Teaching & Learning Guide for: Relational Approaches to Personal Autonomy

The concept of personal autonomy in contemporary moral and political philosophy is broadly associated with an agent's self-determining or self-governing capacities. However, scholars have long criticized the tendency in philosophy to idealize autonomy in an overtly atomistic and asocial manner, for example by assuming that autonomous individuals are totally independent decision-makers unaffected by interpersonal ties. Feminist philosophers especially have developed ‘relational’ approaches to autonomy in attempt to reconfigure this individualistic tradition in ways that are amenable to social considerations. Relational autonomy accounts are now known for espousing a more socially informed version of human agency. Such frameworks recognize that the very making of the autonomous self must involve some degree of socialization, for instance, or that certain subordinating social phenomena like oppression might problematically influence one's otherwise autonomous beliefs, preferences, and so forth. There remains much theoretical variation, however, in the range of relational accounts which have thus far been proposed. My Philosophy Compass article endeavours to highlight and organize some of the major points of disagreement between relational theories, covering distinctions commonly invoked in the debate. Despite the heterogeneity of relational autonomy theories, I also emphasize the ways that relational autonomy-theorizing makes for a challenging but valuable contribution to philosophy. Frankfurt, Harry. “Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person.” The Journal of Philosophy 68 (1971): 5–20. A paper that offers a theorization on the structure of the human will, which catalysed and invigorated many of the debates about the nature of personal autonomy ongoing today. Khader, Serene J. Adaptive Preference and Women's Empowerment. New York: Oxford University Press, 2011. A book which offers in-depth analysis of adaptive preferences in relation to various themes in feminist debates, such as internalized oppression and multiculturalism. Mackenzie, Catriona and Stoljar, Natalie. (eds.) Relational Autonomy: Feminist Perspectives on Autonomy, Agency, and the Social Self. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000. This is the first anthology which collates articles around the subject of ‘relational autonomy’ as understood within contemporary feminist philosophy. It contains a comprehensive introduction to the topic, and many of the texts that have defined feminist debates on autonomy. Oshana, Marina A.L. (ed.) Personal Autonomy and Social Oppression. New York: Routledge, 2014. This edited volume focuses on the problem of oppression for autonomy. Taylor, James Stacey. (ed.) Personal Autonomy New Essays on Personal Autonomy and its Role in Contemporary Moral Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005. A definitive anthology which captures the major contemporary developments on the nature, value, and applications of personal autonomy within moral philosophy. Veltman, Andrea and Piper, Mark. (eds.) Autonomy, Oppression, and Gender. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014. A collection of articles which examines the concept of autonomy in juxtaposition with issues of feminism, gender, and social conditions. Dr Suzanne Killmister talks about autonomy on the Radical Philosophy podcast. https://www.3cr.org.au/radicalphilosophy/episode-201904061330/dr-suzanne-killmister-autonomy Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry on ‘Autonomy in Moral and Political Philosophy’ https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/autonomy-moral/ Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry on ‘Feminist perspectives on autonomy’ https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/feminism-autonomy/ Week I: Introduction to Relational Autonomy Friedman, Marilyn. “Autonomy and Social Relationships: Rethinking the Feminist Critique.” In Autonomy, Gender, Politics, pp. 81–97. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003. Mackenzie, Catriona, and Stoljar, Natalie. “Autonomy Refigured.” In Relational Autonomy: Feminist Perspectives on Autonomy, Agency, and the Social Self, ed. By Catriona Mackenzie and Natalie Stoljar. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000. Week II: The Problem of Oppression Oshana, Marina A. L. “Personal Autonomy and Society.” Journal of Social Philosophy 29 no. 1 (1998): 81–102. Stoljar, Natalie. “‘Living Constantly at Tiptoe Stance’: Social Scripts, Psychological Freedom, and Autonomy.” In Personal Autonomy and Social Oppression, ed. By Marina A.L. Oshana, 105–123. New York: Routledge, 2014. Week III: Self-abnegation Hill Jr., Thomas E. “Servility and Self-Respect.” The Monist 57, No. 1, Women's Liberation: Ethical, Social, and Political Issue 1973: 87–104. Westlund, Andrea C. “Selflessness and Responsibility for Self: Is Deference Compatible with Autonomy?” The Philosophical Review 112 (2003): 483–523. Week IV: Adaptive Preferences Khader, Serene J. “Adaptive Preferences and Procedural Autonomy.” Journal of Human Development and Capabilities 10, no. 2 (2009): 169–187. Terlazzo, Rosa. “Conceptualizing Adaptive Preferences Respectfully: An Indirectly Substantive Account.” The Journal of Political Philosophy 24, no. 2 (2016): 206–226. Week V: Autonomy Ascription Ben-Ishai, Elizabeth. “Sexual Politics and Ascriptive Autonomy.” Politics & Gender 6 (2010): 573–600. Lee, J.Y. “Dialogical Answerability and Autonomy Ascription.” Hypatia 37 (2002): 97–110. Week VI: Relational Autonomy and Feminist Values Meyers, Diana T. “The Feminist Debate over Values in Autonomy Theory.” In Autonomy, Oppression, and Gender, ed. By Andrea Veltman and Mark Piper, 114–140. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014. Oshana, Marina. “A Commitment to Autonomy Is a Commitment to Feminism.” In Autonomy, Oppression, and Gender, ed. By Andrea Veltman and Mark Piper, 141–162. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014. Week VII: Critiques of Relational Autonomy Christman, John. “Relational Autonomy, Liberal Individualism, and the Social Constitution of Selves.” Philosophical Studies 117 (2004): 143–164. Herr, Ranjoo Seodu. “Islamist Women's Agency and Relational Autonomy.” Hypatia 33, no. 2 (2018): 195–215. To what extent is social oppression compatible – or incompatible – with personal autonomy? How might self-abnegation or excessive deference be defended under a relational account of autonomy? Are adaptive preferences autonomy deficits? In what ways is the concept of autonomy relevant for emancipatory feminist projects? Should relational autonomy theories be committed to political perfectionism? I am grateful to receive funding from a Velux foundation grant [Project number: 00026589]. The author declares no conflict of interest.