{"title":"武器的呼唤:金正恩与战术炸弹","authors":"A. Panda","doi":"10.1080/0163660X.2021.1969089","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Having declared his nuclear deterrent “complete” following the testing of three intercontinental-range ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and a thermonuclear device in 2017, North Korean leader Kim Jong Un has been overseeing a period of qualitative nuclear modernization and quantitative force expansion. North Korea’s nuclear forces continued to grow during the short-lived period of diplomacy with South Korea and the United States in 2018 and 2019. In January 2021, in reviewing the accomplishments of the five-year period following North Korea’s Seventh Party Congress in 2016, Kim alluded to “tactical nuclear weapons” among other significant accomplishments concerning his nuclear forces during that era. This was a notable statement. Traditionally, North Korea has referred to its nuclear capabilities euphemistically as “strategic” weapons. When references to tactical nuclear weapons (TNW) would appear in state media, they would reference US nuclear capabilities; North Korea has never acknowledged that the United States withdrew its last nuclear weapons from the Korean Peninsula in December 1991. Does Kim Jong Un intend to deploy tactical nuclear weapons? If so, how might these weapons manifest in the country’s existing nuclear forces and what challenges may arise for the United States and South Korea? This article examines North Korean claims to date concerning TNWs, explores the practical implications of these capabilities for Pyongyang’s strategy, and argues that these weapons are likely to be a component of the country’s growing nuclear force.","PeriodicalId":46957,"journal":{"name":"Washington Quarterly","volume":"44 1","pages":"7 - 24"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2000,"publicationDate":"2021-07-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"2","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"A Call to Arms: Kim Jong Un and the Tactical Bomb\",\"authors\":\"A. Panda\",\"doi\":\"10.1080/0163660X.2021.1969089\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Having declared his nuclear deterrent “complete” following the testing of three intercontinental-range ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and a thermonuclear device in 2017, North Korean leader Kim Jong Un has been overseeing a period of qualitative nuclear modernization and quantitative force expansion. North Korea’s nuclear forces continued to grow during the short-lived period of diplomacy with South Korea and the United States in 2018 and 2019. In January 2021, in reviewing the accomplishments of the five-year period following North Korea’s Seventh Party Congress in 2016, Kim alluded to “tactical nuclear weapons” among other significant accomplishments concerning his nuclear forces during that era. This was a notable statement. Traditionally, North Korea has referred to its nuclear capabilities euphemistically as “strategic” weapons. When references to tactical nuclear weapons (TNW) would appear in state media, they would reference US nuclear capabilities; North Korea has never acknowledged that the United States withdrew its last nuclear weapons from the Korean Peninsula in December 1991. Does Kim Jong Un intend to deploy tactical nuclear weapons? If so, how might these weapons manifest in the country’s existing nuclear forces and what challenges may arise for the United States and South Korea? This article examines North Korean claims to date concerning TNWs, explores the practical implications of these capabilities for Pyongyang’s strategy, and argues that these weapons are likely to be a component of the country’s growing nuclear force.\",\"PeriodicalId\":46957,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Washington Quarterly\",\"volume\":\"44 1\",\"pages\":\"7 - 24\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":1.2000,\"publicationDate\":\"2021-07-03\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"2\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Washington Quarterly\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"90\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2021.1969089\",\"RegionNum\":3,\"RegionCategory\":\"社会学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q2\",\"JCRName\":\"INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Washington Quarterly","FirstCategoryId":"90","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2021.1969089","RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q2","JCRName":"INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS","Score":null,"Total":0}
Having declared his nuclear deterrent “complete” following the testing of three intercontinental-range ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and a thermonuclear device in 2017, North Korean leader Kim Jong Un has been overseeing a period of qualitative nuclear modernization and quantitative force expansion. North Korea’s nuclear forces continued to grow during the short-lived period of diplomacy with South Korea and the United States in 2018 and 2019. In January 2021, in reviewing the accomplishments of the five-year period following North Korea’s Seventh Party Congress in 2016, Kim alluded to “tactical nuclear weapons” among other significant accomplishments concerning his nuclear forces during that era. This was a notable statement. Traditionally, North Korea has referred to its nuclear capabilities euphemistically as “strategic” weapons. When references to tactical nuclear weapons (TNW) would appear in state media, they would reference US nuclear capabilities; North Korea has never acknowledged that the United States withdrew its last nuclear weapons from the Korean Peninsula in December 1991. Does Kim Jong Un intend to deploy tactical nuclear weapons? If so, how might these weapons manifest in the country’s existing nuclear forces and what challenges may arise for the United States and South Korea? This article examines North Korean claims to date concerning TNWs, explores the practical implications of these capabilities for Pyongyang’s strategy, and argues that these weapons are likely to be a component of the country’s growing nuclear force.
期刊介绍:
The Washington Quarterly (TWQ) is a journal of global affairs that analyzes strategic security challenges, changes, and their public policy implications. TWQ is published out of one of the world"s preeminent international policy institutions, the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), and addresses topics such as: •The U.S. role in the world •Emerging great powers: Europe, China, Russia, India, and Japan •Regional issues and flashpoints, particularly in the Middle East and Asia •Weapons of mass destruction proliferation and missile defenses •Global perspectives to reduce terrorism Contributors are drawn from outside as well as inside the United States and reflect diverse political, regional, and professional perspectives.