{"title":"四种生产者延伸责任回收制度下电子制造商的可回收水平和数量决策","authors":"","doi":"10.1016/j.cie.2024.110617","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Some electronic manufacturers and groups have left or are planning to leave the default recycling system that regulates their responsibilities for end-of-life (EoL) products. A legislative menu in the extended producer responsibility (EPR) framework allows manufacturers to choose the rate or cost model freely. In this paper, we model four potential recycling systems to study how two firms with brand differentiation should choose legislative models. We analyze the effect of take-back rate and brand differentiation on the firms’ equilibrium decisions, identify the condition in which firms leave the default plan, and further compare economic and environmental outcomes among all recycling systems. We find that only the cost system creates free-riding avenues because the current cost allocation mechanism by market shares does not concern the environmental contributions of members. We also find that the hybrid system (which includes rate-cost and cost-rate systems) provides higher design incentives than the basic case (which includes rate and cost systems), contrasting to the conventional wisdom in which the rate system has superior design incentives. Finally, our results demonstrate that the rate-cost system performs better economic and environmental benefits due to the perfect match between differentiated manufacturers and legislative models.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":55220,"journal":{"name":"Computers & Industrial Engineering","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":6.7000,"publicationDate":"2024-10-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Recyclability level and quantity decisions of electronic manufacturers under four recycling systems of extended producer responsibility\",\"authors\":\"\",\"doi\":\"10.1016/j.cie.2024.110617\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<div><div>Some electronic manufacturers and groups have left or are planning to leave the default recycling system that regulates their responsibilities for end-of-life (EoL) products. A legislative menu in the extended producer responsibility (EPR) framework allows manufacturers to choose the rate or cost model freely. In this paper, we model four potential recycling systems to study how two firms with brand differentiation should choose legislative models. We analyze the effect of take-back rate and brand differentiation on the firms’ equilibrium decisions, identify the condition in which firms leave the default plan, and further compare economic and environmental outcomes among all recycling systems. We find that only the cost system creates free-riding avenues because the current cost allocation mechanism by market shares does not concern the environmental contributions of members. We also find that the hybrid system (which includes rate-cost and cost-rate systems) provides higher design incentives than the basic case (which includes rate and cost systems), contrasting to the conventional wisdom in which the rate system has superior design incentives. Finally, our results demonstrate that the rate-cost system performs better economic and environmental benefits due to the perfect match between differentiated manufacturers and legislative models.</div></div>\",\"PeriodicalId\":55220,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Computers & Industrial Engineering\",\"volume\":null,\"pages\":null},\"PeriodicalIF\":6.7000,\"publicationDate\":\"2024-10-09\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Computers & Industrial Engineering\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"5\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0360835224007393\",\"RegionNum\":1,\"RegionCategory\":\"工程技术\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q1\",\"JCRName\":\"COMPUTER SCIENCE, INTERDISCIPLINARY APPLICATIONS\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Computers & Industrial Engineering","FirstCategoryId":"5","ListUrlMain":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0360835224007393","RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"工程技术","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"COMPUTER SCIENCE, INTERDISCIPLINARY APPLICATIONS","Score":null,"Total":0}
Recyclability level and quantity decisions of electronic manufacturers under four recycling systems of extended producer responsibility
Some electronic manufacturers and groups have left or are planning to leave the default recycling system that regulates their responsibilities for end-of-life (EoL) products. A legislative menu in the extended producer responsibility (EPR) framework allows manufacturers to choose the rate or cost model freely. In this paper, we model four potential recycling systems to study how two firms with brand differentiation should choose legislative models. We analyze the effect of take-back rate and brand differentiation on the firms’ equilibrium decisions, identify the condition in which firms leave the default plan, and further compare economic and environmental outcomes among all recycling systems. We find that only the cost system creates free-riding avenues because the current cost allocation mechanism by market shares does not concern the environmental contributions of members. We also find that the hybrid system (which includes rate-cost and cost-rate systems) provides higher design incentives than the basic case (which includes rate and cost systems), contrasting to the conventional wisdom in which the rate system has superior design incentives. Finally, our results demonstrate that the rate-cost system performs better economic and environmental benefits due to the perfect match between differentiated manufacturers and legislative models.
期刊介绍:
Computers & Industrial Engineering (CAIE) is dedicated to researchers, educators, and practitioners in industrial engineering and related fields. Pioneering the integration of computers in research, education, and practice, industrial engineering has evolved to make computers and electronic communication integral to its domain. CAIE publishes original contributions focusing on the development of novel computerized methodologies to address industrial engineering problems. It also highlights the applications of these methodologies to issues within the broader industrial engineering and associated communities. The journal actively encourages submissions that push the boundaries of fundamental theories and concepts in industrial engineering techniques.