Pub Date : 2023-10-03DOI: 10.1080/14751798.2023.2257483
Caroline Batka
ABSTRACTStakeholders use a number of different terms to refer to the contractors supporting expeditionary military operations. Often, these terms are inconsistently-applied, stigmatising, and unclear. This analysis uses the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) as a case study for exploring the efforts that the U.S. military has taken to improve contractor terminology. The study finds that DoD uses the terms contractor, contractor personnel, and contractor employee to refer to organisations, groups of employees, and individual employees providing outsourced expeditionary services. DoD also uses a number of more specific terms to refer to certain contractors and relationships. However, there are gaps and inconsistencies in DoD’s terminological scheme, and challenges remain in differentiating contractors from other actors in war and in reconciling terminology across the U.S. Government and the international community. By contextualising DoD contractor terminology within the framework of the Confucian Rectification of Names, this study offers insights regarding contractors’ normative roles.KEYWORDS: Contractorsprivate military and security companiesmercenariesU.S. Department of DefenseConfucian Rectification of Names Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1 Sean McFate, Mercenaries and War: Understanding Private Armies Today (National Defense University, 2019), https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/strat-monograph/mercenaries-and-war.pdf (accessed November 4, 2022).2 Joel A.C. Baum and Anita M. McGahan, ‘The Reorganization of Legitimate Violence: The Contested Terrain of the Private Military and Security Industry During the Post-Cold War Era’, Research in Organizational Behavior 33 (2013): 34.3 Jozef Bátora, ‘States, Interstitial Organizations and the Prospects for Liberal International Order’, International Affairs 97, no. 5 (2021): 1433–50.4 Caroline Batka, Stefan Schilling, and Christopher Kinsey, ‘Examining the Positive and Negative Aspects of the U.S. Military/Contractor Bond in the Operational Environment’, Journal of Political & Military Sociology 48, no. 2 (2022): 135–73; Katherine E. McCoy, ‘Beyond Civil—Military Relations: Reflections on Civilian Control of a Private, Multinational Workforce’, Armed Forces & Society 36, no. 4 (2010): 671–94; Fred Schreier and Marina Caparini, Privatising Security: Law, Practice and Governance of Private Military and Security Companies (Geneva: Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, 2005).5 Deborah Avant, The Market for Force: The Consequences of Privatizing Security (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 264.6 Jozef Bátora, ‘Turbulence and War: Private Military Corporations and the Reinstitutionalization of War Making’, in Governance in Turbulent Times (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), 184; Sean McFate, The New Rules of War: Victory in the Age of Durable Disorder (New York: Harper Collins, 2019), 4.7 Kevin Cunningham, Sta
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Pub Date : 2023-10-03DOI: 10.1080/14751798.2023.2264070
Michael Mayer
Continuous advances in artificial intelligence has enabled higher levels of autonomy in military systems. As the role of machine-intelligence expands, effective co-operation between humans and autonomous systems will become an increasingly relevant aspect of future military operations. Successful human-autonomy teaming (HAT) requires establishing appropriate levels of trust in machine-intelligence, which can vary according to the context in which HAT occurs. The expansive body of literature on trust and automation, combined with newer contributions focused on autonomy in military systems, forms the basis of this study. Various aspects of trust within three general categories of machine intelligence applications are examined. These include data integration and analysis, autonomous systems in all domains, and decision-support applications. The issues related to appropriately calibrating trust levels varies within each category, as do the consequences of poorly aligned trust and potential mitigation measures.
{"title":"Trusting machine intelligence: artificial intelligence and human-autonomy teaming in military operations","authors":"Michael Mayer","doi":"10.1080/14751798.2023.2264070","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/14751798.2023.2264070","url":null,"abstract":"Continuous advances in artificial intelligence has enabled higher levels of autonomy in military systems. As the role of machine-intelligence expands, effective co-operation between humans and autonomous systems will become an increasingly relevant aspect of future military operations. Successful human-autonomy teaming (HAT) requires establishing appropriate levels of trust in machine-intelligence, which can vary according to the context in which HAT occurs. The expansive body of literature on trust and automation, combined with newer contributions focused on autonomy in military systems, forms the basis of this study. Various aspects of trust within three general categories of machine intelligence applications are examined. These include data integration and analysis, autonomous systems in all domains, and decision-support applications. The issues related to appropriately calibrating trust levels varies within each category, as do the consequences of poorly aligned trust and potential mitigation measures.","PeriodicalId":309223,"journal":{"name":"Defense & Security Analysis","volume":"92 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135695917","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-09-29DOI: 10.1080/14751798.2023.2257484
Zsolt Lazar
{"title":"Subversion – the strategic weaponization of narratives <b>Subversion – the strategic weaponization of narratives</b> , by Andreas Krieg, Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2023, 252 pp. $99, ISBN 978-1647123352 (HBK)","authors":"Zsolt Lazar","doi":"10.1080/14751798.2023.2257484","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/14751798.2023.2257484","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":309223,"journal":{"name":"Defense & Security Analysis","volume":"63 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135244048","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-09-29DOI: 10.1080/14751798.2023.2257485
Bohuslav Pernica
Click to increase image sizeClick to decrease image size Notes1 Thomas-Durell Young, Anatomy of Post-Communist European Defense Institutions: The Mirage of Military Modernity (London: Bloomsbury, 2017).2 Dalius Polekauskas, ʹTime for honest defence. Review of Thomas-Durell Young. 2017. Anatomy of post-communist European defence institutions: the mirage of military modernityʹ, Journal on Baltic Security 4 (2018): 59–61.3 Thomas-Durell Young, ʹHow to defend Romania?: Identifying legacy and institutional impedimentsʹ, Problems of Post-Communism 70 no. 1 (2021): 94–106; Thomas-Durell Young, ʹReinforcing NATO's Eastern Airspaceʹ, The RUSI Journal 168 no. 1–2 (2023): 30–49.4 Thomas S. Szayna, ʹThe Czech Republic. A Small Contributor or a “Free Rider”?ʹ, in. America's New Allies: Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic in NATO, ed. Andrew A. Michta, (Washington: University of Washington Press, 1999).5 Bohuslav Pernica, Marcel Pikhart,ʹLeft by the West? Academic discourse on corruption for a better social resilienceʹ, Emerging Science Journal 5 no. 2 (2021): 171–183; Glen Grant, Vladimir Milenski, ʹIdentifying the challenges to defence reform in Central and Eastern Europe: observations from the fieldʹ, Defense & Security Analysis 34 no. 2 (2018): 191–209.6 Jaroslav Dvorak, Bohuslav Pernica, (2021). ʹTo free or not to free (ride): a comparative analysis of the NATO burden-sharing in the Czech Republic and Lithuania – another insight into the issues of military performance in the Central and Eastern Europeʹ, Defense & Security Analysis 37 no. 2 (2021): 164–176; Bohuslav Pernica, Jan Ženka, ʹSpatial distribution of military bases and power of interest groups in an emergent democracyʹ, GeoScape 16 no. 2 (2022): 158–174.7 Mihail Naydenov ʹThe subversion of the Bulgarian defence system – the Russian wayʹ, Defense & Security Analysis 34 no. 1 (2018): 93–112.8 Sebastián Briones Razeto, and Nicole Jenne, (2021) ʹSecurity and defence policy documents: a new datasetʹ, Defense & Security Analysis 37 no. 3 (2021): 346–363.9 Marian Zulean, Emilia Şercan, ʹDemocratic control of Romanian intelligence after three decades: quis custodiet ipsos custodes?ʹ, Defense & Security Analysis 34 no. 4 (2018): 365–384.10 Zdeněk Kříž, ʹThe security perception and security policy of the Czech Republic, 1993–2018ʹ, Defense & Security Analysis 37 no. 1 (2021): 38–52.11 Bohuslav Pernica, Jaroslav Dvorak, Zsolt Lazar, Balázs Taksáz, Alex Maskalík, ʹDefense industrial bases (DIB) in six small NATO post-communist countriesʹ, Economics of Peace and Security Journal 18, no. 1 (2023): 53–65.12 Czech Republic Supreme Audit Office, ʹThe system of protection of the population in the Czech Republic has a number of fundamental shortcomings, people are not sufficiently informed, masks and shelters are lackingʹ Czech Republic Supreme Audit Office, Press release on audit No 22/12–27 March 2023, https://www.nku.cz/scripts/detail.php?id=13117 (accessed June 20 2023).13 Ibid 1: 58; Pavol Frič, Bohuslav P
{"title":"Military strategies of the new European allies. A comparative study. (Cass Military Studies) <b>Military strategies of the new European allies. A comparative study. (Cass Military Studies)</b> , by Håkan Edström and Jacob Westberg, London, Routledge, 240 pp., ISBN 9781032286938, GBP 120 (hardback)","authors":"Bohuslav Pernica","doi":"10.1080/14751798.2023.2257485","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/14751798.2023.2257485","url":null,"abstract":"Click to increase image sizeClick to decrease image size Notes1 Thomas-Durell Young, Anatomy of Post-Communist European Defense Institutions: The Mirage of Military Modernity (London: Bloomsbury, 2017).2 Dalius Polekauskas, ʹTime for honest defence. Review of Thomas-Durell Young. 2017. Anatomy of post-communist European defence institutions: the mirage of military modernityʹ, Journal on Baltic Security 4 (2018): 59–61.3 Thomas-Durell Young, ʹHow to defend Romania?: Identifying legacy and institutional impedimentsʹ, Problems of Post-Communism 70 no. 1 (2021): 94–106; Thomas-Durell Young, ʹReinforcing NATO's Eastern Airspaceʹ, The RUSI Journal 168 no. 1–2 (2023): 30–49.4 Thomas S. Szayna, ʹThe Czech Republic. A Small Contributor or a “Free Rider”?ʹ, in. America's New Allies: Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic in NATO, ed. Andrew A. Michta, (Washington: University of Washington Press, 1999).5 Bohuslav Pernica, Marcel Pikhart,ʹLeft by the West? Academic discourse on corruption for a better social resilienceʹ, Emerging Science Journal 5 no. 2 (2021): 171–183; Glen Grant, Vladimir Milenski, ʹIdentifying the challenges to defence reform in Central and Eastern Europe: observations from the fieldʹ, Defense & Security Analysis 34 no. 2 (2018): 191–209.6 Jaroslav Dvorak, Bohuslav Pernica, (2021). ʹTo free or not to free (ride): a comparative analysis of the NATO burden-sharing in the Czech Republic and Lithuania – another insight into the issues of military performance in the Central and Eastern Europeʹ, Defense & Security Analysis 37 no. 2 (2021): 164–176; Bohuslav Pernica, Jan Ženka, ʹSpatial distribution of military bases and power of interest groups in an emergent democracyʹ, GeoScape 16 no. 2 (2022): 158–174.7 Mihail Naydenov ʹThe subversion of the Bulgarian defence system – the Russian wayʹ, Defense & Security Analysis 34 no. 1 (2018): 93–112.8 Sebastián Briones Razeto, and Nicole Jenne, (2021) ʹSecurity and defence policy documents: a new datasetʹ, Defense & Security Analysis 37 no. 3 (2021): 346–363.9 Marian Zulean, Emilia Şercan, ʹDemocratic control of Romanian intelligence after three decades: quis custodiet ipsos custodes?ʹ, Defense & Security Analysis 34 no. 4 (2018): 365–384.10 Zdeněk Kříž, ʹThe security perception and security policy of the Czech Republic, 1993–2018ʹ, Defense & Security Analysis 37 no. 1 (2021): 38–52.11 Bohuslav Pernica, Jaroslav Dvorak, Zsolt Lazar, Balázs Taksáz, Alex Maskalík, ʹDefense industrial bases (DIB) in six small NATO post-communist countriesʹ, Economics of Peace and Security Journal 18, no. 1 (2023): 53–65.12 Czech Republic Supreme Audit Office, ʹThe system of protection of the population in the Czech Republic has a number of fundamental shortcomings, people are not sufficiently informed, masks and shelters are lackingʹ Czech Republic Supreme Audit Office, Press release on audit No 22/12–27 March 2023, https://www.nku.cz/scripts/detail.php?id=13117 (accessed June 20 2023).13 Ibid 1: 58; Pavol Frič, Bohuslav P","PeriodicalId":309223,"journal":{"name":"Defense & Security Analysis","volume":"56 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135246851","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-09-22DOI: 10.1080/14751798.2023.2254079
Maria Constantinescu
ABSTRACTElements of mission command can be found in successful styles of leadership both in military and in business environments, as it is based on empowering subordinates or employees to make decisions, encouraging their confidence and creativity to solve problems/achieve objectives. The purpose of this paper is to explore the potential advantages and drawbacks of applying this concept to the field of defence resources management, by analysing the common areas between these approaches. The research hypothesis is that the concept of mission command can be approached as a management process aimed at achieving clearly identified objectives, similar to the processes of project management, programme management, or defence resource management in general. The paper uses qualitative research methods, based on the analysis of existing specialised literature regarding the concept of mission-based command, the concept of defence resource management, and on an exploratory research, based on unstructured interviews with specialists in the two fields.KEYWORDS: Mission commandprinciplesresourcesmanagementadvantageschallenges Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1 Ivan Yardley and Andrew Kakabadse, ‘Understanding Mission Command: A Model for Developing Competitive Advantage in a Business Context’, Strategic Change – Briefings in Entrepreneurial Finance 16, no. 1–2 (2007): 69–78, doi:10.1002/jsc.779. Gordon A. Craig, The Politics of the Prussian Army 1640–1945 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1964), chapters 2–4.2 Andrew J. Kiser, ‘Mission Command: The Historical Roots of Mission Command in the US Army, Technical Report’, 2015, 2, apps.dtic.mil/sti/citations/AD1001514.3 ‘The U.S. Army Leadership Field Manual’, 1st ed. Department of the Army (New York: McGraw Hill, 2004), 41.4 NATO Standard AJP-01 Allied Joint Doctrine, December 2017, 5-1.5 H.L.C Liyanage, ‘Mission Command – a Perceptible Solution for Future Challenges of the Army’, Department of Strategic Studies, Faculty of Defence and Strategic Studies, General Sir John Kotelawala, Defence University, Ratmalana, 2015; 176, http://ir.kdu.ac.lk/handle/345/1370%0A.6 Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 6-0, Mission Command: Command and Control of Army Forces, Department of the Army, 2019; 1–7.7 Combat Orders Foundations b2b2377 Student Handout, United States Marine Corps, The Basic School Marine Corps Training Command, 8–19, https://navy.rotc.umich.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/Combat_Orders_Foundations.pdf.8 Vance Gordon and Wade P. Hinkle, ‘Best Practices in Defence Resource Management’, IDA Document D-4137, Institute for Defence Analysis, 2011, iii, https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA541650.pdf.9 Romanian White Paper of Defence, 2017, 11, https://sgg.gov.ro/1/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/CARTA-ALBA-A-APARARII-.pdf.10 Ibid., 42.11 Ibid.12 George T. Doran, ‘There's a S.M.A.R.T. Way to Write Management's Goals and Objectives’, Management Review 70, no. 11 (1981): 3
任务指挥的要素可以在军事和商业环境中成功的领导风格中找到,因为它基于授权下属或员工做出决策,鼓励他们的信心和创造力来解决问题/实现目标。本文的目的是通过分析这些方法之间的共同领域,探讨将这一概念应用于国防资源管理领域的潜在优点和缺点。研究假设是,任务指挥的概念可以作为一种管理过程来处理,目的是实现明确确定的目标,类似于一般的项目管理、方案管理或国防资源管理过程。本文采用定性研究方法,基于对现有的关于基于任务的指挥概念和国防资源管理概念的专业文献的分析,以及基于对这两个领域专家的非结构化访谈的探索性研究。关键词:任务指挥原则资源管理优势挑战披露声明作者未报告潜在的利益冲突。注1:Ivan Yardley和Andrew Kakabadse,“理解任务指挥:在商业环境中发展竞争优势的模型”,《战略变革:创业金融简报》第16期。1-2 (2007): 69-78, doi:10.1002/jsc.779。Gordon A. Craig,普鲁士军队的政治1640-1945(纽约:牛津大学出版社,1964),第2 - 4.2章Andrew J. Kiser,“任务指挥:美国陆军任务指挥的历史根源,技术报告”,2015年2月,apps.dtic.mil/sti/citation /AD1001514.3“美国陆军领导现场手册”,第1版。陆军部(纽约:McGraw Hill, 2004), 41.4北约标准AJP-01盟军联合条令,2017年12月,5-1.5 H.L.C Liyanage,“任务指挥——陆军未来挑战的可感知解决方案”,国防与战略研究学院战略研究系,国防大学,拉特马拉纳,约翰·科特拉瓦拉将军爵士;176, http://ir.kdu.ac.lk/handle/345/1370%0A.6陆军条令出版物(ADP) 6-0,任务指挥:陆军部队的指挥与控制,陆军部,2019;1-7.7战斗命令基础b2b2377学生讲义,美国海军陆战队,基础学校海军陆战队训练司令部,8-19,https://navy.rotc.umich.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/Combat_Orders_Foundations.pdf.8 Vance Gordon和Wade P. Hinkle,“国防资源管理的最佳实践”,IDA文件D-4137,国防分析研究所,2011,iii, https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA541650.pdf.9罗马尼亚国防白皮书,2017,11,https://sgg.gov.ro/1/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/CARTA-ALBA-A-APARARII-.pdf.10同上,42.11同上。12 George T. Doran,“有一种S.M.A.R.T.的方式来写管理的目标和目的”,《管理评论》第70期。11 (1981): 35-36.13 Armata rom,个人赤字。leaster: O problememoi cam n toate unitățile militare, 2019, https://www.defenseromania.ro/armata-romana-duce-lipsa-acuta-de-personal_597971.html.14 https://dgmru.mapn.ro/pages/acasa.15 https://www.defense.ro/directii/dpm.16 Brian Martin, Uprooting War(伦敦:自由出版社,1984),第9章,网络版,https://www.bmartin.cc/pubs/90uw/uw09.html.17罗马尼亚国防白皮书,2017,41,https://sgg.gov.ro/1/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/CARTA-ALBA-A-APARARII-.pdf.18同上,42.19 G. Hofstede,“文化维度化:语境中的Hofstede模型”,心理学与文化在线阅读2,第2期。1(2011): 15-41。doi:10.9707/2307-0919.1014, https://scholarworks.gvsu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1014&context=orpc.20 S. Ting-Toomey和C.L. Chung,理解跨文化交际,第3版(牛津:牛津大学出版社,2012),48.21 https://www.hofstede-insights.com/country-comparison.22 Hofstede,“维度化文化”,8.23 Thomas-Durell Young,“遗产概念:中欧和东欧的指挥社会学”,参数47,no。马丁·e·邓普西,“任务指挥白皮书”,2012年4月3日,11日,https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/jfq/jfq-72/jfq-72_10-13_Murray.pdf?ver=2014-03-13-152404-877.Additional信息Maria Constantinescu,国防资源管理研究区域系副教授,为学术期刊以及加密货币-技术,经济和安全撰写了许多文章,由Editura Pro Universitaria(布加勒斯特,2020年)出版,以及国防规划和国防资源管理背景下的规划规划预算系统,由国防大学“Carol I”(布加勒斯特,2013年)出版。
{"title":"Using the concept of mission command in defence resources management – the case of Romania","authors":"Maria Constantinescu","doi":"10.1080/14751798.2023.2254079","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/14751798.2023.2254079","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACTElements of mission command can be found in successful styles of leadership both in military and in business environments, as it is based on empowering subordinates or employees to make decisions, encouraging their confidence and creativity to solve problems/achieve objectives. The purpose of this paper is to explore the potential advantages and drawbacks of applying this concept to the field of defence resources management, by analysing the common areas between these approaches. The research hypothesis is that the concept of mission command can be approached as a management process aimed at achieving clearly identified objectives, similar to the processes of project management, programme management, or defence resource management in general. The paper uses qualitative research methods, based on the analysis of existing specialised literature regarding the concept of mission-based command, the concept of defence resource management, and on an exploratory research, based on unstructured interviews with specialists in the two fields.KEYWORDS: Mission commandprinciplesresourcesmanagementadvantageschallenges Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1 Ivan Yardley and Andrew Kakabadse, ‘Understanding Mission Command: A Model for Developing Competitive Advantage in a Business Context’, Strategic Change – Briefings in Entrepreneurial Finance 16, no. 1–2 (2007): 69–78, doi:10.1002/jsc.779. Gordon A. Craig, The Politics of the Prussian Army 1640–1945 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1964), chapters 2–4.2 Andrew J. Kiser, ‘Mission Command: The Historical Roots of Mission Command in the US Army, Technical Report’, 2015, 2, apps.dtic.mil/sti/citations/AD1001514.3 ‘The U.S. Army Leadership Field Manual’, 1st ed. Department of the Army (New York: McGraw Hill, 2004), 41.4 NATO Standard AJP-01 Allied Joint Doctrine, December 2017, 5-1.5 H.L.C Liyanage, ‘Mission Command – a Perceptible Solution for Future Challenges of the Army’, Department of Strategic Studies, Faculty of Defence and Strategic Studies, General Sir John Kotelawala, Defence University, Ratmalana, 2015; 176, http://ir.kdu.ac.lk/handle/345/1370%0A.6 Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 6-0, Mission Command: Command and Control of Army Forces, Department of the Army, 2019; 1–7.7 Combat Orders Foundations b2b2377 Student Handout, United States Marine Corps, The Basic School Marine Corps Training Command, 8–19, https://navy.rotc.umich.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/Combat_Orders_Foundations.pdf.8 Vance Gordon and Wade P. Hinkle, ‘Best Practices in Defence Resource Management’, IDA Document D-4137, Institute for Defence Analysis, 2011, iii, https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA541650.pdf.9 Romanian White Paper of Defence, 2017, 11, https://sgg.gov.ro/1/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/CARTA-ALBA-A-APARARII-.pdf.10 Ibid., 42.11 Ibid.12 George T. Doran, ‘There's a S.M.A.R.T. Way to Write Management's Goals and Objectives’, Management Review 70, no. 11 (1981): 3","PeriodicalId":309223,"journal":{"name":"Defense & Security Analysis","volume":"67 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136061683","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-09-15DOI: 10.1080/14751798.2023.2255382
Haim Yogev, Ronen A. Cohen, Eyal Lewin
ABSTRACTThis research empirically examines the common assumption in scholarly literature that a military stratagem leads to an advantage on battlefields. It focuses on three different forms of stratagem: (1) surprise, (2) deception, and (3) special tactics. We took the battles for the Mount Hermon outpost during the 1973 Arab-Israeli war as our case studies. Constructing an independent measures design, or a between-groups design, we treated the Golani Brigade (in a set of two battles), and the 317 Paratroopers Brigade (in another battle), as two separate groups of participants – one experiencing the use of stratagems and one avoiding this condition. Our analysis shows that stratagems prove to be highly effective; however, we also raise some reservations, calling for any generalisation to be taken with a grain of salt. This research can serve as a model for future examinations of other military campaigns throughout history.KEYWORDS: Stratagemindependent measures designbetween-groups designMount Hermon1973 Arab-Israeli war Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1 B. Strauss, The Trojan War: A New History (New York, NY: Simon & Schuster, 2006); O. Coolidge, The Trojan War (New York, NY: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1980).2 K. Smith, ‘The Military Texts: The Sunzi’, in Sources of Chinese Tradition: From Earliest Times to 1600, vol. 1, ed. W.T. de Bary (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1999), 213–24.3 Sextus Julius Frontinus, The Stratagems. The Aqueducts of Rome, trans. Charles E. Bennett, ed. Mary R. McElwain (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1925).4 A.H. Jomini, The Art of War, trans. G. Mendell and W. Craighill (Radford, VA: Wilder Publications, [1837] 2008).5 C. von Clausewitz, On War, trans. M. Howard and P. Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, [1832] 1984).6 B.H. Liddell Hart, The Indirect Approach (New Delhi: Pentagon Press, [1929] 2012).7 2020, 2012.8 Mainly, as mentioned earlier, Jomini, The Art of War; Clausewitz, On War; and Liddell Hart, The Indirect Approach.9 DOD, Military Deception Manual (Joint Publication 3-13.4), https://jfsc.ndu.edu/Portals/72/Documents/JC2IOS/Additional_Reading/1C3-JP_3-13-4_MILDEC.pdf; DOD, DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/dictionary.pdf.10 IDF, Dictionary of the IDF Terms (Tel Aviv: Agam-Tohad, 1998).11 DOA Headquarters, Field Manual 100-5: Operations (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1993), 2–5.12 R.E. Simpkin, Race to the Swift: Thoughts on Twenty-First Century Warfare (Lincoln, NE: Potomac Books, 1985); W.S. Lind, Maneuver Warfare Handbook (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1985).13 S. Gerwehr and R.W. Glenn, Unweaving the Web: Deception and Adaptation in Future Urban Operations (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2002).14 IDF, Dictionary of the IDF Terms, 126.15 DOD, Military Deception Manual; DOD, DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms.16 B.J. Bell and B.
{"title":"The importance of war stratagem: the case study of the 1973 war Mount Hermon battles","authors":"Haim Yogev, Ronen A. Cohen, Eyal Lewin","doi":"10.1080/14751798.2023.2255382","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/14751798.2023.2255382","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACTThis research empirically examines the common assumption in scholarly literature that a military stratagem leads to an advantage on battlefields. It focuses on three different forms of stratagem: (1) surprise, (2) deception, and (3) special tactics. We took the battles for the Mount Hermon outpost during the 1973 Arab-Israeli war as our case studies. Constructing an independent measures design, or a between-groups design, we treated the Golani Brigade (in a set of two battles), and the 317 Paratroopers Brigade (in another battle), as two separate groups of participants – one experiencing the use of stratagems and one avoiding this condition. Our analysis shows that stratagems prove to be highly effective; however, we also raise some reservations, calling for any generalisation to be taken with a grain of salt. This research can serve as a model for future examinations of other military campaigns throughout history.KEYWORDS: Stratagemindependent measures designbetween-groups designMount Hermon1973 Arab-Israeli war Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1 B. Strauss, The Trojan War: A New History (New York, NY: Simon & Schuster, 2006); O. Coolidge, The Trojan War (New York, NY: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1980).2 K. Smith, ‘The Military Texts: The Sunzi’, in Sources of Chinese Tradition: From Earliest Times to 1600, vol. 1, ed. W.T. de Bary (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1999), 213–24.3 Sextus Julius Frontinus, The Stratagems. The Aqueducts of Rome, trans. Charles E. Bennett, ed. Mary R. McElwain (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1925).4 A.H. Jomini, The Art of War, trans. G. Mendell and W. Craighill (Radford, VA: Wilder Publications, [1837] 2008).5 C. von Clausewitz, On War, trans. M. Howard and P. Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, [1832] 1984).6 B.H. Liddell Hart, The Indirect Approach (New Delhi: Pentagon Press, [1929] 2012).7 2020, 2012.8 Mainly, as mentioned earlier, Jomini, The Art of War; Clausewitz, On War; and Liddell Hart, The Indirect Approach.9 DOD, Military Deception Manual (Joint Publication 3-13.4), https://jfsc.ndu.edu/Portals/72/Documents/JC2IOS/Additional_Reading/1C3-JP_3-13-4_MILDEC.pdf; DOD, DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/dictionary.pdf.10 IDF, Dictionary of the IDF Terms (Tel Aviv: Agam-Tohad, 1998).11 DOA Headquarters, Field Manual 100-5: Operations (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1993), 2–5.12 R.E. Simpkin, Race to the Swift: Thoughts on Twenty-First Century Warfare (Lincoln, NE: Potomac Books, 1985); W.S. Lind, Maneuver Warfare Handbook (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1985).13 S. Gerwehr and R.W. Glenn, Unweaving the Web: Deception and Adaptation in Future Urban Operations (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2002).14 IDF, Dictionary of the IDF Terms, 126.15 DOD, Military Deception Manual; DOD, DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms.16 B.J. Bell and B.","PeriodicalId":309223,"journal":{"name":"Defense & Security Analysis","volume":"21 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135397115","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-07-03DOI: 10.1080/14751798.2023.2235121
Nicholas Marsh
ABSTRACT The article analyses the provision of military aid to Ukraine during the first year after the 2022 Russian invasion and explains why it was more effective compared to other examples. It discusses the impact of material and intangible military assistance. The article examines tensions arising from principal-agent relationships between Ukraine and the states that provided support that may have affected what was provided and when it was delivered. It is notable that providers of assistance emphasised equipment rather than training, a choice that could be made because Ukraine had already built up a high level of combat skills and military organisation. The article argues that the distinctive aspects of military assistance to Ukraine that led to its impact were the quality and quantity of equipment provided, good communication and co-ordination between Ukraine and those states providing assistance, and that Ukrainian defence and government institutions could manage the aid provided.
{"title":"Responding to needs: military aid to Ukraine during the first year after the 2022 invasion","authors":"Nicholas Marsh","doi":"10.1080/14751798.2023.2235121","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/14751798.2023.2235121","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT The article analyses the provision of military aid to Ukraine during the first year after the 2022 Russian invasion and explains why it was more effective compared to other examples. It discusses the impact of material and intangible military assistance. The article examines tensions arising from principal-agent relationships between Ukraine and the states that provided support that may have affected what was provided and when it was delivered. It is notable that providers of assistance emphasised equipment rather than training, a choice that could be made because Ukraine had already built up a high level of combat skills and military organisation. The article argues that the distinctive aspects of military assistance to Ukraine that led to its impact were the quality and quantity of equipment provided, good communication and co-ordination between Ukraine and those states providing assistance, and that Ukrainian defence and government institutions could manage the aid provided.","PeriodicalId":309223,"journal":{"name":"Defense & Security Analysis","volume":"30 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-07-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126701358","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-07-03DOI: 10.1080/14751798.2023.2232188
Richard Stojar
ABSTRACT In February 2022, Russia launched a large-scale military operation to take full control of the Ukrainian state. The invasion achieved virtually none of Russia's originally stated goals and instead of demonstrating Russian military power and effectiveness, it showed the exact opposite. Ambitious goals that were supposed to be achieved within a few days, turned out to be completely unrealistic. The war has become a long-term conflict of high intensity, instead of a flash military operation. The author argues that the cause of the Russian failure was not only the erroneous intelligence evaluation of the adversary by the Russian intelligence services and numerous mistakes of Russian units at the tactical and operational level. Rather, failure has also been due the structural weaknesses and shortcomings of the Russian army as institution. These long-term shortcomings were identified during the previous combat deployment of Russian forces in local conflicts and have never been resolved.
{"title":"The Russian invasion and its failure in the first days","authors":"Richard Stojar","doi":"10.1080/14751798.2023.2232188","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/14751798.2023.2232188","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT In February 2022, Russia launched a large-scale military operation to take full control of the Ukrainian state. The invasion achieved virtually none of Russia's originally stated goals and instead of demonstrating Russian military power and effectiveness, it showed the exact opposite. Ambitious goals that were supposed to be achieved within a few days, turned out to be completely unrealistic. The war has become a long-term conflict of high intensity, instead of a flash military operation. The author argues that the cause of the Russian failure was not only the erroneous intelligence evaluation of the adversary by the Russian intelligence services and numerous mistakes of Russian units at the tactical and operational level. Rather, failure has also been due the structural weaknesses and shortcomings of the Russian army as institution. These long-term shortcomings were identified during the previous combat deployment of Russian forces in local conflicts and have never been resolved.","PeriodicalId":309223,"journal":{"name":"Defense & Security Analysis","volume":"85 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-07-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114335376","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-06-04DOI: 10.1080/14751798.2023.2201017
D. Sanders
ABSTRACT This article explores an important and often overlooked element of Ukraine’s ability to defend itself against the Russian invasion in February 2022 – the adoption of a modified western transformational model of military reform – which has focused on mass and building a western style NATO interoperable and trained military. This article argues that Ukraine’s military reform since 2016, in particular the focus on Command and Control, the development of an NCO Corps and Special Forces as well as clear procurement priorities have created the enabling conditions for the development of a flexible and adaptable military force, able to limit Russia’s battlefield success and bring the fight to the enemy. Despite this progress, however, a recurring problem facing the Ukrainian military, that is likely to continue in the future, is how to balance the ongoing requirement for mass against the urgent need for military modernisation.
{"title":"Ukraine’s third wave of military reform 2016–2022 – building a military able to defend Ukraine against the Russian invasion","authors":"D. Sanders","doi":"10.1080/14751798.2023.2201017","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/14751798.2023.2201017","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT This article explores an important and often overlooked element of Ukraine’s ability to defend itself against the Russian invasion in February 2022 – the adoption of a modified western transformational model of military reform – which has focused on mass and building a western style NATO interoperable and trained military. This article argues that Ukraine’s military reform since 2016, in particular the focus on Command and Control, the development of an NCO Corps and Special Forces as well as clear procurement priorities have created the enabling conditions for the development of a flexible and adaptable military force, able to limit Russia’s battlefield success and bring the fight to the enemy. Despite this progress, however, a recurring problem facing the Ukrainian military, that is likely to continue in the future, is how to balance the ongoing requirement for mass against the urgent need for military modernisation.","PeriodicalId":309223,"journal":{"name":"Defense & Security Analysis","volume":"112 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-06-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133682254","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-05-21DOI: 10.1080/14751798.2023.2204595
Stephen J. Blank
ABSTRACT If we examine the role played by nuclear weapons in Russia's war against Ukraine, we find that they play an offensive role in Russian strategy. The deterrence mission is as much intended to free Russia's hands for conventional war on its periphery as it is intended to prevent a nuclear first strike from the West. Indeed, the evidence of exercises etc. strongly points to a readiness for attacking Western sea-lines of communication in the Atlantic were a Western response to come as a result of the attack on Ukraine. Similarly, the potential for nuclear threat exists in the vicinity of the Black Sea as shown by Russian exercises in advance of the war there and in the Eastern Mediterranean. Those exercises reveal that Moscow's power projection policy into the Levant and beyond is also part of its deterrence strategy and has amongst its objectives protecting the Black Sea as a Russian lake, an inherently offensive posture. Therefore Russia's nuclear strategy in this war and in general stand revealed as offensive ones which the West must reckon with.
{"title":"How Ukraine reveals Russian nuclear strategy","authors":"Stephen J. Blank","doi":"10.1080/14751798.2023.2204595","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/14751798.2023.2204595","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT If we examine the role played by nuclear weapons in Russia's war against Ukraine, we find that they play an offensive role in Russian strategy. The deterrence mission is as much intended to free Russia's hands for conventional war on its periphery as it is intended to prevent a nuclear first strike from the West. Indeed, the evidence of exercises etc. strongly points to a readiness for attacking Western sea-lines of communication in the Atlantic were a Western response to come as a result of the attack on Ukraine. Similarly, the potential for nuclear threat exists in the vicinity of the Black Sea as shown by Russian exercises in advance of the war there and in the Eastern Mediterranean. Those exercises reveal that Moscow's power projection policy into the Levant and beyond is also part of its deterrence strategy and has amongst its objectives protecting the Black Sea as a Russian lake, an inherently offensive posture. Therefore Russia's nuclear strategy in this war and in general stand revealed as offensive ones which the West must reckon with.","PeriodicalId":309223,"journal":{"name":"Defense & Security Analysis","volume":"86 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-05-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134159395","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}