Policy inertia and mass protests have been part of politics in northeast China for decades. Chinese scholars and policymakers have partly attributed these phenomena to a region-specific ideological resistance based on nostalgia for the former Maoist political economy which obstructs implementation of market-oriented economic policies. However, these phenomena can also be explained as political consequences of the northeast China’s status as a deindustrialising regional economy. This article will create an analytical framework for understanding the political consequences of regional deindustrialisation and apply it to the case of northeast China. It argues that because of China’s authoritarian regime, political expression occurs through local party-state resistance to central government economic policy change and ‘social disturbances’ like worker protests, where in other regional rust belts in democratic regimes, these same sentiments can be expressed though electoral politics.
{"title":"Northeast China’s Rust Belt Politics: A New Governing Challenge for the Party-State in a Post-Industrial Era?","authors":"Nathan Attrill","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3667616","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3667616","url":null,"abstract":"Policy inertia and mass protests have been part of politics in northeast China for decades. Chinese scholars and policymakers have partly attributed these phenomena to a region-specific ideological resistance based on nostalgia for the former Maoist political economy which obstructs implementation of market-oriented economic policies. However, these phenomena can also be explained as political consequences of the northeast China’s status as a deindustrialising regional economy. This article will create an analytical framework for understanding the political consequences of regional deindustrialisation and apply it to the case of northeast China. It argues that because of China’s authoritarian regime, political expression occurs through local party-state resistance to central government economic policy change and ‘social disturbances’ like worker protests, where in other regional rust belts in democratic regimes, these same sentiments can be expressed though electoral politics.","PeriodicalId":189833,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Politics of Autocratic Regimes (Topic)","volume":"3 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-07-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128454841","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The literature suggests that dictators allocate resources to loyal supporters and protect them from political attacks. However, it has not distinguished between the dictator’s resource allocation and rational allocation by economic actors in anticipation of a new leader. We theorize that rational expectation in authoritarian political economy has its greatest impact on the cross-sectional distribution of resources rather than over-time growth or inflation. To test this, we take advantage of the time disparity between a clear sign of Xi Jinping’s becoming the next Chinese Communist Party General Secretary in October 2010 and his assumption to power in November 2012. Real estate and transportation infrastructure investment increased in provinces with factional tie to Xi following this sign, but before Xi had gained formal authorities to allocate resources himself. Additionally, the expectation of protection from Xi had a separate, positive effect on real estate investment in the midst of an anti-corruption drive.
{"title":"Expectation of Power, Protective Umbrella, Or Both: Investigating the Heterogeneous Effect of Power on Provincial Investment in China","authors":"Victor C. Shih, T. Duy","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3872091","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3872091","url":null,"abstract":"The literature suggests that dictators allocate resources to loyal supporters and protect them from political attacks. However, it has not distinguished between the dictator’s resource allocation and rational allocation by economic actors in anticipation of a new leader. We theorize that rational expectation in authoritarian political economy has its greatest impact on the cross-sectional distribution of resources rather than over-time growth or inflation. To test this, we take advantage of the time disparity between a clear sign of Xi Jinping’s becoming the next Chinese Communist Party General Secretary in October 2010 and his assumption to power in November 2012. Real estate and transportation infrastructure investment increased in provinces with factional tie to Xi following this sign, but before Xi had gained formal authorities to allocate resources himself. Additionally, the expectation of protection from Xi had a separate, positive effect on real estate investment in the midst of an anti-corruption drive.","PeriodicalId":189833,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Politics of Autocratic Regimes (Topic)","volume":"407 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-05-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134157733","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Korean Abstract: 본고에서는 텍스트 마이닝 등 인공지능 분석 기법을 활용하여 북한 학술지 「경제연구」의 제목에서 유추할 수 있는 북한 경제정책 변화를 분석해 보았다. 「경제연구」에 수록된 논문을 김일성, 김정일, 김정은 시기로 구분하여, 각 통치자별 경제정책의 특징을 일관성과 변화 관점에서 추적하였다. 통치자의 정책적 관심사를 반영한다고 볼 수 있는 「경제연구」에 게재된 논문에 대한 심층 분석 결과는 김일성, 김정일, 김정은으로 이어지는 통치자 관점에서 경제정책의 핵심적인 방향과 당면 과제의 변화를 잘 포착하고 있다. 분석 결과, ‘주체의 경제이론’에 기반한 ‘사회주의 경제강국건설’을 위한 ‘경제사업’에 대한 ‘국가의 전략적 관리’는 일관되게 강조되는 원칙으로 고수하면서도, 대내외 환경변화에 대응한 차별화된 정책 방향의 변화도 관찰되었다. 또한 통치자 시기별로 논문 주제의 분포가 크게 다르게 나타나며 주제의 범위나 방향도 최고통치자에 따라 많은 차이가 나타났다. 「경제연구」등 북한 문헌에 대한 연구는 북한 내부에서 일어나고 있는 정책의 변화를 잘 반영하고 있으므로 대북정책 수립에 기여할 것으로 기대된다.
English Abstract: This paper analyzes changes in North Korea’s economic policy according to the North Korean journal, Economic Research, through various analysis techniques of text mining. The paper included in Economic Research is divided into periods according to ruler－Kim Il-sung, Kim Jong-il, and Kim Jong-un, and tracks the consistency of and changes in each ruler’s economic policies. The analysis showed a change in policy direction that was differentiated in response to changes in the internal and external environments while adhering to the principle of consistent emphasis on national strategic management for the “socialist economic construction of a powerful country” based on the economic theory of Juche. The in-depth analysis of the paper published in Economic Research, which reflects the policy interests of the rulers, captures changes in the core direction and challenges of economic policy from the perspective of rulers. The number and the variety of the thesis topics is more obvious in Kim Jong-un compared to the former highest rulers. The study of North Korean literature, including Economic Research, is expected to contribute to the establishment of North Korea’s policy as it reflects the change in policy taking place inside the country.
Korean Abstract:本高中利用文本挖掘等人工智能分析技法，分析了从朝鲜学术杂志《经济研究》题目中可以类推的朝鲜经济政策变化。《经济研究》收录的论文分为金日成、金正日、金正恩时期，从一贯性和变化的观点追踪了各统治者经济政策的特征。《经济研究》刊登的论文反映了统治者的政策关注焦点，对该论文的深层分析结果从金日成、金正日、金正银等统治者的观点出发，很好地捕捉到了经济政策的核心方向和当前课题的变化。分析结果显示,“主体的经济理论”为基础的“建设社会主义经济强国”为“经济”对国家的战略管理”的一贯强调,虽然坚持原则,应对内外环境变化的差别化政策方向的变化,观察了。另外，在统治者时期，论文主题的分布也有很大的不同，主题的范围和方向也因最高统治者而有很大的差异。《经济研究》等对北韩文献的研究很好地反映了北韩内部正在发生的政策变化，因此有望对制定对北政策做出贡献。English Abstract: This paper analyzes changes in North Korea ' s economic policy according to the North Korean journal, economic Research, through various analysis techniques of text mining。The paper included in Economic Research is divided into periods according to ruler - Kim Il-sung, Kim Jong- Il, and Kim Jong-unand tracks the consistency of and changes in each ruler ' s economic policies。The analysis showed a change in policy direction that was differentiated in response to changes in The internal and external environments while adhering to The principle of consistent emphasis onnational strategic management for the socialist economic construction of a powerful country " based on the economic theory of Juche。The in-depth analysis of The paper published in Economic Research, which reflects The policy interests of The rulers，captures changes in the core direction and challenges of经济政策from the perspective of rulers。The number and The variety of The thesis topics is more obvious in Kim Jong-un compared to The former highest rulers。北朝鲜文学研究，包括经济研究is expected to contribute to the establishment of North Korea ' s policy as it reflects the change in policy taking place inside the country。
{"title":"북한 「경제연구」로 분석한 경제정책 변화: 텍스트 마이닝 접근법 (Economic Policy Changes in North Korea: A Text Mining Approach to Economic Research)","authors":"Soohyon Kim, Woo-Hyong Sohn","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3540582","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3540582","url":null,"abstract":"<b>Korean Abstract:</b> 본고에서는 텍스트 마이닝 등 인공지능 분석 기법을 활용하여 북한 학술지 「경제연구」의 제목에서 유추할 수 있는 북한 경제정책 변화를 분석해 보았다. 「경제연구」에 수록된 논문을 김일성, 김정일, 김정은 시기로 구분하여, 각 통치자별 경제정책의 특징을 일관성과 변화 관점에서 추적하였다. 통치자의 정책적 관심사를 반영한다고 볼 수 있는 「경제연구」에 게재된 논문에 대한 심층 분석 결과는 김일성, 김정일, 김정은으로 이어지는 통치자 관점에서 경제정책의 핵심적인 방향과 당면 과제의 변화를 잘 포착하고 있다. 분석 결과, ‘주체의 경제이론’에 기반한 ‘사회주의 경제강국건설’을 위한 ‘경제사업’에 대한 ‘국가의 전략적 관리’는 일관되게 강조되는 원칙으로 고수하면서도, 대내외 환경변화에 대응한 차별화된 정책 방향의 변화도 관찰되었다. 또한 통치자 시기별로 논문 주제의 분포가 크게 다르게 나타나며 주제의 범위나 방향도 최고통치자에 따라 많은 차이가 나타났다. 「경제연구」등 북한 문헌에 대한 연구는 북한 내부에서 일어나고 있는 정책의 변화를 잘 반영하고 있으므로 대북정책 수립에 기여할 것으로 기대된다.<br><br><b>English Abstract:</b> This paper analyzes changes in North Korea’s economic policy according to the North Korean journal, Economic Research, through various analysis techniques of text mining. The paper included in Economic Research is divided into periods according to ruler－Kim Il-sung, Kim Jong-il, and Kim Jong-un, and tracks the consistency of and changes in each ruler’s economic policies. The analysis showed a change in policy direction that was differentiated in response to changes in the internal and external environments while adhering to the principle of consistent emphasis on national strategic management for the “socialist economic construction of a powerful country” based on the economic theory of Juche. The in-depth analysis of the paper published in Economic Research, which reflects the policy interests of the rulers, captures changes in the core direction and challenges of economic policy from the perspective of rulers. The number and the variety of the thesis topics is more obvious in Kim Jong-un compared to the former highest rulers. The study of North Korean literature, including Economic Research, is expected to contribute to the establishment of North Korea’s policy as it reflects the change in policy taking place inside the country.","PeriodicalId":189833,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Politics of Autocratic Regimes (Topic)","volume":"2 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-02-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125253356","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This research was supported by Vetenskapsradet [grant number 2018-016114], PI: Anna Luehrmann and European Research Council, Grant 724191, PI: Staff an I. Lindberg, V-Dem Institute, University of Gothenburg, Sweden as well as by internal grants from the Vice-Chancellors offi ce, the Dean of the College of Social Sciences, and the Department of Political Science at University of Gothenburg. We are grateful for Philipp Toenjes' and Sandra Grahn's skillful research assistance.
本研究得到了Vetenskapsradet[资助号2018-016114]，PI: Anna Luehrmann和欧洲研究委员会，资助号724191,PI: Staff和I. Lindberg，瑞典哥德堡大学V-Dem研究所，以及哥德堡大学副校长办公室，社会科学学院院长和政治学系的内部资助。我们非常感谢Philipp Toenjes和Sandra Grahn的研究协助。
{"title":"When Democracy has a Fever: States of Emergency As a Symptom and Accelerator of Autocratization","authors":"Anna Lührmann, B. Rooney","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3345155","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3345155","url":null,"abstract":"This research was supported by Vetenskapsradet [grant number 2018-016114], PI: Anna Luehrmann and European Research Council, Grant 724191, PI: Staff an I. Lindberg, V-Dem Institute, University of Gothenburg, Sweden as well as by internal grants from the Vice-Chancellors offi ce, the Dean of the College of Social Sciences, and the Department of Political Science at University of Gothenburg. We are grateful for Philipp Toenjes' and Sandra Grahn's skillful research assistance.","PeriodicalId":189833,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Politics of Autocratic Regimes (Topic)","volume":"44 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114542712","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper analyses the role of autocratic governors in public procurement performance on the sub-national level. In particular, we estimate the impact of autocratic governors’ tenure and their local ties on competition over public procurement and contract execution. To this purpose, we use the data on public contracts on road construction and repair in Russian regions from 2011-2014 and match it with the biographical information of governors, who administrate the auctions. We find the evidence that governors who are appointed by the president and do not have pre-governing local ties in the region (governors-outsiders) demonstrate predatory behaviour, compared with governors with local ties (governors-insiders). In particular, governors-outsiders restrict the competition at public procurement auctions significantly more than governors-insiders. Moreover, this restriction becomes worse with tenure in office by governors-outsiders, while governors-insiders do not exert this tenure effect. We argue that this restriction of competition cannot be explained by the intention of better contracts execution. Namely, the delays in execution and the probability of contract termination both increase with tenure for governors-outsiders and are quite stable for governors-insiders
{"title":"The Role of Governors in Public Procurement","authors":"Andrey Tkachenko, D. Esaulov","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3301191","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3301191","url":null,"abstract":"This paper analyses the role of autocratic governors in public procurement performance on the sub-national level. In particular, we estimate the impact of autocratic governors’ tenure and their local ties on competition over public procurement and contract execution. To this purpose, we use the data on public contracts on road construction and repair in Russian regions from 2011-2014 and match it with the biographical information of governors, who administrate the auctions. We find the evidence that governors who are appointed by the president and do not have pre-governing local ties in the region (governors-outsiders) demonstrate predatory behaviour, compared with governors with local ties (governors-insiders). In particular, governors-outsiders restrict the competition at public procurement auctions significantly more than governors-insiders. Moreover, this restriction becomes worse with tenure in office by governors-outsiders, while governors-insiders do not exert this tenure effect. We argue that this restriction of competition cannot be explained by the intention of better contracts execution. Namely, the delays in execution and the probability of contract termination both increase with tenure for governors-outsiders and are quite stable for governors-insiders","PeriodicalId":189833,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Politics of Autocratic Regimes (Topic)","volume":"43 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-12-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125458597","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Authoritarian or illiberal regimes control a growing number of states throughout the world. Among the information strategies that these regimes use to gain and maintain support are the dissemination of false or misleading policy information and the use of manipulative policy frames. Deliberative mini-publics can partially counter those strategies by distributing accurate policy information and employing non-exploitative policy frames that affirm the dignity of members of the polity as free and equal citizens.
{"title":"Deliberative Mini-publics As a Partial Antidote to Authoritarian Information Strategies","authors":"R. Richards","doi":"10.16997/JDD.305","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.16997/JDD.305","url":null,"abstract":"Authoritarian or illiberal regimes control a growing number of states throughout the world. Among the information strategies that these regimes use to gain and maintain support are the dissemination of false or misleading policy information and the use of manipulative policy frames. Deliberative mini-publics can partially counter those strategies by distributing accurate policy information and employing non-exploitative policy frames that affirm the dignity of members of the polity as free and equal citizens.","PeriodicalId":189833,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Politics of Autocratic Regimes (Topic)","volume":"12 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-12-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128124357","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We develop a model of reform and rebellion to explore Alexis de Tocqueville's conjecture that reform provokes political unrest. Our theory emphasizes that reform often must be implemented by local actors with a stake in the status quo. In this setting, the promise of reform represents an implicit contract against which subsequent implementation is measured: when implementation falls short of the promise, citizens are aggrieved and more likely to rebel. In equilibrium, when reform is predominantly under local control, a more ambitious reform encourages greater implementation; nonetheless, the equilibrium probability of rebellion also increases. We illustrate our argument with a discussion of Russia's Emancipation Reform of 1861.
{"title":"The Tocqueville Paradox: When Does Reform Provoke Rebellion?","authors":"E. Finkel, Scott Gehlbach","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3202013","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3202013","url":null,"abstract":"We develop a model of reform and rebellion to explore Alexis de Tocqueville's conjecture that reform provokes political unrest. Our theory emphasizes that reform often must be implemented by local actors with a stake in the status quo. In this setting, the promise of reform represents an implicit contract against which subsequent implementation is measured: when implementation falls short of the promise, citizens are aggrieved and more likely to rebel. In equilibrium, when reform is predominantly under local control, a more ambitious reform encourages greater implementation; nonetheless, the equilibrium probability of rebellion also increases. We illustrate our argument with a discussion of Russia's Emancipation Reform of 1861.","PeriodicalId":189833,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Politics of Autocratic Regimes (Topic)","volume":"71 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-11-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127284573","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Unity and indivisibility proclaimed by Jean Bodin is the fundamental principle of sovereignty. As it is shown in this text, this principle can be productively problematized. At the heart of this problematization is the conflict between the two "rock" political forms, singled out by Karl Schmitt - representation and identity/immanence, taken as an unavoidable condition for the possibility of the exercising of state power. Conflict, in this case, is understood not as divarication, not as the situation of choice in favour of one or another basis of sovereignty. It is about the possibilities of using the unavoidability of this very conflict itself for the construction of unique "bad governments", the so-called authoritarian regimes. In the introduction, we've drawn the distinction between ontological and symbolic sovereignty, symmetric with Schmitt's distinction between identity and representation. In the first chapter, the problem of transforming a sovereign into a "figure of silence" in European political philosophy is elaborated. In the second chapter, we analyze two strategies of "gaining" sovereignty: Kant's and de Sade's. In the third, we propose a sketch of a reconceptualization of the dictatorship, based on the dictator's ability to use resources of identity as a political form.
{"title":"По Ту Сторону Принципа Единства Суверенитета: Тождество и Репрезентация Как Ресурсы Авторитарной Власти (Beyond the Principle of Sovereign Unity: Identity and Representation as the Resources of Authoritarian Power)","authors":"V. Vakhshtayn","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3203307","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3203307","url":null,"abstract":"Unity and indivisibility proclaimed by Jean Bodin is the fundamental principle of sovereignty. As it is shown in this text, this principle can be productively problematized. At the heart of this problematization is the conflict between the two \"rock\" political forms, singled out by Karl Schmitt - representation and identity/immanence, taken as an unavoidable condition for the possibility of the exercising of state power. Conflict, in this case, is understood not as divarication, not as the situation of choice in favour of one or another basis of sovereignty. It is about the possibilities of using the unavoidability of this very conflict itself for the construction of unique \"bad governments\", the so-called authoritarian regimes. In the introduction, we've drawn the distinction between ontological and symbolic sovereignty, symmetric with Schmitt's distinction between identity and representation. In the first chapter, the problem of transforming a sovereign into a \"figure of silence\" in European political philosophy is elaborated. In the second chapter, we analyze two strategies of \"gaining\" sovereignty: Kant's and de Sade's. In the third, we propose a sketch of a reconceptualization of the dictatorship, based on the dictator's ability to use resources of identity as a political form.","PeriodicalId":189833,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Politics of Autocratic Regimes (Topic)","volume":"64 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-06-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115805488","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Do sanctions strengthen the targeted regime? I analyze the 2014 imposition of Western sanctions on Russia and its impact on voting. The United States and the European Union introduced targeted measures against Russian entities and individuals related to President Putin’s regime. Using polling station-level data I investigate whether President Putin gained relatively more support among those local constituencies which were geographically close to a sanctioned firm. I find a significant effect of targeted sanctions imposition on the vote share in presidential elections between 2012 and 2018. Polling stations exposed to a sanctioned firm displayed larger increase in support for presidential candidate Putin. The effect is mediated through an increasingly patriotic rhetoric on Russian state TV. Contrary to policymakers’ hopes, modern-day targeted sanctions seem to be beneficial to a dictator.
{"title":"Did Sanctions Help Putin?","authors":"Aleksandra Peeva","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3403261","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3403261","url":null,"abstract":"Do sanctions strengthen the targeted regime? I analyze the 2014 imposition of Western sanctions on Russia and its impact on voting. The United States and the European Union introduced targeted measures against Russian entities and individuals related to President Putin’s regime. Using polling station-level data I investigate whether President Putin gained relatively more support among those local constituencies which were geographically close to a sanctioned firm. I find a significant effect of targeted sanctions imposition on the vote share in presidential elections between 2012 and 2018. Polling stations exposed to a sanctioned firm displayed larger increase in support for presidential candidate Putin. The effect is mediated through an increasingly patriotic rhetoric on Russian state TV. Contrary to policymakers’ hopes, modern-day targeted sanctions seem to be beneficial to a dictator.","PeriodicalId":189833,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Politics of Autocratic Regimes (Topic)","volume":"20 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114878642","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Free and fair elections are the cornerstone of a democratic system, but elections are common in other regimes as well. Such an election might be a pure farce, with the incumbents getting close to 100% of the vote. In other instances, incumbents allow opposition candidates to be on the ballot and run campaigns, limit electoral fraud, e.g., by inviting international observers, all to make elections appear fair. In our model, the incumbent is informed about his popularity, and having a fair election allows him to signal his popularity to the people. After casting their vote, heterogeneous citizens decide whether or not to participate in a protest, and they are more willing to do so if they expect others to protest as well. We demonstrate theoretically that regimes that have a high level of elite repression are less likely to have fair elections, but regimes with a high cost of protesting for ordinary citizens make fair elections more likely.
{"title":"Elections in Non-Democracies","authors":"Georgy Egorov, K. Sonin","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2497277","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2497277","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Free and fair elections are the cornerstone of a democratic system, but elections are common in other regimes as well. Such an election might be a pure farce, with the incumbents getting close to 100% of the vote. In other instances, incumbents allow opposition candidates to be on the ballot and run campaigns, limit electoral fraud, e.g., by inviting international observers, all to make elections appear fair. In our model, the incumbent is informed about his popularity, and having a fair election allows him to signal his popularity to the people. After casting their vote, heterogeneous citizens decide whether or not to participate in a protest, and they are more willing to do so if they expect others to protest as well. We demonstrate theoretically that regimes that have a high level of elite repression are less likely to have fair elections, but regimes with a high cost of protesting for ordinary citizens make fair elections more likely.","PeriodicalId":189833,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Politics of Autocratic Regimes (Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130065579","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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