四种生产者延伸责任回收制度下电子制造商的可回收水平和数量决策

IF 6.7 1区 工程技术 Q1 COMPUTER SCIENCE, INTERDISCIPLINARY APPLICATIONS Computers & Industrial Engineering Pub Date : 2024-10-09 DOI:10.1016/j.cie.2024.110617
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引用次数: 0

摘要

一些电子产品制造商和团体已经退出或计划退出规范其对报废产品(EoL)责任的默认回收系统。生产者延伸责任(EPR)框架中的立法菜单允许制造商自由选择回收率或成本模式。在本文中,我们模拟了四种潜在的回收体系,研究了具有品牌差异的两家公司应如何选择立法模式。我们分析了回收率和品牌差异对企业均衡决策的影响,确定了企业离开默认计划的条件,并进一步比较了所有回收体系的经济和环境结果。我们发现,只有成本制度会产生搭便车的机会,因为目前按市场份额分配成本的机制并不考虑成员对环境的贡献。我们还发现,混合系统(包括费率-成本系统和成本-费率系统)比基本系统(包括费率和成本系统)提供了更高的设计激励,这与传统观点不同,传统观点认为费率系统具有更高的设计激励。最后,我们的研究结果表明,由于差异化制造商和立法模式之间的完美匹配,费率-成本体系具有更好的经济和环境效益。
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Recyclability level and quantity decisions of electronic manufacturers under four recycling systems of extended producer responsibility
Some electronic manufacturers and groups have left or are planning to leave the default recycling system that regulates their responsibilities for end-of-life (EoL) products. A legislative menu in the extended producer responsibility (EPR) framework allows manufacturers to choose the rate or cost model freely. In this paper, we model four potential recycling systems to study how two firms with brand differentiation should choose legislative models. We analyze the effect of take-back rate and brand differentiation on the firms’ equilibrium decisions, identify the condition in which firms leave the default plan, and further compare economic and environmental outcomes among all recycling systems. We find that only the cost system creates free-riding avenues because the current cost allocation mechanism by market shares does not concern the environmental contributions of members. We also find that the hybrid system (which includes rate-cost and cost-rate systems) provides higher design incentives than the basic case (which includes rate and cost systems), contrasting to the conventional wisdom in which the rate system has superior design incentives. Finally, our results demonstrate that the rate-cost system performs better economic and environmental benefits due to the perfect match between differentiated manufacturers and legislative models.
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来源期刊
Computers & Industrial Engineering
Computers & Industrial Engineering 工程技术-工程:工业
CiteScore
12.70
自引率
12.70%
发文量
794
审稿时长
10.6 months
期刊介绍: Computers & Industrial Engineering (CAIE) is dedicated to researchers, educators, and practitioners in industrial engineering and related fields. Pioneering the integration of computers in research, education, and practice, industrial engineering has evolved to make computers and electronic communication integral to its domain. CAIE publishes original contributions focusing on the development of novel computerized methodologies to address industrial engineering problems. It also highlights the applications of these methodologies to issues within the broader industrial engineering and associated communities. The journal actively encourages submissions that push the boundaries of fundamental theories and concepts in industrial engineering techniques.
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