{"title":"麦金太尔的动物理性观:对相对主义挑战的回应","authors":"Sherel Jeevan Mendonsa","doi":"10.36383/diskursus.v19i2.439","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Alasdair MacIntyre is considered one of the most prominent moral philosophers in the contemporary period. Nevertheless, some authors criticize his views on practical rationality as being relativistic. Though there have been authors who have defended MacIntyre through various arguments, none of these authors has referred to one of his later works, namely, Dependent Rational Animals: Why Human Beings Need the Virtues (DRA) for addressing the relativist challenge. The paper aims to fill this lacuna. Thus, the principal question to which the paper responds is: Can the views discussed in DRA contribute toward addressing the relativist challenge raised against MacIntyre? Accordingly, through various arguments, the paper demonstrates that MacIntyre’s views on animal rationality, vulnerability, and dependence as well as those concerning the virtues of care and misericordia as discussed in DRA contribute their mite toward addressing the relativist challenge raised against him.
 Abstrak 
 Alasdair MacIntyre merupakan salah satu pakar filsafat moral terkemuka di era kontemporer. Namun, beberapa pemikir menuduh konsepnya tentang rasionalitas praktis bersifat relativistis. Meski banyak penulis lain telah berusaha membela posisi MacIntyre, tidak satu pun dari mereka mendasarkan diri pada karya MacIntyre yang lebih mutakhir, y.i. Dependent Rational Animals: Why Human Beings Need the Virtues (DRA). Makalah ini berusaha untuk mengisi kekosongan tersebut. Maka, pertanyaan utama tulisan ini ialah apakah gagasan-gagasan yang dikembangkan MacIntyre di dalam DRA dapat dipakai untuk menghadapi tuduhan relativisme terhadapnya. Artikel ini hendak menunjukkan bahwa konsep-konsep yang dikemukakan di dalam DRA, seperti “rasionalitas hewani” (animal rationality), kerapuhan, ketergantungan, kepedulian, dan belarasa (misericordia) dapat dipergunakan untuk menangkis tuduhan bahwa MacIntyre jatuh kedalam relativisme.
 Kata-kata Kunci: Alasdair MacIntyre, rasionalitas praktis, relativismemoral, rasionalitas hewani, kerapuhan, kepedulian","PeriodicalId":55670,"journal":{"name":"AlAraf Jurnal Pemikiran Islam dan Filsafat","volume":"121 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2023-09-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"A. MacIntyre’s Views on Animal Rationality: A Response to the Relativist Challenge\",\"authors\":\"Sherel Jeevan Mendonsa\",\"doi\":\"10.36383/diskursus.v19i2.439\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Alasdair MacIntyre is considered one of the most prominent moral philosophers in the contemporary period. Nevertheless, some authors criticize his views on practical rationality as being relativistic. Though there have been authors who have defended MacIntyre through various arguments, none of these authors has referred to one of his later works, namely, Dependent Rational Animals: Why Human Beings Need the Virtues (DRA) for addressing the relativist challenge. The paper aims to fill this lacuna. Thus, the principal question to which the paper responds is: Can the views discussed in DRA contribute toward addressing the relativist challenge raised against MacIntyre? Accordingly, through various arguments, the paper demonstrates that MacIntyre’s views on animal rationality, vulnerability, and dependence as well as those concerning the virtues of care and misericordia as discussed in DRA contribute their mite toward addressing the relativist challenge raised against him.
 Abstrak 
 Alasdair MacIntyre merupakan salah satu pakar filsafat moral terkemuka di era kontemporer. Namun, beberapa pemikir menuduh konsepnya tentang rasionalitas praktis bersifat relativistis. Meski banyak penulis lain telah berusaha membela posisi MacIntyre, tidak satu pun dari mereka mendasarkan diri pada karya MacIntyre yang lebih mutakhir, y.i. Dependent Rational Animals: Why Human Beings Need the Virtues (DRA). Makalah ini berusaha untuk mengisi kekosongan tersebut. Maka, pertanyaan utama tulisan ini ialah apakah gagasan-gagasan yang dikembangkan MacIntyre di dalam DRA dapat dipakai untuk menghadapi tuduhan relativisme terhadapnya. Artikel ini hendak menunjukkan bahwa konsep-konsep yang dikemukakan di dalam DRA, seperti “rasionalitas hewani” (animal rationality), kerapuhan, ketergantungan, kepedulian, dan belarasa (misericordia) dapat dipergunakan untuk menangkis tuduhan bahwa MacIntyre jatuh kedalam relativisme.
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引用次数: 0
摘要
麦金太尔被认为是当代最杰出的道德哲学家之一。然而,一些作者批评他的实践理性的观点是相对的。虽然有一些作者通过各种争论为麦金太尔辩护,但这些作者都没有提到他后来的一部作品,即《依赖的理性动物:为什么人类需要美德》(DRA),以应对相对主义的挑战。本文旨在填补这一空白。因此,本文回应的主要问题是:DRA中讨论的观点能否有助于解决针对麦金太尔提出的相对主义挑战?因此,通过各种论证,本文证明了麦金太尔关于动物理性、脆弱性和依赖性的观点,以及《DRA》中所讨论的关于关怀和仁慈美德的观点,有助于解决对他提出的相对主义挑战。Abstrak & # x0D;Alasdair MacIntyre merupakan salah satu pakar filsafat moral terkemuka di era kontemporer。Namun, beberapappemikir menuduh konsepnya tententenrationalitas praktis bersiverelativistis。Meski banyak penulis lain telah berusaha membela posisi MacIntyre, tidak satu pun dari mereka mendasarkan diri padya MacIntyre yang lebih mutakhir, i.依赖理性动物:为什么人类需要美德(DRA)。Makalah ini berusaha untuk mengisi kekosongan tersebut。Maka, pertanyaan utama tulisan ini ialah apakah gagasan-gagasan yang dikembangkan didalam drapat dipakai untuk menghadapi tuduhan relativisme terhadapnya。Artikel ini hendak menunjukkan bahwa konsep-konsep yang dikemukakan di dalam DRA, seperti“rasionalitas hewani”(动物理性),kerapuhan, ketergantungan, kepedulian, dan belarasa (misericordia) dapat dipergunakan untuk menangkis tuduhan bahwa MacIntyre jatuh kedalam相对论。
Kata-kata Kunci: Alasdair MacIntyre,理性主义praktis,相对论记忆,理性主义hewani, kerapuhan, kepedulian
A. MacIntyre’s Views on Animal Rationality: A Response to the Relativist Challenge
Alasdair MacIntyre is considered one of the most prominent moral philosophers in the contemporary period. Nevertheless, some authors criticize his views on practical rationality as being relativistic. Though there have been authors who have defended MacIntyre through various arguments, none of these authors has referred to one of his later works, namely, Dependent Rational Animals: Why Human Beings Need the Virtues (DRA) for addressing the relativist challenge. The paper aims to fill this lacuna. Thus, the principal question to which the paper responds is: Can the views discussed in DRA contribute toward addressing the relativist challenge raised against MacIntyre? Accordingly, through various arguments, the paper demonstrates that MacIntyre’s views on animal rationality, vulnerability, and dependence as well as those concerning the virtues of care and misericordia as discussed in DRA contribute their mite toward addressing the relativist challenge raised against him.
Abstrak
Alasdair MacIntyre merupakan salah satu pakar filsafat moral terkemuka di era kontemporer. Namun, beberapa pemikir menuduh konsepnya tentang rasionalitas praktis bersifat relativistis. Meski banyak penulis lain telah berusaha membela posisi MacIntyre, tidak satu pun dari mereka mendasarkan diri pada karya MacIntyre yang lebih mutakhir, y.i. Dependent Rational Animals: Why Human Beings Need the Virtues (DRA). Makalah ini berusaha untuk mengisi kekosongan tersebut. Maka, pertanyaan utama tulisan ini ialah apakah gagasan-gagasan yang dikembangkan MacIntyre di dalam DRA dapat dipakai untuk menghadapi tuduhan relativisme terhadapnya. Artikel ini hendak menunjukkan bahwa konsep-konsep yang dikemukakan di dalam DRA, seperti “rasionalitas hewani” (animal rationality), kerapuhan, ketergantungan, kepedulian, dan belarasa (misericordia) dapat dipergunakan untuk menangkis tuduhan bahwa MacIntyre jatuh kedalam relativisme.
Kata-kata Kunci: Alasdair MacIntyre, rasionalitas praktis, relativismemoral, rasionalitas hewani, kerapuhan, kepedulian