{"title":"V3rified:去中心化可验证计算的启示与非启示机制","authors":"Tiantian Gong, Aniket Kate, Alexandros Psomas, Athina Terzoglou","doi":"arxiv-2408.07177","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"In the era of Web3, decentralized technologies have emerged as the\ncornerstone of a new digital paradigm. Backed by a decentralized blockchain\narchitecture, the Web3 space aims to democratize all aspects of the web. From\ndata-sharing to learning models, outsourcing computation is an established,\nprevalent practice. Verifiable computation makes this practice trustworthy as\nclients/users can now efficiently validate the integrity of a computation. As\nverifiable computation gets considered for applications in the Web3 space,\ndecentralization is crucial for system reliability, ensuring that no single\nentity can suppress clients. At the same time, however, decentralization needs\nto be balanced with efficiency: clients want their computations done as quickly\nas possible. Motivated by these issues, we study the trade-off between decentralization\nand efficiency when outsourcing computational tasks to strategic, rational\nsolution providers. Specifically, we examine this trade-off when the client\nemploys (1) revelation mechanisms, i.e. auctions, where solution providers bid\ntheir desired reward for completing the task by a specific deadline and then\nthe client selects which of them will do the task and how much they will be\nrewarded, and (2) simple, non-revelation mechanisms, where the client commits\nto the set of rules she will use to map solutions at specific times to rewards\nand then solution providers decide whether they want to do the task or not. We\ncompletely characterize the power and limitations of revelation and\nnon-revelation mechanisms in our model.","PeriodicalId":501316,"journal":{"name":"arXiv - CS - Computer Science and Game Theory","volume":"29 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2024-08-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"V3rified: Revelation vs Non-Revelation Mechanisms for Decentralized Verifiable Computation\",\"authors\":\"Tiantian Gong, Aniket Kate, Alexandros Psomas, Athina Terzoglou\",\"doi\":\"arxiv-2408.07177\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"In the era of Web3, decentralized technologies have emerged as the\\ncornerstone of a new digital paradigm. Backed by a decentralized blockchain\\narchitecture, the Web3 space aims to democratize all aspects of the web. From\\ndata-sharing to learning models, outsourcing computation is an established,\\nprevalent practice. Verifiable computation makes this practice trustworthy as\\nclients/users can now efficiently validate the integrity of a computation. As\\nverifiable computation gets considered for applications in the Web3 space,\\ndecentralization is crucial for system reliability, ensuring that no single\\nentity can suppress clients. At the same time, however, decentralization needs\\nto be balanced with efficiency: clients want their computations done as quickly\\nas possible. Motivated by these issues, we study the trade-off between decentralization\\nand efficiency when outsourcing computational tasks to strategic, rational\\nsolution providers. Specifically, we examine this trade-off when the client\\nemploys (1) revelation mechanisms, i.e. auctions, where solution providers bid\\ntheir desired reward for completing the task by a specific deadline and then\\nthe client selects which of them will do the task and how much they will be\\nrewarded, and (2) simple, non-revelation mechanisms, where the client commits\\nto the set of rules she will use to map solutions at specific times to rewards\\nand then solution providers decide whether they want to do the task or not. We\\ncompletely characterize the power and limitations of revelation and\\nnon-revelation mechanisms in our model.\",\"PeriodicalId\":501316,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"arXiv - CS - Computer Science and Game Theory\",\"volume\":\"29 1\",\"pages\":\"\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2024-08-13\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"arXiv - CS - Computer Science and Game Theory\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/arxiv-2408.07177\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"arXiv - CS - Computer Science and Game Theory","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/arxiv-2408.07177","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
V3rified: Revelation vs Non-Revelation Mechanisms for Decentralized Verifiable Computation
In the era of Web3, decentralized technologies have emerged as the
cornerstone of a new digital paradigm. Backed by a decentralized blockchain
architecture, the Web3 space aims to democratize all aspects of the web. From
data-sharing to learning models, outsourcing computation is an established,
prevalent practice. Verifiable computation makes this practice trustworthy as
clients/users can now efficiently validate the integrity of a computation. As
verifiable computation gets considered for applications in the Web3 space,
decentralization is crucial for system reliability, ensuring that no single
entity can suppress clients. At the same time, however, decentralization needs
to be balanced with efficiency: clients want their computations done as quickly
as possible. Motivated by these issues, we study the trade-off between decentralization
and efficiency when outsourcing computational tasks to strategic, rational
solution providers. Specifically, we examine this trade-off when the client
employs (1) revelation mechanisms, i.e. auctions, where solution providers bid
their desired reward for completing the task by a specific deadline and then
the client selects which of them will do the task and how much they will be
rewarded, and (2) simple, non-revelation mechanisms, where the client commits
to the set of rules she will use to map solutions at specific times to rewards
and then solution providers decide whether they want to do the task or not. We
completely characterize the power and limitations of revelation and
non-revelation mechanisms in our model.