{"title":"从法律上反对相信奇迹","authors":"Gesiel DA Silva","doi":"10.1590/0100-6045.2021.v44n4.gs","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Alvin Plantinga (1993a, 1993b, 2000) argues that de jure objections to theism depend on de facto objections: in order to say that belief in God is not warranted, one should first assume that this belief is false. Assuming Plantinga’s epistemology and his de facto/de jure distinction, In this essay, I argue that to show that belief in miracles is not warranted, one must suppose that belief in miracles is always false. Therefore, a person who holds a skeptical position regarding miracles must choose either to find evidence that all of the supposed miracles are false, or admit that one is assuming an areligious commitment as a starting point. The De Jure Objection Against Belief in Miracles 435 Manuscrito – Rev. Int. Fil. Campinas, v. 44, n. 4, pp. 434-452, Oct.-Dec. 2021.","PeriodicalId":42903,"journal":{"name":"Manuscrito","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.2000,"publicationDate":"2021-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"THE DE JURE OBJECTION AGAINST BELIEF IN MIRACLES\",\"authors\":\"Gesiel DA Silva\",\"doi\":\"10.1590/0100-6045.2021.v44n4.gs\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Alvin Plantinga (1993a, 1993b, 2000) argues that de jure objections to theism depend on de facto objections: in order to say that belief in God is not warranted, one should first assume that this belief is false. Assuming Plantinga’s epistemology and his de facto/de jure distinction, In this essay, I argue that to show that belief in miracles is not warranted, one must suppose that belief in miracles is always false. Therefore, a person who holds a skeptical position regarding miracles must choose either to find evidence that all of the supposed miracles are false, or admit that one is assuming an areligious commitment as a starting point. The De Jure Objection Against Belief in Miracles 435 Manuscrito – Rev. Int. Fil. Campinas, v. 44, n. 4, pp. 434-452, Oct.-Dec. 2021.\",\"PeriodicalId\":42903,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Manuscrito\",\"volume\":\" \",\"pages\":\"\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.2000,\"publicationDate\":\"2021-12-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Manuscrito\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1590/0100-6045.2021.v44n4.gs\",\"RegionNum\":4,\"RegionCategory\":\"哲学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"0\",\"JCRName\":\"PHILOSOPHY\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Manuscrito","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1590/0100-6045.2021.v44n4.gs","RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"0","JCRName":"PHILOSOPHY","Score":null,"Total":0}
Alvin Plantinga (1993a, 1993b, 2000) argues that de jure objections to theism depend on de facto objections: in order to say that belief in God is not warranted, one should first assume that this belief is false. Assuming Plantinga’s epistemology and his de facto/de jure distinction, In this essay, I argue that to show that belief in miracles is not warranted, one must suppose that belief in miracles is always false. Therefore, a person who holds a skeptical position regarding miracles must choose either to find evidence that all of the supposed miracles are false, or admit that one is assuming an areligious commitment as a starting point. The De Jure Objection Against Belief in Miracles 435 Manuscrito – Rev. Int. Fil. Campinas, v. 44, n. 4, pp. 434-452, Oct.-Dec. 2021.
京公网安备 11010802042870号
京ICP备2023020795号-1
分享
求助内容：
应助结果提醒方式：
扫码关注我们
