{"title":"对因果对比论的“csamesides”辩护的回复","authors":"Asbjørn Steglich‐Petersen","doi":"10.22201/IIFS.18704905E.2016.227","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"In a recent article in this journal, Esteban Cespedes (2015) seeks to defend the contrastive account of singular causation from my criticisms (Steglich-Petersen 2012). Cespedes objects to my argument on three counts: (1) it is circular in presupposing a principle that it seeks to establish; (2) that same principle is false; and (3) even if the principle were true, it would not speak against the contrastive account. In this note I argue that all three objections are unconvincing.","PeriodicalId":43820,"journal":{"name":"CRITICA-REVISTA HISPANOAMERICANA DE FILOSOFIA","volume":"28 1","pages":"93-98"},"PeriodicalIF":0.1000,"publicationDate":"2016-10-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"A Reply to \\\"Céspedes\\\" Defense of Causal Contrastivism\",\"authors\":\"Asbjørn Steglich‐Petersen\",\"doi\":\"10.22201/IIFS.18704905E.2016.227\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"In a recent article in this journal, Esteban Cespedes (2015) seeks to defend the contrastive account of singular causation from my criticisms (Steglich-Petersen 2012). Cespedes objects to my argument on three counts: (1) it is circular in presupposing a principle that it seeks to establish; (2) that same principle is false; and (3) even if the principle were true, it would not speak against the contrastive account. In this note I argue that all three objections are unconvincing.\",\"PeriodicalId\":43820,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"CRITICA-REVISTA HISPANOAMERICANA DE FILOSOFIA\",\"volume\":\"28 1\",\"pages\":\"93-98\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.1000,\"publicationDate\":\"2016-10-31\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"CRITICA-REVISTA HISPANOAMERICANA DE FILOSOFIA\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.22201/IIFS.18704905E.2016.227\",\"RegionNum\":4,\"RegionCategory\":\"哲学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"0\",\"JCRName\":\"PHILOSOPHY\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"CRITICA-REVISTA HISPANOAMERICANA DE FILOSOFIA","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.22201/IIFS.18704905E.2016.227","RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"0","JCRName":"PHILOSOPHY","Score":null,"Total":0}
A Reply to "Céspedes" Defense of Causal Contrastivism
In a recent article in this journal, Esteban Cespedes (2015) seeks to defend the contrastive account of singular causation from my criticisms (Steglich-Petersen 2012). Cespedes objects to my argument on three counts: (1) it is circular in presupposing a principle that it seeks to establish; (2) that same principle is false; and (3) even if the principle were true, it would not speak against the contrastive account. In this note I argue that all three objections are unconvincing.