公正与可行性

Q4 Social Sciences IPPR Progressive Review Pub Date : 2023-08-10 DOI:10.1111/newe.12354
Louise Haagh
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Meanwhile, global corporates hiking up inflation on the back of war and global shortages are listing huge windfalls.4 The government response in the form of windfall taxes has been too accommodating (in the UK, 90 per cent are effectively returned via subsidies), and neither this measure nor government schemes for households have been made permanent.5 The problem of establishing grounds and measures for government to subsidise household budgets encapsulates a dissonance between ideal and reality that pertains to the case for basic income as well. We need not only a new social contract, but also a new social construct, in which concerns of justice inform the design of institutions and the economy follows.</p><p>When questions about the justification for and feasibility of basic income are set together, this can generate productive insights about wider reasons and conditions for basic income, which test more theoretical arguments. In this paper, rather than looking at principled arguments in terms of fairer distribution, I focus on the institutional and democratic innovation within the political economy that a basic income can contribute by inculcating the idea and form of developmental justice.</p><p>The modern classical defence of basic income by Philippe Van Parijs focusses on the scope for free lifestyle choices involving personally set trade-offs between employment, care and leisure in a globalised economy, in which basic income as a form of distributive justice secures freedom.6 While debates have begun to shift towards anti-poverty, health, personal development, and choice of work, the notion that – with basic income – individuals can attain control over their lives and wellbeing remains quite influential.7 However, looking at freedom or wellbeing in terms of individual time-profile and activity choices may be too transactional – and the more we take this approach, the more dominant the market already governing our lives becomes.</p><p>The right to retire goes beyond our current idea of retirement and is defined as living well at any age and having the right to control our tempo – our own and in fellowship with others. 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However, by taking people partially out of structural injustice basic income – properly understood as a stable institution among others - sends a signal of desert to structural justice, and leads us on a path to define what this is and requires within other institutions besides. ‘Living like gentlemen’ was complemented in Marshall with the idea of occupational ‘second chances’. He of course had in mind a later escape from the early damning effect of the tiered education system in Britain. The concept is broader. Real occupational chances (and second chances) must be part of what structural justice requires: that human beings cannot be displaced from their homes or from occupying productive life journeys of their choosing within a better organised economy.</p><p>In this sense the idea of basic income as a stable institution is part of envisioning structural justice, but not itself the whole path. The idea of basic income as part of envisioning a stable state of human development allows us to look from the individual perspective upwards to what structural justice entails.</p><p>There are many other examples of how institutions currently spend money inefficiently.15 The impact of precarious contracting on public costs can be illustrated in the care sector, which has been beset by chronic staff shortages, which in turn drive up public health costs.16 Weak regulation is also costly. A case in point is the very significant role and expansion of housing subsidies in Britain during the period after housing policy liberalisation of the 1980s.17 The contemporary structural injustice of the benefit system extends to those working and earning now. 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引用次数: 0

摘要

对基本收入- -个别、每月、无条件和在人口中普遍和永久地支付的现金补助金- -的分析一直受到对该计划的理由和执行的关切的影响,这些关切在实际情况中不可避免地相互矛盾。因此,本文首先考察了当前的约束背景,然后支持基本收入与分配替代方案的发展正义案例,最后强调了与屈服于现行福利规范和危机相关的实施辩论中的风险。然而,尽管《经济学人》认为公共‘客户’付出更多却得到更少,而且在英国,在紧缩政策之后,“原本慷慨的法律援助变得吝啬;在职福利下降;(和)警察解决的犯罪更少”,而不是强调代际之间的分配和税收权衡(见下面的“可行性”部分),我将认为更深层次的问题是利害攸关的,与选择基于跟随市场的发展治理有关。“缩水式通货膨胀”——以更少的钱支付更多的钱(我们可以补充说,工作更多)——已经深入到当代私营和公共经济的运作中。与此同时,在战争和全球物资短缺的背景下,全球企业推高了通胀,列出了巨额意外之财政府以暴利税的形式做出的回应过于宽松(在英国,90%的暴利税实际上是通过补贴返还的),而且这一措施和政府针对家庭的计划都没有长久化为政府补贴家庭预算建立理由和措施的问题,体现了理想与现实之间的不协调,这也适用于基本收入的情况。我们不仅需要一种新的社会契约,而且需要一种新的社会结构,在这种社会结构中,对正义的关注影响着制度的设计和经济的发展。当有关基本收入的合理性和可行性的问题被放在一起时,这可以产生关于基本收入的更广泛的原因和条件的富有成效的见解,从而检验更多的理论论点。在本文中,我并没有着眼于更公平分配方面的原则性论点,而是将重点放在政治经济学中的制度和民主创新上,即基本收入可以通过灌输发展正义的理念和形式来做出贡献。菲利普·范·帕里斯(Philippe Van Parijs)对基本收入的现代经典辩护侧重于自由生活方式选择的范围,包括在全球化经济中个人设定就业、护理和休闲之间的权衡,在这种情况下,基本收入作为一种分配正义的形式确保了自由虽然辩论已经开始转向反贫困、健康、个人发展和工作选择,但有了基本收入,个人可以控制自己的生活和幸福的观念仍然相当有影响力然而,从个人时间分布和活动选择的角度来看待自由或幸福可能过于交易化——我们越采用这种方法,已经支配我们生活的市场就越占主导地位。退休的权利超越了我们目前对退休的概念,它被定义为在任何年龄都能生活得很好,并有权控制我们的节奏——我们自己的节奏,以及与他人的节奏。这项权利为一个更稳定的公共服务部门带来了希望,也是工会自成立以来一直为之奋斗的东西。实验研究还表明,这种形式的控制允许更深入的思考,增强人的动机和功能获得或改变稳定职业和控制时间的能力符合战后英国提出的从未真正实现的平等观念,与t.h.马歇尔在优质服务和优质生活方式方面的公民观念有关,所有人都能“像绅士一样生活”如今,利害攸关的不仅是工作时间,还有工作量,以及抵御人际竞争的侵蚀力量。原则上,基本收入是一种防止这种形式的结构性不公正的制度。(我认为)创造结构正义所要求的是不够的。然而,通过将人们部分地从结构性不公正中解救出来,基本收入——在其他制度中被恰当地理解为一种稳定的制度——向结构性公正发出了一个“沙漠”的信号,并引导我们走上一条定义这是什么以及在其他制度中需要什么的道路。在马歇尔,“像绅士一样生活”被职业“第二次机会”的理念所补充。当然,他想到的是后来从英国分层教育体系的早期恶果中逃脱出来。这个概念更广泛。真正的职业机会(以及第二次机会)必须是结构正义所要求的一部分:在一个组织更完善的经济体中,人类不能被迫离开家园,也不能被迫从事自己选择的生产性生活旅程。 从这个意义上说,基本收入作为一种稳定制度的想法是设想结构性正义的一部分,但它本身并不是整个道路。基本收入作为人类发展稳定状态设想的一部分,使我们能够从个人的角度向上看结构正义需要什么。还有许多其他的例子说明目前的机构是如何低效地花钱的16 .不稳定的合同对公共费用的影响可以从护理部门得到说明,该部门长期受到工作人员短缺的困扰,这反过来又推高了公共保健费用监管不力的代价也很高。一个恰当的例子是,在20世纪80年代住房政策自由化之后的一段时间里,住房补贴在英国发挥了非常重要的作用并不断扩大当代福利制度的结构性不公正延伸到了那些现在工作和挣钱的人身上。当人们不得不花费辛苦挣来的积蓄来满足他们的需求,直到他们完全破产,他们才能获得收入支持(以及制裁的威胁),这种情况也是对发展正义的一种冒犯基本收入的关键是不受两次惩罚的权利,即不受不幸的惩罚和不受不幸的惩罚,不幸会把暂时的坏运气变成永久的状态。如上所述,为基本收入辩护的正确理由不是它将收入重新分配给贫困人口,而是它恢复了公民的基本独立性,并减弱了目前造成发展不公正的结构性力量。最近在世界范围内对部分基本收入的实验和对经济安全来源的其他研究毫无疑问地表明了经济稳定的激励作用然而,基本安全的激励作用从来都是毋庸置疑的:它怎么可能违背公认的观点,即企业精神受益于有限的责任和稳定的税收?这场辩论需要进一步深入,准确地考虑政治经济、共享资金和权利之间的关系。在同样的背景下,将基本收入纯粹浪漫化为一种反贫困工具(更不用说一种充分的工具了)的风险在于,它可能成为倡导加强全球一体化的国际发展资助者的一种简单解决方案。在某种程度上,这已经成为现实,因为国际货币基金组织(IMF)最近提议通过简化福利制度来削减印度政府的开支,同时认为对失业人员的制裁应该在富裕国家继续实施,因为这些国家有行政能力来监管贫困人口。根据马丁·沃尔夫(Martin Wolf)的说法,在最近的一个土地税案例中,大大小小的土地所有者几乎没有或根本没有为他们的土地创造价值,作为征税的理由然而,我们能平等地说,所有的土地所有者都不配拥有他们的土地(或建筑)吗?另一方面,沃尔夫也提出了对土地征税的理由,因为它(比对流动资本征税)更容易做到。
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Justice and feasibility

Analysis of basic income – a cash grant paid individually, monthly, unconditionally and universally in a population, and permanently – has been shaped by concerns about the grounds for and the implementation of the scheme that inevitably come up against each other in practical terms. This paper accordingly first examines the present constrained context, then champions a developmental justice case for basic income against distributive alternatives, and finally highlights risks in implementation debates linked with bending to prevailing welfare norms and crises.

However, while The Economist got it right when arguing that public ‘customers’ get less for more cost, and that in Britain, following austerity, “[o]nce-generous legal aid became miserly; in-work benefits fell; [and the] police solved fewer crimes”, rather than emphasising distributive and tax trade-offs between generations (see the ‘Feasibility’ section below), I will argue that deeper issues are at stake, linked with choice of development governance based on following the market.3 ‘Shrinkflation’ – paying (and, we might add, working) more for less – has become embedded in the workings of contemporary private and public economies. Meanwhile, global corporates hiking up inflation on the back of war and global shortages are listing huge windfalls.4 The government response in the form of windfall taxes has been too accommodating (in the UK, 90 per cent are effectively returned via subsidies), and neither this measure nor government schemes for households have been made permanent.5 The problem of establishing grounds and measures for government to subsidise household budgets encapsulates a dissonance between ideal and reality that pertains to the case for basic income as well. We need not only a new social contract, but also a new social construct, in which concerns of justice inform the design of institutions and the economy follows.

When questions about the justification for and feasibility of basic income are set together, this can generate productive insights about wider reasons and conditions for basic income, which test more theoretical arguments. In this paper, rather than looking at principled arguments in terms of fairer distribution, I focus on the institutional and democratic innovation within the political economy that a basic income can contribute by inculcating the idea and form of developmental justice.

The modern classical defence of basic income by Philippe Van Parijs focusses on the scope for free lifestyle choices involving personally set trade-offs between employment, care and leisure in a globalised economy, in which basic income as a form of distributive justice secures freedom.6 While debates have begun to shift towards anti-poverty, health, personal development, and choice of work, the notion that – with basic income – individuals can attain control over their lives and wellbeing remains quite influential.7 However, looking at freedom or wellbeing in terms of individual time-profile and activity choices may be too transactional – and the more we take this approach, the more dominant the market already governing our lives becomes.

The right to retire goes beyond our current idea of retirement and is defined as living well at any age and having the right to control our tempo – our own and in fellowship with others. This right holds out the hope for a more stable public services sector and is something that labour unions have fought for since their inception. Experimental studies also suggest that this form of control allows more deep thought, enhancing human motivation and function.10 The ability to attain or change stable occupations and control of time accords with post-war British-drawn ideas of equality that were never really implemented, linked with T. H. Marshall's notion of citizenship in terms of quality services and quality lifestyles, for all to be able “to live like gentlemen”.11 At stake today is not just working hours but also workload, and standing up to the eroding forces of interpersonal competition.

Basic income is in principle an institution to protect against structural injustice in this form. It is not enough (I believe) to create what structural justice demands. However, by taking people partially out of structural injustice basic income – properly understood as a stable institution among others - sends a signal of desert to structural justice, and leads us on a path to define what this is and requires within other institutions besides. ‘Living like gentlemen’ was complemented in Marshall with the idea of occupational ‘second chances’. He of course had in mind a later escape from the early damning effect of the tiered education system in Britain. The concept is broader. Real occupational chances (and second chances) must be part of what structural justice requires: that human beings cannot be displaced from their homes or from occupying productive life journeys of their choosing within a better organised economy.

In this sense the idea of basic income as a stable institution is part of envisioning structural justice, but not itself the whole path. The idea of basic income as part of envisioning a stable state of human development allows us to look from the individual perspective upwards to what structural justice entails.

There are many other examples of how institutions currently spend money inefficiently.15 The impact of precarious contracting on public costs can be illustrated in the care sector, which has been beset by chronic staff shortages, which in turn drive up public health costs.16 Weak regulation is also costly. A case in point is the very significant role and expansion of housing subsidies in Britain during the period after housing policy liberalisation of the 1980s.17 The contemporary structural injustice of the benefit system extends to those working and earning now. The case when people have to spend hard-earned savings to cover their needs until they are completely broke before they can access income support (and the threat of sanctions) is an offence to developmental justice too.18 At stake in basic income is the right not to be punished twice, by misfortune, and for misfortune, which turns temporary bad luck into a permanent state.

As argued above, the right defence of basic income is not that it redistributes to people in poverty, but that it restores the basic independence of citizens and abates the current structural forces of developmental injustice. Recent experiments in partial versions of basic income worldwide and other research on sources of economic security have shown beyond doubt the motivating effect of economic stability.19 However, the motivating effect of basic security was never really in doubt, surely: how could it be, against the accepted argument that entrepreneurship benefits from limited liability and stable taxes? The debate needs to move on to consider precisely the relationship between political economy, shared funding, and rights.

In the same context, a risk with romanticising basic income purely as an anti-poverty tool (let alone a sufficient one – again) is that it could become an easy solution for international development funders advocating intensified global integration. To some extent this has materialised, as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) has recently proposed to cut back the Indian state through a simplified welfare system, while arguing that sanctions on unemployed people should remain in place in rich countries that have the administrative capacity to police people in poverty.25

According to Martin Wolf, in a recent case for land tax, landowners big or small have done little or nothing to produce the value of their land, as a justification for taxing it.28 Yet, can we say equally of all landowners that they do not deserve their land (or building)?29 On the other hand, Wolf also makes a case for taxing land because it is easier to do (than taxing movable capital).

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来源期刊
IPPR Progressive Review
IPPR Progressive Review Social Sciences-Political Science and International Relations
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期刊介绍: The permafrost of no alternatives has cracked; the horizon of political possibilities is expanding. IPPR Progressive Review is a pluralistic space to debate where next for progressives, examine the opportunities and challenges confronting us and ask the big questions facing our politics: transforming a failed economic model, renewing a frayed social contract, building a new relationship with Europe. Publishing the best writing in economics, politics and culture, IPPR Progressive Review explores how we can best build a more equal, humane and prosperous society.
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