Issues in Australian Foreign Policy January to June 2023

International politics often seems like an ever-unfolding stream of crises, some predicted and some not, coupled with proclamations that we live in extraordinary times (sometimes to justify exceptional measures). The first half of 2023 did not disappoint in this regard. The year began with continued violence in Myanmar, Yemen, and Ukraine. By April, a new conflict had broken out in Sudan between the Sudanese Armed forces and the Rapid Support Forces.1 March marked the 20^th anniversary of the Iraq War, a reminder of the profound and lasting impact it has had on global politics.2 Natural disasters and extreme weather events also featured heavily in the first half of 2023, often aggravating already precarious situations around the world. These included a tragic earthquake that crossed the border of Turkey and Syria, wildfires in Chile and Cyclone Gabrielle in New Zealand. On March 4, Vanuatu implemented a state of emergency after suffering two cyclones in a week,3 while a state of emergency was declared in Alberta, Canada on May 6 due to wildfires.4 June 2023 was recorded as the hottest June on record,5 while July was the hottest month ever in the global temperature record.6 Summer in the Northern Hemisphere saw heatwaves and record global daily temperatures being exceeded on numerous occasions. Despite a sense of impending doom around a future climate apocalypse, limited advances were made in tackling the problem. Worth noting in this regard was the passing of a UN resolution to secure a legal opinion from the International Court of Justice on the obligation of states to tackle the climate crisis.7

Heightened uncertainty around technological developments and how they will transform global politics also loomed large in the first half of 2023. Released at the end of 2022, ChatGPT burst onto the scene at the beginning of this year sparking a range of predictions and discussions around the role of Artificial Intelligence in global politics.8 The app TikTok continued to be at the heart of much controversy with a range of Western states banning its use on government devices. From 18 June, the world was captivated as rescuers sought to locate a tourist vessel that had imploded while visiting the submerged wreckage of the Titanic. The period was also marked by, sometimes controversial, leadership transitions. Charles III was crowned to both pomp and protest. On 8 January, supporters of Jair Bolsonaro stormed the congress in Brazil, in scenes reminiscent of the Capitol attacks in the US in 2021, after he lost the election to Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva.9 On 14 May, Recep Tayip Erdoğan won a hotly contested run-off election in Turkey, dashing hopes from his opponents that his reign was coming to an end.10 In another failed transition on the same day, the Move Forward Party won the most seats in the Thai general election but were unable to rule.11 Less controversial, but perhaps more surprising, was the resignation of New Zealand's Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern on 19 January. Showing her human side for one last time, Ardern suggested that she “no longer had enough left in the tank” to carry on.12

All the while, the spectre of power politics loomed and sometimes floated in the background. In late January, a Chinese balloon was discovered drifting over US airspace. The incident led to a crisis in which US Secretary of State Antony Blinken cancelled a planned trip to Beijing. The US eventually shot down the balloon claiming that it was being used for surveillance purposes while the Chinese government suggested that it was a meteorological device that had been blown off course. Beyond this incident, there was intense scrutiny of initiatives and actions taken by the Chinese government throughout the first half of the year in the West, including the brokering of a deal between Iran and Saudi Arabia,13 and Xi Jinping's visit to Russia on 20-22 March.14 In the region, there was some international concern when a Chinese state company was awarded a contract to redevelop the port in Honiara, Solomon Island.15 Seeking to expand on their own influence in the Pacific, the US signed a security deal with Papua New Guinea.16

This foreign policy review will explore how Australia has sought to negotiate these, predictably, extraordinary times. It will do this by, first, chronicling key developments in Australian foreign policy between January and June 2023. Second, it will discuss the discursive framing of Australian foreign policy articulated by the Labor government during this period, building on analysis provided by Kate Clayton in the previous review.17 It will focus particularly on how the government has framed national identity and interests, the situation it sees itself to be operating in, and how it considers national interests to be best pursued in this context. Third, it will outline some questions that arise from unresolved tensions between the discourse and conduct of foreign policy during this period: How will military build-up be balanced with action on climate change? How will an agenda for Indigenous diplomacy fit within a largely ‘business as usual' approach to foreign policy? Will claims to defend the rules-based international order be credible with ongoing questions around human rights abuses?

This section will chronicle key developments in Australian foreign policy during this period. There has been substantial change as well as a lot of inertia. While being ostensibly a ‘domestic’ issue, it is impossible to overlook the significance of the upcoming (or past at the time of publication) referendum on constitutional recognition of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples and the creation of the Voice to Parliament.18 The first half of 2023 saw intense, and often divisive, public debate on the Voice. A few weeks before the design principles of the Voice were released, Justin Mohamed was announced as the first Ambassador for First Nations people,19 marking a significant advance in efforts to formulate an Indigenous foreign policy.20

Despite some fundamental questions being raised regarding the foundations of Australia as a nation,21 and how it pursues its interests, the conduct of foreign policy followed largely familiar patterns, oblivious to the debates occurring around it. Both in the media and in political discourse, the primary focus continues to be on geopolitical competition. The drums of war were beating ever faster in certain sectors. Notable in this regard was the ‘Red Alert’ series published in The Age and The Sydney Morning Herald on 6–7 March, in which it was claimed that Australia faced the threat of war with China within the next three years.22 Given such coverage, it was quite unsurprising that three quarters of Australians were found to believe that it was likely that China would become a military threat to Australia in the next two decades in a study appearing on 20 June.23 The Albanese government attempted to stabilise the difficult relationship with China in the context of such coverage, with some improvements made in terms of trade relations. According to Penny Wong, the government has sought to “cooperate where we can, disagree where we must, manage our differences wisely, and above all else, engage in and vigorously pursue our own national interest”.24 A shipment of Australian coal arrived in Chinese ports on 8 February after an unofficial ban was lifted following a meeting between trade minister Don Farrell and China's commerce minister Wang Wentao.25 Tariffs on Australian barley were later lifted,26 and the first in-person meeting between Trade Ministers since 2019 was held in Beijing on 13 May.

A little over a month after the unveiling of AUKUS, a public version of the Defence Strategic Review was published. The recommendations of the review, such as the acquisition of weaponry, defence capabilities and regulation, and investment to support the Australian Defence industry were embraced by the Albanese government to much fanfare.31 The review marked a significant shift in Australia's strategic doctrine, arguing for a move away from the “Defence of Australia” doctrine to a new doctrine of “National Defence”. The former was aimed at deterring low-level threats from small and middle powers in the region.32 In contrast, National Defence entails a whole-of-government approach focused on the maintenance of a desirable regional balance of power, and regional stability, in the Indo-Pacific. The focus here is not only on the acceleration of defence acquisitions and procurement, but also on active diplomacy and statecraft within the Indo-Pacific.33 The shift has been prompted by the government's assessment of the increasing risks of great power conflict in the region as strategic competition between the US and China advances, and the resulting reduction in the previously assumed ten-year warning time for conflict or the use of force or coercion against Australia.34

There were several other key developments regarding strategic alliances. The Quad Summit to be held in Sydney on 17 May was cancelled when Joe Biden withdrew to deal with domestic issues. The leaders of Australia, India, Japan, and the US later met on the sidelines of the G7 meeting in Hiroshima, reaffirming commitments and deepening an agenda in a joint statement released on 20 May.35 India's Prime Minister Narendra Modi then visited Sydney on 23 May, receiving a rock-star welcome. Criticism of Modi and his Bharatiya Janata party (BJP) for discriminatory policies against Muslims and their broader Hindu Nationalist agenda were largely ignored during the visit.36 The government also made efforts to strengthen relationships in the Pacific in reaction to concerns regarding increased geopolitical competition. A new bilateral security treaty between Australia and Papua New Guinea was announced on 12 January. Anthony Albanese described the treaty as being part of a “family-first approach” to security in the Pacific.37 The federal budget included almost $2 billion in funding to enhance influence in the Pacific and provide military, environmental and economic support.38 At the same time, Australia's support for fossil fuel projects continued to be a point of contention with its neighbours. Most recently, Vanuatu minister Ralph Regenvanu questioned why Australia continues to invest “billions of dollars into the fossil fuel industry, which we in the Pacific have agreed, including Australia, is the greatest threat to our security.”39 Tensions between Australia's objectives in the Pacific and the methods it uses to achieve them will be picked up in more detail later in the review.

Geopolitical tensions were also manifested in domestic settings in a number of ways. In February, it was announced that surveillance cameras built by Chinese companies Hikvision and Dahua were to be removed from Australian government buildings following similar bans in the US and UK.40 The Australian government followed the lead of allies by banning the use of TikTok on government devices.41 At the end of March, the government introduced a bill that would lead to ASIO taking over the issuing of high-level security clearances. Home Affairs minister Clare O'Neil argued that this will “harden access to Australia's most sensitive information, capabilities and secrets” in a context of increased foreign interference.42 In June, emergency legislation was passed to cancel the lease for a new Russian Embassy in Canberra, citing national security concerns.43

Australian foreign policy under the Albanese government has been marked by some discursive shifts as well as continuities with respect to previous Liberal-National Coalition governments. In this section, we will outline how this framing has been forwarded during the period covered in this review. The discursive framing can be divided into a description of who we are, a diagnosis of the situation in which foreign policy is to be conducted, and a prescription of what needs to be done to further the national interest. As Wong's quote at the beginning of this section suggests, the government does not approach foreign policy as simply an ‘objective’ pursuit but one that is shaped by fluid national values, national interests and national identity. If the stories we tell the world about who we are the starting point of our foreign policy, what do these stories currently look like?

In line with previous Labor governments, the current government has sought to locate Australia's identity in the region, now most commonly referred to as the ‘Indo-Pacific.’45 We are, Richard Marles suggests, “a three ocean nation, our interests stretch across the entirety of the Indo-Pacific.”46 There was some controversy at the beginning of the year when Penny Wong distanced contemporary Australia from its British history and colonial connections, suggesting that we now claim a rightful place in the region as a multicultural nation with substantial ancestral ties, when giving a speech at the Centre for Grand Strategy at King's College, London.47 This claim to a rightful place is partly based on migration from the region, including Wong's family, but also on the appropriation of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander history. Wong often emphasises how the multicultural make-up of Australia defines our place in the world: “[w]hen Australians look out to the world, we see ourselves reflected in it – just as the world can see itself reflected in us”.48 She also points to deep historical connections represented by interactions between Makassar traders that sought sea cucumbers from the Yolngu people of Arnhem land.49 She suggests that “First Nations people were this land's first diplomats and traders” and that “elevating First Nations perspectives will allow Australia to build connections around the world, particularly in the Pacific”.50 Such claims regarding Australia's national identity are most prominent in Wong's discourse but much more understated in the speeches of other key government figures.

This reframing of Australia's identity in part responds to a broader diagnosis of the state of affairs in global politics. This, it is argued, is a “world in which the rules-based order is under enormous strain, the threat of armed conflict is less remote, and foreign interference is more prevalent than ever.”51 We live in “a time of profound geopolitical uncertainty, both in our region and around the world”52 where “Australia is no longer blessed with a benign strategic environment”.53 Instead, “strategic competition” is occurring across economic, military and diplomatic spheres.54 The region we are part of, the Indo-Pacific, is framed as “the most consequential region of our time – and likely… for generations to come”.55 This is attributed to current and projected economic growth in the region as well as the geostrategic competition that is currently transforming the region.

Our position in the region, and the current dynamics shaping it, are seen to offer great opportunities but also pose new threats. The main threat is seen to come from challenges to the rule-based order and particularly norms of sovereignty and territoriality. The conflict in Ukraine is often mentioned as a reflection of such a threat, “a brutal war that has meant we cannot take the security and prosperity of our region for granted”.56 This often comes with allusions to the potential for a similar conflict to occur in Taiwan. In his speech at the Shangri-La Dialogue, for example, Richard Marles transitioned from discussing the war in Ukraine to China's military build-up. Other threats commonly mentioned also allude to China such as “coercive trade measures; unsustainable lending; political interference; disinformation; and reshaping international rules, standards and norms that have benefitted smaller countries, from trade to human rights”.57

The prescription of how to pursue our national interests in this context follows on from this framing of who we are and the situation we are facing. In this regard, the government has sought to downplay some of the sensationalism in the media regarding the inevitability of future conflict, and to stabilise relations with China. It has argued that peace may be built through a combination of diplomacy and deterrence.58 Key Labor figures often point to post-WWII leader, and president of the UN General Assembly, H. V. “Doc” Evatt, as encapsulating the type of approach that needs to be followed. This is to be done by safeguarding international institutions that allow “middle powers and smaller nations… [to] have a seat at the table and to be able to make a contribution to their collective security”.59 Small and middle powers, such as Australia, are understood to be more than supporting players in a world dominated by great powers.

Unsurprisingly, given the framing outlined above, national interests are to be pursued through the region due to interconnectedness in security and trade with the Indo-Pacific. The region is not “a mere theatre for great power competition”,60 and states should work to create a region that is stable, prosperous, and respectful of international law and norms through ASEAN, the Pacific Island Forum, the East Asia Summit, APEC, and other regional institutions.61 A key aspect of much of the discourse in this regard revolves around “recognising the centrality of ASEAN” to the region.62 It is often reiterated that “we will always invest in the core meaning and efficacy of ASEAN centrality”.63 This is partially due to a desire to increase economic integration and trade liberalisation in the region. It is argued that Australia's greatest trade opportunities over the next thirty years are to be found in the ASEAN region,64 justifying the formulation of a Southeast Asia Economic Strategy to 2040.65 Deepened trade relations and the resulting prosperity, it is argued, will also contribute to security.

The Pacific is the other main area of engagement. The “Pacific is family” but also a site of strategic importance due to geography. The government argues that it seeks to ensure the Pacific “remains peaceful, prosperous and equipped to respond to the challenges of our time”.66 It does this as a “family member”, as “partners, not patriarchs”.67 It seeks to portray its engagement with the Pacific as more meaningful than previous Coalition initiatives such as the Pacific “step up.” One of the ways this is said to be done is through the creation of a new development policy and an increase in official development assistance over the next four years. Rather than aid, this is framed as being important for achieving strategic objectives regarding security and development.68 Wong has argued that “development assistance is central to statecraft. It helps our regional partners become more economically resilient, develop critical infrastructure and provide their own security”,69 particularly in the context of environmental change. This connects with government claims that it is taking meaningful action on climate change, “after nine years of disrespect from the previous government”.70

While it is argued that regional organisations such as ASEAN and the Pacific Island Forum are “necessary condition[s] for regional security”,71 and that cooperation with the region is necessary for addressing emerging issues such as climate change and terrorism, it is also suggested that force is needed to uphold the rules-based order, to secure “our strategic geography and the viability of trade and supply routes”.72 Central to the discourse here are notions of “strategic equilibrium” and “collective deterrence”. Deterrence is necessary so that “no country dominates, and no country is dominated”.73 States need to be able to make their own choices and not be coerced by great powers and this is only possible through demonstrations of strength. For this, it is argued, “smaller groupings can help to complement the central architecture” of international institutions.74 Strategic alliances that exist outside of regional frameworks, including with the US, Five-Eyes, Five Power Defence (with Malaysia, Singapore, New Zealand and UK), the Quad (with India, Japan and UK) and AUKUS are justified in these terms. For example, Richard Marles argues that the nuclear submarines to be acquired through AUKUS are intended to allow Australia to “make our contribution to the collective security of our region, and to the maintenance of the global rules-based order”.75 Militarisation and the adoption of “a new strategic posture”, as outlined in the Defence Strategic Review, are thus seen to be necessary to uphold the rules-based order.76

There is, of course, more to foreign policy than the stories that we tell about ourselves. For this reason, it is important not to take the discursive framing of the government at face value but rather to interrogate whether this is backed up by actions, whether there are contradictions between words and deeds, and indeed whether there are contradictions in the stories themselves. In this section, we seek to flesh out several questions that emerge from contradictions between the stories we tell about ourselves and the way in which these are enacted.

The first of these, and perhaps the most obvious, is around addressing climate insecurities. How will military build-up and defence posturing be balanced with action on climate change? The Albanese government has moved away from the climate denialism of the previous government, framing action on climate change as an “entry pass” into international negotiations and partnerships.77 The rhetoric about taking real action on climate change, however, comes into tension with the actions. In this sense, scholars have pointed out continuities with previous governments and argued for a much more ambitious strategy.78 Most obviously in contradiction with the rhetoric is the government's refusal to take a backward step on continuing to mine fossil fuels and indeed initiating new projects. In addition to this, however, is the very nature of the approach outlined in the Defence Strategic Review and pursued through AUKUS. It seems difficult to conceive how such initiatives will be pursued without further aggravating the climate crisis. As noted by others, the Defence Strategic Review takes a reductionist approach to security and overlooks broader conceptions of global insecurity.79 As a result, while climate change and climate-related incidents are mentioned, these are largely framed as nuisances that distract from the core (and more important, apparently) tasks of the defence force.80 The priority is on building military capacity, supply chains and industry, as well as the pollutants that power them, rather than concerns related to the environment (that the Defence Strategic Review argues should be relegated to lesser government bodies). Indeed, both the Defence Strategic Review and AUKUS are heavily concerned with bolstering a nascent military-industrial complex, and not solely for security purposes.

Along these lines, Albanese has claimed that AUKUS is much more than submarines, it “is about the future”.81 Marles suggests that it “offers so much more for Australia: for jobs, for industry and for investment…It will be one of the greatest industrial endeavours Australia has ever undertaken – rivalling the likes of the Snowy Hydro Scheme or the establishment of the Australian automotive industry”.82 Albanese similarly waxes lyrical about how it “will be a catalyst for innovation and research breakthroughs that will reverberate throughout the Australian economy” and educate “young Australians today for the opportunities of tomorrow”.83 Kate Clayton and Katherine Newman point to tensions between rhetoric about strengthening ties with the Indo-Pacific while pursuing Anglo alliances through AUKUS, grounded in settler colonial positionality and seeking to ensure Western dominance in the region.84 The climate impact shows how tensions between deeds and acts run deeper than this, however. What are we seeking to build through this “whole-of-nation effort”? Most importantly, how can a new industrial revolution based around arms manufacturing be reconciled with real action on climate change? Even in the context of increasing extreme weather events, military and climate security continue to be treated as separate spheres with the military ultimately taking precedence.85 In this sense, claims to be taking real action on climate change are likely to be called out, particularly by Pacific nations. The framing of the “Pacific family” by the government will continue to function as a ‘domestication’ strategy that encloses while excluding the authentic concerns of Pacific Island nations.86

Another tension is regarding efforts to integrate an approach to Indigenous diplomacy, most prominently represented by the appointment of an Ambassador for First Nations people. How will an agenda for Indigenous diplomacy fit within a largely business-as-usual approach to foreign policy? Wong has explicitly drawn on Indigenous history to claim our “rightful place” in the region and to accentuate “ancestral ties”. She has argued that “elevating First Nations perspectives will strengthen our connections across the world and in our region, especially across the Blue Pacific”.87 The discourse in this regard often seems instrumental and is sometimes framed as an additional weapon to have in our arsenal to leverage connections that have been “neglected for too long”.88 This leads to questions around whether this is about “adding and stirring” Indigenous perspectives, or whether Indigenous concerns and ideas will come to the fore of policy making. The jury is still out on this.89 However, it seems unlikely that Indigenous views will be taken seriously when they come into direct tension with broader strategy. Again, we may return to the Defence Strategic Review and AUKUS that are built around a rigid perspective of the “strategic environment” and the steps that are necessary to address this. To what extent is/will this be informed by Indigenous perspectives? To what extent are First Nations peoples on board with military build-up on their lands? Similarly, we may consider the extent to which the continued focus on extractivism, be it through fossil fuels or so called “critical minerals”, lines up with Indigenous perspectives. With this in mind, we should ask whether these are stories that we tell about ourselves when it is convenient to do so and forget about when not.

Tools for thinking through some of these issues can be found in a recently published special issue of Australian Journal of Politics and History edited by Alexander Davis and James Blackwell on “Decolonising Australia's International Relations?” Contributions to the special issue include discussions of pedagogical practice and curriculums in IR scholarship in Australia,90 the coloniality of the conduct of Australia's foreign policy,91 its grounding it its settler colonial history,92 and endeavours for Indigenous inclusion.93 Davis and Blackwell underline the difficulty of doing IR and foreign policy otherwise in a context where the colonial history and present are rarely confronted, meaningful efforts to decolonise the Australian state have not taken place, and where IR and foreign policy circles do “not sufficiently engage with Indigenous issues, or speak to the concerns of Indigenous peoples”.94 This leads them to the conclusion that decolonising the discipline will be extremely difficult if not impossible.95 A similar conclusion could be reached with regards to an agenda for Indigenous diplomacy that does not involve a broader reckoning with the colonial foundations of the Australian state and its foreign policy. One would think that an endeavour to develop other geopolitical imaginations,96 and establish the kinds of “deep relations” Wong gestures towards,97 could only be possible after decolonisation has taken place (and not decolonisation as a metaphor).98 In any case, it is clear that the future directions of an Indigenous foreign policy are very much tied up with the debate around the referendum for the Voice to Parliament. As the divisive, and partisan, debate indicates, the stories that we tell about ourselves are far from settled in this regard.

Finally, there remains a tension between Australia's claims to be a defender of the rules-based order and its record on human rights. Human Rights Watch's World Report 2023 challenged Australia's credibility on human rights and climate justice issues, due to poor treatment of First Nations peoples and asylum seekers as well as its continued promotion of fossil fuel development.99 With this in mind, we may question whether claims about defending the rules-based international order will be credible without addressing ongoing human rights issues. The rules-based order, as used by the Australian government, often seems to simply refer to US primacy, and norms of sovereignty and territorial integrity, when they are convenient. With regards to the punitive border policies that have caused concerns regarding Australia's treatment of asylum seekers and fulfillment of its human rights obligations, this year has been marked by the exportation of Australian innovations, particularly to the UK where the “stop the boats” slogan has reappeared, where there is ongoing controversy around plans for offshore detention in Rwanda,100 and an Australian company won the contract to run the offshore detention barge Bibby Stockholm.101 Australia has become a norm entrepreneur for an international order where anti-migrant sentiment has been drummed up for political gain on multiple occasions this year around the world, from the migrant ‘crisis’ in Chile,102 to the racist comments of Tunisia's president.103 While the Albanese government has downplayed some of the rhetoric regarding the border regime, it continues to maintain “its clear commitment to the three pillars of Operation Sovereign Borders and the important role of the Australian Border Force”.104 People on the move continue to die and suffer as a result of such punitive policies. Most tragically this year, more than 600 migrants died after their ship capsized off the coast of Greece, while “the Greek government treated the situation like a law enforcement operation, not a rescue”.105 Important questions were also raised when it was deemed that sufficient evidence had been given that decorated soldier Ben Roberts-Smith had committed war crimes in Afghanistan in a defamation case he brought against the Sydney Morning Herald, The Age and The Canberra Times.106 The case again drew attention to evidence of possible war crimes committed by Australian troops in Afghanistan, casting further doubt on Australia's human rights credentials. A special issue of Australian Journal of Political Science this year, edited by Megan MacKenzie, Thomas Gregory, Bilal Sarwary, and Sherene Razack,107 provides nuanced analysis of the possible war crimes, including the gendered and racialized forms of dehumanization that make such acts possible,108 and the need to address violent masculinities within the Australian Defence Force.109

During the first half of 2023, the Albanese government has further cemented its foreign policy doctrine. Minister for Foreign Affairs, Penny Wong, has taken an active role in re-framing Australia's place in the world to build connections with the Indo-Pacific region. This in part continues a tradition of similar reimaginings by previous Labor governments. At the same time, the strategy forwarded by the government seeks to respond to the changing circumstances of the last decade, that has seen our region (re)invented as the Indo-Pacific. Accordingly, the Indo-Pacific is where Australia's risks and opportunities are seen to lie. The government has pursued the opportunities by playing an active role in bolstering the “rules based international order”, particularly through regional institutions and partnerships. It has attempted to ward off threats to this order by seeking “strategic equilibrium” and “collective deterrence” via militarisation and strategic alliances. The discourse, and the actions it informs, are not entirely convincing, however, and seem somewhat out of step with the key challenges of our times. Notably, we may ask whether, in the context of increasingly regular extreme weather events and rising global temperatures, embarking on a “whole-of-nation” effort to build a defence industry should be at the top of our priorities. At the same time, much more critical thought is needed regarding the rules based international order we are apparently defending through military build-up, particularly if this is to be something worthwhile. Discussions around Indigenous recognition, reconciliation, reparations, and representation are a fundamental part of such a process, and there have been some promising developments in this regard. Nevertheless, a much broader reckoning with the colonial foundations of the Australian state and its foreign policy will be needed if we are to contribute to a truly just international order. Division around such topics seems to indicate that sustained movement in that direction continues to be unlikely.