Pub Date : 2023-11-09DOI: 10.1080/09592318.2023.2271244
Federico Manfredi Firmian
ABSTRACTStudies on militias tend to focus on state policies, such as government collusion with militias during counterinsurgencies or post-conflict demobilization programs. This article examines militia strategies vis-à-vis the state, focusing on the case of militias engaged in ‘state capture’ – i.e. the covert and gradual penetration of state institutions aimed to shape public policy. The article provides an overview of key concepts and definitions, proposes a theoretical framework of state capture, and presents three fieldwork-based case studies: Hezbollah in Lebanon, Shia militias in Iraq, and the Rapid Support Forces in Sudan.KEYWORDS: Militiasconflictcivil warelectionsinstitutionsstate capture Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1. See Cohen, ‘Distant Battles’; Kaldor, New and Old Wars.2. Carey, Mitchell, and Lowe, ‘States, the Security Sector, and the Monopoly of Violence’.3. Aliyev, ‘Pro-Regime Militias and Civil War Duration’.4. Lyons, ‘Post-Conflict Elections and the Process of Demilitarizing Politics’; Alden, Thakur, Arnold, Militias and the Challenges of Post-Conflict Peace; Matanock and Staniland, ‘How and Why Armed Groups Participate in Elections’; Shaw and Aliyev, ‘The Frontlines Have Shifted’.5. Reno, Warfare in independent Africa; Debos, Living by the Gun in Chad; Stearns, The War that Doesn’t Say Its Name.6. Cohen and Nordas, ‘Do States Delegate Shameful Violence to Militias?’; Staniland, ‘Militias, Ideology, and the State’; Staniland, ‘Armed Politics and the Study of Intrastate Conflict’; Carey, Colaresi, and Mitchell, ‘Governments, Informal Links to Militias, and Accountability’; Aliyev, “When and How Do Militias Disband?7. Staniland, ‘Militias, Ideology, and the State’.8. Ahram, Proxy Warriors.9. Reno, Warfare in independent Africa10. Aliyev, ‘Strong Militias, Weak States and Armed Violence’.11. Lijphart, ‘The Comparable Cases Strategy in Comparative Research’; Collier and Mahoney, ‘Insights and Pitfalls’; Seawright and Gerring, ‘Case selection techniques in case study research’.12. Jentzsch, Kalyvas, and Schubiger, ‘Militias in Civil Wars’.13. Ahram, Proxy Warriors; Carey, Mitchell, and Lowe, ‘States, the Security Sector, and the Monopoly of Violence’.14. Weber, Politik als Beruf.15. Hellman and Kaufmann, ‘Seize the State, Seize the Day’.16. Faccio, ‘Politically Connected Firms’; Martin and Solomon, ‘Understanding the Phenomenon of “State Capture” in South Africa’; Chipkin and Swilling, Shadow State.17. Meirotti and Masterson, State Capture in Africa.18. Hertel-Fernandez, State Capture.19. Al-Idrissi and Lacher, ‘Capital of Militias’; Smith, Malik, and Knights, ‘Team of Legal Gladiators?’; Wimmen, ‘Lebanon’s Vicious Cycles’.20. Gingeras, ‘Last Rites for a “Pure Bandit”’21. Hussein, Frontline Pakistan.22. Interview code: MSC2021–02 (political analyst), 15 November 2021, Baghdad.23. e.g., Chambers, ‘Democratization Interrupted’.24. Paxton, The Anatomy of Fascism.25. Briscoe,
联合国儿童基金会，《生活在黎巴嫩的边缘》，47页。采访代码:MSC2020-06(学术)，2020年7月22日，贝鲁特。采访代码:MSC2020-10(政治分析师)，2020年7月27日，贝鲁特。采访代码:MSC2020-14(民间社会活动家)，2020年11月30日，贝鲁特。访谈代码:MSC2019-16(法律专家)，2019年8月8日，贝鲁特。采访代码:MSC2021-08(调查记者)，2021年11月18日，巴格达。采访代码:MSC2021-08(调查记者)，2021年11月18日，巴格达。威廉姆斯，《伊拉克的有组织犯罪和腐败》;MSC2021-17(法律专家)，2021年11月25日，巴格达。采访代码:MSC2021-07(伊拉克警察)，2021年11月17日，巴格达。采访代码:MSC2021-01(学术)，2021年11月14日，巴格达。采访代码:MSC2021-16(政治分析师)，2021年11月25日，巴格达。面试代码:MSC2021-18(学术)，2021年11月29日，巴格达。史密斯和骑士，《重塑伊拉克》，58。访谈代码:MSC2021-17(法律专家)，2021年11月25日，巴格达，59。面试代码:MSC2021-01(学术)，2021年11月14日，巴格达。采访代码:MSC2021-11(学术)，2021年11月20日，Basra.61。采访代码:MSC2021-05(政治分析师)，2021年11月16日，巴格达;采访代码:MSC2021-07(伊拉克警察)，2021年11月17日，巴格达。访谈代码:MSC2021-22(政治分析师)，2021年12月2日，喀土穆(在线访谈).63。采访代码:MSC2021-29(调查记者)，2021年12月13日，喀土穆(在线采访)。Manfredi Firmian and Mirghani， <苏丹的民主转型可以挽救吗? >，65。采访代码:MSC2021-29(调查记者)，2021年12月13日，喀土穆(在线采访)。67.访谈代码:MSC2021-21(法律专家)，2021年12月1日，喀土穆(在线访谈)。采访代码:MSC2021-31(无国界记者干部)，2021年12月14日，喀土穆(在线采访)。面试代码:MSC2022-3(学术)，2022年1月11日，Omdurman(在线面试).68。采访代码:MSC2022-2(非政府组织官员)，2022年1月10日，喀土穆(在线采访)。69。采访代码:MSC2021-28(政治分析师)，2021年12月9日，喀土穆(在线采访)。国际危机组织，《扭转苏丹的危险政变》，71。Ibid.72。采访代码:MSC2022-4(政治分析师)，2022年1月12日，喀土穆(在线采访)。73。采访代码:MSC2022-8(学术)，2022年9月19日，喀土穆(在线采访)。作者简介federico Manfredi Firmian是巴黎政治学院政治学讲师，也是国际政治研究所(ISPI)副研究员。他拥有索邦大学政治地理学博士学位和哈佛大学公共政策硕士学位。他的研究重点是大中东地区的内战和武装冲突。他曾在《生存》、《中东政策》、《亚洲事务》、《世界政策杂志》、《西点现代战争研究所》和《ISPI》上发表文章。
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ABSTRACTThis study explores the interface of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), a high-modernist hydraulic scheme, with the protracted frontier conflict in Metekel Zone of Benishangul Gumuz Regional State. Without downplaying the national technocratic ambitions that it invokes, based on fieldwork conducted in 2022, the study witnessed as the dam’s presence in Metekel has escalated the perennial state-local skirmishes, rekindled inter-group hostilities, and ultimately trans-nationalized the frontier mayhem in the area. Such impacts of the dam were rooted in the state’s long-held frontier imagination and coercive relocation program through which hegemonic high-modernist narratives contested locals’ lived experiences. Differential local impacts of the dam, its role in mounting competing territorialities, and the concomitance of the trans-national feud with local discords were also equally influencing. However, the interface between the GERD and frontier struggles in Metekel was broadly shaped by the frontier’s history and national governance policies. In revealing so, the study provides insights that complement debates about frontier dynamics and struggles in Ethiopia and Africa, which tend to concentrate on tensions related to land transfer for private investors. Indeed, frontier struggles seem too complex: one must interrogate multiple actors, the complex history, and a broader range of issues with local, national, and regional dimensions.KEYWORDS: GERDfrontierfrontier conflicthigh-modernismMetekel Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1. Interview, eye witness, Mambuk, 16 May 2022.2. Scott, Seeing Like a State, 4.3. Bloom et al., ‘Introduction’.4. McCully, Silenced Rivers, 237; Nusser, ‘Political Ecology of’; Everard, Hydro politics of Dam5. Adams, Wasting the Rain, 14.6. Hoag, Developing the Rivers, 4.7. Scott, Seeing Like a State.8. Nusser; Scudder, The Future of Large Dams; Bromber et al., The Temporal Politics of Big Dams; See also Abbink, ‘Dam Controversies’; Asebe and Korf, ‘Post-imperial Statecraft’.9. Li, ‘What is Land’, 592; Geiger, Turner in The Tropics, 94; Rasmussen and Lund, ‘Reconfiguring Frontier’, 391.10. Hopkins, Ruling The Savage, 14; Makki and Geisler, ‘Development by Dispossession’, 6.11. See Geiger; Hvalok, ‘Colonization and Conflict’; Kopytoff, ‘Introduction’; Triphaty, ‘Frontier Legacy of America’; Prout and Howitt, ‘Frontier Imaginings’; Ramussen and Lund.12. Central Statistics of Ethiopia, Census.13. Tsega, Inter-ethnic interaction; Gonzalez-Ruibal, An Archeology of; Taddesse, ‘Nilo-Saharan Interaction’.14. BGRS, Regional Socio-Economic Profile; A brochure from zonal office of investment.15. See note 14 above.16. Woldesellassie, Gumuz and Highland Resettles. While majorities were Amharas, considerable number of resettlers were also from Tigray, Hadiya, and Kambata. Subsequently, around 18,000 Gumuz natives were forcefully dislocated.17. FDRE, Constitution; BGRS,
摘要本文探讨了埃塞俄比亚复兴大坝(GERD)这一高度现代主义水利工程与Benishangul Gumuz地区国家Metekel地区旷日持久的边境冲突之间的关系。根据2022年进行的实地调查，这项研究并没有淡化它所引发的国家技术官僚的野心，而是见证了大坝在迈特克尔的存在已经升级了长期存在的州与地方之间的小规模冲突，重新点燃了群体间的敌对行动，并最终将该地区的边境混乱跨国化。大坝的这种影响根植于该州长期以来对边疆的想象和强制性的搬迁计划，霸权主义的现代主义叙事通过这些计划挑战了当地人的生活经历。大坝对地方的不同影响，它在日益激烈的领土竞争中的作用，以及跨国宿怨与地方不和谐的共存，也同样产生了影响。然而，在梅特克尔，GERD和边境斗争之间的界面在很大程度上是由边境的历史和国家治理政策形成的。在揭示这一点时，该研究提供了补充关于埃塞俄比亚和非洲边境动态和斗争的辩论的见解，这些辩论往往集中在与私人投资者的土地转让有关的紧张局势上。事实上，边境斗争似乎太复杂了:一个人必须审问多个角色，复杂的历史，以及更广泛的地方、国家和地区层面的问题。关键词:gerd前沿冲突现代主义披露声明作者未报告潜在利益冲突。采访，证人，曼巴克，2022年5月16日。斯科特，《像一个州一样看问题》，4.3分。Bloom等人，《引言》。麦卡利，《沉默的河流》，237页;Nusser，《政治生态学》;埃弗拉，水坝水利政治。亚当斯，《浪费雨水》，14.6页。Hoag，开发河流，4.7。斯科特，像一个州一样看。努瑟;斯卡德尔:《大型水坝的未来》;Bromber et al.，大坝的时间政治;参见Abbink，“大坝争议”;Asebe and Korf，《后帝国治国方略》，第9页。李，《土地是什么》，592页;盖格，特纳的《热带》，1994年;Rasmussen and Lund，“reconfigure Frontier”，391.10。霍普金斯，《统治野蛮人》，第14页;Makki和Geisler，“剥夺的发展”，6.11。看到盖革;Hvalok，《殖民与冲突》;Kopytoff“介绍”;Triphaty，《美国的边疆遗产》;普劳特和霍伊特，《前沿想象》;拉姆森和伦德。埃塞俄比亚中央统计局，人口普查。Tsega，民族间互动;冈萨雷斯-鲁伊巴尔，考古学家;Taddesse，“尼罗-撒哈拉的相互作用”，第14页。区域社会经济概况;地区投资局寄来的小册子。见上面说明14。Woldesellassie, Gumuz和Highland resettlements。虽然大多数是阿姆哈拉人，但相当多的重新定居者也来自提格雷、哈迪亚和坎巴塔。随后，大约1.8万名古木兹土著人被迫流离失所。FDRE宪法;BGRS，《地区章程》，18。Dagnachew，《相对剥夺》;土著政治带来了权力平衡的转变，古木兹人被赋予了权力，凌驾于历史上占主导地位的舒瓦族邻居之上。同时，尽管获得了前所未有的政治权力，古木兹的社会经济地位却从未与后者相比。惠廷顿等人，《文艺复兴大坝》，第20页。2011年4月2日，古巴，他在项目正式开工典礼上的就职演说。《发展与转型计划》，第13期，第22页。范霍文，《大埃塞俄比亚人》，167.23。FDRE，电力系统扩展总体规划(2012-2037).24。世界银行，埃塞俄比亚。见上面说明21。2007年3月4日，亚的斯亚贝巴。在第三轮短信筹款启动仪式上的讲话，202028年3月4日。见上面说明8。采访，2022.30年3月19日。《亚的斯亚贝巴财富》专访2013.31霍格:《开发河流》埃塞俄比亚通讯社2018年8月25日报道。2012年11月12日GERD第三次备案作业完成时的电视直播讲话。参见Asiedu， ' The Construction '， 1-2;恩格尔克和帕塞尔，《来自海湾》埃及85%的水源来自埃塞俄比亚，而1929年英国签订的殖民条约却让埃及几乎垄断了尼罗河的水资源。1959年，埃及再次与苏丹签署协议，确保两国获得90%的水资源。因此，埃及对所有上游工程拥有绝对的权力，长期以来一直支配着该盆地的事务，并以报复相威胁来强制执行其意志。Verhoeven, 162.37。38.阿索萨的门迪和赫马什的西尔巴贝也受到部分影响。韦勒克斯，大坝发展，191-196.39。Ibid.40。采访，一个受大坝影响的当地人，曼库什，2022.41年8月29日。BGRS，村庄计划。 采访，灾害和风险管理专家，也是古巴重新安置委员会成员，2022年5月3日。2022.44年8月/ 9月，受大坝影响的当地人的线人记录。采访，官员，吉尔-贝尔斯，2022.45年6月。2016年9月6日，曼库什。采访，古木兹民族理事会成员和当地重新安置委员会成员，吉格尔-贝勒斯，2022.47年6月28日。2018年9月14日，曼库什。报道，古巴通讯办公室，2018年12月6日和2019年3月13日。沃恩和梅斯芬，重新安置，16.50。见上面说明49。T.斯卡德尔。大型水坝的未来《国际河流》，实地考察报告，2012.53。沃恩和梅斯芬，《再安置》，第54页。2010年11月16日，埃塞俄比亚电力公司(EEPCO)、Salini Costruttori和SP Studio Pietrangelli咨询工程师的ppt报告(参见International Rivers Citation2012, 16)。访谈，官员，2020;Asebe and Korf， <后帝国治国方略>，第56页。采访，曼巴克，2022年6月13日。见上文注释59,16-17.58。见上面说明45。《母亲》梅伦，36.60分。2016年6月22日，Gilgel-Beles接受采访。土著人民权利委员会和土著人民调查协会，1962年。另见Fana电视台，2016.12.23。同上，6-7,335.64。阿宾克，《大坝争议》，65页。特顿，《荒野》，165.66。盖革,87 - 88.67。采访，国家官员，吉尔-贝勒斯，2022.68年6月18日。见上面说明47。Ibid.70。2010年，BGRS启动了公社计划，为古穆兹和其他土著居民重新安置和定居。“现代化”这些“落后”的边疆原住民，改善他们的生计和获得服务的机会是官方宣布的目标之一。然而，这一目标几乎没有实现。与此同时，被遗弃的土地被给予了“外来”投资者，许多古木兹人失去了传统的所有权。这个项目被认为是促进土地商业化的国家战略，而不是改善当地生活的真正计划。不同的线人账户，2022.72。斯科特，统治，147.73。见上面说明44和48。报告，古巴通讯办公室，2019.75。采访，古巴当地警察，2022.76年6月。线人账户，2022;Guba和Metekel通信办公室，2019.77。斯科特,统治;斯科特,Weapons.78。报告，古巴通讯办公室，2017.06见上文说明44、48和77。TIKVAH-ETHIOPIA, 2020.81。武装冲突地点与事件数据，2022.82。埃塞俄比亚红十字会，实地报告，2018.12。Ibid.84。见上面说明77。85。见Dagnachew，“相对剥夺”，第7-8页;尼森，《边缘化的古木兹》，3.
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Pub Date : 2023-10-06DOI: 10.1080/09592318.2023.2261400
Ralph Shield
ABSTRACTRwandan military behavior in Mozambique operationalizes Kigali’s rhetorical commitment to aggressively defend endangered civilians. The counterinsurgency doctrine applied in Cabo Delgado balances insurgent pursuit and civilian protection through a combination of contact patrolling and tactical restraint. This formula demonstrates learning from the country’s past experience with domestic rebellion and international peacekeeping but contrasts sharply with Rwandan army conduct in eastern Congo. The disparity suggests Rwandan battlefield demeanor is conditioned by institutional culture and role conception. The campaign underscores the influence of ideology on Rwandan soldiers' self-understanding and complicates the equivalence of nondemocratic regime type with repressive strategies of counterinsurgency.KEYWORDS: Rwandacounterinsurgencypeacekeepingcivilian protectionMozambique AcknowledgmentsThe author thanks Rick Orth, Emilia Columbo, Marco Jowell, Brittany Hall, and Tertius Jacobs for sharing insights, comments, and feedback that informed and improved this article. The author is also indebted to Focus Group intelligence-driven risk management company for granting complimentary access to subscription products related to the Cabo Delgado crisis on a research exchange basis.Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Supplementary materialSupplemental data for this article can be accessed online at https://doi.org/10.1080/09592318.2023.2261400Notes1. Kisangani and Pickering, African Interventions, 4–5, 8–11; Bode and Karlsrud, ‘Implementation in Practice’, 465; Fisher and Wilen, African Peacekeeping, 1–2, 11–3.2. Fisher and Wilen, African Peacekeeping, 12, 156; Harig and Jenne, ‘Whose Rules? Whose Power?’ 662–5.3. Abiola et al ‘The Large Contributors’, 158–60.4. Donelli, ‘Rwanda’s Military Diplomacy’.5. Cabo Ligado Monthly (abbreviated hereafter as CLM): December 2021 (21 December 2021), 6–7; CLM: March 2022 (15 April 2022), 2–46. This analysis draws heavily on insights from the Cabo Ligado conflict observatory (https://acleddata.com/cabo-ligado-mozambique-conflict-observatory/) and Focus Group risk management company (https://focusholding.net/). Focus Group reporting is cited here with express permission; referenced products remain proprietary materials subject to applicable use and disclosure restrictions.7. Keeler, Kigali Principles.8. Paul et al, ‘Moving Beyond Population-Centric’.9. Whereas Kigali seeks stability in Mozambique, CAR, and its various peacekeeping engagements, high-level regime defectors have indicated that the regime prefers a chronic but manageable modicum of disorder in eastern Congo – see Wrong, Do Not Disturb, 280–1.10. Ruffa, Military Cultures, 31–5.11. Abiola et al, ‘The Large Contributors’, 158–9; Fisher and Wilen, African Peacekeeping, 2.12. Jowell, ‘Contributor Profile’.13. Peacekeeping Data: Fatalities, https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/fatalities (accessed 9 February 2022). Fat
{"title":"Rwanda’s War in Mozambique: Road-Testing a Kigali Principles approach to counterinsurgency?","authors":"Ralph Shield","doi":"10.1080/09592318.2023.2261400","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09592318.2023.2261400","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACTRwandan military behavior in Mozambique operationalizes Kigali’s rhetorical commitment to aggressively defend endangered civilians. The counterinsurgency doctrine applied in Cabo Delgado balances insurgent pursuit and civilian protection through a combination of contact patrolling and tactical restraint. This formula demonstrates learning from the country’s past experience with domestic rebellion and international peacekeeping but contrasts sharply with Rwandan army conduct in eastern Congo. The disparity suggests Rwandan battlefield demeanor is conditioned by institutional culture and role conception. The campaign underscores the influence of ideology on Rwandan soldiers' self-understanding and complicates the equivalence of nondemocratic regime type with repressive strategies of counterinsurgency.KEYWORDS: Rwandacounterinsurgencypeacekeepingcivilian protectionMozambique AcknowledgmentsThe author thanks Rick Orth, Emilia Columbo, Marco Jowell, Brittany Hall, and Tertius Jacobs for sharing insights, comments, and feedback that informed and improved this article. The author is also indebted to Focus Group intelligence-driven risk management company for granting complimentary access to subscription products related to the Cabo Delgado crisis on a research exchange basis.Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Supplementary materialSupplemental data for this article can be accessed online at https://doi.org/10.1080/09592318.2023.2261400Notes1. Kisangani and Pickering, African Interventions, 4–5, 8–11; Bode and Karlsrud, ‘Implementation in Practice’, 465; Fisher and Wilen, African Peacekeeping, 1–2, 11–3.2. Fisher and Wilen, African Peacekeeping, 12, 156; Harig and Jenne, ‘Whose Rules? Whose Power?’ 662–5.3. Abiola et al ‘The Large Contributors’, 158–60.4. Donelli, ‘Rwanda’s Military Diplomacy’.5. Cabo Ligado Monthly (abbreviated hereafter as CLM): December 2021 (21 December 2021), 6–7; CLM: March 2022 (15 April 2022), 2–46. This analysis draws heavily on insights from the Cabo Ligado conflict observatory (https://acleddata.com/cabo-ligado-mozambique-conflict-observatory/) and Focus Group risk management company (https://focusholding.net/). Focus Group reporting is cited here with express permission; referenced products remain proprietary materials subject to applicable use and disclosure restrictions.7. Keeler, Kigali Principles.8. Paul et al, ‘Moving Beyond Population-Centric’.9. Whereas Kigali seeks stability in Mozambique, CAR, and its various peacekeeping engagements, high-level regime defectors have indicated that the regime prefers a chronic but manageable modicum of disorder in eastern Congo – see Wrong, Do Not Disturb, 280–1.10. Ruffa, Military Cultures, 31–5.11. Abiola et al, ‘The Large Contributors’, 158–9; Fisher and Wilen, African Peacekeeping, 2.12. Jowell, ‘Contributor Profile’.13. Peacekeeping Data: Fatalities, https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/fatalities (accessed 9 February 2022). Fat","PeriodicalId":46215,"journal":{"name":"Small Wars and Insurgencies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135351983","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-09-26DOI: 10.1080/09592318.2023.2257591
Nsemba Edward Lenshie, Patience Kondu Jacob, Confidence Nwachinemere Ogbonna, Buhari Shehu Miapyen, Paul Onuh, Aminu Idris, Christian Ezeibe
ABSTRACTThe Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF), comprising soldiers from the Lake Chad Basin countries (Cameroon, Chad, Niger, Nigeria, and Benin), has been countering insurgency in the region since 2015. Frictional relationships resulting from mutual distrust affected the commitments of MNJTF contributing countries in counterinsurgency operations in Lake Chad. Chad, notably, considered itself an arrowhead in the counterinsurgency due to the laxity of other coalition countries. The devastation its soldiers suffered and the waxing strength of the operation of Boko Haram and allied groups in the region motivated the late Chadian President Idriss Déby to declare in December 2019 the exiting of his soldiers from the MNJTF to concentrate on protecting the borders of the country. The study relied on extant literature and explorative qualitative techniques to investigate the consequences of such exit on northeast Nigeria. At the very least, it reveals that Chad’s exit betrayed the MNJTF counterinsurgency coalition and has negative consequences for the security complexity in northeast Nigeria.KEYWORDS: Multinational Joint Task ForcecounterinsurgencyBoko HaramChadian exitLake Chad basin AcknowledgmentsWe are thankful to our research assistants for assisting during data collection and the reviewers, for valuable comments and the editors, for their observations, insights, and comments, which helped improve the quality of the article.Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1. Ezeani et al., ‘From a Religious Sect to a Terrorist Group : The Military and Boko Haram in Northeast Nigeria’; Campbell and Harwood, ‘Boko Haram’s Deadly Impact’.2. Lenshie and Yenda, ‘Boko Haram Insurgency, Internally Displaced Persons and Humanitarian Response in Northeast Nigeria’, p. 144; Okoli and Azom, ‘Boko Haram Insurgency and Gendered Victimhood: Women as Corporal Victims and Objects of War’, p. 1219; Okoli and Lenshie, ‘“Beyond Military Might”: Boko Haram and the Asymmetries of Counterinsurgency in Nigeria’, p. 683.3. Campbell and Harwood, ‘Boko Haram’s Deadly Impact’; Lenshie and Yenda, ‘Boko Haram Insurgency, Internally Displaced Persons and Humanitarian Response in Northeast Nigeria’.4. Lenshie et al., ‘Boko Haram, Security Architecture and Counterinsurgency in North-East, Nigeria’, p. 2; Marie Cold-Ravnkilde and Plambech, ‘Boko Haram: From Local Grievances to the Violent Insurgency’.5. Ezeibe et al., ‘Strange Bedfellows: Relations between International Nongovernmental Organisations and Military Actors in Preventing/Countering Violent Extremism in Northeast Nigeria’; Haruna, ‘Nigerian Soldiers Fighting Boko Haram Release Video, Lament Obsolete Weapons, Accusing Commanders of Corruption’.6. Eizenga, ‘Chad’s Escalating Fight against Boko Haram’.7. Abdul’ Aziz, ‘Boko Haram: Chadian Troop’s Free Nigerian Soldiers in Captivity, Kill 100 Terrorists as Shekau Reacts’.8. Head Topic, ‘Saluting President Idriss Deby – Daily Trust’
多国联合特遣部队(MNJTF)由乍得湖盆地国家(喀麦隆、乍得、尼日尔、尼日利亚和贝宁)的士兵组成，自2015年以来一直在该地区打击叛乱。互不信任造成的摩擦关系影响到多国临时警察部队派遣国对乍得湖平叛行动的承诺。值得注意的是，由于其他联盟国家的松懈，乍得认为自己是反叛乱的一个箭头。其士兵遭受的破坏以及博科圣地及其盟友组织在该地区的行动日益强大，促使已故乍得总统伊德里斯·戴姆塞比于2019年12月宣布他的士兵从MNJTF撤出，集中精力保护该国的边界。该研究依靠现有文献和探索性定性技术来调查这种退出对尼日利亚东北部的影响。至少，它揭示了乍得的退出背叛了MNJTF反叛乱联盟，并对尼日利亚东北部复杂的安全局势产生了负面影响。感谢我们的研究助理在数据收集过程中的协助，感谢审稿人的宝贵意见，感谢编辑的观察、见解和评论，这有助于提高文章的质量。披露声明作者未报告潜在的利益冲突。Ezeani et al.，《从一个宗教派别到一个恐怖组织:尼日利亚东北部的军队和博科圣地》;坎贝尔和哈伍德，“博科圣地的致命影响”。Lenshie和Yenda，“博科圣地叛乱，尼日利亚东北部的国内流离失所者和人道主义反应”，第144页;Okoli和Azom，“博科圣地叛乱和性别受害者:女性作为下士受害者和战争对象”，第1219页;Okoli和Lenshie，“超越军事力量”:博科圣地和尼日利亚反叛乱的不对称”，第683.3页。坎贝尔和哈伍德，《博科圣地的致命影响》;4. Lenshie和Yenda，“博科圣地叛乱，尼日利亚东北部的国内流离失所者和人道主义反应”。Lenshie等人，“博科圣地，尼日利亚东北部的安全架构和反叛乱”，第2页;5. Marie Cold-Ravnkilde和Plambech，《博科圣地:从地方不满到暴力叛乱》。Ezeibe等人，《奇怪的同床异榻:国际非政府组织和军事行动者在尼日利亚东北部预防/打击暴力极端主义方面的关系》;与博科圣地作战的尼日利亚士兵发布视频，哀叹武器过时，指责指挥官腐败。Eizenga，“乍得对博科圣地不断升级的战斗”。8. Abdul ' Aziz，《博科圣地:乍得军队释放被囚禁的尼日利亚士兵，杀死100名恐怖分子作为谢考的反应》。标题:“向伊德里斯·代比总统致敬——每日信任”。Eizenga，“乍得对博科圣地不断升级的战斗”。布朗:“乍得称将从萨赫勒撤军，打击圣战分子的战争受到重大打击”;11.《乍得总统停止参与博科圣地和萨赫勒地区的反恐行动》。Nwezeh，“军事:MNJTF协议排除单方面撤军”。Butfoy， <对集体安全的批判性反思>，第1-2页。《集体安全思想中的主题》，第491页。米勒，《集体安全的理念与现实》，第304页;贝茨，《和平制度还是战争起因?》第16.15页。贝茨，《和平的制度还是战争的原因?》第21.16页。Gleason和Shaihutdinov，“欧亚大陆的集体安全和非国家行为体”，第276-280.17页。贝茨，《和平制度还是战争起因?》第13.18页。米勒，《集体安全的理念与现实》，第309-310.19页。De Luca，《联合国宪章下的海湾危机与集体安全》，第270.20页。Tarzi， <集体安全的困境:一个理论批判>，第45-46.21页。Clark， <集体安全的麻烦>，240-242.22页。沃尔夫，《国家失败的区域维度》，第962页;Buzan和WÆver，“宏观证券化和安全星座:重新考虑证券化理论中的规模”，第254.23页。Hanau Santini，“中东和北非的新区域冷战:重新审视区域安全复合体理论”，第4页;Omotuyi，“法国-尼日利亚dsamente ?”“博科圣地恐怖主义时代的尼日利亚、法国和乍得湖地区法语国家”，第4-6页。Olawoyin, Akinrinde和irlabour，“多国联合特遣部队和尼日利亚反多国联合特遣部队和尼日利亚反恐”，第116 - 117.25页。Dyduch, Jarząbek, and Skorek，“海湾国家对碳氢化合物出口的依赖——一个区域安全复杂理论的视角”，第131-132.26页。Onuoha，“不仅仅是尼日利亚的危险——博科圣地的跨国影响和区域反应”，页。
{"title":"Multinational Joint Task Force’s counterinsurgency in the Lake Chad Basin and the consequences of Chadian exit for the Northeast, Nigeria","authors":"Nsemba Edward Lenshie, Patience Kondu Jacob, Confidence Nwachinemere Ogbonna, Buhari Shehu Miapyen, Paul Onuh, Aminu Idris, Christian Ezeibe","doi":"10.1080/09592318.2023.2257591","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09592318.2023.2257591","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACTThe Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF), comprising soldiers from the Lake Chad Basin countries (Cameroon, Chad, Niger, Nigeria, and Benin), has been countering insurgency in the region since 2015. Frictional relationships resulting from mutual distrust affected the commitments of MNJTF contributing countries in counterinsurgency operations in Lake Chad. Chad, notably, considered itself an arrowhead in the counterinsurgency due to the laxity of other coalition countries. The devastation its soldiers suffered and the waxing strength of the operation of Boko Haram and allied groups in the region motivated the late Chadian President Idriss Déby to declare in December 2019 the exiting of his soldiers from the MNJTF to concentrate on protecting the borders of the country. The study relied on extant literature and explorative qualitative techniques to investigate the consequences of such exit on northeast Nigeria. At the very least, it reveals that Chad’s exit betrayed the MNJTF counterinsurgency coalition and has negative consequences for the security complexity in northeast Nigeria.KEYWORDS: Multinational Joint Task ForcecounterinsurgencyBoko HaramChadian exitLake Chad basin AcknowledgmentsWe are thankful to our research assistants for assisting during data collection and the reviewers, for valuable comments and the editors, for their observations, insights, and comments, which helped improve the quality of the article.Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1. Ezeani et al., ‘From a Religious Sect to a Terrorist Group : The Military and Boko Haram in Northeast Nigeria’; Campbell and Harwood, ‘Boko Haram’s Deadly Impact’.2. Lenshie and Yenda, ‘Boko Haram Insurgency, Internally Displaced Persons and Humanitarian Response in Northeast Nigeria’, p. 144; Okoli and Azom, ‘Boko Haram Insurgency and Gendered Victimhood: Women as Corporal Victims and Objects of War’, p. 1219; Okoli and Lenshie, ‘“Beyond Military Might”: Boko Haram and the Asymmetries of Counterinsurgency in Nigeria’, p. 683.3. Campbell and Harwood, ‘Boko Haram’s Deadly Impact’; Lenshie and Yenda, ‘Boko Haram Insurgency, Internally Displaced Persons and Humanitarian Response in Northeast Nigeria’.4. Lenshie et al., ‘Boko Haram, Security Architecture and Counterinsurgency in North-East, Nigeria’, p. 2; Marie Cold-Ravnkilde and Plambech, ‘Boko Haram: From Local Grievances to the Violent Insurgency’.5. Ezeibe et al., ‘Strange Bedfellows: Relations between International Nongovernmental Organisations and Military Actors in Preventing/Countering Violent Extremism in Northeast Nigeria’; Haruna, ‘Nigerian Soldiers Fighting Boko Haram Release Video, Lament Obsolete Weapons, Accusing Commanders of Corruption’.6. Eizenga, ‘Chad’s Escalating Fight against Boko Haram’.7. Abdul’ Aziz, ‘Boko Haram: Chadian Troop’s Free Nigerian Soldiers in Captivity, Kill 100 Terrorists as Shekau Reacts’.8. Head Topic, ‘Saluting President Idriss Deby – Daily Trust’","PeriodicalId":46215,"journal":{"name":"Small Wars and Insurgencies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134957896","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-09-19DOI: 10.1080/09592318.2023.2256039
Clara Voyvodic
Research has shown that the counterinsurgent proposition of ‘winning Hearts and Minds’ is more complex than building a road. This paper examines how project workers in three infrastructure projects in Colombia sought community support not for military intelligence or to improve government-community relations, but to intervene with armed groups on the project’s behalf. The findings highlight the role of community institutions in negotiating between two actors – rather than being ‘won over’ by either. This paper also indicates the limitations of community agency in the face of changing local orders, questioning the local empowerment of goods delivery in conflict areas.
{"title":"Negotiating ‘Hearts and Minds’: conflict, infrastructure, and community support in Colombia","authors":"Clara Voyvodic","doi":"10.1080/09592318.2023.2256039","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09592318.2023.2256039","url":null,"abstract":"Research has shown that the counterinsurgent proposition of ‘winning Hearts and Minds’ is more complex than building a road. This paper examines how project workers in three infrastructure projects in Colombia sought community support not for military intelligence or to improve government-community relations, but to intervene with armed groups on the project’s behalf. The findings highlight the role of community institutions in negotiating between two actors – rather than being ‘won over’ by either. This paper also indicates the limitations of community agency in the face of changing local orders, questioning the local empowerment of goods delivery in conflict areas.","PeriodicalId":46215,"journal":{"name":"Small Wars and Insurgencies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135015571","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-09-15DOI: 10.1080/09592318.2023.2257592
Thomas Ameyaw-Brobbey
ABSTRACTThis paper focuses on external state support for rebel movements by developing an analytical tool to explain how external support for rebels leads to civil conflict onset and intensification in the target state and how conflict reverses to the sponsoring state, engendering conflict diffusion and continuation. I present a two-fold argument that a cooperative relationship between external states and rebels triggers the remote causes of civil conflict, translating latent grievances into manifest conflict in the target state. Further, the resulting conflict has a boomerang effect. It has the potential to reverse to the sponsoring state. I do this by using a case studies method – cooperative relationships of governments of Sudan and Chad with each other’s rebels vis-à-vis Sudan Civil War (2000–2005) and Chad Civil War (2005–2010) – to provide a detailed explanation of the framework and its hypotheses. The explanations I offer here may help us understand some African conflict dynamics for us to take some recent developments, for example, in the Great Lakes, more seriously.KEYWORDS: unholy alignmentcivil war and conflictinsurgency and counterinsurgencySudan and Chadsub-Saharan Africaweak statesstate-rebel cooperationrebel sponsorship Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.Notes1. Notes.Bakken and Rustad, ‘Conflict Trends in Africa’, 4–27; Welz, ‘Omnibalancing and international interventions’, 387.2. Cilliers, ‘Violence in Africa’, 3–11.3. Bakken and Rustad, ‘Conflict Trends in Africa’, 7.4. Ibid., 13.5. Arowolo, ‘Dancing on a Knife-edge’, 6–8.6. Wegenast and Schneider, ‘Ownership Matters’, 110–18.7. Cunningham, Huang, and Sawyer, ‘Voting for Militants’, 3.8. Byman et al., Trends in Outside Support, 9–33; Salehyan, Siroky, and Wood, ‘External Rebel Sponsorship’, 633–61; Fortna, Lotito and Rubin, ‘Don’t Bite the Hand’, 782–94.9. Ibid.10. Byman et al., Trends in Outside Support, 9–33; San-Akca, States in Disguise, 38–41; Fortna, Lotito and Rubin, ‘Don’t Bite the Hand’, 783; Salehyan, Siroky, and Wood, ‘External Rebel Sponsorship’, 633–61.11. Gras, ‘DRC: Why Tensions are Rising’, para. 5–13.12. International Crisis Group (ICG), Averting proxy wars, 1–3.13. Gras, ‘DRC: Why Tensions are Rising’, para. 3–5.14. Salehyan, Gleditsch, and Cunningham, ‘Explaining External Support’, 709–44.15. Arjona, ‘Wartime Institutions’, 1360–389; Arjona, Kasfir, and Mampilly, Rebel Governance, 21–24, 34–38; Mampilly, Rebel Rulers, 58–70.16. Staniland, ‘States, Insurgents, and Wartime’, 243.17. Staniland, ‘States, Insurgents, and Wartime’, 248–252; van Baalen and Terpstra, ‘Behind enemy lines’, 221–246; Schievels and Colley, ‘Explaining Rebel-State Collaboration’, 1332–1361; Terpstra, “Rebel Governance, 1143–1173.18. van Baalen and Terpstra, ‘Behind enemy lines’, 221–246.19. Schievels and Colley, ‘Explaining Rebel-State Collaboration’, 1332–1361.20. van Baalen and Terpstra, ‘Behind enemy lines’, 222, 233–237.21. Sawyer, Cunningha
摘要本文关注外部国家对叛乱运动的支持，通过开发一种分析工具来解释外部支持如何导致目标国内部冲突的爆发和加剧，以及冲突如何反向到赞助国，从而导致冲突的扩散和持续。我提出了一个双重论点，即外部国家和叛军之间的合作关系触发了国内冲突的远程原因，将潜在的不满转化为目标国家的明显冲突。此外，由此产生的冲突具有自食其果的效果。它有可能逆转到发起国。我通过使用案例研究方法——苏丹和乍得政府与彼此的叛军在-à-vis苏丹内战(2000-2005)和乍得内战(2005-2010)中的合作关系——来提供框架及其假设的详细解释。我在这里提供的解释可能有助于我们了解非洲的一些冲突动态，以便我们更认真地对待最近的一些事态发展，例如在大湖区。关键词:邪恶联盟;内战与冲突;叛乱与反叛乱;苏丹与乍得;撒哈拉以南非洲;笔记。Bakken和Rustad，“非洲的冲突趋势”，第4-27页;Welz，“全面平衡与国际干预”，387.2。《非洲的暴力》，第3-11.3页。Bakken和Rustad，“非洲的冲突趋势”，第7.4页。如上,13.5。Arowolo，《在刀刃上跳舞》，6-8.6。Wegenast和Schneider，“所有权问题”，110-18.7。Cunningham, Huang和Sawyer，“为激进分子投票”，第3.8页。Byman等人，《外部支持趋势》，9-33;Salehyan, Siroky, and Wood，“外部叛军赞助”，633-61页;Fortna, Lotito和Rubin， ' Don ' t Bite the Hand '， 782-94.9。Ibid.10。Byman等人，《外部支持趋势》，9-33;圣阿卡，伪装的国家，38-41;Fortna, Lotito和Rubin， ' Don ' t Bite the Hand '， 783;Salehyan, Siroky, and Wood，“外部叛军赞助”，633-61.11。格拉斯，《刚果民主共和国:为什么紧张局势正在加剧》，第2段。5 - 13.12。国际危机组织(ICG)，避免代理战争，1-3.13。格拉斯，《刚果民主共和国:为什么紧张局势正在加剧》，第2段。3 - 5.14。Salehyan, Gleditsch和Cunningham，“解释外部支持”，709-44.15。Arjona，“战时机构”，1360-389;Arjona, Kasfir, and Mampilly，叛军治理，21-24,34-38;《反叛的统治者》，58-70.16页。斯坦兰，《国家、叛乱分子和战时》，243.17。斯坦兰，《国家、起义者和战时》，248-252页;范巴伦和特普斯特拉，《敌后》，221-246页;Schievels and Colley，“解释叛军与国家的合作”，1332-1361;Terpstra， <叛军治理>，1143-1173.18。范巴伦和特普斯特拉，“敌后”，221-246.19。Schievels and Colley，“解释叛军与国家的合作”，1332-1361.20。范巴伦和特普斯特拉，“敌后”，222,233-237.21。索耶，坎宁安和里德，“外部支持的作用”，1175-1178.22。Cunningham, Gleditsch, and Salehyan， ' It Takes Two '， 580-81.23。出处同上,571 - 72.24。Fortna, Lotito和Rubin， ' Don ' t Bite the Hand '， 790-92;Salehyan, Siroky, and Wood，“外部叛军赞助”，633-61.25。Salehyan, Gleditsch和Cunningham，“解释外部支持”，712-15.26。出处同上,709 - 44.27。《是福还是祸?》”,130.28。克拉伯斯，国际法，70-73.29。阿西莫格鲁和罗宾逊，《国家为什么失败》，73-90.30页。Ibid.31。同上，74-83,95.32。艾伦，《战争，地方性暴力》，377.33。Ibid.34。出处同上,367 - 84;Lucas, Appel和prorook， ' Not Too Distant '， 497-523.35。阿卜杜拉和拉希德，《反叛运动》，169-93;比弗斯，建设和平与自然资源，67-76.36。阿布，西非的动乱地区，21-28.37。艾伦，《战争，地方性暴力》，377-80.38页。strinver，《中国的伙伴外交》，第35-37页;威尔金斯，“结盟”，而不是“联盟”，59-62.39。威尔金斯，“结盟”，而不是“联盟”，53-76.40。艾伦，《战争，地方性暴力》，377-80页;沃尔特，《为什么治理不好》，1243-49;《不平等、不满与内战》，第58-90期，第94-116.41页。Walsh等人，《Funding Rebellion》，699-707.42。同前。建设和平与自然资源，67-76,125-132.43。阿卜杜拉和拉希德，《反叛运动》，180-89.44页。如上,188.45。Salehyan, Siroky和Wood，“外部叛军赞助”，633-61.46。《独立非洲的战争》，第4-15.47页。Kasfir，“叛军治理”，21-46.48页。斯坦兰，《国家、叛乱分子和战时》，246-47.49页。Arjona, Kasfir和Mampilly，叛军治理，3.50。《反叛的统治者》，58-70.51页。Cunningham, Huang和Sawyer，“为激进分子投票”，81-107.52。Glawion和Le Noan，“叛军治理或叛军领土内的治理”，24-51.53。同上，25,37-41.54。Hyyppä，“战争委员会，52-80.55。同上，53,60-65.56。Arjona，“战时机构”，1375.57。Loyle等人。
{"title":"Unholy alignment and boomerang civil conflicts: Examining how conflicts beget conflicts through external states support for rebels","authors":"Thomas Ameyaw-Brobbey","doi":"10.1080/09592318.2023.2257592","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09592318.2023.2257592","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACTThis paper focuses on external state support for rebel movements by developing an analytical tool to explain how external support for rebels leads to civil conflict onset and intensification in the target state and how conflict reverses to the sponsoring state, engendering conflict diffusion and continuation. I present a two-fold argument that a cooperative relationship between external states and rebels triggers the remote causes of civil conflict, translating latent grievances into manifest conflict in the target state. Further, the resulting conflict has a boomerang effect. It has the potential to reverse to the sponsoring state. I do this by using a case studies method – cooperative relationships of governments of Sudan and Chad with each other’s rebels vis-à-vis Sudan Civil War (2000–2005) and Chad Civil War (2005–2010) – to provide a detailed explanation of the framework and its hypotheses. The explanations I offer here may help us understand some African conflict dynamics for us to take some recent developments, for example, in the Great Lakes, more seriously.KEYWORDS: unholy alignmentcivil war and conflictinsurgency and counterinsurgencySudan and Chadsub-Saharan Africaweak statesstate-rebel cooperationrebel sponsorship Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.Notes1. Notes.Bakken and Rustad, ‘Conflict Trends in Africa’, 4–27; Welz, ‘Omnibalancing and international interventions’, 387.2. Cilliers, ‘Violence in Africa’, 3–11.3. Bakken and Rustad, ‘Conflict Trends in Africa’, 7.4. Ibid., 13.5. Arowolo, ‘Dancing on a Knife-edge’, 6–8.6. Wegenast and Schneider, ‘Ownership Matters’, 110–18.7. Cunningham, Huang, and Sawyer, ‘Voting for Militants’, 3.8. Byman et al., Trends in Outside Support, 9–33; Salehyan, Siroky, and Wood, ‘External Rebel Sponsorship’, 633–61; Fortna, Lotito and Rubin, ‘Don’t Bite the Hand’, 782–94.9. Ibid.10. Byman et al., Trends in Outside Support, 9–33; San-Akca, States in Disguise, 38–41; Fortna, Lotito and Rubin, ‘Don’t Bite the Hand’, 783; Salehyan, Siroky, and Wood, ‘External Rebel Sponsorship’, 633–61.11. Gras, ‘DRC: Why Tensions are Rising’, para. 5–13.12. International Crisis Group (ICG), Averting proxy wars, 1–3.13. Gras, ‘DRC: Why Tensions are Rising’, para. 3–5.14. Salehyan, Gleditsch, and Cunningham, ‘Explaining External Support’, 709–44.15. Arjona, ‘Wartime Institutions’, 1360–389; Arjona, Kasfir, and Mampilly, Rebel Governance, 21–24, 34–38; Mampilly, Rebel Rulers, 58–70.16. Staniland, ‘States, Insurgents, and Wartime’, 243.17. Staniland, ‘States, Insurgents, and Wartime’, 248–252; van Baalen and Terpstra, ‘Behind enemy lines’, 221–246; Schievels and Colley, ‘Explaining Rebel-State Collaboration’, 1332–1361; Terpstra, “Rebel Governance, 1143–1173.18. van Baalen and Terpstra, ‘Behind enemy lines’, 221–246.19. Schievels and Colley, ‘Explaining Rebel-State Collaboration’, 1332–1361.20. van Baalen and Terpstra, ‘Behind enemy lines’, 222, 233–237.21. Sawyer, Cunningha","PeriodicalId":46215,"journal":{"name":"Small Wars and Insurgencies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135397489","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-09-12DOI: 10.1080/09592318.2023.2256645
Ricardo Pereira, Ana Luquett, Rui Forte, Mohammad Eslami
{"title":"Chinese Private Security Companies and the limit of coercion","authors":"Ricardo Pereira, Ana Luquett, Rui Forte, Mohammad Eslami","doi":"10.1080/09592318.2023.2256645","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09592318.2023.2256645","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46215,"journal":{"name":"Small Wars and Insurgencies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135878262","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-09-12DOI: 10.1080/09592318.2023.2248868
Edward Newman, Pegah Hashemvand Khiabani, Remi Chandran
The Lake Chad Basin region has experienced a steep increase in violence and instability since 2010, associated with ethnic identity conflict, ecological degradation, and insurgency. This article explores the association between the activities of insurgency groups – focussing on the perpetration of violence against civilians and state actors – and agropastoral conflict, against a background of ecological stresses in this region. The article finds a pattern of close spatial and temporal proximity between agropastoral conflict and insurgency violence, suggesting that there is a significant intersection and overlap between socio-economic grievances, compounded by ecological stresses, and violent instability.
{"title":"Intercommunal violence, insurgency, and agropastoral conflict in the Lake Chad Basin region","authors":"Edward Newman, Pegah Hashemvand Khiabani, Remi Chandran","doi":"10.1080/09592318.2023.2248868","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09592318.2023.2248868","url":null,"abstract":"The Lake Chad Basin region has experienced a steep increase in violence and instability since 2010, associated with ethnic identity conflict, ecological degradation, and insurgency. This article explores the association between the activities of insurgency groups – focussing on the perpetration of violence against civilians and state actors – and agropastoral conflict, against a background of ecological stresses in this region. The article finds a pattern of close spatial and temporal proximity between agropastoral conflict and insurgency violence, suggesting that there is a significant intersection and overlap between socio-economic grievances, compounded by ecological stresses, and violent instability.","PeriodicalId":46215,"journal":{"name":"Small Wars and Insurgencies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135879246","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-08-30DOI: 10.1080/09592318.2023.2245209
Robin Burda
{"title":"Taliban’s PSYOP – strategic enabler for the 2021 offensive","authors":"Robin Burda","doi":"10.1080/09592318.2023.2245209","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09592318.2023.2245209","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46215,"journal":{"name":"Small Wars and Insurgencies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2023-08-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"81583412","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-08-25DOI: 10.1080/09592318.2023.2246613
Jimmy Sebastian Daimary, Pahi Saikia
{"title":"Insurgent movements and paths to negotiation: a case study of the National Democratic Front of Boroland (NDFB) in India’s northeast","authors":"Jimmy Sebastian Daimary, Pahi Saikia","doi":"10.1080/09592318.2023.2246613","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09592318.2023.2246613","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46215,"journal":{"name":"Small Wars and Insurgencies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2023-08-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"74642959","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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