On the Kantian distinction between Ethics and Right: Linearity and Mediation

The aim of this paper is to provide an original account of the distinction between the spheres of  Sitten  that goes beyond the traditional one based on the nature of incentives, since this underestimates some of their characteristics. First, the paper identifies in  obligatio  a common source between Ethics and Right. Then, it explores how in the  Metaphysics of Morals  the  connection  between law and incentive constitutes a more relevant criterion to distinguish ethical lawgiving from juridical lawgiving. Specifically, it demonstrates that such connection: (a) to be ethical should be  linear , understood as a necessary self-determined process of connecting law to incentive; (b) to be juridical should be  mediated , namely it comprises an inclusive disjunction between two modalities of connecting law to incentive: a non-necessary linear and a divergent one. It concludes by exploring the implications of such perspective on the notions of internalisation and externalisation associated to each lawgiving.