Od Fichtego do Kanta i z powrotem. Kilka uwag o Marka J. Siemka idei transcendentalizmu

Q4 Arts and Humanities Argument Biannual Philosophical Journal Pub Date : 2018-12-01 DOI:10.24917/20841043.8.2.13
Wojciech Hanuszkiewicz
{"title":"Od Fichtego do Kanta i z powrotem. Kilka uwag o Marka J. Siemka idei transcendentalizmu","authors":"Wojciech Hanuszkiewicz","doi":"10.24917/20841043.8.2.13","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"From Fichte to Kant and back. Several considerations on Marek J. Siemek’s concept of transcendentalism: The basic interpretation claim presented in Marek J. Siemek’s book is that Kant created a completely new level of philosophical reflection, for which the epistemological question remains characteristic. This question — in contrast to the epistemic questions posed before Kant — neither solely focuses on the problem of the ontic structure of the reality nor it does on the cognitive conditions which enable a subject to get to know the latter. The epistemological question deals with the very relationship that occurs between the cognition (subject) and the reality (object) and constitutes both the ontological and cognitive conditions of knowledge. According to Siemek, Kant developed a transcendental perspective, but only Fichte was able to fully develop it, while Kant dealt with interweaving epistemic and epistemological threads. However, one can defend the thesis that Kantian solutions, on the one hand, are much more strongly situated on the epistemological level of reflection than Siemek was ready to admit, and on the other hand, they offer a weaker (static) model of transcendentalism which — in contrast to the stronger (genetic) Fichte’s model — explores only the impassable limits of transcendental reflection.","PeriodicalId":30403,"journal":{"name":"Argument Biannual Philosophical Journal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2018-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Argument Biannual Philosophical Journal","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.24917/20841043.8.2.13","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q4","JCRName":"Arts and Humanities","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0

Abstract

From Fichte to Kant and back. Several considerations on Marek J. Siemek’s concept of transcendentalism: The basic interpretation claim presented in Marek J. Siemek’s book is that Kant created a completely new level of philosophical reflection, for which the epistemological question remains characteristic. This question — in contrast to the epistemic questions posed before Kant — neither solely focuses on the problem of the ontic structure of the reality nor it does on the cognitive conditions which enable a subject to get to know the latter. The epistemological question deals with the very relationship that occurs between the cognition (subject) and the reality (object) and constitutes both the ontological and cognitive conditions of knowledge. According to Siemek, Kant developed a transcendental perspective, but only Fichte was able to fully develop it, while Kant dealt with interweaving epistemic and epistemological threads. However, one can defend the thesis that Kantian solutions, on the one hand, are much more strongly situated on the epistemological level of reflection than Siemek was ready to admit, and on the other hand, they offer a weaker (static) model of transcendentalism which — in contrast to the stronger (genetic) Fichte’s model — explores only the impassable limits of transcendental reflection.
查看原文
分享 分享
微信好友 朋友圈 QQ好友 复制链接
本刊更多论文
从费尔特到康德再回来。关于西米克先验主义概念的几点思考:西米克书中提出的基本解释主张是,康德创造了一个全新的哲学反思层面,其认识论问题仍然具有特色。这个问题——与康德之前提出的认识论问题相反——既不仅仅关注现实的本体结构问题,也不关注使主体能够了解后者的认知条件。认识论问题处理的是认知(主体)和现实(客体)之间的关系,它构成了知识的本体论条件和认知条件。西米克认为,康德发展了一种先验视角,但只有费希特能够充分发展它,而康德处理的是相互交织的认识论和认识论线索。然而,我们可以为这样的论点辩护:一方面,康德的解决方案比西米克愿意承认的更强烈地位于反思的认识论层面上,另一方面,它们提供了一个较弱的(静态的)先验主义模型,与较强的(遗传的)费希特的模型相比,它只探索了先验反思的不可逾越的界限。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
求助全文
约1分钟内获得全文 去求助
来源期刊
Argument  Biannual Philosophical Journal
Argument Biannual Philosophical Journal Arts and Humanities-Religious Studies
自引率
0.00%
发文量
0
审稿时长
16 weeks
期刊最新文献
Anil Seth, Being you. A new science of consciousness A revitalisation of virtue ethics in contemporary education Synkretyczne pouczenie jogiczne w Ćarakasanhicie (Śarirasthana 1.137–155) Geistlosigkeit. Reflexionen zur Aktualität von Søren Kierkegaards Konstruktion des Selbst im Spannungsfeld von Immanenz und Transzendenz Dharmarāja and Dhammarāja (II)
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
现在去查看 取消
×
提示
确定
0
微信
客服QQ
Book学术公众号 扫码关注我们
反馈
×
意见反馈
请填写您的意见或建议
请填写您的手机或邮箱
已复制链接
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
×
扫码分享
扫码分享
Book学术官方微信
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术
文献互助 智能选刊 最新文献 互助须知 联系我们:info@booksci.cn
Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。
Copyright © 2023 Book学术 All rights reserved.
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号 京ICP备2023020795号-1