基于功耗分析的硬件木马检测

H. Xue, Shuo Li, S. Ren
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引用次数: 8

摘要

芯片产品链的外包使得硬件容易受到攻击。例如,具有硬件制造过程访问权限的攻击者可以通过插入隐藏的硬件元素(硬件木马)来改变真实的硬件。因此,微电子电路硬件木马检测成为芯片生产的关键步骤。提出了一种基于功耗分析的微电子电路硬件木马检测方法。该检测方法采用90nm CMOS工艺实现。基于仿真结果,我们提出的技术可以检测到占主机电路面积0.013%的硬件木马。
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Power analysis-based Hardware Trojan detection
Outsourcing of chip product chain makes hardware vulnerable to being attacked. For example, an attacker who has access to hardware fabrication process can alter the genuine hardware with the insertion of concealed hardware elements (Hardware Trojan). Therefore, microelectronic circuit Hardware Trojan detection becomes a key step of chip production. A power analysis-based power-analysis microelectronic circuit Hardware Trojan detection methodology is proposed in this paper. The detection method is implemented in 90nm CMOS process. Based on simulation results, our proposed technique can detect Hardware Trojans with areas that are 0.013% of the host-circuitry.
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