{"title":"万事开头难:利用锚定偏差考察处罚力度和社会规范对纳税遵从的影响","authors":"Tisha King","doi":"10.1007/s10551-024-05750-8","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<p>Although ethics research shows that prospective penalties for tax fraud can increase taxpayers’ compliance with tax laws, we do not have a clear understanding of how perceptions of penalty severity impact tax compliance. To address this gap, I first conduct a survey to establish what propriety of penalty severity encourages compliance. I then examine experimentally whether taxpayers’ compliance is jointly influenced by penalty severity and social norms. I expect social norms to moderate the impact of penalty severity because social norms provide a contextual cue about the scope and relevance of an ethical issue. Specifically, I expect that when taxpayers anchor (do not anchor) on information about social norms, the positive impact of penalty severity on tax compliance is suppressed (not suppressed). My results are as predicted. I conclude that governments can increase compliance with tax laws by imposing appropriately severe tax fraud penalties and carefully considering the release of information related to compliance norms.</p>","PeriodicalId":15279,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Business Ethics","volume":"42 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":5.9000,"publicationDate":"2024-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"First Things First: Using Anchoring Bias to Examine the Effect of Penalty Severity and Social Norms on Tax Compliance\",\"authors\":\"Tisha King\",\"doi\":\"10.1007/s10551-024-05750-8\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<p>Although ethics research shows that prospective penalties for tax fraud can increase taxpayers’ compliance with tax laws, we do not have a clear understanding of how perceptions of penalty severity impact tax compliance. To address this gap, I first conduct a survey to establish what propriety of penalty severity encourages compliance. I then examine experimentally whether taxpayers’ compliance is jointly influenced by penalty severity and social norms. I expect social norms to moderate the impact of penalty severity because social norms provide a contextual cue about the scope and relevance of an ethical issue. Specifically, I expect that when taxpayers anchor (do not anchor) on information about social norms, the positive impact of penalty severity on tax compliance is suppressed (not suppressed). My results are as predicted. I conclude that governments can increase compliance with tax laws by imposing appropriately severe tax fraud penalties and carefully considering the release of information related to compliance norms.</p>\",\"PeriodicalId\":15279,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Journal of Business Ethics\",\"volume\":\"42 1\",\"pages\":\"\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":5.9000,\"publicationDate\":\"2024-07-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Journal of Business Ethics\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"91\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-024-05750-8\",\"RegionNum\":1,\"RegionCategory\":\"哲学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q1\",\"JCRName\":\"BUSINESS\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Journal of Business Ethics","FirstCategoryId":"91","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-024-05750-8","RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"BUSINESS","Score":null,"Total":0}
First Things First: Using Anchoring Bias to Examine the Effect of Penalty Severity and Social Norms on Tax Compliance
Although ethics research shows that prospective penalties for tax fraud can increase taxpayers’ compliance with tax laws, we do not have a clear understanding of how perceptions of penalty severity impact tax compliance. To address this gap, I first conduct a survey to establish what propriety of penalty severity encourages compliance. I then examine experimentally whether taxpayers’ compliance is jointly influenced by penalty severity and social norms. I expect social norms to moderate the impact of penalty severity because social norms provide a contextual cue about the scope and relevance of an ethical issue. Specifically, I expect that when taxpayers anchor (do not anchor) on information about social norms, the positive impact of penalty severity on tax compliance is suppressed (not suppressed). My results are as predicted. I conclude that governments can increase compliance with tax laws by imposing appropriately severe tax fraud penalties and carefully considering the release of information related to compliance norms.
期刊介绍:
The Journal of Business Ethics publishes only original articles from a wide variety of methodological and disciplinary perspectives concerning ethical issues related to business that bring something new or unique to the discourse in their field. Since its initiation in 1980, the editors have encouraged the broadest possible scope. The term `business'' is understood in a wide sense to include all systems involved in the exchange of goods and services, while `ethics'' is circumscribed as all human action aimed at securing a good life. Systems of production, consumption, marketing, advertising, social and economic accounting, labour relations, public relations and organisational behaviour are analysed from a moral viewpoint. The style and level of dialogue involve all who are interested in business ethics - the business community, universities, government agencies and consumer groups. Speculative philosophy as well as reports of empirical research are welcomed. In order to promote a dialogue between the various interested groups as much as possible, papers are presented in a style relatively free of specialist jargon.