提升等级

Q4 Social Sciences IPPR Progressive Review Pub Date : 2024-05-15 DOI:10.1111/newe.12378
Nick Gray, Danny Dickinson
{"title":"提升等级","authors":"Nick Gray,&nbsp;Danny Dickinson","doi":"10.1111/newe.12378","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<p>We are coming to the end of a parliament where levelling up has been an ongoing theme, so it is a good time to begin to consider what levelling up is (or was), how it emerged, what if anything it has achieved and what lessons the past few years might offer a new, potentially progressive, government. In this article we argue that government has begun to deliver on some eye-catching initiatives, but their impact on economic levelling up is unlikely to be significant. More positively, we argue that levelling up – including a broadening and deepening of devolved economic governance – has moved regional inequality up the political agenda and into the public consciousness. This represents an opportunity for a progressive government if it first resolves some of the political tensions and contradictions around levelling up. These include a conflation and confusion over whether interventions are designed to drive economic growth and productivity or build social infrastructure and pride in place.</p><p><i>Progressive Review</i> readers are likely familiar with at least the headline evidence on UK regional economic inequality, which remains exceptionally high for an advanced economy.1 Pointedly, for an article such as this one examining the impact of recent policy, regional disparities have worsened over the past five years.2 Recent years saw populist politicians, thinktanks and commentators claim the cause of tackling regional economic inequality as theirs; with particular emphasis in Conservative politics on a ‘Brexit dividend’. Advocates of progressive politics were left on the defensive as ‘out of touch’ and representative of an often vaguely defined ‘metropolitan elite’. The government elected in 2019 presented itself as best able to help people in places that had been ‘left behind’ in a globalised economy – the places that “don't matter”.3</p><p>Levelling up builds on the Cities and Local Growth agenda (CLoG; incorporating the northern powerhouse) that gave us the current patchwork of regional development governance, including combined authorities, ‘metro-mayors’ and local enterprise partnerships (the last of which are being wound down this year). Genuine revolutions in regional policy have been comparatively rare, but the 2010 Coalition government's scrapping of much of the regional tier of governance – particularly the regional development agencies and regional government offices – was a relatively radical juncture. (The-then business secretary, Vince Cable, described the sweeping away of the regional structures as “a bit Maoist”. Is it possible to be <i>a bit</i> Maoist?)4</p><p>Analyses of levelling up often takes the 2022 levelling-up white paper5 as a point of departure. However, levelling up in practice is sometimes only loosely related to the themes in the white paper, which is broad in its analysis and aspirational in its goals. Much of the document discusses academic analysis of economic geography with an implicit nod to the agglomeration-focussed rhetoric of the northern powerhouse, framed as the “Medici model”. More practically, the white paper sets out 12 levelling-up missions with a series of metrics, reminiscent of the 1997–2010 government's public service agreements.6 The missions encompass pride in place, economic growth, democracy and public service improvement, and the targets cover most of the domestic business of government other than transfer payments.7 A levelling-up bill followed, with its main contribution being to set the missions in law. Given the grand scope of the white paper, and limited content of the levelling-up bill, it is reasonable to consider levelling up in the broader sense as it has developed in practice over the course of the parliament, rather than attempt to evaluate it against its wide-ranging missions, particularly given that there has been limited action against these targets in the two years since the white paper's publication.</p><p>Levelling up <i>in practice</i>, to the extent that it represented a distinct approach, developed in an ad-hoc, confused and confusing manner but there have been attempts to identify some structure and coherence.8 First, there was a possible shift in geographical focus to smaller places and an emphasis on community identity rather than the ‘cities’ rhetoric of recent years, together with ambitions to boost manufacturing through active industrial policy. There are the familiar themes of infrastructure investment, regional dispersal of civil service jobs, and special economic zones in the form of freeports. In addition, political devolution to functional economic geographies has remained prominent in policy discussions and there is also significant interest (but limited action) in the decentralisation of public funding for research and development (R&amp;D). In governance terms, levelling up uses much of the institutional architecture of CLoG, which itself developed on an ad-hoc basis under the Coalition government and Cameron/Osborne Conservative government, alongside the emerging towns focus. The CLoG governance structures of combined authorities and local enterprise partnerships functioned through a series of place-based ‘deals’ and competitive funding streams, and levelling up continued this approach, with more emphasis on left-behind places and hyper-local delivery through local councils.</p><p>Importantly, there are tensions around the political rhetoric of levelling up that partially distinguishes it from CLoG's city-region-focussed approach. These tensions are in part the result of levelling up beginning life as a political slogan that has subsequently struggled to differentiate itself from (or to coherently direct) existing policy. Whoever forms a government after the forthcoming general election will inherit them, and a new progressive government would likely need to resolve them.</p><p>Some of these tensions flow from the rhetorical conflation of economic growth with pride in place, and the suggestion that all places have equal economic potential. First, there is a tension between a message that everywhere can have a dynamic local economy and the reality of a continuation of the competitive deals. The second tension concerns geographic scale and levelling up's (sometime) emphasis on smaller places (or towns) over larger cities/urban areas (although the levelling-up white paper emphasises that different places have different roles in the spatial economy). Third is a tension between promoting pride in place and policies to promote regional productivity and growth, with the two often being conflated. Fourth, there is a clear tension between the rhetoric of devolution and a government that seeks to control regional policy from the centre, often bypassing subnational institutions, such as metro-mayors, that purport to provide a regional strategic tier of governance.</p><p>On industrial strategy, R&amp;D funding and the role of place, there remains internal friction between the idea of ‘science superpower’ and levelling up. UK Research and Innovation and other research funders have increasingly emphasised ‘place’ in their literature and in their funding calls, and the government has created Innovation Accelerator pilots in Glasgow, Greater Manchester and the West Midlands. However, in practice this is still quite marginal (for example, the Innovation Accelerators have a total budget of around £100 million) and much of the government machinery and many of the beneficiaries of public research funding remain resolutely ‘space neutral’ and have a belief that allocating money to place or using some kind of levelling-up criteria will lead to sub-optimal investments. Civil service dispersals are a welcome (but marginal) policy where government has made some high-profile progress. For example, Darlington Economic Campus has seen staff numbers from different government departments increase there, including some senior civils servants, and success is being claimed.9</p><p>On funding, there have been several high-profile regional development funds since the launch of the Towns Fund in 2021, including the Levelling Up Fund (LUF) – essentially a local infrastructure fund open to bids from local authorities – and the UK Shared Prosperity Fund (UKSPF) – the long-awaited replacement for the European Structural Investment Funds. Delivery of the LUF has been slow, with a lack of local capacity and inflationary cost pressures meaning councils have struggled to get infrastructure projects off the ground, leaving much of the LUF unspent.10 Government investment in larger infrastructure projects has at best stuttered, exemplified in the scrapping of High Speed 2 (HS2) to the north of England and the poorly communicated and sceptically received assurance that the budget would be spent elsewhere on regional transport projects.</p><p>The UKSPF is largely revenue funding and therefore easier to invest more quickly but has experienced many of the issues that had been raised as concerns in advance, particularly greater centralisation of control, timescale requirements from government that encourage rapid spending, and policy churn. Government dictated that more than a fifth of the fund was to be spent on the Multiply national numeracy programme (in effect centralised), while the structure of the fund – wherein with the largest amount available is the final year – makes it more difficult for local leadership to plan for the long term. More broadly, there is no guarantee that the UKSPF will continue beyond the current spending review period, meaning the UKSPF, as it stands, does not come close to matching the level of funding available through the EU funds it replaced.11 Importantly, the fund is managed by combined authorities where they exist, or local authorities where they do not, meaning councils can lack the critical mass to deliver larger projects. The wide-ranging UKSPF objectives, reflecting the levelling-up missions, spread the fund even thinner, with local authorities using it to provide anything from skills projects to lights shows. On spatial policy, freeports are in place for ministers, mayors and council leaders to point at, and local teams and Whitehall civil servants are working on them. Elsewhere, negotiations are under way to develop business cases for investment zones across the UK. Again, freeports and investment zones are likely to be marginal interventions, given their relatively small scale and limited budgets. Levelling up has continued to implement devolution deals with combined authorities, and most of the north of England is now covered by a deal, including (and eventually) the North East, which had seen a ‘no’ vote in a devolution referendum in 2004 and the failure of more recent devolution deal negotiations. This is an area where levelling up has made progress, although the devolution framework with its four tiers still lacks some transparency on what constitutes good governance and good performance.</p><p>While further steps towards decentralisation are welcome, most of the levelling-up interventions are unlikely to be transformative, either because they lack scale or because they are marginal – or both. First, it is important to acknowledge the narrative that emerged of levelling up representing an almost unique or first attempt to tackle spatial economic disparities. In this sense, levelling up has ‘failed’ when measured against some of the more ambitious rhetorical claims and media coverage, but in terms of real policy interventions, the post-2019 government has begun to deliver much of what it realistically set out to do, albeit in an ad-hoc way. The problem is less that these policies have failed in their own terms, but more that they never amounted to a great deal, and were never likely to make a measurable impact on regional economic inequality.</p><p>Perhaps levelling up's biggest achievement has been to help put spatial economic inequality at or near the top of the policy agenda and in the public consciousness, and in doing so articulate a sense that peripheral places matter. It may be electorally motivated, but levelling up recognises that places that feel neglected need a decent public realm, physical infrastructure (most obviously transport) and social infrastructure,12 the last of these being articulated in the levelling up white paper as a sense of pride in place. Of course, there are large caveats to this faint praise, with the government's own spending cuts since 2010 leading to a sense that places do not matter after all, while many of the initiatives badged as levelling up and paid for with time-limited levelling-up funding (from new leisure centres to community events) are things local government would have done anyway when it had more money. However, the new enthusiasm for regional policy and tacking spatial economic inequality still represents a huge opportunity for an incoming government.</p><p>The years following the global financial crisis of 2008 and subsequent fiscal retrenchments (and, in the UK, particularly around and after the vote to leave the EU) have seen progressive politics accused of solely middle-class, metropolitan interests. It is beyond the scope of this article to unpack this fully, but levelling up provided the backdrop against which Conservative and populist politicians championed ‘left behind’ and ‘forgotten’ places. A narrative developed that levelling up was the first serious attempt in decades to reduce spatial economic inequality. While this was at best debatable, it proved a political challenge for progressive politics.</p><p>However, the national political mood appears to have turned, with voters giving government little credit for levelling-up initiatives and polling on voting intention suggesting that levelling up's political success could be temporary, at least in a general election (Conservative mayors Andy Street and Ben Houchen remain popular). Progressive politicians can reclaim the agenda, but Labour as the likely next government needs a clearer message.</p><p>Recent years have seen a range of interventions from academics and thinktanks, offering advice and guidance on better regional policy.13<sup>,</sup>14<sup>,</sup>15 An additional blueprint for the future is beyond the scope of this article, but as a first step we argue that a new government needs to tackle the distributive politics of levelling up and resolve some of the contradictions and tensions. One of the first things to address are some of the tensions around growth and pride in place and the role of different places in the spatial economy (typically articulated as a towns/cities divide). This is exemplified in the conflation of policies to promote pride in place (including a better public realm) and policies to facilitate economic productivity – a false promise of levelling up that people in peripheral places tended not to believe.16 A new, transparent regional policy would be clear that different places have different roles in the spatial economy and require appropriate public investments.</p><p>From this perspective, productivity-oriented spending would be selective and targeted while a needs-based funding formula for local services would demonstrate fairness and empower local leaders. In the latter context, local public services, infrastructure and the public realm have required significant investment for some time. Many places have social and economic challenges that are deep, persistent and beyond the scope of discrete economic development policy where, for example, poor health interacts with economic challenges. Crucially, this means the need for serious public investment and, while everyone is in favour of fair and progressive taxation, probably a willingness from most, if not all, citizens to pay more tax.</p><p>The era of levelling up presents lessons for a future government in providing clarity of purpose and policy coherence. Government can pursue economic growth alongside policies to promote pride in place and social inclusion but should take care not to conflate and confuse different challenges. In doing so, the next government should clearly articulate the ‘rules of the game’; with funding allocated by credible justification to encourage the crowding-in of the resources, skills and talents of industry, government, academia and communities. Despite the fiscal challenges the government may inherit, the clarity and ambition highlighted above may go some way to driving a progressive response to the challenges of places where the concept of levelling up itself seems confusing and far away.</p>","PeriodicalId":37420,"journal":{"name":"IPPR Progressive Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2024-05-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/newe.12378","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Levelling up\",\"authors\":\"Nick Gray,&nbsp;Danny Dickinson\",\"doi\":\"10.1111/newe.12378\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<p>We are coming to the end of a parliament where levelling up has been an ongoing theme, so it is a good time to begin to consider what levelling up is (or was), how it emerged, what if anything it has achieved and what lessons the past few years might offer a new, potentially progressive, government. In this article we argue that government has begun to deliver on some eye-catching initiatives, but their impact on economic levelling up is unlikely to be significant. More positively, we argue that levelling up – including a broadening and deepening of devolved economic governance – has moved regional inequality up the political agenda and into the public consciousness. This represents an opportunity for a progressive government if it first resolves some of the political tensions and contradictions around levelling up. These include a conflation and confusion over whether interventions are designed to drive economic growth and productivity or build social infrastructure and pride in place.</p><p><i>Progressive Review</i> readers are likely familiar with at least the headline evidence on UK regional economic inequality, which remains exceptionally high for an advanced economy.1 Pointedly, for an article such as this one examining the impact of recent policy, regional disparities have worsened over the past five years.2 Recent years saw populist politicians, thinktanks and commentators claim the cause of tackling regional economic inequality as theirs; with particular emphasis in Conservative politics on a ‘Brexit dividend’. Advocates of progressive politics were left on the defensive as ‘out of touch’ and representative of an often vaguely defined ‘metropolitan elite’. The government elected in 2019 presented itself as best able to help people in places that had been ‘left behind’ in a globalised economy – the places that “don't matter”.3</p><p>Levelling up builds on the Cities and Local Growth agenda (CLoG; incorporating the northern powerhouse) that gave us the current patchwork of regional development governance, including combined authorities, ‘metro-mayors’ and local enterprise partnerships (the last of which are being wound down this year). Genuine revolutions in regional policy have been comparatively rare, but the 2010 Coalition government's scrapping of much of the regional tier of governance – particularly the regional development agencies and regional government offices – was a relatively radical juncture. (The-then business secretary, Vince Cable, described the sweeping away of the regional structures as “a bit Maoist”. Is it possible to be <i>a bit</i> Maoist?)4</p><p>Analyses of levelling up often takes the 2022 levelling-up white paper5 as a point of departure. However, levelling up in practice is sometimes only loosely related to the themes in the white paper, which is broad in its analysis and aspirational in its goals. Much of the document discusses academic analysis of economic geography with an implicit nod to the agglomeration-focussed rhetoric of the northern powerhouse, framed as the “Medici model”. More practically, the white paper sets out 12 levelling-up missions with a series of metrics, reminiscent of the 1997–2010 government's public service agreements.6 The missions encompass pride in place, economic growth, democracy and public service improvement, and the targets cover most of the domestic business of government other than transfer payments.7 A levelling-up bill followed, with its main contribution being to set the missions in law. Given the grand scope of the white paper, and limited content of the levelling-up bill, it is reasonable to consider levelling up in the broader sense as it has developed in practice over the course of the parliament, rather than attempt to evaluate it against its wide-ranging missions, particularly given that there has been limited action against these targets in the two years since the white paper's publication.</p><p>Levelling up <i>in practice</i>, to the extent that it represented a distinct approach, developed in an ad-hoc, confused and confusing manner but there have been attempts to identify some structure and coherence.8 First, there was a possible shift in geographical focus to smaller places and an emphasis on community identity rather than the ‘cities’ rhetoric of recent years, together with ambitions to boost manufacturing through active industrial policy. There are the familiar themes of infrastructure investment, regional dispersal of civil service jobs, and special economic zones in the form of freeports. In addition, political devolution to functional economic geographies has remained prominent in policy discussions and there is also significant interest (but limited action) in the decentralisation of public funding for research and development (R&amp;D). In governance terms, levelling up uses much of the institutional architecture of CLoG, which itself developed on an ad-hoc basis under the Coalition government and Cameron/Osborne Conservative government, alongside the emerging towns focus. The CLoG governance structures of combined authorities and local enterprise partnerships functioned through a series of place-based ‘deals’ and competitive funding streams, and levelling up continued this approach, with more emphasis on left-behind places and hyper-local delivery through local councils.</p><p>Importantly, there are tensions around the political rhetoric of levelling up that partially distinguishes it from CLoG's city-region-focussed approach. These tensions are in part the result of levelling up beginning life as a political slogan that has subsequently struggled to differentiate itself from (or to coherently direct) existing policy. Whoever forms a government after the forthcoming general election will inherit them, and a new progressive government would likely need to resolve them.</p><p>Some of these tensions flow from the rhetorical conflation of economic growth with pride in place, and the suggestion that all places have equal economic potential. First, there is a tension between a message that everywhere can have a dynamic local economy and the reality of a continuation of the competitive deals. The second tension concerns geographic scale and levelling up's (sometime) emphasis on smaller places (or towns) over larger cities/urban areas (although the levelling-up white paper emphasises that different places have different roles in the spatial economy). Third is a tension between promoting pride in place and policies to promote regional productivity and growth, with the two often being conflated. Fourth, there is a clear tension between the rhetoric of devolution and a government that seeks to control regional policy from the centre, often bypassing subnational institutions, such as metro-mayors, that purport to provide a regional strategic tier of governance.</p><p>On industrial strategy, R&amp;D funding and the role of place, there remains internal friction between the idea of ‘science superpower’ and levelling up. UK Research and Innovation and other research funders have increasingly emphasised ‘place’ in their literature and in their funding calls, and the government has created Innovation Accelerator pilots in Glasgow, Greater Manchester and the West Midlands. However, in practice this is still quite marginal (for example, the Innovation Accelerators have a total budget of around £100 million) and much of the government machinery and many of the beneficiaries of public research funding remain resolutely ‘space neutral’ and have a belief that allocating money to place or using some kind of levelling-up criteria will lead to sub-optimal investments. Civil service dispersals are a welcome (but marginal) policy where government has made some high-profile progress. For example, Darlington Economic Campus has seen staff numbers from different government departments increase there, including some senior civils servants, and success is being claimed.9</p><p>On funding, there have been several high-profile regional development funds since the launch of the Towns Fund in 2021, including the Levelling Up Fund (LUF) – essentially a local infrastructure fund open to bids from local authorities – and the UK Shared Prosperity Fund (UKSPF) – the long-awaited replacement for the European Structural Investment Funds. Delivery of the LUF has been slow, with a lack of local capacity and inflationary cost pressures meaning councils have struggled to get infrastructure projects off the ground, leaving much of the LUF unspent.10 Government investment in larger infrastructure projects has at best stuttered, exemplified in the scrapping of High Speed 2 (HS2) to the north of England and the poorly communicated and sceptically received assurance that the budget would be spent elsewhere on regional transport projects.</p><p>The UKSPF is largely revenue funding and therefore easier to invest more quickly but has experienced many of the issues that had been raised as concerns in advance, particularly greater centralisation of control, timescale requirements from government that encourage rapid spending, and policy churn. Government dictated that more than a fifth of the fund was to be spent on the Multiply national numeracy programme (in effect centralised), while the structure of the fund – wherein with the largest amount available is the final year – makes it more difficult for local leadership to plan for the long term. More broadly, there is no guarantee that the UKSPF will continue beyond the current spending review period, meaning the UKSPF, as it stands, does not come close to matching the level of funding available through the EU funds it replaced.11 Importantly, the fund is managed by combined authorities where they exist, or local authorities where they do not, meaning councils can lack the critical mass to deliver larger projects. The wide-ranging UKSPF objectives, reflecting the levelling-up missions, spread the fund even thinner, with local authorities using it to provide anything from skills projects to lights shows. On spatial policy, freeports are in place for ministers, mayors and council leaders to point at, and local teams and Whitehall civil servants are working on them. Elsewhere, negotiations are under way to develop business cases for investment zones across the UK. Again, freeports and investment zones are likely to be marginal interventions, given their relatively small scale and limited budgets. Levelling up has continued to implement devolution deals with combined authorities, and most of the north of England is now covered by a deal, including (and eventually) the North East, which had seen a ‘no’ vote in a devolution referendum in 2004 and the failure of more recent devolution deal negotiations. This is an area where levelling up has made progress, although the devolution framework with its four tiers still lacks some transparency on what constitutes good governance and good performance.</p><p>While further steps towards decentralisation are welcome, most of the levelling-up interventions are unlikely to be transformative, either because they lack scale or because they are marginal – or both. First, it is important to acknowledge the narrative that emerged of levelling up representing an almost unique or first attempt to tackle spatial economic disparities. In this sense, levelling up has ‘failed’ when measured against some of the more ambitious rhetorical claims and media coverage, but in terms of real policy interventions, the post-2019 government has begun to deliver much of what it realistically set out to do, albeit in an ad-hoc way. The problem is less that these policies have failed in their own terms, but more that they never amounted to a great deal, and were never likely to make a measurable impact on regional economic inequality.</p><p>Perhaps levelling up's biggest achievement has been to help put spatial economic inequality at or near the top of the policy agenda and in the public consciousness, and in doing so articulate a sense that peripheral places matter. It may be electorally motivated, but levelling up recognises that places that feel neglected need a decent public realm, physical infrastructure (most obviously transport) and social infrastructure,12 the last of these being articulated in the levelling up white paper as a sense of pride in place. Of course, there are large caveats to this faint praise, with the government's own spending cuts since 2010 leading to a sense that places do not matter after all, while many of the initiatives badged as levelling up and paid for with time-limited levelling-up funding (from new leisure centres to community events) are things local government would have done anyway when it had more money. However, the new enthusiasm for regional policy and tacking spatial economic inequality still represents a huge opportunity for an incoming government.</p><p>The years following the global financial crisis of 2008 and subsequent fiscal retrenchments (and, in the UK, particularly around and after the vote to leave the EU) have seen progressive politics accused of solely middle-class, metropolitan interests. It is beyond the scope of this article to unpack this fully, but levelling up provided the backdrop against which Conservative and populist politicians championed ‘left behind’ and ‘forgotten’ places. A narrative developed that levelling up was the first serious attempt in decades to reduce spatial economic inequality. While this was at best debatable, it proved a political challenge for progressive politics.</p><p>However, the national political mood appears to have turned, with voters giving government little credit for levelling-up initiatives and polling on voting intention suggesting that levelling up's political success could be temporary, at least in a general election (Conservative mayors Andy Street and Ben Houchen remain popular). Progressive politicians can reclaim the agenda, but Labour as the likely next government needs a clearer message.</p><p>Recent years have seen a range of interventions from academics and thinktanks, offering advice and guidance on better regional policy.13<sup>,</sup>14<sup>,</sup>15 An additional blueprint for the future is beyond the scope of this article, but as a first step we argue that a new government needs to tackle the distributive politics of levelling up and resolve some of the contradictions and tensions. One of the first things to address are some of the tensions around growth and pride in place and the role of different places in the spatial economy (typically articulated as a towns/cities divide). This is exemplified in the conflation of policies to promote pride in place (including a better public realm) and policies to facilitate economic productivity – a false promise of levelling up that people in peripheral places tended not to believe.16 A new, transparent regional policy would be clear that different places have different roles in the spatial economy and require appropriate public investments.</p><p>From this perspective, productivity-oriented spending would be selective and targeted while a needs-based funding formula for local services would demonstrate fairness and empower local leaders. In the latter context, local public services, infrastructure and the public realm have required significant investment for some time. Many places have social and economic challenges that are deep, persistent and beyond the scope of discrete economic development policy where, for example, poor health interacts with economic challenges. Crucially, this means the need for serious public investment and, while everyone is in favour of fair and progressive taxation, probably a willingness from most, if not all, citizens to pay more tax.</p><p>The era of levelling up presents lessons for a future government in providing clarity of purpose and policy coherence. Government can pursue economic growth alongside policies to promote pride in place and social inclusion but should take care not to conflate and confuse different challenges. In doing so, the next government should clearly articulate the ‘rules of the game’; with funding allocated by credible justification to encourage the crowding-in of the resources, skills and talents of industry, government, academia and communities. Despite the fiscal challenges the government may inherit, the clarity and ambition highlighted above may go some way to driving a progressive response to the challenges of places where the concept of levelling up itself seems confusing and far away.</p>\",\"PeriodicalId\":37420,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"IPPR Progressive Review\",\"volume\":null,\"pages\":null},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2024-05-15\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/newe.12378\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"IPPR Progressive Review\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/newe.12378\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q4\",\"JCRName\":\"Social Sciences\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"IPPR Progressive Review","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/newe.12378","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q4","JCRName":"Social Sciences","Score":null,"Total":0}
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摘要

在治理方面,"提升水平 "采用了联合政府的大部分机构架构,而联合政府本身是在联合政府和卡梅伦/奥斯本保守党政府执政期间,在以新兴城镇为重点的同时临时发展起来的。在联合政府和卡梅伦/奥斯本保守党政府时期,联合政府的治理结构包括联合当局和地方企业伙伴关系,通过一系列基于地方的 "交易 "和竞争性资金流来运作。这些矛盾在一定程度上是由于 "提升水平 "一开始只是一个政治口号,后来却很难将其与现有政策区分开来(或对现有政策进行连贯的指导)。在即将到来的大选之后,无论谁组建政府,都将继承这些矛盾,而新的进步政府很可能需要解决这些矛盾。其中一些矛盾来自于将经济增长与地方自豪感混为一谈的言论,以及认为所有地方都具有同等经济潜力的说法。首先,"任何地方都可以拥有充满活力的地方经济 "这一信息与竞争性交易继续存在的现实之间存在矛盾。第二个矛盾涉及地理规模和 "均衡化"(有时)对较小地方(或城镇)而非较大城市/城区的强调(尽管 "均衡化 "白皮书强调不同地方在空间经济中扮演不同角色)。第三,促进地方自豪感与促进地区生产力和增长的政策之间存在矛盾,两者经常被混为一谈。第四,在权力下放的言辞与政府试图从中央控制地区政策之间存在明显的矛盾,政府往往绕过次国家机构,如都市长,这些机构旨在提供地区治理的战略层级。在工业战略、研发资金和地方作用方面,"科学超级大国 "的理念与提升水平之间仍然存在内耗。英国研究与创新组织和其他研究资助机构在其文献和资助呼吁中越来越多地强调 "地方",政府也在格拉斯哥、大曼彻斯特和西米德兰兹设立了创新加速器试点。然而,在实践中,这仍然是微不足道的(例如,创新加速器的总预算约为 1 亿英镑),而且大部分政府机构和公共研究资金的许多受益者仍然坚决保持 "空间中立",并认为将资金分配给地方或使用某种拉平标准将导致次优投资。公务员分散是一项值得欢迎的(但微不足道的)政策,政府在这方面取得了一些引人注目的进展。例如,达林顿经济园区(Darlington Economic Campus)中来自不同政府部门的员工人数有所增加,其中包括一些高级公务员,并声称取得了成功。9 关于资金问题,自 2021 年城镇基金启动以来,已有多个备受瞩目的区域发展基金,包括 "提升水平基金"(Levelling Up Fund,LUF)--本质上是一个地方基础设施基金,接受地方当局的投标--以及 "英国共同繁荣基金"(UKSPF)--期待已久的欧洲结构性投资基金的替代基金。地方基础设施基金的实施一直进展缓慢,地方能力不足和通胀成本压力意味着议会在启动基础设施项目方面举步维艰,导致地方基础设施基金的大部分资金没有使用。10 政府对大型基础设施项目的投资充其量也只是停滞不前,例如英格兰北部的高速 2 号公路(HS2)项目被取消,以及关于预算将用于其他地区交通项目的保证沟通不畅,并受到怀疑。政府规定,超过五分之一的基金将用于 "乘法 "全国算术计划(实际上是集中控制),而基金的结构--其中可用金额最大的是最后一年--使得地方领导更难进行长期规划。从更广泛的意义上讲,英国战略规划基金并不能保证在当前的支出审查期结束后仍能继续运作,这意味着英国战略规划基金目前的状况并不能与它所取代的欧盟基金所提供的资金水平相匹配。 11 重要的是,该基金在有联合当局的地方由联合当局管理,在没有联合当局的地方由地方当局管理,这意味着议会可能缺乏实施大型项目的临界质量。英国空间政策基金的目标范围很广,反映了平准化的使命,因此基金的使用范围更广,从技能项目到灯光表演,地方当局都可以使用基金。在空间政策方面,自由港已经到位,部长们、市长们和议会领袖们都可以指点江山,地方团队和白厅公务员们也正在努力工作。在其他方面,正在进行谈判,为英国各地的投资区制定商业案例。同样,由于自由港和投资区的规模相对较小,预算有限,因此很可能只是边缘干预措施。英格兰北部大部分地区现在都已签署了权力下放协议,包括(最终)东北部地区,该地区在 2004 年的权力下放公投中投了 "反对票",最近的权力下放协议谈判也以失败告终。虽然权力下放框架的四个层级在什么是良好治理和良好绩效方面仍然缺乏一定的透明度,但这一领域的权力下放已经取得了进展。虽然权力下放的进一步措施值得欢迎,但大多数权力下放干预措施不太可能带来变革,因为它们要么缺乏规模,要么处于边缘地位--或者两者兼而有之。首先,重要的是要承认一种说法,即提高平均水平是解决空间经济差距问题的一种几乎独一无二或首次尝试。从这个意义上说,与一些雄心勃勃的言论和媒体报道相比,levelling up 已经 "失败 "了,但就实际政策干预而言,2019 年后的政府已经开始实现其现实目标中的大部分内容,尽管是以一种临时的方式。问题并不在于这些政策本身的失败,而在于这些政策从来都没有达到很大的程度,也不可能对地区经济不平等产生可衡量的影响。也许levelling up最大的成就是帮助将空间经济不平等问题置于或接近政策议程和公众意识的首要位置,并通过这样做表达了一种边缘地区很重要的意识。这可能是出于选举动机,但提升水平认识到,那些感觉被忽视的地方需要一个像样的公共领域、有形基础设施(最明显的是交通)和社会基础设施,12 提升水平白皮书将最后一项基础设施阐述为一种地方自豪感。当然,这种微弱的赞美也有很大的局限性,自 2010 年以来,政府自身的开支削减导致了一种地方终究不重要的感觉,而许多被冠以 "提升水平 "并由有时限的 "提升水平 "资金支付的举措(从新的休闲中心到社区活动)都是地方政府在有更多资金时会做的事情。2008 年全球金融危机之后的几年,以及随后的财政紧缩(在英国,尤其是在投票脱离欧盟前后),进步政治被指责为只顾中产阶级和大都市的利益。这超出了本文的讨论范围,但 "levelling up "为保守党和民粹主义政治家提供了支持 "落后 "和 "被遗忘 "地区的背景。有一种说法认为,提升水平是几十年来减少空间经济不平等的首次认真尝试。然而,全国的政治情绪似乎已经发生了转变,选民们对政府的平准化举措评价不高,投票意向调查显示,平准化的政治成功可能只是暂时的,至少在大选中是如此(保守党市长安迪-斯切特(Andy Street)和本-侯臣(Ben Houchen)仍然很受欢迎)。13,14,15 未来的补充蓝图超出了本文的讨论范围,但作为第一步,我们认为新政府需要处理好均衡化的分配政治,并解决一些矛盾和紧张关系。首先要解决的问题之一是围绕增长和地方自豪感以及不同地方在空间经济中的作用(通常被表述为城镇与城市之间的鸿沟)所产生的一些紧张关系。 16 新的、透明的区域政策将明确不同地方在空间经济中的作用不同,需要适当的公共投资。从这个角度来看,以生产力为导向的支出将是有选择性和有针对性的,而以需求为基础的地方服务供资公式将体现公平性,并赋予地方领导人权力。就后者而言,一段时间以来,地方公共服务、基础设施和公共领域都需要大量投资。许多地方面临的社会和经济挑战是深层次的、持续性的,超出了单独的经济发展政策的范围,例如,健康状况不佳与经济挑战相互影响。最重要的是,这意味着需要进行大量的公共投资,尽管每个人都赞成公平的累进税制,但大多数(如果不是全部)公民可能都愿意缴纳更多的税。政府可以在追求经济增长的同时,制定促进地方自豪感和社会包容的政策,但应注意不要混淆不同的挑战。在此过程中,下届政府应明确阐述 "游戏规则";以可信的理由分配资金,鼓励产业界、政府、学术界和社区的资源、技能和人才的集聚。尽管政府可能会面临财政方面的挑战,但上文强调的清晰度和雄心壮志可能会在一定程度上推动我们逐步应对一些地方所面临的挑战,在这些地方,提升水平的概念本身似乎令人困惑且遥不可及。
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Levelling up

We are coming to the end of a parliament where levelling up has been an ongoing theme, so it is a good time to begin to consider what levelling up is (or was), how it emerged, what if anything it has achieved and what lessons the past few years might offer a new, potentially progressive, government. In this article we argue that government has begun to deliver on some eye-catching initiatives, but their impact on economic levelling up is unlikely to be significant. More positively, we argue that levelling up – including a broadening and deepening of devolved economic governance – has moved regional inequality up the political agenda and into the public consciousness. This represents an opportunity for a progressive government if it first resolves some of the political tensions and contradictions around levelling up. These include a conflation and confusion over whether interventions are designed to drive economic growth and productivity or build social infrastructure and pride in place.

Progressive Review readers are likely familiar with at least the headline evidence on UK regional economic inequality, which remains exceptionally high for an advanced economy.1 Pointedly, for an article such as this one examining the impact of recent policy, regional disparities have worsened over the past five years.2 Recent years saw populist politicians, thinktanks and commentators claim the cause of tackling regional economic inequality as theirs; with particular emphasis in Conservative politics on a ‘Brexit dividend’. Advocates of progressive politics were left on the defensive as ‘out of touch’ and representative of an often vaguely defined ‘metropolitan elite’. The government elected in 2019 presented itself as best able to help people in places that had been ‘left behind’ in a globalised economy – the places that “don't matter”.3

Levelling up builds on the Cities and Local Growth agenda (CLoG; incorporating the northern powerhouse) that gave us the current patchwork of regional development governance, including combined authorities, ‘metro-mayors’ and local enterprise partnerships (the last of which are being wound down this year). Genuine revolutions in regional policy have been comparatively rare, but the 2010 Coalition government's scrapping of much of the regional tier of governance – particularly the regional development agencies and regional government offices – was a relatively radical juncture. (The-then business secretary, Vince Cable, described the sweeping away of the regional structures as “a bit Maoist”. Is it possible to be a bit Maoist?)4

Analyses of levelling up often takes the 2022 levelling-up white paper5 as a point of departure. However, levelling up in practice is sometimes only loosely related to the themes in the white paper, which is broad in its analysis and aspirational in its goals. Much of the document discusses academic analysis of economic geography with an implicit nod to the agglomeration-focussed rhetoric of the northern powerhouse, framed as the “Medici model”. More practically, the white paper sets out 12 levelling-up missions with a series of metrics, reminiscent of the 1997–2010 government's public service agreements.6 The missions encompass pride in place, economic growth, democracy and public service improvement, and the targets cover most of the domestic business of government other than transfer payments.7 A levelling-up bill followed, with its main contribution being to set the missions in law. Given the grand scope of the white paper, and limited content of the levelling-up bill, it is reasonable to consider levelling up in the broader sense as it has developed in practice over the course of the parliament, rather than attempt to evaluate it against its wide-ranging missions, particularly given that there has been limited action against these targets in the two years since the white paper's publication.

Levelling up in practice, to the extent that it represented a distinct approach, developed in an ad-hoc, confused and confusing manner but there have been attempts to identify some structure and coherence.8 First, there was a possible shift in geographical focus to smaller places and an emphasis on community identity rather than the ‘cities’ rhetoric of recent years, together with ambitions to boost manufacturing through active industrial policy. There are the familiar themes of infrastructure investment, regional dispersal of civil service jobs, and special economic zones in the form of freeports. In addition, political devolution to functional economic geographies has remained prominent in policy discussions and there is also significant interest (but limited action) in the decentralisation of public funding for research and development (R&D). In governance terms, levelling up uses much of the institutional architecture of CLoG, which itself developed on an ad-hoc basis under the Coalition government and Cameron/Osborne Conservative government, alongside the emerging towns focus. The CLoG governance structures of combined authorities and local enterprise partnerships functioned through a series of place-based ‘deals’ and competitive funding streams, and levelling up continued this approach, with more emphasis on left-behind places and hyper-local delivery through local councils.

Importantly, there are tensions around the political rhetoric of levelling up that partially distinguishes it from CLoG's city-region-focussed approach. These tensions are in part the result of levelling up beginning life as a political slogan that has subsequently struggled to differentiate itself from (or to coherently direct) existing policy. Whoever forms a government after the forthcoming general election will inherit them, and a new progressive government would likely need to resolve them.

Some of these tensions flow from the rhetorical conflation of economic growth with pride in place, and the suggestion that all places have equal economic potential. First, there is a tension between a message that everywhere can have a dynamic local economy and the reality of a continuation of the competitive deals. The second tension concerns geographic scale and levelling up's (sometime) emphasis on smaller places (or towns) over larger cities/urban areas (although the levelling-up white paper emphasises that different places have different roles in the spatial economy). Third is a tension between promoting pride in place and policies to promote regional productivity and growth, with the two often being conflated. Fourth, there is a clear tension between the rhetoric of devolution and a government that seeks to control regional policy from the centre, often bypassing subnational institutions, such as metro-mayors, that purport to provide a regional strategic tier of governance.

On industrial strategy, R&D funding and the role of place, there remains internal friction between the idea of ‘science superpower’ and levelling up. UK Research and Innovation and other research funders have increasingly emphasised ‘place’ in their literature and in their funding calls, and the government has created Innovation Accelerator pilots in Glasgow, Greater Manchester and the West Midlands. However, in practice this is still quite marginal (for example, the Innovation Accelerators have a total budget of around £100 million) and much of the government machinery and many of the beneficiaries of public research funding remain resolutely ‘space neutral’ and have a belief that allocating money to place or using some kind of levelling-up criteria will lead to sub-optimal investments. Civil service dispersals are a welcome (but marginal) policy where government has made some high-profile progress. For example, Darlington Economic Campus has seen staff numbers from different government departments increase there, including some senior civils servants, and success is being claimed.9

On funding, there have been several high-profile regional development funds since the launch of the Towns Fund in 2021, including the Levelling Up Fund (LUF) – essentially a local infrastructure fund open to bids from local authorities – and the UK Shared Prosperity Fund (UKSPF) – the long-awaited replacement for the European Structural Investment Funds. Delivery of the LUF has been slow, with a lack of local capacity and inflationary cost pressures meaning councils have struggled to get infrastructure projects off the ground, leaving much of the LUF unspent.10 Government investment in larger infrastructure projects has at best stuttered, exemplified in the scrapping of High Speed 2 (HS2) to the north of England and the poorly communicated and sceptically received assurance that the budget would be spent elsewhere on regional transport projects.

The UKSPF is largely revenue funding and therefore easier to invest more quickly but has experienced many of the issues that had been raised as concerns in advance, particularly greater centralisation of control, timescale requirements from government that encourage rapid spending, and policy churn. Government dictated that more than a fifth of the fund was to be spent on the Multiply national numeracy programme (in effect centralised), while the structure of the fund – wherein with the largest amount available is the final year – makes it more difficult for local leadership to plan for the long term. More broadly, there is no guarantee that the UKSPF will continue beyond the current spending review period, meaning the UKSPF, as it stands, does not come close to matching the level of funding available through the EU funds it replaced.11 Importantly, the fund is managed by combined authorities where they exist, or local authorities where they do not, meaning councils can lack the critical mass to deliver larger projects. The wide-ranging UKSPF objectives, reflecting the levelling-up missions, spread the fund even thinner, with local authorities using it to provide anything from skills projects to lights shows. On spatial policy, freeports are in place for ministers, mayors and council leaders to point at, and local teams and Whitehall civil servants are working on them. Elsewhere, negotiations are under way to develop business cases for investment zones across the UK. Again, freeports and investment zones are likely to be marginal interventions, given their relatively small scale and limited budgets. Levelling up has continued to implement devolution deals with combined authorities, and most of the north of England is now covered by a deal, including (and eventually) the North East, which had seen a ‘no’ vote in a devolution referendum in 2004 and the failure of more recent devolution deal negotiations. This is an area where levelling up has made progress, although the devolution framework with its four tiers still lacks some transparency on what constitutes good governance and good performance.

While further steps towards decentralisation are welcome, most of the levelling-up interventions are unlikely to be transformative, either because they lack scale or because they are marginal – or both. First, it is important to acknowledge the narrative that emerged of levelling up representing an almost unique or first attempt to tackle spatial economic disparities. In this sense, levelling up has ‘failed’ when measured against some of the more ambitious rhetorical claims and media coverage, but in terms of real policy interventions, the post-2019 government has begun to deliver much of what it realistically set out to do, albeit in an ad-hoc way. The problem is less that these policies have failed in their own terms, but more that they never amounted to a great deal, and were never likely to make a measurable impact on regional economic inequality.

Perhaps levelling up's biggest achievement has been to help put spatial economic inequality at or near the top of the policy agenda and in the public consciousness, and in doing so articulate a sense that peripheral places matter. It may be electorally motivated, but levelling up recognises that places that feel neglected need a decent public realm, physical infrastructure (most obviously transport) and social infrastructure,12 the last of these being articulated in the levelling up white paper as a sense of pride in place. Of course, there are large caveats to this faint praise, with the government's own spending cuts since 2010 leading to a sense that places do not matter after all, while many of the initiatives badged as levelling up and paid for with time-limited levelling-up funding (from new leisure centres to community events) are things local government would have done anyway when it had more money. However, the new enthusiasm for regional policy and tacking spatial economic inequality still represents a huge opportunity for an incoming government.

The years following the global financial crisis of 2008 and subsequent fiscal retrenchments (and, in the UK, particularly around and after the vote to leave the EU) have seen progressive politics accused of solely middle-class, metropolitan interests. It is beyond the scope of this article to unpack this fully, but levelling up provided the backdrop against which Conservative and populist politicians championed ‘left behind’ and ‘forgotten’ places. A narrative developed that levelling up was the first serious attempt in decades to reduce spatial economic inequality. While this was at best debatable, it proved a political challenge for progressive politics.

However, the national political mood appears to have turned, with voters giving government little credit for levelling-up initiatives and polling on voting intention suggesting that levelling up's political success could be temporary, at least in a general election (Conservative mayors Andy Street and Ben Houchen remain popular). Progressive politicians can reclaim the agenda, but Labour as the likely next government needs a clearer message.

Recent years have seen a range of interventions from academics and thinktanks, offering advice and guidance on better regional policy.13,14,15 An additional blueprint for the future is beyond the scope of this article, but as a first step we argue that a new government needs to tackle the distributive politics of levelling up and resolve some of the contradictions and tensions. One of the first things to address are some of the tensions around growth and pride in place and the role of different places in the spatial economy (typically articulated as a towns/cities divide). This is exemplified in the conflation of policies to promote pride in place (including a better public realm) and policies to facilitate economic productivity – a false promise of levelling up that people in peripheral places tended not to believe.16 A new, transparent regional policy would be clear that different places have different roles in the spatial economy and require appropriate public investments.

From this perspective, productivity-oriented spending would be selective and targeted while a needs-based funding formula for local services would demonstrate fairness and empower local leaders. In the latter context, local public services, infrastructure and the public realm have required significant investment for some time. Many places have social and economic challenges that are deep, persistent and beyond the scope of discrete economic development policy where, for example, poor health interacts with economic challenges. Crucially, this means the need for serious public investment and, while everyone is in favour of fair and progressive taxation, probably a willingness from most, if not all, citizens to pay more tax.

The era of levelling up presents lessons for a future government in providing clarity of purpose and policy coherence. Government can pursue economic growth alongside policies to promote pride in place and social inclusion but should take care not to conflate and confuse different challenges. In doing so, the next government should clearly articulate the ‘rules of the game’; with funding allocated by credible justification to encourage the crowding-in of the resources, skills and talents of industry, government, academia and communities. Despite the fiscal challenges the government may inherit, the clarity and ambition highlighted above may go some way to driving a progressive response to the challenges of places where the concept of levelling up itself seems confusing and far away.

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来源期刊
IPPR Progressive Review
IPPR Progressive Review Social Sciences-Political Science and International Relations
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43
期刊介绍: The permafrost of no alternatives has cracked; the horizon of political possibilities is expanding. IPPR Progressive Review is a pluralistic space to debate where next for progressives, examine the opportunities and challenges confronting us and ask the big questions facing our politics: transforming a failed economic model, renewing a frayed social contract, building a new relationship with Europe. Publishing the best writing in economics, politics and culture, IPPR Progressive Review explores how we can best build a more equal, humane and prosperous society.
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