{"title":"对因果关系对比理论的辩护","authors":"E. Céspedes","doi":"10.22201/IIFS.18704905E.2015.503","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"An argument proposed by Steglich-Petersen (2012) establishes that while contrastive causation can be applied to general causation and causal explanation, it is a mistake to consider it in cases of singular causation. I attempt to show that there is no mistake. Steglich-Petersen’s argument does not seem to be strong enough and is actually circular. Furthermore, I briefly argue that even if we take his argument to be valid, there is still a response from the side of contrastive causation.","PeriodicalId":43820,"journal":{"name":"CRITICA-REVISTA HISPANOAMERICANA DE FILOSOFIA","volume":"5 1","pages":"93-99"},"PeriodicalIF":0.1000,"publicationDate":"2015-12-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"1","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"A defense of the contrastive theory of causation\",\"authors\":\"E. Céspedes\",\"doi\":\"10.22201/IIFS.18704905E.2015.503\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"An argument proposed by Steglich-Petersen (2012) establishes that while contrastive causation can be applied to general causation and causal explanation, it is a mistake to consider it in cases of singular causation. I attempt to show that there is no mistake. Steglich-Petersen’s argument does not seem to be strong enough and is actually circular. Furthermore, I briefly argue that even if we take his argument to be valid, there is still a response from the side of contrastive causation.\",\"PeriodicalId\":43820,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"CRITICA-REVISTA HISPANOAMERICANA DE FILOSOFIA\",\"volume\":\"5 1\",\"pages\":\"93-99\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.1000,\"publicationDate\":\"2015-12-07\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"1\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"CRITICA-REVISTA HISPANOAMERICANA DE FILOSOFIA\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.22201/IIFS.18704905E.2015.503\",\"RegionNum\":4,\"RegionCategory\":\"哲学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"0\",\"JCRName\":\"PHILOSOPHY\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"CRITICA-REVISTA HISPANOAMERICANA DE FILOSOFIA","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.22201/IIFS.18704905E.2015.503","RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"0","JCRName":"PHILOSOPHY","Score":null,"Total":0}
An argument proposed by Steglich-Petersen (2012) establishes that while contrastive causation can be applied to general causation and causal explanation, it is a mistake to consider it in cases of singular causation. I attempt to show that there is no mistake. Steglich-Petersen’s argument does not seem to be strong enough and is actually circular. Furthermore, I briefly argue that even if we take his argument to be valid, there is still a response from the side of contrastive causation.