Coup Process and Private Information Under Autocracy

Traditional point views the success of coup as the shifting of focal point from supporting dictator to supporting coup plotter, which cannot be rationalized. When we look at coup’s micro-process, we find that it is rationalizable. In this paper, I propose a model of coup with unique sub-game perfect equilibrium that focus on plotter and follower’s decision making process, and use it to study how the revelation of plotter’s ability affects the winning chance thus his decision of whether to start a coup. I show that the plotter’s income plays as a double edged-sword to the safety of the dictator. On one hand, high income decreases plotter’s motivation; on the other hand, it augments the plotter’s winning chance once coup is implemented. Meanwhile, this model also shows hidden ability is more effective than visible power in the coup process. Moreover, it is found that regime becomes more stable after some time without coup.