V3rified:去中心化可验证计算的启示与非启示机制

Tiantian Gong, Aniket Kate, Alexandros Psomas, Athina Terzoglou
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引用次数: 0

摘要

在 Web3 时代,去中心化技术已成为新数字范式的基石。在去中心化区块链架构的支持下,Web3 领域旨在使网络的各个方面民主化。从数据共享到学习模式,外包计算是一种既定的普遍做法。可验证计算使这种做法变得值得信赖,客户/用户现在可以高效地验证计算的完整性。随着可验证计算被考虑用于 Web3 空间的应用,去中心化对于系统可靠性至关重要,它可以确保没有任何单一实体可以压制客户端。但与此同时,去中心化需要与效率保持平衡:客户希望尽快完成计算。受这些问题的启发,我们研究了将计算任务外包给战略性合理解决方案提供商时,去中心化与效率之间的权衡。具体来说,我们研究了客户在以下两种情况下的权衡:(1)启示机制,即拍卖,解决方案提供者为在特定截止日期前完成任务而竞价,然后客户选择由哪些提供者来完成任务以及他们将获得多少奖励;(2)简单的非启示机制,即客户承诺将使用一组规则来将特定时间的解决方案映射为奖励,然后由解决方案提供者决定是否要完成任务。在我们的模型中,我们完整地描述了启示机制和非启示机制的威力和局限性。
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V3rified: Revelation vs Non-Revelation Mechanisms for Decentralized Verifiable Computation
In the era of Web3, decentralized technologies have emerged as the cornerstone of a new digital paradigm. Backed by a decentralized blockchain architecture, the Web3 space aims to democratize all aspects of the web. From data-sharing to learning models, outsourcing computation is an established, prevalent practice. Verifiable computation makes this practice trustworthy as clients/users can now efficiently validate the integrity of a computation. As verifiable computation gets considered for applications in the Web3 space, decentralization is crucial for system reliability, ensuring that no single entity can suppress clients. At the same time, however, decentralization needs to be balanced with efficiency: clients want their computations done as quickly as possible. Motivated by these issues, we study the trade-off between decentralization and efficiency when outsourcing computational tasks to strategic, rational solution providers. Specifically, we examine this trade-off when the client employs (1) revelation mechanisms, i.e. auctions, where solution providers bid their desired reward for completing the task by a specific deadline and then the client selects which of them will do the task and how much they will be rewarded, and (2) simple, non-revelation mechanisms, where the client commits to the set of rules she will use to map solutions at specific times to rewards and then solution providers decide whether they want to do the task or not. We completely characterize the power and limitations of revelation and non-revelation mechanisms in our model.
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