以性状为中心的自然选择定义与以适应性为中心的自然选择定义

IF 1.7 1区 哲学 Q1 HISTORY & PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE Biology & Philosophy Pub Date : 2024-09-10 DOI:10.1007/s10539-024-09965-x
Ciprian Jeler
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引用次数: 0

摘要

在过去的几十年里,以 "适合度 "为中心的自然选择定义和以 "性状 "为中心的自然选择定义在哲学文献中并存。前者认为自然选择的定义取决于适存差异的存在,其中 "适存 "被理解为与实际繁殖成功不同的属性。另一方面,以性状为中心的定义则认为,选择的定义取决于性状(不一定是适应性)与繁殖成功之间的因果关系。有趣的是,这些定义的支持者很少--通常只是粗略地--批判性地讨论另一阵营的观点。因此,文献中缺乏对这两种定义的批判性比较。本文通过讨论这两种定义中哪一种更合适来填补这一空白。我首先论证了以适应性为中心的定义难以适应相关性状的对立选择情况,而以性状为中心的观点则不存在此类问题。为此,我重温了埃利奥特-索伯(Elliott Sober)提出的一个古老论点,并证明以适配性为中心的阵营最近试图回应索伯的指控并不成功。然后,我表明,以体质为中心的观点在处理另一种不同类型的情况(即单一性状上的对立选择)时也会遇到问题;另一方面,以性状为中心的观点可以容纳这种情况,如果我们像我在这里提议的那样,明确指出在这些观点中占据重要地位的因果关系被理解为一种促成因果关系的话。这些论点表明,以性状为中心的选择定义比以适合度为中心的定义更可取。
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Trait-centered vs. fitness-centered definitions of natural selection

During the past few decades, fitness-centered and trait-centered definitions of natural selection have coexisted in the philosophical literature. The former render natural selection definitionally dependent on the presence of fitness differences, where “fitness” is understood as a distinct property from actual reproductive success. On the other hand, trait-centered definitions see selection as definitionally dependent on the presence of a causal relation between a trait (not necessarily fitness) and reproductive success. Interestingly, endorsers of these definitions have rarely–and usually only cursorily–critically engaged the views of the other camp. Therefore, a critical comparison of the two kinds of definitions is lacking in the literature. This paper starts filling this void by opening a discussion about which of the two kinds of definition is more appropriate. I first argue that fitness-centered definitions have difficulties in accommodating cases of opposing selection on correlated traits, whereas trait-centered views have no such problems. To do so, I revisit an old argument put forth by Elliott Sober and I show that recent attempts from the fitness-centered camp to reply to Sober’s charge are unsuccessful. I then show that fitness-centered views also have problems with a different type of case, namely opposing selection on a single trait; trait-centered views, on the other hand, may accommodate such cases if, as I propose here, we specify that the causal relation that figures prominently in them is understood as a relation of contributing causation. These arguments suggest that trait-centered definitions of selection are preferable to fitness-centered ones.

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来源期刊
Biology & Philosophy
Biology & Philosophy 管理科学-科学史与科学哲学
CiteScore
4.10
自引率
8.00%
发文量
48
审稿时长
>12 weeks
期刊介绍: Recent decades have witnessed fascinating and controversial advances in the biological sciences. This journal answers the need for meta-theoretical analysis, both about the very nature of biology, as well as about its social implications. Biology and Philosophy is aimed at a broad readership, drawn from both the sciences and the humanities. The journal subscribes to no specific school of biology, nor of philosophy, and publishes work from authors of all persuasions and all disciplines. The editorial board reflects this attitude in its composition and its world-wide membership. Each issue of Biology and Philosophy carries one or more discussions or comparative reviews, permitting the in-depth study of important works and topics.
期刊最新文献
Environmental interference Trait-centered vs. fitness-centered definitions of natural selection Exploration and perspectival modelling with model organisms: developmental biology as a case study The evolution of reproductive characters: an organismal-relational approach Different kinds of data: samples and the relational framework
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