Multinational Joint Task Force’s counterinsurgency in the Lake Chad Basin and the consequences of Chadian exit for the Northeast, Nigeria

IF 0.9 Q3 INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS Small Wars and Insurgencies Pub Date : 2023-09-26 DOI:10.1080/09592318.2023.2257591
Nsemba Edward Lenshie, Patience Kondu Jacob, Confidence Nwachinemere Ogbonna, Buhari Shehu Miapyen, Paul Onuh, Aminu Idris, Christian Ezeibe
{"title":"Multinational Joint Task Force’s counterinsurgency in the Lake Chad Basin and the consequences of Chadian exit for the Northeast, Nigeria","authors":"Nsemba Edward Lenshie, Patience Kondu Jacob, Confidence Nwachinemere Ogbonna, Buhari Shehu Miapyen, Paul Onuh, Aminu Idris, Christian Ezeibe","doi":"10.1080/09592318.2023.2257591","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACTThe Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF), comprising soldiers from the Lake Chad Basin countries (Cameroon, Chad, Niger, Nigeria, and Benin), has been countering insurgency in the region since 2015. Frictional relationships resulting from mutual distrust affected the commitments of MNJTF contributing countries in counterinsurgency operations in Lake Chad. Chad, notably, considered itself an arrowhead in the counterinsurgency due to the laxity of other coalition countries. The devastation its soldiers suffered and the waxing strength of the operation of Boko Haram and allied groups in the region motivated the late Chadian President Idriss Déby to declare in December 2019 the exiting of his soldiers from the MNJTF to concentrate on protecting the borders of the country. The study relied on extant literature and explorative qualitative techniques to investigate the consequences of such exit on northeast Nigeria. At the very least, it reveals that Chad’s exit betrayed the MNJTF counterinsurgency coalition and has negative consequences for the security complexity in northeast Nigeria.KEYWORDS: Multinational Joint Task ForcecounterinsurgencyBoko HaramChadian exitLake Chad basin AcknowledgmentsWe are thankful to our research assistants for assisting during data collection and the reviewers, for valuable comments and the editors, for their observations, insights, and comments, which helped improve the quality of the article.Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1. Ezeani et al., ‘From a Religious Sect to a Terrorist Group : The Military and Boko Haram in Northeast Nigeria’; Campbell and Harwood, ‘Boko Haram’s Deadly Impact’.2. Lenshie and Yenda, ‘Boko Haram Insurgency, Internally Displaced Persons and Humanitarian Response in Northeast Nigeria’, p. 144; Okoli and Azom, ‘Boko Haram Insurgency and Gendered Victimhood: Women as Corporal Victims and Objects of War’, p. 1219; Okoli and Lenshie, ‘“Beyond Military Might”: Boko Haram and the Asymmetries of Counterinsurgency in Nigeria’, p. 683.3. Campbell and Harwood, ‘Boko Haram’s Deadly Impact’; Lenshie and Yenda, ‘Boko Haram Insurgency, Internally Displaced Persons and Humanitarian Response in Northeast Nigeria’.4. Lenshie et al., ‘Boko Haram, Security Architecture and Counterinsurgency in North-East, Nigeria’, p. 2; Marie Cold-Ravnkilde and Plambech, ‘Boko Haram: From Local Grievances to the Violent Insurgency’.5. Ezeibe et al., ‘Strange Bedfellows: Relations between International Nongovernmental Organisations and Military Actors in Preventing/Countering Violent Extremism in Northeast Nigeria’; Haruna, ‘Nigerian Soldiers Fighting Boko Haram Release Video, Lament Obsolete Weapons, Accusing Commanders of Corruption’.6. Eizenga, ‘Chad’s Escalating Fight against Boko Haram’.7. Abdul’ Aziz, ‘Boko Haram: Chadian Troop’s Free Nigerian Soldiers in Captivity, Kill 100 Terrorists as Shekau Reacts’.8. Head Topic, ‘Saluting President Idriss Deby – Daily Trust’.9. Eizenga, ‘Chad’s Escalating Fight against Boko Haram’.10. Brown, ‘War against Jihadists in Sahel Dealt Major Blow as Chad Says It Will Withdraw Troops’; Shaban, ‘Chad Ends Involvement in Boko Haram, Sahel Antiterrorism Ops: President’.11. Nwezeh, ‘Military: MNJTF Agreement Precludes Unilateral Withdrawal of Troops’.12. Butfoy, ‘Critical Reflections on Collective Security, p. 1–2’.13. Butfoy, ‘Themes Within the Collective Security Idea, p. 491’.14. Miller, ‘The Idea and the Reality of Collective Security’, p. 304; Betts, ‘Systems for Peace or Causes of War ?’ p. 16.15. Betts, ‘Systems for Peace or Causes of War ?’ p. 21.16. Gleason and Shaihutdinov, ‘Collective Security and Non-State Actors in Eurasia’, pp. 276–280.17. Betts, ‘Systems for Peace or Causes of War ?’ p. 13.18. Miller, ‘The Idea and the Reality of Collective Security’, pp. 309–310.19. De Luca, ‘The Gulf Crisis and Collective Security under the United Nations Charter’, p. 270.20. Tarzi, ‘The Dilemma of Collective Security: A Theoretical Critique’, pp. 45–46.21. Clark, ‘The Trouble with Collective Security’, pp. 240–242.22. Wolff, ‘The Regional Dimensions of State Failure’, p. 962; Buzan and WÆver, “Macrosecuritisation and Security Constellations: Reconsidering Scale in Securitisation Theory’’, p. 254.23. Hanau Santini, ‘A New Regional Cold War in the Middle East and North Africa: Regional Security Complex Theory Revisited’, p. 4; Omotuyi, ‘Franco-Nigerian Détente? Nigeria, France and the Francophone States of the Lake Chad Region in the Era of the Boko Haram Terrorism’, pp. 4–6”.24. Olawoyin, Akinrinde, and Irabor, ‘The Multinational Joint Task Force and Nigerian Counter- Multinational Joint Task Force and Nigerian Counterterrorism’, pp.116–117.25. Dyduch, Jarząbek, and Skorek, ‘The Dependence of Gulf Countries on Hydrocarbons Export – a Perspective of Regional Security Complex Theory’, pp. 131–132.26. Onuoha, ‘A Danger Not to Nigeria Alone – Boko Haram Transnational Reach and Regional Responses’, pp. 9–11.27. Ismail and Kifle, New Collective Security Arrangements in the Sahel : A Comparative Study of the MNJTF and G-5 Sahel, pp.20–22.28. Mwagwabi, “The Theory of Collective Security and Its Limitation in Explaining International Organization: A Critical Analysis, p. 6.29. Institute for Economics and Peace, ‘Global Terrorism Index for 2022’.30. Lenshie et al., ‘Desertification, Migration, and Herder-Farmer Conflicts in Nigeria: Rethinking the Ungoverned Spaces Thesis’; Moses and Lenshie, ‘Border Security, Arms Proliferation, and the Conundrum of Ungovernable Spaces in Nigeria’.31. Bensahel, ‘A Coalition of Coalitions: International Cooperation against Terrorism’, pp. 43–44.32. Bensahel.33. Kindzeka, ‘Lake Chad Countries Agree on Military Task Force Amid Insecurity’.34. Agbiboa, ‘Borders That Continue to Bother Us: The Politics of Cross-Border Security Cooperation in Africa’s Lake Chad Basin’, p. 404.35. Onuoha, Tchie, and Zabala, The Quest to Win Hearts and Minds: Assessing the Effectiveness of the Multinational Joint Task Force, p. 9.36. International Crisis Group, “What Role for the Multinational Joint Task Force in Fighting Boko Haram? p. 29.37. Africa Defence Force, ‘The Multinational Joint Task Force Shows the Strengths and Limits of Collective Security Action’.38. Omenma, Onyishi, and Michael, ‘A Decade of Boko Haram Activities : The Attacks, Responses and Challenges Ahead’, p. 17”.39. Interview: Nigerian soldier claiming to have been on the front lines of the battle against Boko Haram in Maiduguri, Borno State, in February 2021.40. Interview: displaced community leader in Maiduguri, Borno State, March 2021.41. Africa Defence Force, ‘The Multinational Joint Task Force Shows the Strengths and Limits of Collective Security Action’.42. International Crisis Group, ‘What Role for the Multinational Joint Task Force in Fighting Boko Haram?’ p. 28.43. Interview: freelance security actor in Mubi, Adamawa State, reported Boko Haram had a long-term regional effect on the population, including brutal experiences during the most violent period of the insurgency.44. Campbell and Harwood, ‘Boko Haram’s Deadly Impact’; Okoli and Azom, ‘Boko Haram Insurgency and Gendered Victimhood: Women as Corporal Victims and Objects of War’.45. International Crisis Group, “What Role for the Multinational Joint Task Force in Fighting Boko Haram? p. 2.46. Gavin, ‘Nigeria Security Tracker’.47. Doukhan, ‘Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) against Boko Haram – Reflections’.48. Odunsi, ‘Boko Haram: 240 Insurgents Surrender to Military’.49. Mutum, ‘240 Boko Haram Militants Surrender To Task Force’.50. Oshoko, ‘Operation Anmi Fakat: MNJTF Kills 59 Boko Haram Terrorists, 3 Suicide Bombers; Lose 22 Soldiers in Action; 75 Injured by IEDS’.51. Interview: critical informant security analyst or expert in Yola, Adamawa State, in February 2021.52. Oshoko, ‘Operation Anmi Fakat: MNJTF Kills 59 Boko Haram Terrorists, 3 Suicide Bombers; Lose 22 Soldiers in Action; 75 Injured by IEDS’.53. Oshoko.54. Interview: security expert from Yola, Adamawa State, in January 2021.55. Reuters, ‘Boko Haram Militants Kill 92 Chadian Soldiers – President’.56. Asadu, ‘FLASHBACK: In 2015, Chad President Said Nigeria Was Absent from Boko Haram War’.57. Eizenga, ‘Chad’s Escalating Fight against Boko Haram’.58. India Today, ‘Operation Bomo’s Anger: 1,000 Boko Haram Fighters Killed, Says Chad’s Army’.59. Nseyen, ‘Don’t Let Them Free Captured Boko Haram Members, Weapons – Deby Tells Chadian Troops [Video]’.60. Nigeria, ‘90% of Boko Haram Wiped out, President Idriss Deby of Chad Claims (Video)’.61. Interview: Damasak village chief in Maiduguri, Borno State, in March 2021.62. International Crisis Group, ‘What Role for the Multinational Joint Task Force in Fighting Boko Haram?’ p. ii.63. Nwezeh, ‘Military: MNJTF Agreement Precludes Unilateral Withdrawal of Troops’.64. The Defence Post, ‘Chad Troops Leave Nigeria with Boko Haram Mission “Finished”’65. The Defence Post.66. Aluko, ‘Boko Haram: MNJTF under Threat as Chad Army Hints at Withdrawal’.67. Interview: security expert from Maiduguri in March 2021.68. Interview with a member of the MNJTF in March 2021 in Maiduguri, Borno State.69. Interview: critical informant security analyst or expert in Yola, Adamawa State, in February 2021”.70. Cocks, ‘Cameroon Weakest Link in Fight against Boko Haram: Nigeria’.71. Ibekwe, ‘Boko Haram: Nigerian Government Not Doing Enough – U.S’.72. Interview: critical informant security analyst or expert in Yola, Adamawa State, in March 2021.73. The information provided in the table is incomplete.74. Data adopted with modification from Omenma (Citation2019), p. 15.75. Enietan-Matthews, ‘Chad, Niger Withdraw from MNJTF over Boko Haram Attacks’.76. Enietan-Matthews.77. Interviews: people of the villages of Shafa, Azare, Tashan Alade, Pemi, and Dikwa in Maiduguri, Borno State, in January and February 2021.78. Interview: security expert in Potiskum, Yobe State, in January 2021.79. Omenma, ‘Untold Story of Boko Haram Insurgency: The Lake Chad Oil and Gas Connection’, p. 4.80. Interview: security expert from Maiduguri, Borno State, in February 2021.81. Harding, ‘Chad’s President Idriss Déby Dies after Clashes with Rebels’.82. Marc, ‘The Death of Chadian President Idris Déby Itno threatens Stability in the Region’.83. Ominabo, ‘Niger Coup and Its Implications to West Africa’.84. Ogbuli, ‘What’s Happening in Niger? The Implications of the July 2023 Niger Coup’.85. Okoli and Lenshie, ‘The Military, Boko Haram, and the Dialectics of Counterinsurgency Operations in Nigeria’.86. Interview: some community leaders in Maiduguri and Borno, and Damaturu, Borno State, in April 2021.87. The Defence Post, ‘Chad Troops Leave Nigeria with Boko Haram Mission “Finished”’88. Africa News, ‘Nigerians Worried as Chad Withdraws All Troops from Lake Chad Area’.89. Several people and FGDs in the states of Adamawa, Borno, and Yobe concur with this position.90. Interview: participant from Maiduguri, Borno State, in March 2021.91. FGDs with Maiduguri residents who were forced to flee their homes in January and February 2021 due to Boko Haram, Ansaru, and ISWAP attacks.92. Interviews with Kakuwa, Mungono, Gidimbari and Gajiram community leaders in Maiduguri, Borno State, between January and March 2021.93. SBMorgen, ‘Chart of the Week: Boko Haram Fatalities in 2020’.94. Interview: Damasak village chief in Maiduguri, Borno State, in March 2021.95. Critical interview with community leaders from Gajiganna and Mungono in Maiduguri, Borno State, February 2021.96. FGDs with Maiduguri residents Boko Haram forced many resident to flee their homes to Maiduguri in January and February 2021.97. Interview with members of Gajiganna and Monguno communities in Maiduguri, Borno State, February 202.98. FGDs with Gajiganna and Monguno residents who were forced to flee their homes to flee to Maiduguri in January and February 2021 due to Boko Haram, Ansaru, and ISWAP attacks.99. Interview with a member of the MNJTF in March 2021 in Maiduguri, Borno State.100. In January and March of 2021, interviews were done with people from the villages of Bama, Gwoza, Kukawa Gubio, Dikwa, Shafa, Marte, Pemi, and Maiduguri, Borno State.101. In February 2021, Gajiganna and Mungono villagers were interviewed in Maiduguri, Borno State.102. Lawal, ‘Boko Haram Attacks Adamawa Town on Christmas Eve’.103. SBMorgen, ‘Chart of the Week: Boko Haram Fatalities in 2020’.104. Onuoha, Nwangwu, and Ugwueze, ‘Counterinsurgency Operations of the Nigerian Military and Boko Haram Insurgency: Expounding the Viscid Manacle’, p. 4–6.105. Between January and March of 2021, multiple FGDs were performed in Mubi and Gombi, Adamawa State; Damaturu and Potiskum, Yobe State; and Maiduguri, Borno State. These meetings were with people who were internally displaced.106. FGDs field data from Yola (Adamawa State), Damaturu (Yobe State) and Maiduguri (Borno State) between January and March 2021.107. Interviews: In January and February 2021, people of the villages of Shafa, Azare, Tashan Alade, Pemi, and Dikwa were interviewed in Maiduguri, Borno State.108. Residents of Busari, Tarmuwa, Damaturu, Gaidam, and Gujba in Damaturu, Yobe State, and Gombi, Madagali, and Minchika in Mubi and Yola, Adamawa State, were interviewed in February and March 2021.Additional informationNotes on contributorsNsemba Edward LenshieNsemba Edward Lenshie teaches political science at the Taraba State University, Jalingo, Taraba State, Nigeria. He is completing his doctorate degree in political economy in the Department of Political Science at the University of Nigeria, Nsukka, in Nigeria. His research interests straddle areas such as political economy, security, citizenship, identity politics, and border and migration and refugee studies. His work has appeared in several reputable journals, including Armed Forces and Society, Journal of Asian and African Studies, Small Wars and Insurgencies, Security Journal, Journal of Migrants and Refugee Studies, Democracy and Society, Local Environment, and African Identities and Society.Patience Kondu JacobPatience Kondu Jacob teaches political science at the Taraba State University, Jalingo, Taraba State, Nigeria. She is a doctoral student in international relations in the Department of Political Science at the University of Nigeria, Nsukka, in Nigeria. Her research interest includes security and gender studies, migration and refugee studies and international relations. Her work has appeared in Journal of Migrants and Refugee Studies.Confidence Nwachinemere OgbonnaConfidence Nwachinemere Ogbonna teaches political science at the Department of Political Science, Evangel University Akaeze: Okpoto, Ebonyi, Nigeria. He is completing his doctorate degree in comparative politics in the Department of Political Science at the University of Nigeria, Nsukka, in Nigeria. His research interest includes soft power politics, border and security studies and electoral politics.Buhari Shehu MiapyenMiapyen Buhari Shehu teaches political science at the Taraba State University. His research interest is in the areas of inequality engendered by capitalism and how such different categories of inequalities are instrumentalised to promote capitalist mode of accumulation. His most recent work is in understanding the utility of Cedric Robinson’s perspective in explaining racial capitalism in Africa, published by the Review of African Political Economy (ROAPE).Paul OnuhPaul Onuh is a lecturer in the Department of Political Science, University of Nigeria, specializing in the Political Economy subfield. He holds a PhD in political economy from the same department. His research interests include the political economy of security, cybercrime, terrorism, the state and governance, corruption in public health governance, election management, and public policy. This study is an aspect of a broader project on the “political economy of insecurity in Nigeria” that our team is presently working on. All listed authors played significant roles throughout the research process.Aminu IdrisAminu Idris teaches Political Science at the Federal University of Gusau, Nigeria. He holds a PhD in Political Science with a specialisation in border and migration studies from the Near East University in Cyprus. His interests straddle border and migration studies, conflict and security studies, identity politics, and international relations. His work has been published in reputable national and international journals, including Security Journal.Christian EzeibeChristian Ezeibe is a Senior Lecturer in the Department of Political Science and a Senior Research Fellow in the Institute of Climate Change Studies, Energy and Environment, University of Nigeria, Nsukka. His areas of research include election, political economy and sustainable development.","PeriodicalId":46215,"journal":{"name":"Small Wars and Insurgencies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.9000,"publicationDate":"2023-09-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Small Wars and Insurgencies","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09592318.2023.2257591","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q3","JCRName":"INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0

Abstract

ABSTRACTThe Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF), comprising soldiers from the Lake Chad Basin countries (Cameroon, Chad, Niger, Nigeria, and Benin), has been countering insurgency in the region since 2015. Frictional relationships resulting from mutual distrust affected the commitments of MNJTF contributing countries in counterinsurgency operations in Lake Chad. Chad, notably, considered itself an arrowhead in the counterinsurgency due to the laxity of other coalition countries. The devastation its soldiers suffered and the waxing strength of the operation of Boko Haram and allied groups in the region motivated the late Chadian President Idriss Déby to declare in December 2019 the exiting of his soldiers from the MNJTF to concentrate on protecting the borders of the country. The study relied on extant literature and explorative qualitative techniques to investigate the consequences of such exit on northeast Nigeria. At the very least, it reveals that Chad’s exit betrayed the MNJTF counterinsurgency coalition and has negative consequences for the security complexity in northeast Nigeria.KEYWORDS: Multinational Joint Task ForcecounterinsurgencyBoko HaramChadian exitLake Chad basin AcknowledgmentsWe are thankful to our research assistants for assisting during data collection and the reviewers, for valuable comments and the editors, for their observations, insights, and comments, which helped improve the quality of the article.Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1. Ezeani et al., ‘From a Religious Sect to a Terrorist Group : The Military and Boko Haram in Northeast Nigeria’; Campbell and Harwood, ‘Boko Haram’s Deadly Impact’.2. Lenshie and Yenda, ‘Boko Haram Insurgency, Internally Displaced Persons and Humanitarian Response in Northeast Nigeria’, p. 144; Okoli and Azom, ‘Boko Haram Insurgency and Gendered Victimhood: Women as Corporal Victims and Objects of War’, p. 1219; Okoli and Lenshie, ‘“Beyond Military Might”: Boko Haram and the Asymmetries of Counterinsurgency in Nigeria’, p. 683.3. Campbell and Harwood, ‘Boko Haram’s Deadly Impact’; Lenshie and Yenda, ‘Boko Haram Insurgency, Internally Displaced Persons and Humanitarian Response in Northeast Nigeria’.4. Lenshie et al., ‘Boko Haram, Security Architecture and Counterinsurgency in North-East, Nigeria’, p. 2; Marie Cold-Ravnkilde and Plambech, ‘Boko Haram: From Local Grievances to the Violent Insurgency’.5. Ezeibe et al., ‘Strange Bedfellows: Relations between International Nongovernmental Organisations and Military Actors in Preventing/Countering Violent Extremism in Northeast Nigeria’; Haruna, ‘Nigerian Soldiers Fighting Boko Haram Release Video, Lament Obsolete Weapons, Accusing Commanders of Corruption’.6. Eizenga, ‘Chad’s Escalating Fight against Boko Haram’.7. Abdul’ Aziz, ‘Boko Haram: Chadian Troop’s Free Nigerian Soldiers in Captivity, Kill 100 Terrorists as Shekau Reacts’.8. Head Topic, ‘Saluting President Idriss Deby – Daily Trust’.9. Eizenga, ‘Chad’s Escalating Fight against Boko Haram’.10. Brown, ‘War against Jihadists in Sahel Dealt Major Blow as Chad Says It Will Withdraw Troops’; Shaban, ‘Chad Ends Involvement in Boko Haram, Sahel Antiterrorism Ops: President’.11. Nwezeh, ‘Military: MNJTF Agreement Precludes Unilateral Withdrawal of Troops’.12. Butfoy, ‘Critical Reflections on Collective Security, p. 1–2’.13. Butfoy, ‘Themes Within the Collective Security Idea, p. 491’.14. Miller, ‘The Idea and the Reality of Collective Security’, p. 304; Betts, ‘Systems for Peace or Causes of War ?’ p. 16.15. Betts, ‘Systems for Peace or Causes of War ?’ p. 21.16. Gleason and Shaihutdinov, ‘Collective Security and Non-State Actors in Eurasia’, pp. 276–280.17. Betts, ‘Systems for Peace or Causes of War ?’ p. 13.18. Miller, ‘The Idea and the Reality of Collective Security’, pp. 309–310.19. De Luca, ‘The Gulf Crisis and Collective Security under the United Nations Charter’, p. 270.20. Tarzi, ‘The Dilemma of Collective Security: A Theoretical Critique’, pp. 45–46.21. Clark, ‘The Trouble with Collective Security’, pp. 240–242.22. Wolff, ‘The Regional Dimensions of State Failure’, p. 962; Buzan and WÆver, “Macrosecuritisation and Security Constellations: Reconsidering Scale in Securitisation Theory’’, p. 254.23. Hanau Santini, ‘A New Regional Cold War in the Middle East and North Africa: Regional Security Complex Theory Revisited’, p. 4; Omotuyi, ‘Franco-Nigerian Détente? Nigeria, France and the Francophone States of the Lake Chad Region in the Era of the Boko Haram Terrorism’, pp. 4–6”.24. Olawoyin, Akinrinde, and Irabor, ‘The Multinational Joint Task Force and Nigerian Counter- Multinational Joint Task Force and Nigerian Counterterrorism’, pp.116–117.25. Dyduch, Jarząbek, and Skorek, ‘The Dependence of Gulf Countries on Hydrocarbons Export – a Perspective of Regional Security Complex Theory’, pp. 131–132.26. Onuoha, ‘A Danger Not to Nigeria Alone – Boko Haram Transnational Reach and Regional Responses’, pp. 9–11.27. Ismail and Kifle, New Collective Security Arrangements in the Sahel : A Comparative Study of the MNJTF and G-5 Sahel, pp.20–22.28. Mwagwabi, “The Theory of Collective Security and Its Limitation in Explaining International Organization: A Critical Analysis, p. 6.29. Institute for Economics and Peace, ‘Global Terrorism Index for 2022’.30. Lenshie et al., ‘Desertification, Migration, and Herder-Farmer Conflicts in Nigeria: Rethinking the Ungoverned Spaces Thesis’; Moses and Lenshie, ‘Border Security, Arms Proliferation, and the Conundrum of Ungovernable Spaces in Nigeria’.31. Bensahel, ‘A Coalition of Coalitions: International Cooperation against Terrorism’, pp. 43–44.32. Bensahel.33. Kindzeka, ‘Lake Chad Countries Agree on Military Task Force Amid Insecurity’.34. Agbiboa, ‘Borders That Continue to Bother Us: The Politics of Cross-Border Security Cooperation in Africa’s Lake Chad Basin’, p. 404.35. Onuoha, Tchie, and Zabala, The Quest to Win Hearts and Minds: Assessing the Effectiveness of the Multinational Joint Task Force, p. 9.36. International Crisis Group, “What Role for the Multinational Joint Task Force in Fighting Boko Haram? p. 29.37. Africa Defence Force, ‘The Multinational Joint Task Force Shows the Strengths and Limits of Collective Security Action’.38. Omenma, Onyishi, and Michael, ‘A Decade of Boko Haram Activities : The Attacks, Responses and Challenges Ahead’, p. 17”.39. Interview: Nigerian soldier claiming to have been on the front lines of the battle against Boko Haram in Maiduguri, Borno State, in February 2021.40. Interview: displaced community leader in Maiduguri, Borno State, March 2021.41. Africa Defence Force, ‘The Multinational Joint Task Force Shows the Strengths and Limits of Collective Security Action’.42. International Crisis Group, ‘What Role for the Multinational Joint Task Force in Fighting Boko Haram?’ p. 28.43. Interview: freelance security actor in Mubi, Adamawa State, reported Boko Haram had a long-term regional effect on the population, including brutal experiences during the most violent period of the insurgency.44. Campbell and Harwood, ‘Boko Haram’s Deadly Impact’; Okoli and Azom, ‘Boko Haram Insurgency and Gendered Victimhood: Women as Corporal Victims and Objects of War’.45. International Crisis Group, “What Role for the Multinational Joint Task Force in Fighting Boko Haram? p. 2.46. Gavin, ‘Nigeria Security Tracker’.47. Doukhan, ‘Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) against Boko Haram – Reflections’.48. Odunsi, ‘Boko Haram: 240 Insurgents Surrender to Military’.49. Mutum, ‘240 Boko Haram Militants Surrender To Task Force’.50. Oshoko, ‘Operation Anmi Fakat: MNJTF Kills 59 Boko Haram Terrorists, 3 Suicide Bombers; Lose 22 Soldiers in Action; 75 Injured by IEDS’.51. Interview: critical informant security analyst or expert in Yola, Adamawa State, in February 2021.52. Oshoko, ‘Operation Anmi Fakat: MNJTF Kills 59 Boko Haram Terrorists, 3 Suicide Bombers; Lose 22 Soldiers in Action; 75 Injured by IEDS’.53. Oshoko.54. Interview: security expert from Yola, Adamawa State, in January 2021.55. Reuters, ‘Boko Haram Militants Kill 92 Chadian Soldiers – President’.56. Asadu, ‘FLASHBACK: In 2015, Chad President Said Nigeria Was Absent from Boko Haram War’.57. Eizenga, ‘Chad’s Escalating Fight against Boko Haram’.58. India Today, ‘Operation Bomo’s Anger: 1,000 Boko Haram Fighters Killed, Says Chad’s Army’.59. Nseyen, ‘Don’t Let Them Free Captured Boko Haram Members, Weapons – Deby Tells Chadian Troops [Video]’.60. Nigeria, ‘90% of Boko Haram Wiped out, President Idriss Deby of Chad Claims (Video)’.61. Interview: Damasak village chief in Maiduguri, Borno State, in March 2021.62. International Crisis Group, ‘What Role for the Multinational Joint Task Force in Fighting Boko Haram?’ p. ii.63. Nwezeh, ‘Military: MNJTF Agreement Precludes Unilateral Withdrawal of Troops’.64. The Defence Post, ‘Chad Troops Leave Nigeria with Boko Haram Mission “Finished”’65. The Defence Post.66. Aluko, ‘Boko Haram: MNJTF under Threat as Chad Army Hints at Withdrawal’.67. Interview: security expert from Maiduguri in March 2021.68. Interview with a member of the MNJTF in March 2021 in Maiduguri, Borno State.69. Interview: critical informant security analyst or expert in Yola, Adamawa State, in February 2021”.70. Cocks, ‘Cameroon Weakest Link in Fight against Boko Haram: Nigeria’.71. Ibekwe, ‘Boko Haram: Nigerian Government Not Doing Enough – U.S’.72. Interview: critical informant security analyst or expert in Yola, Adamawa State, in March 2021.73. The information provided in the table is incomplete.74. Data adopted with modification from Omenma (Citation2019), p. 15.75. Enietan-Matthews, ‘Chad, Niger Withdraw from MNJTF over Boko Haram Attacks’.76. Enietan-Matthews.77. Interviews: people of the villages of Shafa, Azare, Tashan Alade, Pemi, and Dikwa in Maiduguri, Borno State, in January and February 2021.78. Interview: security expert in Potiskum, Yobe State, in January 2021.79. Omenma, ‘Untold Story of Boko Haram Insurgency: The Lake Chad Oil and Gas Connection’, p. 4.80. Interview: security expert from Maiduguri, Borno State, in February 2021.81. Harding, ‘Chad’s President Idriss Déby Dies after Clashes with Rebels’.82. Marc, ‘The Death of Chadian President Idris Déby Itno threatens Stability in the Region’.83. Ominabo, ‘Niger Coup and Its Implications to West Africa’.84. Ogbuli, ‘What’s Happening in Niger? The Implications of the July 2023 Niger Coup’.85. Okoli and Lenshie, ‘The Military, Boko Haram, and the Dialectics of Counterinsurgency Operations in Nigeria’.86. Interview: some community leaders in Maiduguri and Borno, and Damaturu, Borno State, in April 2021.87. The Defence Post, ‘Chad Troops Leave Nigeria with Boko Haram Mission “Finished”’88. Africa News, ‘Nigerians Worried as Chad Withdraws All Troops from Lake Chad Area’.89. Several people and FGDs in the states of Adamawa, Borno, and Yobe concur with this position.90. Interview: participant from Maiduguri, Borno State, in March 2021.91. FGDs with Maiduguri residents who were forced to flee their homes in January and February 2021 due to Boko Haram, Ansaru, and ISWAP attacks.92. Interviews with Kakuwa, Mungono, Gidimbari and Gajiram community leaders in Maiduguri, Borno State, between January and March 2021.93. SBMorgen, ‘Chart of the Week: Boko Haram Fatalities in 2020’.94. Interview: Damasak village chief in Maiduguri, Borno State, in March 2021.95. Critical interview with community leaders from Gajiganna and Mungono in Maiduguri, Borno State, February 2021.96. FGDs with Maiduguri residents Boko Haram forced many resident to flee their homes to Maiduguri in January and February 2021.97. Interview with members of Gajiganna and Monguno communities in Maiduguri, Borno State, February 202.98. FGDs with Gajiganna and Monguno residents who were forced to flee their homes to flee to Maiduguri in January and February 2021 due to Boko Haram, Ansaru, and ISWAP attacks.99. Interview with a member of the MNJTF in March 2021 in Maiduguri, Borno State.100. In January and March of 2021, interviews were done with people from the villages of Bama, Gwoza, Kukawa Gubio, Dikwa, Shafa, Marte, Pemi, and Maiduguri, Borno State.101. In February 2021, Gajiganna and Mungono villagers were interviewed in Maiduguri, Borno State.102. Lawal, ‘Boko Haram Attacks Adamawa Town on Christmas Eve’.103. SBMorgen, ‘Chart of the Week: Boko Haram Fatalities in 2020’.104. Onuoha, Nwangwu, and Ugwueze, ‘Counterinsurgency Operations of the Nigerian Military and Boko Haram Insurgency: Expounding the Viscid Manacle’, p. 4–6.105. Between January and March of 2021, multiple FGDs were performed in Mubi and Gombi, Adamawa State; Damaturu and Potiskum, Yobe State; and Maiduguri, Borno State. These meetings were with people who were internally displaced.106. FGDs field data from Yola (Adamawa State), Damaturu (Yobe State) and Maiduguri (Borno State) between January and March 2021.107. Interviews: In January and February 2021, people of the villages of Shafa, Azare, Tashan Alade, Pemi, and Dikwa were interviewed in Maiduguri, Borno State.108. Residents of Busari, Tarmuwa, Damaturu, Gaidam, and Gujba in Damaturu, Yobe State, and Gombi, Madagali, and Minchika in Mubi and Yola, Adamawa State, were interviewed in February and March 2021.Additional informationNotes on contributorsNsemba Edward LenshieNsemba Edward Lenshie teaches political science at the Taraba State University, Jalingo, Taraba State, Nigeria. He is completing his doctorate degree in political economy in the Department of Political Science at the University of Nigeria, Nsukka, in Nigeria. His research interests straddle areas such as political economy, security, citizenship, identity politics, and border and migration and refugee studies. His work has appeared in several reputable journals, including Armed Forces and Society, Journal of Asian and African Studies, Small Wars and Insurgencies, Security Journal, Journal of Migrants and Refugee Studies, Democracy and Society, Local Environment, and African Identities and Society.Patience Kondu JacobPatience Kondu Jacob teaches political science at the Taraba State University, Jalingo, Taraba State, Nigeria. She is a doctoral student in international relations in the Department of Political Science at the University of Nigeria, Nsukka, in Nigeria. Her research interest includes security and gender studies, migration and refugee studies and international relations. Her work has appeared in Journal of Migrants and Refugee Studies.Confidence Nwachinemere OgbonnaConfidence Nwachinemere Ogbonna teaches political science at the Department of Political Science, Evangel University Akaeze: Okpoto, Ebonyi, Nigeria. He is completing his doctorate degree in comparative politics in the Department of Political Science at the University of Nigeria, Nsukka, in Nigeria. His research interest includes soft power politics, border and security studies and electoral politics.Buhari Shehu MiapyenMiapyen Buhari Shehu teaches political science at the Taraba State University. His research interest is in the areas of inequality engendered by capitalism and how such different categories of inequalities are instrumentalised to promote capitalist mode of accumulation. His most recent work is in understanding the utility of Cedric Robinson’s perspective in explaining racial capitalism in Africa, published by the Review of African Political Economy (ROAPE).Paul OnuhPaul Onuh is a lecturer in the Department of Political Science, University of Nigeria, specializing in the Political Economy subfield. He holds a PhD in political economy from the same department. His research interests include the political economy of security, cybercrime, terrorism, the state and governance, corruption in public health governance, election management, and public policy. This study is an aspect of a broader project on the “political economy of insecurity in Nigeria” that our team is presently working on. All listed authors played significant roles throughout the research process.Aminu IdrisAminu Idris teaches Political Science at the Federal University of Gusau, Nigeria. He holds a PhD in Political Science with a specialisation in border and migration studies from the Near East University in Cyprus. His interests straddle border and migration studies, conflict and security studies, identity politics, and international relations. His work has been published in reputable national and international journals, including Security Journal.Christian EzeibeChristian Ezeibe is a Senior Lecturer in the Department of Political Science and a Senior Research Fellow in the Institute of Climate Change Studies, Energy and Environment, University of Nigeria, Nsukka. His areas of research include election, political economy and sustainable development.
查看原文
分享 分享
微信好友 朋友圈 QQ好友 复制链接
本刊更多论文
多国联合特遣部队在乍得湖盆地的平叛行动以及乍得撤离对尼日利亚东北部的影响
多国联合特遣部队(MNJTF)由乍得湖盆地国家(喀麦隆、乍得、尼日尔、尼日利亚和贝宁)的士兵组成,自2015年以来一直在该地区打击叛乱。互不信任造成的摩擦关系影响到多国临时警察部队派遣国对乍得湖平叛行动的承诺。值得注意的是,由于其他联盟国家的松懈,乍得认为自己是反叛乱的一个箭头。其士兵遭受的破坏以及博科圣地及其盟友组织在该地区的行动日益强大,促使已故乍得总统伊德里斯·戴姆塞比于2019年12月宣布他的士兵从MNJTF撤出,集中精力保护该国的边界。该研究依靠现有文献和探索性定性技术来调查这种退出对尼日利亚东北部的影响。至少,它揭示了乍得的退出背叛了MNJTF反叛乱联盟,并对尼日利亚东北部复杂的安全局势产生了负面影响。感谢我们的研究助理在数据收集过程中的协助,感谢审稿人的宝贵意见,感谢编辑的观察、见解和评论,这有助于提高文章的质量。披露声明作者未报告潜在的利益冲突。Ezeani et al.,《从一个宗教派别到一个恐怖组织:尼日利亚东北部的军队和博科圣地》;坎贝尔和哈伍德,“博科圣地的致命影响”。Lenshie和Yenda,“博科圣地叛乱,尼日利亚东北部的国内流离失所者和人道主义反应”,第144页;Okoli和Azom,“博科圣地叛乱和性别受害者:女性作为下士受害者和战争对象”,第1219页;Okoli和Lenshie,“超越军事力量”:博科圣地和尼日利亚反叛乱的不对称”,第683.3页。坎贝尔和哈伍德,《博科圣地的致命影响》;4. Lenshie和Yenda,“博科圣地叛乱,尼日利亚东北部的国内流离失所者和人道主义反应”。Lenshie等人,“博科圣地,尼日利亚东北部的安全架构和反叛乱”,第2页;5. Marie Cold-Ravnkilde和Plambech,《博科圣地:从地方不满到暴力叛乱》。Ezeibe等人,《奇怪的同床异榻:国际非政府组织和军事行动者在尼日利亚东北部预防/打击暴力极端主义方面的关系》;与博科圣地作战的尼日利亚士兵发布视频,哀叹武器过时,指责指挥官腐败。Eizenga,“乍得对博科圣地不断升级的战斗”。8. Abdul ' Aziz,《博科圣地:乍得军队释放被囚禁的尼日利亚士兵,杀死100名恐怖分子作为谢考的反应》。标题:“向伊德里斯·代比总统致敬——每日信任”。Eizenga,“乍得对博科圣地不断升级的战斗”。布朗:“乍得称将从萨赫勒撤军,打击圣战分子的战争受到重大打击”;11.《乍得总统停止参与博科圣地和萨赫勒地区的反恐行动》。Nwezeh,“军事:MNJTF协议排除单方面撤军”。Butfoy, <对集体安全的批判性反思>,第1-2页。《集体安全思想中的主题》,第491页。米勒,《集体安全的理念与现实》,第304页;贝茨,《和平制度还是战争起因?》第16.15页。贝茨,《和平的制度还是战争的原因?》第21.16页。Gleason和Shaihutdinov,“欧亚大陆的集体安全和非国家行为体”,第276-280.17页。贝茨,《和平制度还是战争起因?》第13.18页。米勒,《集体安全的理念与现实》,第309-310.19页。De Luca,《联合国宪章下的海湾危机与集体安全》,第270.20页。Tarzi, <集体安全的困境:一个理论批判>,第45-46.21页。Clark, <集体安全的麻烦>,240-242.22页。沃尔夫,《国家失败的区域维度》,第962页;Buzan和WÆver,“宏观证券化和安全星座:重新考虑证券化理论中的规模”,第254.23页。Hanau Santini,“中东和北非的新区域冷战:重新审视区域安全复合体理论”,第4页;Omotuyi,“法国-尼日利亚dsamente ?”“博科圣地恐怖主义时代的尼日利亚、法国和乍得湖地区法语国家”,第4-6页。Olawoyin, Akinrinde和irlabour,“多国联合特遣部队和尼日利亚反多国联合特遣部队和尼日利亚反恐”,第116 - 117.25页。Dyduch, Jarząbek, and Skorek,“海湾国家对碳氢化合物出口的依赖——一个区域安全复杂理论的视角”,第131-132.26页。Onuoha,“不仅仅是尼日利亚的危险——博科圣地的跨国影响和区域反应”,页。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
求助全文
约1分钟内获得全文 去求助
来源期刊
Small Wars and Insurgencies
Small Wars and Insurgencies INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS-
CiteScore
1.90
自引率
25.00%
发文量
65
期刊最新文献
When Militias capture the state: evidence from Lebanon, Iraq, and Sudan High-modernist intervention and the prolonged frontier conflict in Metekel, North-West Ethiopia: the case of the grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam Rwanda’s War in Mozambique: Road-Testing a Kigali Principles approach to counterinsurgency? Multinational Joint Task Force’s counterinsurgency in the Lake Chad Basin and the consequences of Chadian exit for the Northeast, Nigeria Negotiating ‘Hearts and Minds’: conflict, infrastructure, and community support in Colombia
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
现在去查看 取消
×
提示
确定
0
微信
客服QQ
Book学术公众号 扫码关注我们
反馈
×
意见反馈
请填写您的意见或建议
请填写您的手机或邮箱
已复制链接
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
×
扫码分享
扫码分享
Book学术官方微信
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术
文献互助 智能选刊 最新文献 互助须知 联系我们:info@booksci.cn
Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。
Copyright © 2023 Book学术 All rights reserved.
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号 京ICP备2023020795号-1