{"title":"我是人民","authors":"J. Mazzone","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2778898","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"This essay is a contribution to a symposium on Randy Barnett’s book, Our Republican Constitution: Securing the Liberty and Sovereignty of We the People (2016). The essay focuses on Barnett’s treatment of courts. On the one hand, Barnett complains, judicial decisions of the past produced a dangerous consolidation of governmental power and truncated rights. On the other hand, fixing the problem — restoring a “republican” constitution — requires highly motivated judges to keep power in check and promote rights. These two impulses are in tension and, at least without additional work on both the diagnostic and remedial sides, appear incompatible. The root of the tension is Barnett’s failure to perceive the inherent limits to judicial recognition of expansive constitutional rights when judicial power itself is consolidated. Barnett celebrates dispersed legislative and executive power as a means for states and localities to adopt different regulatory programs, with variation triggering citizen foot voting. He complains that such experimentation has become more difficult with legislative and executive powers increasingly concentrated at the national level because the end result is a one-size-fits-all regulatory scheme. Yet Barnett does not extend the same analysis to the courts, where a one-size-fits-all judicial scheme is equally problematic for Barnett’s constitutional vision. Consolidated judicial power, where ultimate authority rests in the Supreme Court of the United States, does not serve well to generate expansive rights for “We the People.” It is even less suited to Barnett’s own individualistic version of rights — a sort of “Me the People” — in which, he says, each of us is sovereign and courts exist to vindicate our own personal liberties. Barnett’s suggestion that courts really will get things right once they are stacked with originalist judges (and a few constitutional amendments are ratified) is a hypothesis unlikely to be tested anytime soon. In the interim, Barnett’s program could find hope in unexpected places: the jurisprudential approaches of Justices John Paul Stevens and Sonia Sotomayor point to a role for courts that would better promote experimentation and protect more securely individual rights along the lines Barnett himself advocates.","PeriodicalId":81001,"journal":{"name":"Constitutional commentary","volume":"31 1","pages":"143-174"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2016-05-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"20","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Me the People\",\"authors\":\"J. 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引用次数: 20
摘要
本文是兰迪·巴内特(Randy Barnett)的著作《我们的共和宪法:确保我们人民的自由和主权》(2016)的研讨会的一篇文章。这篇文章的重点是巴内特对法院的看法。巴奈特抱怨说,一方面,过去的司法裁决造成了政府权力的危险巩固和权利的削弱。另一方面,要解决这个问题——恢复“共和”宪法——需要高度积极的法官来控制权力,促进权利。这两种冲动是紧张的,至少在没有诊断和治疗方面的额外工作的情况下,似乎是不相容的。这种紧张关系的根源在于,当司法权本身得到巩固时,巴尼特未能认识到司法承认扩张性宪法权利的内在限制。巴尼特赞扬分散的立法权和行政权,认为这是各州和地方采取不同监管计划的一种手段,而不同的监管计划会引发公民投票。他抱怨说,由于立法和行政权力日益集中在国家一级,这种实验变得更加困难,因为最终的结果是一个一刀切的监管计划。然而,巴奈特并没有将同样的分析扩展到法院,在法院,一刀切的司法方案对巴奈特的宪法愿景来说同样是有问题的。最终权力掌握在美国最高法院的统一司法权,并不能很好地为“我们人民”创造广泛的权利。它更不适合巴尼特自己的个人主义版本的权利——一种“我是人民”——他说,我们每个人都是主权,法院的存在是为了维护我们自己的个人自由。巴尼特的建议是,一旦法院由原旨主义法官组成(以及一些宪法修正案得到批准),法院就会把事情做好,这是一个不太可能在短期内得到验证的假设。在此期间,巴尼特的计划可能会在意想不到的地方找到希望:大法官约翰·保罗·史蒂文斯(John Paul Stevens)和索尼娅·索托马约尔(Sonia Sotomayor)的法理方法指出,法院可以更好地促进实验,并按照巴尼特本人所倡导的方式,更安全地保护个人权利。
This essay is a contribution to a symposium on Randy Barnett’s book, Our Republican Constitution: Securing the Liberty and Sovereignty of We the People (2016). The essay focuses on Barnett’s treatment of courts. On the one hand, Barnett complains, judicial decisions of the past produced a dangerous consolidation of governmental power and truncated rights. On the other hand, fixing the problem — restoring a “republican” constitution — requires highly motivated judges to keep power in check and promote rights. These two impulses are in tension and, at least without additional work on both the diagnostic and remedial sides, appear incompatible. The root of the tension is Barnett’s failure to perceive the inherent limits to judicial recognition of expansive constitutional rights when judicial power itself is consolidated. Barnett celebrates dispersed legislative and executive power as a means for states and localities to adopt different regulatory programs, with variation triggering citizen foot voting. He complains that such experimentation has become more difficult with legislative and executive powers increasingly concentrated at the national level because the end result is a one-size-fits-all regulatory scheme. Yet Barnett does not extend the same analysis to the courts, where a one-size-fits-all judicial scheme is equally problematic for Barnett’s constitutional vision. Consolidated judicial power, where ultimate authority rests in the Supreme Court of the United States, does not serve well to generate expansive rights for “We the People.” It is even less suited to Barnett’s own individualistic version of rights — a sort of “Me the People” — in which, he says, each of us is sovereign and courts exist to vindicate our own personal liberties. Barnett’s suggestion that courts really will get things right once they are stacked with originalist judges (and a few constitutional amendments are ratified) is a hypothesis unlikely to be tested anytime soon. In the interim, Barnett’s program could find hope in unexpected places: the jurisprudential approaches of Justices John Paul Stevens and Sonia Sotomayor point to a role for courts that would better promote experimentation and protect more securely individual rights along the lines Barnett himself advocates.