高度现代主义的干预与埃塞俄比亚西北部迈特克尔地区旷日持久的边境冲突:以埃塞俄比亚复兴大坝为例

IF 0.9 Q3 INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS Small Wars and Insurgencies Pub Date : 2023-11-01 DOI:10.1080/09592318.2023.2244740
Dagnachew Ayenew Yeshiwas, Gutema Imana Keno, Tsega Endale Etefa, Tompson Makahamadze
{"title":"高度现代主义的干预与埃塞俄比亚西北部迈特克尔地区旷日持久的边境冲突:以埃塞俄比亚复兴大坝为例","authors":"Dagnachew Ayenew Yeshiwas, Gutema Imana Keno, Tsega Endale Etefa, Tompson Makahamadze","doi":"10.1080/09592318.2023.2244740","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACTThis study explores the interface of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), a high-modernist hydraulic scheme, with the protracted frontier conflict in Metekel Zone of Benishangul Gumuz Regional State. Without downplaying the national technocratic ambitions that it invokes, based on fieldwork conducted in 2022, the study witnessed as the dam’s presence in Metekel has escalated the perennial state-local skirmishes, rekindled inter-group hostilities, and ultimately trans-nationalized the frontier mayhem in the area. Such impacts of the dam were rooted in the state’s long-held frontier imagination and coercive relocation program through which hegemonic high-modernist narratives contested locals’ lived experiences. Differential local impacts of the dam, its role in mounting competing territorialities, and the concomitance of the trans-national feud with local discords were also equally influencing. However, the interface between the GERD and frontier struggles in Metekel was broadly shaped by the frontier’s history and national governance policies. In revealing so, the study provides insights that complement debates about frontier dynamics and struggles in Ethiopia and Africa, which tend to concentrate on tensions related to land transfer for private investors. Indeed, frontier struggles seem too complex: one must interrogate multiple actors, the complex history, and a broader range of issues with local, national, and regional dimensions.KEYWORDS: GERDfrontierfrontier conflicthigh-modernismMetekel Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1. Interview, eye witness, Mambuk, 16 May 2022.2. Scott, Seeing Like a State, 4.3. Bloom et al., ‘Introduction’.4. McCully, Silenced Rivers, 237; Nusser, ‘Political Ecology of’; Everard, Hydro politics of Dam5. Adams, Wasting the Rain, 14.6. Hoag, Developing the Rivers, 4.7. Scott, Seeing Like a State.8. Nusser; Scudder, The Future of Large Dams; Bromber et al., The Temporal Politics of Big Dams; See also Abbink, ‘Dam Controversies’; Asebe and Korf, ‘Post-imperial Statecraft’.9. Li, ‘What is Land’, 592; Geiger, Turner in The Tropics, 94; Rasmussen and Lund, ‘Reconfiguring Frontier’, 391.10. Hopkins, Ruling The Savage, 14; Makki and Geisler, ‘Development by Dispossession’, 6.11. See Geiger; Hvalok, ‘Colonization and Conflict’; Kopytoff, ‘Introduction’; Triphaty, ‘Frontier Legacy of America’; Prout and Howitt, ‘Frontier Imaginings’; Ramussen and Lund.12. Central Statistics of Ethiopia, Census.13. Tsega, Inter-ethnic interaction; Gonzalez-Ruibal, An Archeology of; Taddesse, ‘Nilo-Saharan Interaction’.14. BGRS, Regional Socio-Economic Profile; A brochure from zonal office of investment.15. See note 14 above.16. Woldesellassie, Gumuz and Highland Resettles. While majorities were Amharas, considerable number of resettlers were also from Tigray, Hadiya, and Kambata. Subsequently, around 18,000 Gumuz natives were forcefully dislocated.17. FDRE, Constitution; BGRS, Regional Constitution.18. Dagnachew, ‘Relative Deprivation’; the politics of indigeneity has brought shifts of power balance in which the Gumuz are empowered over the historically dominant Shuwa neighbors. Meanwhile, despite the unprecedented political empowerment, the socio-economic status of Gumuz has never been comparable with the latter.19. Whittington et al., ‘The Grand Renaissance Dam’.20. His inauguration speech at the official commencement of the project, Guba, 2 April 2011.21. FDRE, Growth and Transformation Plan, 13, 4922. Verhoeven, ‘The Grand Ethiopian’, 167.23. FDRE, the Power System Expansion Master Plan (2012–2037).24. World Bank, Ethiopia.25. See note 21 above.26. Interview, Addis Ababa, 4 March 2022.27. Official speech at launching 3rd round SMS fundraising, 4 March 202028. See note 8 above.29. Interview, 19 March 2022.30. Interview with Addis Fortune, 2013.31. Haile Mariam, the former PM of FDRE, official Speech at the 120th anniversary of the Adwa Victory, 01 March 2016.32. Hoag, Developing the Rivers33. Ethiopian News Agency, 25 August 2018.34. Directly televised speech at completion of GERD’s third filing operation, 12 November 2012.35. See Asiedu, ‘The Construction’, 1–2; Engelke and Passell, ‘From the Gulf’. While Ethiopia is the source for about 85% its water, the 1929 Britain’s colonial treaty provided Egypt with near monopoly over the Nile River. In 1959, Egypt again signed a deal with Sudan which ensured the two states access to 90% of the water. Having outright power over all upstream projects, thus, Egypt has long dominated the basin’s affairs and enforced its will with threats of retribution.36. Verhoeven, 162.37. Mendi of Assosa and Sirbabay of Khmashi are also partly affected.38. Veilleux, Is dam development, 191–196.39. Ibid.40. Interview, a dam-affected local, Mankush, 29 August 2022.41. BGRS, Villagization Program.42. Interview, Disaster and Risk Management Expert, who was also member of the resettlement committee in Guba, 3 May 2022.43. Informant accounts of the dam-affected locals, August/September 2022.44. Interview, officials, Gilgel-Beles, June 2022.45. Interview, Mankush, 6 September 2022.46. Interview, member of the Gumuz Nationality Council and the local resettlement committee, Gilgel-Beles, 28 June 2022.47. Interview, Mankush, 14 September 2022.48. Reports, Guba Communication Office, on 6 December 2018 and 13 March 2019.49. Vaughan and Mesfin, Resettlement, 16.50. See note 49 above.51. Scudder, T. The future of large dams52. International Rivers, Field Visit Report, 2012.53. Vaughan and Mesfin, Resettlement.54. Reported in a PowerPoint presentation by the Ethiopian Electric Power Corporation (EEPCO), Salini Costruttori and SP Studio Pietrangelli consulting engineers, 16 November 2010 (See also International Rivers Citation2012, 16).55. Interview, Officials, 2020; Asebe and Korf, ‘Post-imperial Statecraft’.56. Interview, Mambuk, 13 June 2022.57. See note 59 above, 16–17.58. See note 45 above.59. Meron, The Mother, 36.60. Interview, Gilgel-Beles, 22 June 2022.61. ACHPR and IWGIA, Indigenous People, 10.62. See also Fana Television, 23 December 2020.63. Ibid, 6–7, 335.64. Abbink, ‘Dam controversies’.65. Turton, ‘Wilderness’, 165.66. Geiger, 87–88.67. Interview, state official, Gilgel-Beles, 18 June 2022.68. See note 47 above.69. Ibid.70. In 2010, the BGRS has launched the Commune Program to relocate and sedenterize Gumuz and other native inhabitants. ‘Modernizing’ this ‘backward’ frontier natives, and improving their livelihoods and access to services were among the stated official objectives. This has hardly attained, however. Meanwhile, the land relocatees abandoned was given to ‘alien’ investors and many of the Gumuz lost traditional tenure rights. The program is then taken as it was a state strategy to facilitate land commercialization than a genuine plan of improving local livings.71. Varied informant accounts, 2022.72. Scott, Domination, 147.73. See note 44 and 48 above.74. Report, Guba Communication Office, 2019.75. Interview, local police officer in Guba, June 2022.76. Informant accounts, 2022; Communication offices of Guba and Metekel, 2019.77. Scott, Domination; Scott, Weapons.78. Report, Guba Communication Office, June 2020.79. See note 44, 48, and 77 above.80. TIKVAH-ETHIOPIA, 2020.81. The Armed Conflict Location and Event Data, 2022.82. Ethiopian Red Cross Society, Field Report, December 2020.83. Ibid.84. See note 77 above.85. See Dagnachew, ‘Relative Deprivation’, 7–8; Nyssen, ‘Marginalised Gumuz’, 3.86. The Gumuz men were observed in Gilgel-Beles and Mambuk while offering parking services to vehicles transporting construction materials to the dam site.87. See note 45 above.88. Interview, project worker, 14 June 2022.89. Dagnachew, ‘Relative Deprivation’.90. See note 58 above.91. Meron, ‘Caught between’, 6.92. Sack, Human Territoriality, 19.93. Delaney, ‘Territory and Territoriality’.94. Geiger, 10; Von, A Post-frontier, 22; Rasmussen and Lund, 393–396.95. Interview, BGRS Prosperity Party leader, 2022.96. Deutsche Welle Amharic, 3 October 2020.97. Interview, Bahirdar, 25 April 2022.98. It is worth to note that the history of Metekel being part of the previous Gojjam province do not justify the existing claim to annex it with the ANRS. First, the state re-structuring and territorialization that gave birth to the ANRS in 1991 is totally ahistorical process. Second, Gojjam itself was not the exclusive territory of Amhara but inhabited by diverse groups, including Gumuz, Agaw, Oromo, Shinasha, and others.99. Gardner, ‘All Is Not Quiet’.100. Interview with OMN.101. Interview, Gilgel-Beles, 17 June 2022.102. See note 69 above.103. Amharas have asserted more following the coming of PM Abiy in 2018 and the creation of the Prosperity Party in late 2019, which marked the demise of TPLF’s political dominance that they perceive as anti-Amhara by its design and ideology.104. See Von; Rasmussen and Lund.105. Siko and Lund, ‘Access and Property’, 7.106. Informant accounts, 2022; Metekel Communication Office, April 2019.107. Informants accounts, 2022; Addis Standard, September/October 2020; Metekel Communication Office, November 2020; Ethiopian Insight, December 2020; AMM, January 2021; Ethiopian Peace Observatory, 2018–2022, January 2023.108. See also note 96 above.109. MoU, Metekel Zone and Agaw-Awi Nationality Zone, Article 5 (22)).110. Interview, Gilgel-Beles, 10 June 2022.111. Interview, Bullen, 2 August 2022.112. Dereje, ‘Power and Its Discontents’, 32.113. See Maasho, ‘Egypt, Ethiopia and Sudan’; Hailemariam Dessalegn, former PM of the FDRE, claims, the dam would ‘fulfill vital electricity needs and enhance regional cooperation.114. Lerman, ‘The Keystone’.115. Booth. ‘The Temperature’; Asiedu, ‘The Construction’; Bayat, ‘Plebeians of’.116. Petrov, 53; Following the 2011 Arab Spring, Egypt’s hegemony has waned, while Ethiopia led regional affairs and gained international prestige. Such a power shift has enabled the latter to embark on and move forward with the GERD.117. Engelke and Passell, ‘From the Gulf’, 11; the 1929 Agreement, codified further in 1959, allocated 4 billion cubic meters of water (BCM) per year of the Nile’s flow to Sudan, 48 BCM per year to Egypt, and none to any of today’s other nine riparian states.118. Verhoeven, 173.119. Attia and Saleh, ‘The Political Deadlock’.120. A televised speech.121. Samuel, ‘Trump Suspends’.122. Al-Monitor, October 26, 2020.123. Booth, 8.124. Caslin and Rabie.125. Ethiopian Broadcasting Corporation, 12 August 2022.126. Interview, Gilgel-Beles, 30 May 2022.127. Addis Standard, 8 March 2021; The Reporter, 13 March 2021; Abdulahi Hamu, committee chairman, reported as they were able to learn that Sudan and Egypt have been funding, training, and arming the youth to keep Metekel unstable.128. Interview with Crisis Group, 25 January 2021.129. Ethiopian Broadcasting Corporation, 14 August 2021.130. Interview, Dibati, 29 July 2022.131. Ethiopia Insight, ‘Marginalization and Persecution’, August 2021.132. Informant accounts, 2022; Ethiopian Insight, 2021; TIKVAH-ETHIOPIA, 2022.133. EHRC, 13 March 2022.134. Abbink, ‘The Atlantic community mistake’.135. A telephone interview with ‘Hadith al-Qahira’ (Cairo Talk) on the ‘al-Qahira wal Nas’ (Cairo and the People) channel, March 2023.136. On April 7 2021, Sis also warned, ‘I am telling our brothers in Ethiopia: let’s not reach the point where you touch a drop of Egypt’s water, because all options are open’.137. On 30 May 2021, addressing the launching ceremony of Adama-Awash 60 Km expressway, PM Abiy announced the plan of building more than 100 small and medium irrigation dams in various regional states in the 2021/22 fiscal year. The dams will help the country to farm agricultural produces three times per year via irrigation thereby ensure food security, the PM stated (See Ethiopian News Agency, 30 May 2021).138. Translated and Twitted by Suleiman Abdela, 2 June 2021.139. Samir Ghattas, Egyptian Parliamentarian and Head of the Middle East Forum for Strategic Studies also confirmed, ‘given the difficulty to go into direct war out of fear of international reactions. Egypt’s support for the rebels is very probable (See Al-Monitor, May 2021).140. Abbink, ‘Dam controversies’.141. Scott, Seeing Like a State.142. See Lo, ‘High Modernism, Conflict’.143. See Asiedu, ‘The Construction’; Engelke and Passell, ‘From the Gulf’; Booth. ‘The Temperature’; Asiedu, ‘The Construction’; Bayat, ‘Plebeians of’. Samuel, ‘Trump Suspends’; Petrov, The Grand Ethiopian; Lerman, ‘The Keystone’.144. See Abbink, ‘Land to the foreigners’.Additional informationFundingThe corresponding author has received support from the Capacity Building Project of the UK Research and Innovation (UKRI) in Partnership with the African Research Universities' Alliance (ARUA).Notes on contributorsDagnachew Ayenew YeshiwasDagnachew Ayenew Yeshiwas is a Ph.D. Candidate at the Institute of Peace and Development Studies, Haramaya University, Ethiopia. He has also been a senior lecturer in Department of Peace and Development Studies at Wollo University, Ethiopia, and he wrote on ethnicity, ethnic relations, and conflict. Looking into the complex interface of Governance, Development, and Indigeneity, Dagnachew is currently examining the Political-Economy of Frontier Conflicts.Gutema Imana KenoGutema Imana Keno (Ph.D.) is an Associate Professor of Sociology at Haramaya University, Haramaya, Ethiopia. He received his Ph.D.in Sociology from the University of Klagenfurt in Austria, and he has been offering graduate classes for students of Sociology, and Peace and Development Studies at Haramaya University. Dr. Gutema's research interest lies on cross-cutting issues of development sociology, and he is the author and editor of numerous research works on that.Tsega Endale EtefaTsega Endale Etefa (Professor) is a Professor of History, and Africana and Latin American Studies at Colgate University in USA. He received his Ph.D. from the University of Hamburg in Germany. Professor Tsega has researched and authored several articles and books on wide-ranging topics, including, ethnicity, ethnic relations and conflict, indigenous mechanisms of conflict resolution and transformation, and integration and peace-building.Tompson MakahamadzeTompson Makahamadze (Ph.D.)is an Associate Professor of Conflict Resolution at George Mason University in USA, where from he received his Ph.D. in Conflict Analysis and Resolution. Dr. Tompson remains Ambassador's Distinguished Scholar to Ethiopia and he was a visiting professor at several universities in. He also wrote numerous research works on political violence, peace-building, and conflict transformation.","PeriodicalId":46215,"journal":{"name":"Small Wars and Insurgencies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.9000,"publicationDate":"2023-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"High-modernist intervention and the prolonged frontier conflict in Metekel, North-West Ethiopia: the case of the grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam\",\"authors\":\"Dagnachew Ayenew Yeshiwas, Gutema Imana Keno, Tsega Endale Etefa, Tompson Makahamadze\",\"doi\":\"10.1080/09592318.2023.2244740\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"ABSTRACTThis study explores the interface of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), a high-modernist hydraulic scheme, with the protracted frontier conflict in Metekel Zone of Benishangul Gumuz Regional State. Without downplaying the national technocratic ambitions that it invokes, based on fieldwork conducted in 2022, the study witnessed as the dam’s presence in Metekel has escalated the perennial state-local skirmishes, rekindled inter-group hostilities, and ultimately trans-nationalized the frontier mayhem in the area. Such impacts of the dam were rooted in the state’s long-held frontier imagination and coercive relocation program through which hegemonic high-modernist narratives contested locals’ lived experiences. Differential local impacts of the dam, its role in mounting competing territorialities, and the concomitance of the trans-national feud with local discords were also equally influencing. However, the interface between the GERD and frontier struggles in Metekel was broadly shaped by the frontier’s history and national governance policies. In revealing so, the study provides insights that complement debates about frontier dynamics and struggles in Ethiopia and Africa, which tend to concentrate on tensions related to land transfer for private investors. Indeed, frontier struggles seem too complex: one must interrogate multiple actors, the complex history, and a broader range of issues with local, national, and regional dimensions.KEYWORDS: GERDfrontierfrontier conflicthigh-modernismMetekel Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1. Interview, eye witness, Mambuk, 16 May 2022.2. Scott, Seeing Like a State, 4.3. Bloom et al., ‘Introduction’.4. McCully, Silenced Rivers, 237; Nusser, ‘Political Ecology of’; Everard, Hydro politics of Dam5. Adams, Wasting the Rain, 14.6. Hoag, Developing the Rivers, 4.7. Scott, Seeing Like a State.8. Nusser; Scudder, The Future of Large Dams; Bromber et al., The Temporal Politics of Big Dams; See also Abbink, ‘Dam Controversies’; Asebe and Korf, ‘Post-imperial Statecraft’.9. Li, ‘What is Land’, 592; Geiger, Turner in The Tropics, 94; Rasmussen and Lund, ‘Reconfiguring Frontier’, 391.10. Hopkins, Ruling The Savage, 14; Makki and Geisler, ‘Development by Dispossession’, 6.11. See Geiger; Hvalok, ‘Colonization and Conflict’; Kopytoff, ‘Introduction’; Triphaty, ‘Frontier Legacy of America’; Prout and Howitt, ‘Frontier Imaginings’; Ramussen and Lund.12. Central Statistics of Ethiopia, Census.13. Tsega, Inter-ethnic interaction; Gonzalez-Ruibal, An Archeology of; Taddesse, ‘Nilo-Saharan Interaction’.14. BGRS, Regional Socio-Economic Profile; A brochure from zonal office of investment.15. See note 14 above.16. Woldesellassie, Gumuz and Highland Resettles. While majorities were Amharas, considerable number of resettlers were also from Tigray, Hadiya, and Kambata. Subsequently, around 18,000 Gumuz natives were forcefully dislocated.17. FDRE, Constitution; BGRS, Regional Constitution.18. Dagnachew, ‘Relative Deprivation’; the politics of indigeneity has brought shifts of power balance in which the Gumuz are empowered over the historically dominant Shuwa neighbors. Meanwhile, despite the unprecedented political empowerment, the socio-economic status of Gumuz has never been comparable with the latter.19. Whittington et al., ‘The Grand Renaissance Dam’.20. His inauguration speech at the official commencement of the project, Guba, 2 April 2011.21. FDRE, Growth and Transformation Plan, 13, 4922. Verhoeven, ‘The Grand Ethiopian’, 167.23. FDRE, the Power System Expansion Master Plan (2012–2037).24. World Bank, Ethiopia.25. See note 21 above.26. Interview, Addis Ababa, 4 March 2022.27. Official speech at launching 3rd round SMS fundraising, 4 March 202028. See note 8 above.29. Interview, 19 March 2022.30. Interview with Addis Fortune, 2013.31. Haile Mariam, the former PM of FDRE, official Speech at the 120th anniversary of the Adwa Victory, 01 March 2016.32. Hoag, Developing the Rivers33. Ethiopian News Agency, 25 August 2018.34. Directly televised speech at completion of GERD’s third filing operation, 12 November 2012.35. See Asiedu, ‘The Construction’, 1–2; Engelke and Passell, ‘From the Gulf’. While Ethiopia is the source for about 85% its water, the 1929 Britain’s colonial treaty provided Egypt with near monopoly over the Nile River. In 1959, Egypt again signed a deal with Sudan which ensured the two states access to 90% of the water. Having outright power over all upstream projects, thus, Egypt has long dominated the basin’s affairs and enforced its will with threats of retribution.36. Verhoeven, 162.37. Mendi of Assosa and Sirbabay of Khmashi are also partly affected.38. Veilleux, Is dam development, 191–196.39. Ibid.40. Interview, a dam-affected local, Mankush, 29 August 2022.41. BGRS, Villagization Program.42. Interview, Disaster and Risk Management Expert, who was also member of the resettlement committee in Guba, 3 May 2022.43. Informant accounts of the dam-affected locals, August/September 2022.44. Interview, officials, Gilgel-Beles, June 2022.45. Interview, Mankush, 6 September 2022.46. Interview, member of the Gumuz Nationality Council and the local resettlement committee, Gilgel-Beles, 28 June 2022.47. Interview, Mankush, 14 September 2022.48. Reports, Guba Communication Office, on 6 December 2018 and 13 March 2019.49. Vaughan and Mesfin, Resettlement, 16.50. See note 49 above.51. Scudder, T. The future of large dams52. International Rivers, Field Visit Report, 2012.53. Vaughan and Mesfin, Resettlement.54. Reported in a PowerPoint presentation by the Ethiopian Electric Power Corporation (EEPCO), Salini Costruttori and SP Studio Pietrangelli consulting engineers, 16 November 2010 (See also International Rivers Citation2012, 16).55. Interview, Officials, 2020; Asebe and Korf, ‘Post-imperial Statecraft’.56. Interview, Mambuk, 13 June 2022.57. See note 59 above, 16–17.58. See note 45 above.59. Meron, The Mother, 36.60. Interview, Gilgel-Beles, 22 June 2022.61. ACHPR and IWGIA, Indigenous People, 10.62. See also Fana Television, 23 December 2020.63. Ibid, 6–7, 335.64. Abbink, ‘Dam controversies’.65. Turton, ‘Wilderness’, 165.66. Geiger, 87–88.67. Interview, state official, Gilgel-Beles, 18 June 2022.68. See note 47 above.69. Ibid.70. In 2010, the BGRS has launched the Commune Program to relocate and sedenterize Gumuz and other native inhabitants. ‘Modernizing’ this ‘backward’ frontier natives, and improving their livelihoods and access to services were among the stated official objectives. This has hardly attained, however. Meanwhile, the land relocatees abandoned was given to ‘alien’ investors and many of the Gumuz lost traditional tenure rights. The program is then taken as it was a state strategy to facilitate land commercialization than a genuine plan of improving local livings.71. Varied informant accounts, 2022.72. Scott, Domination, 147.73. See note 44 and 48 above.74. Report, Guba Communication Office, 2019.75. Interview, local police officer in Guba, June 2022.76. Informant accounts, 2022; Communication offices of Guba and Metekel, 2019.77. Scott, Domination; Scott, Weapons.78. Report, Guba Communication Office, June 2020.79. See note 44, 48, and 77 above.80. TIKVAH-ETHIOPIA, 2020.81. The Armed Conflict Location and Event Data, 2022.82. Ethiopian Red Cross Society, Field Report, December 2020.83. Ibid.84. See note 77 above.85. See Dagnachew, ‘Relative Deprivation’, 7–8; Nyssen, ‘Marginalised Gumuz’, 3.86. The Gumuz men were observed in Gilgel-Beles and Mambuk while offering parking services to vehicles transporting construction materials to the dam site.87. See note 45 above.88. Interview, project worker, 14 June 2022.89. Dagnachew, ‘Relative Deprivation’.90. See note 58 above.91. Meron, ‘Caught between’, 6.92. Sack, Human Territoriality, 19.93. Delaney, ‘Territory and Territoriality’.94. Geiger, 10; Von, A Post-frontier, 22; Rasmussen and Lund, 393–396.95. Interview, BGRS Prosperity Party leader, 2022.96. Deutsche Welle Amharic, 3 October 2020.97. Interview, Bahirdar, 25 April 2022.98. It is worth to note that the history of Metekel being part of the previous Gojjam province do not justify the existing claim to annex it with the ANRS. First, the state re-structuring and territorialization that gave birth to the ANRS in 1991 is totally ahistorical process. Second, Gojjam itself was not the exclusive territory of Amhara but inhabited by diverse groups, including Gumuz, Agaw, Oromo, Shinasha, and others.99. Gardner, ‘All Is Not Quiet’.100. Interview with OMN.101. Interview, Gilgel-Beles, 17 June 2022.102. See note 69 above.103. Amharas have asserted more following the coming of PM Abiy in 2018 and the creation of the Prosperity Party in late 2019, which marked the demise of TPLF’s political dominance that they perceive as anti-Amhara by its design and ideology.104. See Von; Rasmussen and Lund.105. Siko and Lund, ‘Access and Property’, 7.106. Informant accounts, 2022; Metekel Communication Office, April 2019.107. Informants accounts, 2022; Addis Standard, September/October 2020; Metekel Communication Office, November 2020; Ethiopian Insight, December 2020; AMM, January 2021; Ethiopian Peace Observatory, 2018–2022, January 2023.108. See also note 96 above.109. MoU, Metekel Zone and Agaw-Awi Nationality Zone, Article 5 (22)).110. Interview, Gilgel-Beles, 10 June 2022.111. Interview, Bullen, 2 August 2022.112. Dereje, ‘Power and Its Discontents’, 32.113. See Maasho, ‘Egypt, Ethiopia and Sudan’; Hailemariam Dessalegn, former PM of the FDRE, claims, the dam would ‘fulfill vital electricity needs and enhance regional cooperation.114. Lerman, ‘The Keystone’.115. Booth. ‘The Temperature’; Asiedu, ‘The Construction’; Bayat, ‘Plebeians of’.116. Petrov, 53; Following the 2011 Arab Spring, Egypt’s hegemony has waned, while Ethiopia led regional affairs and gained international prestige. Such a power shift has enabled the latter to embark on and move forward with the GERD.117. Engelke and Passell, ‘From the Gulf’, 11; the 1929 Agreement, codified further in 1959, allocated 4 billion cubic meters of water (BCM) per year of the Nile’s flow to Sudan, 48 BCM per year to Egypt, and none to any of today’s other nine riparian states.118. Verhoeven, 173.119. Attia and Saleh, ‘The Political Deadlock’.120. A televised speech.121. Samuel, ‘Trump Suspends’.122. Al-Monitor, October 26, 2020.123. Booth, 8.124. Caslin and Rabie.125. Ethiopian Broadcasting Corporation, 12 August 2022.126. Interview, Gilgel-Beles, 30 May 2022.127. Addis Standard, 8 March 2021; The Reporter, 13 March 2021; Abdulahi Hamu, committee chairman, reported as they were able to learn that Sudan and Egypt have been funding, training, and arming the youth to keep Metekel unstable.128. Interview with Crisis Group, 25 January 2021.129. Ethiopian Broadcasting Corporation, 14 August 2021.130. Interview, Dibati, 29 July 2022.131. Ethiopia Insight, ‘Marginalization and Persecution’, August 2021.132. Informant accounts, 2022; Ethiopian Insight, 2021; TIKVAH-ETHIOPIA, 2022.133. EHRC, 13 March 2022.134. Abbink, ‘The Atlantic community mistake’.135. A telephone interview with ‘Hadith al-Qahira’ (Cairo Talk) on the ‘al-Qahira wal Nas’ (Cairo and the People) channel, March 2023.136. On April 7 2021, Sis also warned, ‘I am telling our brothers in Ethiopia: let’s not reach the point where you touch a drop of Egypt’s water, because all options are open’.137. On 30 May 2021, addressing the launching ceremony of Adama-Awash 60 Km expressway, PM Abiy announced the plan of building more than 100 small and medium irrigation dams in various regional states in the 2021/22 fiscal year. The dams will help the country to farm agricultural produces three times per year via irrigation thereby ensure food security, the PM stated (See Ethiopian News Agency, 30 May 2021).138. Translated and Twitted by Suleiman Abdela, 2 June 2021.139. Samir Ghattas, Egyptian Parliamentarian and Head of the Middle East Forum for Strategic Studies also confirmed, ‘given the difficulty to go into direct war out of fear of international reactions. Egypt’s support for the rebels is very probable (See Al-Monitor, May 2021).140. Abbink, ‘Dam controversies’.141. Scott, Seeing Like a State.142. See Lo, ‘High Modernism, Conflict’.143. See Asiedu, ‘The Construction’; Engelke and Passell, ‘From the Gulf’; Booth. ‘The Temperature’; Asiedu, ‘The Construction’; Bayat, ‘Plebeians of’. Samuel, ‘Trump Suspends’; Petrov, The Grand Ethiopian; Lerman, ‘The Keystone’.144. See Abbink, ‘Land to the foreigners’.Additional informationFundingThe corresponding author has received support from the Capacity Building Project of the UK Research and Innovation (UKRI) in Partnership with the African Research Universities' Alliance (ARUA).Notes on contributorsDagnachew Ayenew YeshiwasDagnachew Ayenew Yeshiwas is a Ph.D. Candidate at the Institute of Peace and Development Studies, Haramaya University, Ethiopia. He has also been a senior lecturer in Department of Peace and Development Studies at Wollo University, Ethiopia, and he wrote on ethnicity, ethnic relations, and conflict. Looking into the complex interface of Governance, Development, and Indigeneity, Dagnachew is currently examining the Political-Economy of Frontier Conflicts.Gutema Imana KenoGutema Imana Keno (Ph.D.) is an Associate Professor of Sociology at Haramaya University, Haramaya, Ethiopia. He received his Ph.D.in Sociology from the University of Klagenfurt in Austria, and he has been offering graduate classes for students of Sociology, and Peace and Development Studies at Haramaya University. Dr. Gutema's research interest lies on cross-cutting issues of development sociology, and he is the author and editor of numerous research works on that.Tsega Endale EtefaTsega Endale Etefa (Professor) is a Professor of History, and Africana and Latin American Studies at Colgate University in USA. He received his Ph.D. from the University of Hamburg in Germany. Professor Tsega has researched and authored several articles and books on wide-ranging topics, including, ethnicity, ethnic relations and conflict, indigenous mechanisms of conflict resolution and transformation, and integration and peace-building.Tompson MakahamadzeTompson Makahamadze (Ph.D.)is an Associate Professor of Conflict Resolution at George Mason University in USA, where from he received his Ph.D. in Conflict Analysis and Resolution. Dr. Tompson remains Ambassador's Distinguished Scholar to Ethiopia and he was a visiting professor at several universities in. 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引用次数: 0

摘要

摘要本文探讨了埃塞俄比亚复兴大坝(GERD)这一高度现代主义水利工程与Benishangul Gumuz地区国家Metekel地区旷日持久的边境冲突之间的关系。根据2022年进行的实地调查,这项研究并没有淡化它所引发的国家技术官僚的野心,而是见证了大坝在迈特克尔的存在已经升级了长期存在的州与地方之间的小规模冲突,重新点燃了群体间的敌对行动,并最终将该地区的边境混乱跨国化。大坝的这种影响根植于该州长期以来对边疆的想象和强制性的搬迁计划,霸权主义的现代主义叙事通过这些计划挑战了当地人的生活经历。大坝对地方的不同影响,它在日益激烈的领土竞争中的作用,以及跨国宿怨与地方不和谐的共存,也同样产生了影响。然而,在梅特克尔,GERD和边境斗争之间的界面在很大程度上是由边境的历史和国家治理政策形成的。在揭示这一点时,该研究提供了补充关于埃塞俄比亚和非洲边境动态和斗争的辩论的见解,这些辩论往往集中在与私人投资者的土地转让有关的紧张局势上。事实上,边境斗争似乎太复杂了:一个人必须审问多个角色,复杂的历史,以及更广泛的地方、国家和地区层面的问题。关键词:gerd前沿冲突现代主义披露声明作者未报告潜在利益冲突。采访,证人,曼巴克,2022年5月16日。斯科特,《像一个州一样看问题》,4.3分。Bloom等人,《引言》。麦卡利,《沉默的河流》,237页;Nusser,《政治生态学》;埃弗拉,水坝水利政治。亚当斯,《浪费雨水》,14.6页。Hoag,开发河流,4.7。斯科特,像一个州一样看。努瑟;斯卡德尔:《大型水坝的未来》;Bromber et al.,大坝的时间政治;参见Abbink,“大坝争议”;Asebe and Korf,《后帝国治国方略》,第9页。李,《土地是什么》,592页;盖格,特纳的《热带》,1994年;Rasmussen and Lund,“reconfigure Frontier”,391.10。霍普金斯,《统治野蛮人》,第14页;Makki和Geisler,“剥夺的发展”,6.11。看到盖革;Hvalok,《殖民与冲突》;Kopytoff“介绍”;Triphaty,《美国的边疆遗产》;普劳特和霍伊特,《前沿想象》;拉姆森和伦德。埃塞俄比亚中央统计局,人口普查。Tsega,民族间互动;冈萨雷斯-鲁伊巴尔,考古学家;Taddesse,“尼罗-撒哈拉的相互作用”,第14页。区域社会经济概况;地区投资局寄来的小册子。见上面说明14。Woldesellassie, Gumuz和Highland resettlements。虽然大多数是阿姆哈拉人,但相当多的重新定居者也来自提格雷、哈迪亚和坎巴塔。随后,大约1.8万名古木兹土著人被迫流离失所。FDRE宪法;BGRS,《地区章程》,18。Dagnachew,《相对剥夺》;土著政治带来了权力平衡的转变,古木兹人被赋予了权力,凌驾于历史上占主导地位的舒瓦族邻居之上。同时,尽管获得了前所未有的政治权力,古木兹的社会经济地位却从未与后者相比。惠廷顿等人,《文艺复兴大坝》,第20页。2011年4月2日,古巴,他在项目正式开工典礼上的就职演说。《发展与转型计划》,第13期,第22页。范霍文,《大埃塞俄比亚人》,167.23。FDRE,电力系统扩展总体规划(2012-2037).24。世界银行,埃塞俄比亚。见上面说明21。2007年3月4日,亚的斯亚贝巴。在第三轮短信筹款启动仪式上的讲话,202028年3月4日。见上面说明8。采访,2022.30年3月19日。《亚的斯亚贝巴财富》专访2013.31霍格:《开发河流》埃塞俄比亚通讯社2018年8月25日报道。2012年11月12日GERD第三次备案作业完成时的电视直播讲话。参见Asiedu, ' The Construction ', 1-2;恩格尔克和帕塞尔,《来自海湾》埃及85%的水源来自埃塞俄比亚,而1929年英国签订的殖民条约却让埃及几乎垄断了尼罗河的水资源。1959年,埃及再次与苏丹签署协议,确保两国获得90%的水资源。因此,埃及对所有上游工程拥有绝对的权力,长期以来一直支配着该盆地的事务,并以报复相威胁来强制执行其意志。Verhoeven, 162.37。38.阿索萨的门迪和赫马什的西尔巴贝也受到部分影响。韦勒克斯,大坝发展,191-196.39。Ibid.40。采访,一个受大坝影响的当地人,曼库什,2022.41年8月29日。BGRS,村庄计划。 采访,灾害和风险管理专家,也是古巴重新安置委员会成员,2022年5月3日。2022.44年8月/ 9月,受大坝影响的当地人的线人记录。采访,官员,吉尔-贝尔斯,2022.45年6月。2016年9月6日,曼库什。采访,古木兹民族理事会成员和当地重新安置委员会成员,吉格尔-贝勒斯,2022.47年6月28日。2018年9月14日,曼库什。报道,古巴通讯办公室,2018年12月6日和2019年3月13日。沃恩和梅斯芬,重新安置,16.50。见上面说明49。T.斯卡德尔。大型水坝的未来《国际河流》,实地考察报告,2012.53。沃恩和梅斯芬,《再安置》,第54页。2010年11月16日,埃塞俄比亚电力公司(EEPCO)、Salini Costruttori和SP Studio Pietrangelli咨询工程师的ppt报告(参见International Rivers Citation2012, 16)。访谈,官员,2020;Asebe and Korf, <后帝国治国方略>,第56页。采访,曼巴克,2022年6月13日。见上文注释59,16-17.58。见上面说明45。《母亲》梅伦,36.60分。2016年6月22日,Gilgel-Beles接受采访。土著人民权利委员会和土著人民调查协会,1962年。另见Fana电视台,2016.12.23。同上,6-7,335.64。阿宾克,《大坝争议》,65页。特顿,《荒野》,165.66。盖革,87 - 88.67。采访,国家官员,吉尔-贝勒斯,2022.68年6月18日。见上面说明47。Ibid.70。2010年,BGRS启动了公社计划,为古穆兹和其他土著居民重新安置和定居。“现代化”这些“落后”的边疆原住民,改善他们的生计和获得服务的机会是官方宣布的目标之一。然而,这一目标几乎没有实现。与此同时,被遗弃的土地被给予了“外来”投资者,许多古木兹人失去了传统的所有权。这个项目被认为是促进土地商业化的国家战略,而不是改善当地生活的真正计划。不同的线人账户,2022.72。斯科特,统治,147.73。见上面说明44和48。报告,古巴通讯办公室,2019.75。采访,古巴当地警察,2022.76年6月。线人账户,2022;Guba和Metekel通信办公室,2019.77。斯科特,统治;斯科特,Weapons.78。报告,古巴通讯办公室,2017.06见上文说明44、48和77。TIKVAH-ETHIOPIA, 2020.81。武装冲突地点与事件数据,2022.82。埃塞俄比亚红十字会,实地报告,2018.12。Ibid.84。见上面说明77。85。见Dagnachew,“相对剥夺”,第7-8页;尼森,《边缘化的古木兹》,3.86分。在Gilgel-Beles和Mambuk,有人观察到Gumuz人在为运送建筑材料到坝址的车辆提供停车服务。见上面说明45。采访,项目工人,2022.89年6月14日。Dagnachew,《相对剥夺》,第90页。见上面说明58。《夹在中间》,6.92分。萨克,人类领土,1993年。德莱尼,《领土与领土性》94页。盖革,10;冯,后边疆,22岁;拉斯穆森和隆德,393-396.95。采访,BGRS繁荣党领导人,2022.96。德国之声阿姆哈拉语,2020年10月3日。1998年4月25日,拜尔达尔。值得注意的是,梅特克尔作为以前Gojjam省的一部分的历史并不能证明将其并入ANRS的现有主张是正当的。首先,1991年产生的国家重构和领土化是一个完全非历史的过程。第二,Gojjam本身并不是阿姆哈拉的专属领土,而是由不同的群体居住,包括Gumuz、Agaw、Oromo、Shinasha等。加德纳,《天下不太平》,100页。面试OMN.101采访,吉尔-贝尔斯,2012.06月17日。见上文说明69。安哈拉人在2018年阿比总理上任和2019年底繁荣党成立后主张更多,这标志着TPLF的政治主导地位的终结,他们认为TPLF的设计和意识形态是反安哈拉的。看到冯;拉斯穆森和伦德,105。Siko and Lund,“访问和财产”,7.106。线人账户,2022;Metekel通信办公室,2017.04。《线人账户》,2022;阿迪斯标准,2020年9月/ 10月;电信通信办公室,2020年11月;埃塞俄比亚洞察号,2020年12月;AMM, 2021年1月;埃塞俄比亚和平观察站,2018-2022,2018年1月。又见上文说明96。谅解备忘录,梅特克尔区和阿加威民族区,第5(22)条。2011年6月10日,吉尔贝尔斯公司。2012年8月2日,布伦。德杰,《权力及其不满》,32.113。见Maasho,“埃及,埃塞俄比亚和苏丹”;勒曼,<楔石>,第115页。展台。“温度”;Asiedu,《建筑》;巴亚特,'的平民' 116。 彼得罗夫,53个;2011年阿拉伯之春之后,埃及的霸权衰落,而埃塞俄比亚主导地区事务,获得国际威望。这样的权力转移使后者能够着手并推进GERD.117。恩格尔克和帕塞尔,《来自海湾》,第11页;1929年的《协定》在1959年进一步编纂,规定每年将尼罗河的40亿立方米水分配给苏丹,480亿立方米水分配给埃及,而没有分配给今天其他9个沿岸国。Verhoeven, 173.119。阿提亚和萨利赫,<政治僵局>,第120页。电视讲话。塞缪尔,“特朗普暂停”。122。Al-Monitor, 2020年10月26日。布斯,8.124。卡斯林和拉比。埃塞俄比亚广播公司,2022.8月12日。2012年5月30日,吉尔贝尔斯面试。阿迪斯标准,2021年3月8日;《记者报》,2021年3月13日;委员会主席Abdulahi Hamu报告说,他们得知苏丹和埃及一直在资助、培训和武装青年,以保持迈特克尔的不稳定。采访危机组织,2021年1月25日。埃塞俄比亚广播公司,2013年8月14日。2012年7月29日,迪巴提。《埃塞俄比亚洞察》,《边缘化与迫害》,20121.132年8月。线人账户,2022;埃塞俄比亚洞察号,2021;TIKVAH-ETHIOPIA, 2022.133。EHRC, 2013年3月13日。阿宾克,<大西洋共同体的错误>,第135页。在“开罗和人民”频道上对“圣训”(开罗谈话)的电话采访,2023.136年3月。2021年4月7日,她还警告说:“我要告诉埃塞俄比亚的兄弟们:不要触及埃及的一滴水,因为所有的选择都是开放的。”2021年5月30日,阿比总理在阿达马-阿瓦什60公里高速公路启动仪式上发表讲话,宣布计划在2021/22财政年度在各地区各州建造100多个中小型灌溉大坝。总理表示,这些水坝将帮助该国每年通过灌溉种植三次农产品,从而确保粮食安全(见埃塞俄比亚新闻社,2021年5月30日)。Suleiman Abdela翻译并推特,2012.1年6月2日。埃及国会议员、中东战略研究论坛负责人萨米尔·加塔斯(Samir Ghattas)也证实,“由于担心国际反应,很难发动直接战争。埃及对叛军的支持是非常可能的(见Al-Monitor, 2021年5月)。阿宾克,《大坝争议》,第141页。斯科特,《像一个州一样看》。见罗,“高级现代主义,冲突”,第143页。参见Asiedu,“The Construction”;恩格尔克和帕塞尔,《来自海湾》;展台。“温度”;Asiedu,《建筑》;巴亚特,平民的意思。塞缪尔,“特朗普暂停”;彼得罗夫,伟大的埃塞俄比亚人;莱曼,<楔石>,第144页。参见阿宾克的《外国人的土地》。通讯作者得到了英国研究与创新(UKRI)与非洲研究型大学联盟(ARUA)合作开展的能力建设项目的支持。作者简介:dagnachew Ayenew Yeshiwas,埃塞俄比亚哈拉马亚大学和平与发展研究所博士研究生。他也是埃塞俄比亚沃罗大学和平与发展研究系的高级讲师,他撰写了关于种族、民族关系和冲突的文章。Dagnachew目前正在研究边境冲突的政治经济学,研究治理、发展和土著的复杂界面。Gutema Imana Keno(博士)是埃塞俄比亚哈拉马亚大学的社会学副教授。他在奥地利克拉根福大学获得社会学博士学位,并在原屋大学为社会学和和平与发展研究专业的学生提供研究生课程。古特马博士的研究兴趣在于发展社会学的交叉问题,他是这方面的许多研究著作的作者和编辑。Tsega Endale Etefa(教授)是美国科尔盖特大学历史、非洲和拉丁美洲研究教授。他在德国汉堡大学获得博士学位。Tsega教授研究并撰写了几篇文章和书籍,主题广泛,包括族裔、族裔关系和冲突、解决冲突和转变的本地机制、一体化和建设和平。thompson Makahamadze(博士)是美国乔治梅森大学冲突解决学副教授,在那里他获得了冲突分析和解决博士学位。汤普森博士是驻埃塞俄比亚大使杰出学者,他曾在埃塞俄比亚几所大学担任客座教授。他还撰写了大量关于政治暴力、和平建设和冲突转变的研究著作。
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High-modernist intervention and the prolonged frontier conflict in Metekel, North-West Ethiopia: the case of the grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam
ABSTRACTThis study explores the interface of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), a high-modernist hydraulic scheme, with the protracted frontier conflict in Metekel Zone of Benishangul Gumuz Regional State. Without downplaying the national technocratic ambitions that it invokes, based on fieldwork conducted in 2022, the study witnessed as the dam’s presence in Metekel has escalated the perennial state-local skirmishes, rekindled inter-group hostilities, and ultimately trans-nationalized the frontier mayhem in the area. Such impacts of the dam were rooted in the state’s long-held frontier imagination and coercive relocation program through which hegemonic high-modernist narratives contested locals’ lived experiences. Differential local impacts of the dam, its role in mounting competing territorialities, and the concomitance of the trans-national feud with local discords were also equally influencing. However, the interface between the GERD and frontier struggles in Metekel was broadly shaped by the frontier’s history and national governance policies. In revealing so, the study provides insights that complement debates about frontier dynamics and struggles in Ethiopia and Africa, which tend to concentrate on tensions related to land transfer for private investors. Indeed, frontier struggles seem too complex: one must interrogate multiple actors, the complex history, and a broader range of issues with local, national, and regional dimensions.KEYWORDS: GERDfrontierfrontier conflicthigh-modernismMetekel Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1. Interview, eye witness, Mambuk, 16 May 2022.2. Scott, Seeing Like a State, 4.3. Bloom et al., ‘Introduction’.4. McCully, Silenced Rivers, 237; Nusser, ‘Political Ecology of’; Everard, Hydro politics of Dam5. Adams, Wasting the Rain, 14.6. Hoag, Developing the Rivers, 4.7. Scott, Seeing Like a State.8. Nusser; Scudder, The Future of Large Dams; Bromber et al., The Temporal Politics of Big Dams; See also Abbink, ‘Dam Controversies’; Asebe and Korf, ‘Post-imperial Statecraft’.9. Li, ‘What is Land’, 592; Geiger, Turner in The Tropics, 94; Rasmussen and Lund, ‘Reconfiguring Frontier’, 391.10. Hopkins, Ruling The Savage, 14; Makki and Geisler, ‘Development by Dispossession’, 6.11. See Geiger; Hvalok, ‘Colonization and Conflict’; Kopytoff, ‘Introduction’; Triphaty, ‘Frontier Legacy of America’; Prout and Howitt, ‘Frontier Imaginings’; Ramussen and Lund.12. Central Statistics of Ethiopia, Census.13. Tsega, Inter-ethnic interaction; Gonzalez-Ruibal, An Archeology of; Taddesse, ‘Nilo-Saharan Interaction’.14. BGRS, Regional Socio-Economic Profile; A brochure from zonal office of investment.15. See note 14 above.16. Woldesellassie, Gumuz and Highland Resettles. While majorities were Amharas, considerable number of resettlers were also from Tigray, Hadiya, and Kambata. Subsequently, around 18,000 Gumuz natives were forcefully dislocated.17. FDRE, Constitution; BGRS, Regional Constitution.18. Dagnachew, ‘Relative Deprivation’; the politics of indigeneity has brought shifts of power balance in which the Gumuz are empowered over the historically dominant Shuwa neighbors. Meanwhile, despite the unprecedented political empowerment, the socio-economic status of Gumuz has never been comparable with the latter.19. Whittington et al., ‘The Grand Renaissance Dam’.20. His inauguration speech at the official commencement of the project, Guba, 2 April 2011.21. FDRE, Growth and Transformation Plan, 13, 4922. Verhoeven, ‘The Grand Ethiopian’, 167.23. FDRE, the Power System Expansion Master Plan (2012–2037).24. World Bank, Ethiopia.25. See note 21 above.26. Interview, Addis Ababa, 4 March 2022.27. Official speech at launching 3rd round SMS fundraising, 4 March 202028. See note 8 above.29. Interview, 19 March 2022.30. Interview with Addis Fortune, 2013.31. Haile Mariam, the former PM of FDRE, official Speech at the 120th anniversary of the Adwa Victory, 01 March 2016.32. Hoag, Developing the Rivers33. Ethiopian News Agency, 25 August 2018.34. Directly televised speech at completion of GERD’s third filing operation, 12 November 2012.35. See Asiedu, ‘The Construction’, 1–2; Engelke and Passell, ‘From the Gulf’. While Ethiopia is the source for about 85% its water, the 1929 Britain’s colonial treaty provided Egypt with near monopoly over the Nile River. In 1959, Egypt again signed a deal with Sudan which ensured the two states access to 90% of the water. Having outright power over all upstream projects, thus, Egypt has long dominated the basin’s affairs and enforced its will with threats of retribution.36. Verhoeven, 162.37. Mendi of Assosa and Sirbabay of Khmashi are also partly affected.38. Veilleux, Is dam development, 191–196.39. Ibid.40. Interview, a dam-affected local, Mankush, 29 August 2022.41. BGRS, Villagization Program.42. Interview, Disaster and Risk Management Expert, who was also member of the resettlement committee in Guba, 3 May 2022.43. Informant accounts of the dam-affected locals, August/September 2022.44. Interview, officials, Gilgel-Beles, June 2022.45. Interview, Mankush, 6 September 2022.46. Interview, member of the Gumuz Nationality Council and the local resettlement committee, Gilgel-Beles, 28 June 2022.47. Interview, Mankush, 14 September 2022.48. Reports, Guba Communication Office, on 6 December 2018 and 13 March 2019.49. Vaughan and Mesfin, Resettlement, 16.50. See note 49 above.51. Scudder, T. The future of large dams52. International Rivers, Field Visit Report, 2012.53. Vaughan and Mesfin, Resettlement.54. Reported in a PowerPoint presentation by the Ethiopian Electric Power Corporation (EEPCO), Salini Costruttori and SP Studio Pietrangelli consulting engineers, 16 November 2010 (See also International Rivers Citation2012, 16).55. Interview, Officials, 2020; Asebe and Korf, ‘Post-imperial Statecraft’.56. Interview, Mambuk, 13 June 2022.57. See note 59 above, 16–17.58. See note 45 above.59. Meron, The Mother, 36.60. Interview, Gilgel-Beles, 22 June 2022.61. ACHPR and IWGIA, Indigenous People, 10.62. See also Fana Television, 23 December 2020.63. Ibid, 6–7, 335.64. Abbink, ‘Dam controversies’.65. Turton, ‘Wilderness’, 165.66. Geiger, 87–88.67. Interview, state official, Gilgel-Beles, 18 June 2022.68. See note 47 above.69. Ibid.70. In 2010, the BGRS has launched the Commune Program to relocate and sedenterize Gumuz and other native inhabitants. ‘Modernizing’ this ‘backward’ frontier natives, and improving their livelihoods and access to services were among the stated official objectives. This has hardly attained, however. Meanwhile, the land relocatees abandoned was given to ‘alien’ investors and many of the Gumuz lost traditional tenure rights. The program is then taken as it was a state strategy to facilitate land commercialization than a genuine plan of improving local livings.71. Varied informant accounts, 2022.72. Scott, Domination, 147.73. See note 44 and 48 above.74. Report, Guba Communication Office, 2019.75. Interview, local police officer in Guba, June 2022.76. Informant accounts, 2022; Communication offices of Guba and Metekel, 2019.77. Scott, Domination; Scott, Weapons.78. Report, Guba Communication Office, June 2020.79. See note 44, 48, and 77 above.80. TIKVAH-ETHIOPIA, 2020.81. The Armed Conflict Location and Event Data, 2022.82. Ethiopian Red Cross Society, Field Report, December 2020.83. Ibid.84. See note 77 above.85. See Dagnachew, ‘Relative Deprivation’, 7–8; Nyssen, ‘Marginalised Gumuz’, 3.86. The Gumuz men were observed in Gilgel-Beles and Mambuk while offering parking services to vehicles transporting construction materials to the dam site.87. See note 45 above.88. Interview, project worker, 14 June 2022.89. Dagnachew, ‘Relative Deprivation’.90. See note 58 above.91. Meron, ‘Caught between’, 6.92. Sack, Human Territoriality, 19.93. Delaney, ‘Territory and Territoriality’.94. Geiger, 10; Von, A Post-frontier, 22; Rasmussen and Lund, 393–396.95. Interview, BGRS Prosperity Party leader, 2022.96. Deutsche Welle Amharic, 3 October 2020.97. Interview, Bahirdar, 25 April 2022.98. It is worth to note that the history of Metekel being part of the previous Gojjam province do not justify the existing claim to annex it with the ANRS. First, the state re-structuring and territorialization that gave birth to the ANRS in 1991 is totally ahistorical process. Second, Gojjam itself was not the exclusive territory of Amhara but inhabited by diverse groups, including Gumuz, Agaw, Oromo, Shinasha, and others.99. Gardner, ‘All Is Not Quiet’.100. Interview with OMN.101. Interview, Gilgel-Beles, 17 June 2022.102. See note 69 above.103. Amharas have asserted more following the coming of PM Abiy in 2018 and the creation of the Prosperity Party in late 2019, which marked the demise of TPLF’s political dominance that they perceive as anti-Amhara by its design and ideology.104. See Von; Rasmussen and Lund.105. Siko and Lund, ‘Access and Property’, 7.106. Informant accounts, 2022; Metekel Communication Office, April 2019.107. Informants accounts, 2022; Addis Standard, September/October 2020; Metekel Communication Office, November 2020; Ethiopian Insight, December 2020; AMM, January 2021; Ethiopian Peace Observatory, 2018–2022, January 2023.108. See also note 96 above.109. MoU, Metekel Zone and Agaw-Awi Nationality Zone, Article 5 (22)).110. Interview, Gilgel-Beles, 10 June 2022.111. Interview, Bullen, 2 August 2022.112. Dereje, ‘Power and Its Discontents’, 32.113. See Maasho, ‘Egypt, Ethiopia and Sudan’; Hailemariam Dessalegn, former PM of the FDRE, claims, the dam would ‘fulfill vital electricity needs and enhance regional cooperation.114. Lerman, ‘The Keystone’.115. Booth. ‘The Temperature’; Asiedu, ‘The Construction’; Bayat, ‘Plebeians of’.116. Petrov, 53; Following the 2011 Arab Spring, Egypt’s hegemony has waned, while Ethiopia led regional affairs and gained international prestige. Such a power shift has enabled the latter to embark on and move forward with the GERD.117. Engelke and Passell, ‘From the Gulf’, 11; the 1929 Agreement, codified further in 1959, allocated 4 billion cubic meters of water (BCM) per year of the Nile’s flow to Sudan, 48 BCM per year to Egypt, and none to any of today’s other nine riparian states.118. Verhoeven, 173.119. Attia and Saleh, ‘The Political Deadlock’.120. A televised speech.121. Samuel, ‘Trump Suspends’.122. Al-Monitor, October 26, 2020.123. Booth, 8.124. Caslin and Rabie.125. Ethiopian Broadcasting Corporation, 12 August 2022.126. Interview, Gilgel-Beles, 30 May 2022.127. Addis Standard, 8 March 2021; The Reporter, 13 March 2021; Abdulahi Hamu, committee chairman, reported as they were able to learn that Sudan and Egypt have been funding, training, and arming the youth to keep Metekel unstable.128. Interview with Crisis Group, 25 January 2021.129. Ethiopian Broadcasting Corporation, 14 August 2021.130. Interview, Dibati, 29 July 2022.131. Ethiopia Insight, ‘Marginalization and Persecution’, August 2021.132. Informant accounts, 2022; Ethiopian Insight, 2021; TIKVAH-ETHIOPIA, 2022.133. EHRC, 13 March 2022.134. Abbink, ‘The Atlantic community mistake’.135. A telephone interview with ‘Hadith al-Qahira’ (Cairo Talk) on the ‘al-Qahira wal Nas’ (Cairo and the People) channel, March 2023.136. On April 7 2021, Sis also warned, ‘I am telling our brothers in Ethiopia: let’s not reach the point where you touch a drop of Egypt’s water, because all options are open’.137. On 30 May 2021, addressing the launching ceremony of Adama-Awash 60 Km expressway, PM Abiy announced the plan of building more than 100 small and medium irrigation dams in various regional states in the 2021/22 fiscal year. The dams will help the country to farm agricultural produces three times per year via irrigation thereby ensure food security, the PM stated (See Ethiopian News Agency, 30 May 2021).138. Translated and Twitted by Suleiman Abdela, 2 June 2021.139. Samir Ghattas, Egyptian Parliamentarian and Head of the Middle East Forum for Strategic Studies also confirmed, ‘given the difficulty to go into direct war out of fear of international reactions. Egypt’s support for the rebels is very probable (See Al-Monitor, May 2021).140. Abbink, ‘Dam controversies’.141. Scott, Seeing Like a State.142. See Lo, ‘High Modernism, Conflict’.143. See Asiedu, ‘The Construction’; Engelke and Passell, ‘From the Gulf’; Booth. ‘The Temperature’; Asiedu, ‘The Construction’; Bayat, ‘Plebeians of’. Samuel, ‘Trump Suspends’; Petrov, The Grand Ethiopian; Lerman, ‘The Keystone’.144. See Abbink, ‘Land to the foreigners’.Additional informationFundingThe corresponding author has received support from the Capacity Building Project of the UK Research and Innovation (UKRI) in Partnership with the African Research Universities' Alliance (ARUA).Notes on contributorsDagnachew Ayenew YeshiwasDagnachew Ayenew Yeshiwas is a Ph.D. Candidate at the Institute of Peace and Development Studies, Haramaya University, Ethiopia. He has also been a senior lecturer in Department of Peace and Development Studies at Wollo University, Ethiopia, and he wrote on ethnicity, ethnic relations, and conflict. Looking into the complex interface of Governance, Development, and Indigeneity, Dagnachew is currently examining the Political-Economy of Frontier Conflicts.Gutema Imana KenoGutema Imana Keno (Ph.D.) is an Associate Professor of Sociology at Haramaya University, Haramaya, Ethiopia. He received his Ph.D.in Sociology from the University of Klagenfurt in Austria, and he has been offering graduate classes for students of Sociology, and Peace and Development Studies at Haramaya University. Dr. Gutema's research interest lies on cross-cutting issues of development sociology, and he is the author and editor of numerous research works on that.Tsega Endale EtefaTsega Endale Etefa (Professor) is a Professor of History, and Africana and Latin American Studies at Colgate University in USA. He received his Ph.D. from the University of Hamburg in Germany. Professor Tsega has researched and authored several articles and books on wide-ranging topics, including, ethnicity, ethnic relations and conflict, indigenous mechanisms of conflict resolution and transformation, and integration and peace-building.Tompson MakahamadzeTompson Makahamadze (Ph.D.)is an Associate Professor of Conflict Resolution at George Mason University in USA, where from he received his Ph.D. in Conflict Analysis and Resolution. Dr. Tompson remains Ambassador's Distinguished Scholar to Ethiopia and he was a visiting professor at several universities in. He also wrote numerous research works on political violence, peace-building, and conflict transformation.
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Small Wars and Insurgencies
Small Wars and Insurgencies INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS-
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