” is the coward and, in contrast to Aristotle’s drunkard, becomes fearful quickly from little danger. This additional somatic component, when connected to Socrates’s position on akrasia in Protagoras adds a new twist to Socrates’s model in the following way: while no one wishes to be ill-starred such that more harm than good will befall one, one may become so as a result of the bad choices one knowingly makes. [1] “After him came Socrates, who spoke better and further about this subject, but even he was not successful. For he used to make the virtues into sciences, and this is impossible. For the sciences all involve reason, and reason is to be found in the intellectual part of the soul. So that all the virtues, according to him arise in the rational part of the soul. The result is that in making the virtues into sciences he is doing away with the nonrational part ","PeriodicalId":185531,"journal":{"name":"Journal of ancient philosophy","volume":"13 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139308254","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-05-31DOI: 10.11606/issn.1981-9471.v17i1p139-146
Orestis Karasmanis
In this paper I discuss passage 403a10-16 from Aristotle’s De Anima. In this passage Aristotle deals with whether the soul could be separate from the body and presents an analogy with geometrical entities. This passage is highly obscure and it presents many textual difficulties. The interpretation I offer resolves the textual problems without requiring emendations to the text as many commentators suggest.
{"title":"A Note on Aristotle’s De Anima Α 1, 403a10-16","authors":"Orestis Karasmanis","doi":"10.11606/issn.1981-9471.v17i1p139-146","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.11606/issn.1981-9471.v17i1p139-146","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper I discuss passage 403a10-16 from Aristotle’s De Anima. In this passage Aristotle deals with whether the soul could be separate from the body and presents an analogy with geometrical entities. This passage is highly obscure and it presents many textual difficulties. The interpretation I offer resolves the textual problems without requiring emendations to the text as many commentators suggest.","PeriodicalId":185531,"journal":{"name":"Journal of ancient philosophy","volume":"18 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-05-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126997744","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-05-31DOI: 10.11606/issn.1981-9471.v17i1p121-138
C. Pineda
In a paper published in 1998, Ricardo Salles argues that the Stoic theory of action cannot account for practical knowledge, i.e., knowledge about what action is appropriate to be carried out in certain circumstances. The aim of this paper is to propose a solution to this problem. For this aim, I argue that the Stoics developed a perceptual theory of moral knowledge. According to this theory, the moral properties instantiated in objects, people, and actions are known through perception. After explaining this theory, I argue that it allows us to show that the Stoics deemed perception as a source of practical knowledge.
{"title":"Percepción Moral y Conocimiento Práctico en el Estoicismo","authors":"C. Pineda","doi":"10.11606/issn.1981-9471.v17i1p121-138","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.11606/issn.1981-9471.v17i1p121-138","url":null,"abstract":"In a paper published in 1998, Ricardo Salles argues that the Stoic theory of action cannot account for practical knowledge, i.e., knowledge about what action is appropriate to be carried out in certain circumstances. The aim of this paper is to propose a solution to this problem. For this aim, I argue that the Stoics developed a perceptual theory of moral knowledge. According to this theory, the moral properties instantiated in objects, people, and actions are known through perception. After explaining this theory, I argue that it allows us to show that the Stoics deemed perception as a source of practical knowledge.","PeriodicalId":185531,"journal":{"name":"Journal of ancient philosophy","volume":"52 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-05-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125190217","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-05-31DOI: 10.11606/issn.1981-9471.v17i1p80-95
Nathan Elvidge
I focus on the distinction between universal and particular knowledge or knowledge simpliciter in APr 2.21 and APo 1.1 as Aristotle’s explicit response to the paradox of the Meno. I attempt to derive a picture of Aristotle’s understanding of the philosophical problem underlying that paradox by asking what that problem would have to be in order for this distinction to make sense as a response to it. I consider two ways of taking the distinction, and argue that both point towards a problem about deriving knowledge of particulars from knowledge of universals as the fundamental problem underlying Aristotle’s understanding of the Meno paradox.
{"title":"How Does Aristotle Understand the Paradox of the Meno?","authors":"Nathan Elvidge","doi":"10.11606/issn.1981-9471.v17i1p80-95","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.11606/issn.1981-9471.v17i1p80-95","url":null,"abstract":"I focus on the distinction between universal and particular knowledge or knowledge simpliciter in APr 2.21 and APo 1.1 as Aristotle’s explicit response to the paradox of the Meno. I attempt to derive a picture of Aristotle’s understanding of the philosophical problem underlying that paradox by asking what that problem would have to be in order for this distinction to make sense as a response to it. I consider two ways of taking the distinction, and argue that both point towards a problem about deriving knowledge of particulars from knowledge of universals as the fundamental problem underlying Aristotle’s understanding of the Meno paradox.","PeriodicalId":185531,"journal":{"name":"Journal of ancient philosophy","volume":"24 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-05-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114264540","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-05-31DOI: 10.11606/issn.1981-9471.v17i1p01-35
D. R. N. Lopes
This essay argues that Callicles is depicted by Plato in the Gorgias as a potential tyrant from a psychological standpoint. To this end I will contend that the Calliclean moral psychology sketched at 491e-492c points towards the analysis of the tyrannical individual pursued by Plato in books VIII and IX of the Republic based upon the tripartite theory of the soul. I will thereby attempt to show that (i) in the Gorgias, Callicles does not actually personify the ideal of the superior person advocated by himself insofar as he is still susceptible to shame, as evinced by Socrates' cross-examination (494c-495a); and that (ii) looking forward to the Republic, he can be understood for this same reason as being precisely on the threshold between the democratic and the tyrannical soul.
{"title":"Callicles as a Potential Tyrant in Plato's Gorgias","authors":"D. R. N. Lopes","doi":"10.11606/issn.1981-9471.v17i1p01-35","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.11606/issn.1981-9471.v17i1p01-35","url":null,"abstract":"This essay argues that Callicles is depicted by Plato in the Gorgias as a potential tyrant from a psychological standpoint. To this end I will contend that the Calliclean moral psychology sketched at 491e-492c points towards the analysis of the tyrannical individual pursued by Plato in books VIII and IX of the Republic based upon the tripartite theory of the soul. I will thereby attempt to show that (i) in the Gorgias, Callicles does not actually personify the ideal of the superior person advocated by himself insofar as he is still susceptible to shame, as evinced by Socrates' cross-examination (494c-495a); and that (ii) looking forward to the Republic, he can be understood for this same reason as being precisely on the threshold between the democratic and the tyrannical soul.","PeriodicalId":185531,"journal":{"name":"Journal of ancient philosophy","volume":"47 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-05-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115751333","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
京公网安备 11010802042870号
京ICP备2023020795号-1
扫码关注我们
求助内容：
应助结果提醒方式：