核扩散前景:过去的序幕?

IF 1.2 3区 社会学 Q2 INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS Washington Quarterly Pub Date : 2021-04-03 DOI:10.1080/0163660X.2021.1934250
Eric Brewer
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引用次数: 0

摘要

在核挑战方面,拜登政府有很多事情要做。在撰写本文时,伊朗的核计划正在扩大,而德黑兰生产足够制造核弹所需的时间正在缩短。即使可以找到外交解决方案,在可预见的未来,伊朗也很可能保留制造核武器的潜在能力。朝鲜核武库的质量和数量上的改进——包括可以打到美国的导弹——意味着它不再被认为是一个小小的核麻烦。有证据表明,政府将密切关注这些威胁。这样做是正确的。但拜登总统和他的团队也应该放眼未来。如果未来的扩散威胁与过去30年类似,即伊拉克、利比亚、朝鲜、叙利亚和伊朗等所谓的“流氓”国家,那么美国应该对自己控制核武器扩散的能力有足够的信心。除了伊朗,几乎没有美国真正的对手可能发起新的扩散挑战。追求核武器的利比亚和伊拉克政权已经不复存在,这两个国家以及叙利亚都深陷内部冲突,不太可能重建核武器计划。此外,华盛顿在应对此类威胁方面拥有丰富的经验和完善且经过检验的工具包。
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The Nuclear Proliferation Landscape: Is Past Prologue?
The Biden administration has a full plate when it comes to nuclear challenges. As of this writing, Iran’s nuclear program is expanding, and the amount of time Tehran would need to produce enough material for a bomb is shrinking. Even if a diplomatic solution can be found, Iran is likely to retain a latent capability to build nuclear weapons for the foreseeable future. North Korea’s qualitative and quantitative improvements to its nuclear arsenal— including missiles that can reach the United States—mean that it can no longer be considered a minor nuclear nuisance. Evidence suggests that the administration will focus closely on these threats. And it would be right to do so. But President Biden and his team should also look beyond the immediate horizon. If future proliferation threats look like the past 30 years—that is, socalled “rogue” states such as Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Syria, and Iran—then the United States should feel reasonably confident about its ability to keep the spread of nuclear weapons contained. Aside from Iran, there are few true US adversaries that are likely to mount a new proliferation challenge. The regimes in Libya and Iraq that pursued nuclear weapons are gone, and those two countries as well as Syria are consumed with internal strife that makes reconstitution of a nuclear weapons program unlikely. Moreover, Washington has a wealth of experience and a refined and tested toolkit for managing such threats.
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来源期刊
CiteScore
2.90
自引率
5.90%
发文量
20
期刊介绍: The Washington Quarterly (TWQ) is a journal of global affairs that analyzes strategic security challenges, changes, and their public policy implications. TWQ is published out of one of the world"s preeminent international policy institutions, the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), and addresses topics such as: •The U.S. role in the world •Emerging great powers: Europe, China, Russia, India, and Japan •Regional issues and flashpoints, particularly in the Middle East and Asia •Weapons of mass destruction proliferation and missile defenses •Global perspectives to reduce terrorism Contributors are drawn from outside as well as inside the United States and reflect diverse political, regional, and professional perspectives.
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