Pub Date : 2023-11-06DOI: 10.1007/s10551-023-05553-3
Dharmendra Naidu, Kumari Ranjeeni
Abstract We examine whether gender-diverse boards prioritize product market concerns over capital market incentives when proprietary costs are high. We argue that gender-diverse boards protect their firm’s competitive edge and maximize long-term shareholder wealth by ethically and carefully maintaining the confidentiality of proprietary information. Due to the reduced disclosure of proprietary information, firms with gender-diverse boards are likely to face more adverse selection when proprietary costs are high. However, the reduced disclosure of proprietary information enables firms with gender-diverse boards to enhance and maintain their competitive edge and gain higher long-term returns. Using a matched sample of the United States-listed companies, we find that firms with gender-diverse boards, relative to similar firms with all-male boards, (1) are associated with higher adverse selection costs and (2) higher long-run stock returns when the firm faces high product market competition. Collectively, our results suggest that firms with gender-diverse boards, which initially experience higher adverse selection in a competitive environment, are rewarded with a net gain of about 10 percent of their stock price in three years. Our research contributes to the literature by highlighting the importance of board gender diversity in fostering the ethical redaction of proprietary information for proprietary cost-based motives as opposed to agency cost-based motives. Our findings have important implications for regulators, firms, and shareholders by identifying gender-diverse boards as an antecedent for the ethical redaction of proprietary information.
{"title":"Shhh… Do Gender-Diverse Boards Prioritize Product Market Concerns Over Capital Market Incentives?","authors":"Dharmendra Naidu, Kumari Ranjeeni","doi":"10.1007/s10551-023-05553-3","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-023-05553-3","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract We examine whether gender-diverse boards prioritize product market concerns over capital market incentives when proprietary costs are high. We argue that gender-diverse boards protect their firm’s competitive edge and maximize long-term shareholder wealth by ethically and carefully maintaining the confidentiality of proprietary information. Due to the reduced disclosure of proprietary information, firms with gender-diverse boards are likely to face more adverse selection when proprietary costs are high. However, the reduced disclosure of proprietary information enables firms with gender-diverse boards to enhance and maintain their competitive edge and gain higher long-term returns. Using a matched sample of the United States-listed companies, we find that firms with gender-diverse boards, relative to similar firms with all-male boards, (1) are associated with higher adverse selection costs and (2) higher long-run stock returns when the firm faces high product market competition. Collectively, our results suggest that firms with gender-diverse boards, which initially experience higher adverse selection in a competitive environment, are rewarded with a net gain of about 10 percent of their stock price in three years. Our research contributes to the literature by highlighting the importance of board gender diversity in fostering the ethical redaction of proprietary information for proprietary cost-based motives as opposed to agency cost-based motives. Our findings have important implications for regulators, firms, and shareholders by identifying gender-diverse boards as an antecedent for the ethical redaction of proprietary information.","PeriodicalId":15279,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Business Ethics","volume":"10 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135634003","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract This paper examines the impact of three culturally endorsed leadership prototypes on bank lending corruption. We bring together studies that approach the corruption of bank lending officers from the perspective of a principal-agent problem and studies from the leadership literature, suggesting leadership as an alternative to contractual solutions to agency problems. We hypothesize, based on these views, that culturally endorsed leadership styles that improve (worsen) the leader-subordinate relationships have a negative (positive) effect on bank lending corruption. Using a sample of around 3,500 firms from 36 countries, we find that the prosocial leadership prototype and the nonautonomous leadership prototype do not matter, whereas the self-serving leadership prototype has a positive and statistically significant effect on bank lending corruption. These findings are robust to the inclusion of various control variables in the regressions, and alternative estimation approaches, including ones that account for endogeneity concerns. Furthermore, we find that the power of bank regulators and the age of the credit information sharing mechanism play a moderating role in the relationship between the self-serving leadership prototype and bank lending corruption.
{"title":"Corruption in Bank Lending: The Role of Culturally Endorsed Leadership Prototypes","authors":"Chrysovalantis Gaganis, Fotios Pasiouras, Menelaos Tasiou","doi":"10.1007/s10551-023-05546-2","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-023-05546-2","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This paper examines the impact of three culturally endorsed leadership prototypes on bank lending corruption. We bring together studies that approach the corruption of bank lending officers from the perspective of a principal-agent problem and studies from the leadership literature, suggesting leadership as an alternative to contractual solutions to agency problems. We hypothesize, based on these views, that culturally endorsed leadership styles that improve (worsen) the leader-subordinate relationships have a negative (positive) effect on bank lending corruption. Using a sample of around 3,500 firms from 36 countries, we find that the prosocial leadership prototype and the nonautonomous leadership prototype do not matter, whereas the self-serving leadership prototype has a positive and statistically significant effect on bank lending corruption. These findings are robust to the inclusion of various control variables in the regressions, and alternative estimation approaches, including ones that account for endogeneity concerns. Furthermore, we find that the power of bank regulators and the age of the credit information sharing mechanism play a moderating role in the relationship between the self-serving leadership prototype and bank lending corruption.","PeriodicalId":15279,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Business Ethics","volume":"231 ","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135870488","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-10-26DOI: 10.1007/s10551-023-05552-4
Atul Gupta, Alok Nemani, Kartik Raman
{"title":"Ethical Issues Around Share Repurchase Announcements: The Role of Social Capital","authors":"Atul Gupta, Alok Nemani, Kartik Raman","doi":"10.1007/s10551-023-05552-4","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-023-05552-4","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":15279,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Business Ethics","volume":"41 4-5","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134908685","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-10-25DOI: 10.1007/s10551-023-05547-1
In-Hye Kang, Amna Kirmani
Abstract Companies are increasingly engaging in corporate activism, defined as taking a public stance on controversial sociopolitical issues. Whereas prior research focuses on consumers’ brand perceptions, attitudes, and purchase behavior, we identify a novel consumer response to activism, unethical consumer behavior. Unethical behavior, such as lying or cheating a company, is prevalent and costly. Across five studies, we show that the effect of corporate activism on unethical behavior is moderated by consumers’ political ideology and mediated by desire for punishment. When the company’s activism stand is [incongruent/congruent] with the consumer’s political ideology, consumers experience [increased/decreased] desire to punish the company, thereby [increasing/decreasing] unethical behavior toward the company. More importantly, we identify two moderators of this process. The effect is attenuated when the company’s current stance is inconsistent with its political reputation and when the immorality of the unethical behavior is high.
{"title":"Lying and Cheating the Company: The Positive and Negative Effects of Corporate Activism on Unethical Consumer Behavior","authors":"In-Hye Kang, Amna Kirmani","doi":"10.1007/s10551-023-05547-1","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-023-05547-1","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Companies are increasingly engaging in corporate activism, defined as taking a public stance on controversial sociopolitical issues. Whereas prior research focuses on consumers’ brand perceptions, attitudes, and purchase behavior, we identify a novel consumer response to activism, unethical consumer behavior. Unethical behavior, such as lying or cheating a company, is prevalent and costly. Across five studies, we show that the effect of corporate activism on unethical behavior is moderated by consumers’ political ideology and mediated by desire for punishment. When the company’s activism stand is [incongruent/congruent] with the consumer’s political ideology, consumers experience [increased/decreased] desire to punish the company, thereby [increasing/decreasing] unethical behavior toward the company. More importantly, we identify two moderators of this process. The effect is attenuated when the company’s current stance is inconsistent with its political reputation and when the immorality of the unethical behavior is high.","PeriodicalId":15279,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Business Ethics","volume":"104 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135168919","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-10-24DOI: 10.1007/s10551-023-05549-z
Depeng Liu, Mo Chen, Isabelle Yi Ren, Xuhong Pang, Yapu Zhao
{"title":"How and When Leaders’ Perceptions of Team Politics Influence Justice Rule Adherence: A Moral Self-Regulation Perspective","authors":"Depeng Liu, Mo Chen, Isabelle Yi Ren, Xuhong Pang, Yapu Zhao","doi":"10.1007/s10551-023-05549-z","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-023-05549-z","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":15279,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Business Ethics","volume":"45 6","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135316137","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-10-19DOI: 10.1007/s10551-023-05544-4
Zheng Zhu, Xingwen Chen, Mengxi Yang, Wansi Chen
{"title":"Entitlement Versus Obligation: The Role of Attributed Motives in Subordinate Reactions to Leader Leniency","authors":"Zheng Zhu, Xingwen Chen, Mengxi Yang, Wansi Chen","doi":"10.1007/s10551-023-05544-4","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-023-05544-4","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":15279,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Business Ethics","volume":"67 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135729883","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-10-19DOI: 10.1007/s10551-023-05532-8
Liwei Shan, Albert Tsang, Xiaoxue Zhang
{"title":"Transporting Audit Quality Across Countries: Returnee CEOs and Audit Fees","authors":"Liwei Shan, Albert Tsang, Xiaoxue Zhang","doi":"10.1007/s10551-023-05532-8","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-023-05532-8","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":15279,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Business Ethics","volume":"15 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135778346","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-10-12DOI: 10.1007/s10551-023-05543-5
Armin Pircher Verdorfer, Frank Belschak, Andrea Bobbio
Abstract The last two decades have seen a mounting fascination with unethical and destructive forms of leadership. Yet, do we know what all encapsulates this “dark” side of leadership? Despite initial evidence that exploitation is a notable addition to the unethical leadership scene, our understanding of its distinctiveness as well as of how and why it exerts its negative effects is limited. We speak to this gap by testing the distinct mechanisms through which exploitative leadership—relative to the more popular counterpart, abusive supervision—affects followers. Borrowing from the aggression literature, we describe exploitative leadership and abusive supervision as varying forms of aggression that undermine followers’ satisfaction with the leader via altered experiences of their social exchange relationship. Our theoretical model proposes that abusive supervision, as an inherently interpersonal provocation, primarily implicates followers’ emotional experiences within the social exchange process. By contrast, given its inherent focus on self-interest, exploitative leadership is assumed to affect followers primarily through the cognitive understanding of the social exchange. Results from multiple studies using different samples, measures, and research designs provide general support for our predictions. In sum, the evidence emerging from our data shows that exploitative leadership is not a symptom of construct proliferation but rather, adds cumulative knowledge to the field of unethical and destructive leadership.
{"title":"Felt or Thought: Distinct Mechanisms Underlying Exploitative Leadership and Abusive Supervision","authors":"Armin Pircher Verdorfer, Frank Belschak, Andrea Bobbio","doi":"10.1007/s10551-023-05543-5","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-023-05543-5","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The last two decades have seen a mounting fascination with unethical and destructive forms of leadership. Yet, do we know what all encapsulates this “dark” side of leadership? Despite initial evidence that exploitation is a notable addition to the unethical leadership scene, our understanding of its distinctiveness as well as of how and why it exerts its negative effects is limited. We speak to this gap by testing the distinct mechanisms through which exploitative leadership—relative to the more popular counterpart, abusive supervision—affects followers. Borrowing from the aggression literature, we describe exploitative leadership and abusive supervision as varying forms of aggression that undermine followers’ satisfaction with the leader via altered experiences of their social exchange relationship. Our theoretical model proposes that abusive supervision, as an inherently interpersonal provocation, primarily implicates followers’ emotional experiences within the social exchange process. By contrast, given its inherent focus on self-interest, exploitative leadership is assumed to affect followers primarily through the cognitive understanding of the social exchange. Results from multiple studies using different samples, measures, and research designs provide general support for our predictions. In sum, the evidence emerging from our data shows that exploitative leadership is not a symptom of construct proliferation but rather, adds cumulative knowledge to the field of unethical and destructive leadership.","PeriodicalId":15279,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Business Ethics","volume":"47 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135969562","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-10-09DOI: 10.1007/s10551-023-05537-3
Malte Jauch
{"title":"Structural Injustice and Workers’ Rights, by Virginia Mantouvalou","authors":"Malte Jauch","doi":"10.1007/s10551-023-05537-3","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-023-05537-3","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":15279,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Business Ethics","volume":"11 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135093941","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-10-09DOI: 10.1007/s10551-023-05545-3
Shujie Zhang, Shuang Ren, Guiyao Tang
{"title":"Correction to: From Passive to Active: The Positive Spillover of Required Employee Green Behavior on Green Advocacy","authors":"Shujie Zhang, Shuang Ren, Guiyao Tang","doi":"10.1007/s10551-023-05545-3","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-023-05545-3","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":15279,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Business Ethics","volume":"1146 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135141329","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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