Pub Date : 2021-12-24DOI: 10.24917/20841043.11.2.9
Nina Budziszewska
A syncretic yogic instruction in Carakasanhita (Śārīrasthāna 1.137–155): Śārīrasthāna (ŚS) 1.137–155, contained in Book 4 of the Ćarakasaṃhitā (1st century BCE — 2nd century CE), is a short treatise on yoga presented for āyurvedic purposes. In its yogic interpretation, the work comprises the Upaniṣads, the Mahābhārata, some Sāṃkhya’s and Vaiśeṣika’s notions as well as the meditative interpretation present in the Buddhist tradition. The ŚS gives a threefold path (ayana) leading to mokṣa (ŚS 150–151), the state of supreme brahman with which the conscious being, bhūtātman, becomes one (ŚS 155): yoga, smṛti, and sāṃkhya. The path to liberation is based on yoga, which is the reinforcement of the manas in the ātman (ŚS 138) and the stopping of suffering by breaking the connection between the erroneous identification of ātman with manas and the senses (ŚS 138–139). On the path of yoga, a powerful eight-fold magical power (eight siddhis) is created through which the yogi is able to overcome external adversities (ŚS 140–141). In the next step, the recognition of the one’s true identity — according to the sāṃkhya — is made through buddhi by the power of jñāna (ŚS 152–153). However, in order for this recognition to be realized, the state of purity of sattva (ŚS 141) must first appear, induced by the practice of the eight-step smṛti realized by eighteen perfections (ŚS 143–147).
{"title":"Synkretyczne pouczenie jogiczne w Ćarakasanhicie (Śarirasthana 1.137–155)","authors":"Nina Budziszewska","doi":"10.24917/20841043.11.2.9","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.24917/20841043.11.2.9","url":null,"abstract":"A syncretic yogic instruction in Carakasanhita (Śārīrasthāna 1.137–155): Śārīrasthāna (ŚS) 1.137–155, contained in Book 4 of the Ćarakasaṃhitā (1st century BCE — 2nd century CE), is a short treatise on yoga presented for āyurvedic purposes. In its yogic interpretation, the work comprises the Upaniṣads, the Mahābhārata, some Sāṃkhya’s and Vaiśeṣika’s notions as well as the meditative interpretation present in the Buddhist tradition. The ŚS gives a threefold path (ayana) leading to mokṣa (ŚS 150–151), the state of supreme brahman with which the conscious being, bhūtātman, becomes one (ŚS 155): yoga, smṛti, and sāṃkhya. The path to liberation is based on yoga, which is the reinforcement of the manas in the ātman (ŚS 138) and the stopping of suffering by breaking the connection between the erroneous identification of ātman with manas and the senses (ŚS 138–139). On the path of yoga, a powerful eight-fold magical power (eight siddhis) is created through which the yogi is able to overcome external adversities (ŚS 140–141). In the next step, the recognition of the one’s true identity — according to the sāṃkhya — is made through buddhi by the power of jñāna (ŚS 152–153). However, in order for this recognition to be realized, the state of purity of sattva (ŚS 141) must first appear, induced by the practice of the eight-step smṛti realized by eighteen perfections (ŚS 143–147).","PeriodicalId":30403,"journal":{"name":"Argument Biannual Philosophical Journal","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-12-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"78406968","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-12-24DOI: 10.24917/20841043.11.2.6
Agnieszka Doda-Wyszyńska, Monika Obrębska
Politics appears to have a direct impact on the quality of our lives as citizens of states. We outline here the dependence between culture and its inherent mechanism of forgetting, and between a hero and a political subject. We employ the theory of Juri Lotman, who underlines the role of individuals and of single events in culture. The primary illustration given is the figure of Lech Wałęsa, politician, legendary co-founder of the Solidarity trade union, and Nobel Peace Prize winner. He exemplifies Lotman’s notion of a mobile hero, one who powered the course of history, but whose present-day political and social activity is of an empty and querulous nature, lacking a goal and deeper meaning, while the actions he performs take place within a closed semantic field. He is an example of a paradoxical hero, whose actions no longer generate tensions or build a new semiotic quality. Wałęsa’s problem is the ossification of his discourse and failure to perceive that transformation has already taken place.
{"title":"The political subject and hero in culture in the light of Juri Lotman’s theory","authors":"Agnieszka Doda-Wyszyńska, Monika Obrębska","doi":"10.24917/20841043.11.2.6","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.24917/20841043.11.2.6","url":null,"abstract":"Politics appears to have a direct impact on the quality of our lives as citizens of states. We outline here the dependence between culture and its inherent mechanism of forgetting, and between a hero and a political subject. We employ the theory of Juri Lotman, who underlines the role of individuals and of single events in culture. The primary illustration given is the figure of Lech Wałęsa, politician, legendary co-founder of the Solidarity trade union, and Nobel Peace Prize winner. He exemplifies Lotman’s notion of a mobile hero, one who powered the course of history, but whose present-day political and social activity is of an empty and querulous nature, lacking a goal and deeper meaning, while the actions he performs take place within a closed semantic field. He is an example of a paradoxical hero, whose actions no longer generate tensions or build a new semiotic quality. Wałęsa’s problem is the ossification of his discourse and failure to perceive that transformation has already taken place.","PeriodicalId":30403,"journal":{"name":"Argument Biannual Philosophical Journal","volume":"184 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-12-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"80441364","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-12-24DOI: 10.24917/20841043.11.2.3
J. Brejdak
The present paper attempts to look at on the genealogy of both shared intentionality and collective intentionality, comparing Michael Tomasello’s concept with Max Scheler’s threedimensional concept of intentionality: ens amans, ens volens, ens cogitans, as affective, conative, and cognitive intentionality. I focus on various forms of affective collective intentionality — Schelerian forms of sympathy — to show collective subjectivity from the whole spectrum of emotional intentionality, presented by Scheler’s example of parents standing over the corpse of a child. Even though Tomasello’s works seem to empirically corroborate Scheler’s intuitions about the emotional genealogy of collective intentionality, they will differ in the horizons within they locate intentionality. In the case of the evolutionary psychology of Tomasello, we can talk about the horizon of cooperation, in the case of Scheler’s Scheler’s phenomenology of acts about the horizon of responsibility or co-responsibility, which gives intentionality its unique character. The similarities of both concepts concern the following pillars: 1) genealogy of intentionality covering the dimension of affective intentionality, conative intentionality, and the level of cognitive intentionality; 2) Imitation or, as Scheler would say, following someone. Because a person is recognized by the author of Formalism as an act, or a bundle of acts, the way to understanding and communication with another person is the maieutic coperformance of their acts — i.e., imitation. The maieutic co-execution of acts of others triggers the constitution process of a person, both on an individual and community level. We can speak, in the case of Tomasello, about the ontho- and sociogenetic function of co-executing acts or imitating; however, in the case of Scheler, we are dealing with the clearly axiological nature of such a constitution of both the individual and collective subjectivity (axiological ego, axiological communio); 3) collaborative engagement as a driving force behind collective intentionality in one case in form of co-responsibility, a nature of a collective person (Scheler); in the other case in form of collaboration developing intentionality to various units of community life (Tomasello).
{"title":"Genealogy of collective intentionality","authors":"J. Brejdak","doi":"10.24917/20841043.11.2.3","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.24917/20841043.11.2.3","url":null,"abstract":"The present paper attempts to look at on the genealogy of both shared intentionality and collective intentionality, comparing Michael Tomasello’s concept with Max Scheler’s threedimensional concept of intentionality: ens amans, ens volens, ens cogitans, as affective, conative, and cognitive intentionality. I focus on various forms of affective collective intentionality — Schelerian forms of sympathy — to show collective subjectivity from the whole spectrum of emotional intentionality, presented by Scheler’s example of parents standing over the corpse of a child. Even though Tomasello’s works seem to empirically corroborate Scheler’s intuitions about the emotional genealogy of collective intentionality, they will differ in the horizons within they locate intentionality. In the case of the evolutionary psychology of Tomasello, we can talk about the horizon of cooperation, in the case of Scheler’s Scheler’s phenomenology of acts about the horizon of responsibility or co-responsibility, which gives intentionality its unique character. The similarities of both concepts concern the following pillars: 1) genealogy of intentionality covering the dimension of affective intentionality, conative intentionality, and the level of cognitive intentionality; 2) Imitation or, as Scheler would say, following someone. Because a person is recognized by the author of Formalism as an act, or a bundle of acts, the way to understanding and communication with another person is the maieutic coperformance of their acts — i.e., imitation. The maieutic co-execution of acts of others triggers the constitution process of a person, both on an individual and community level. We can speak, in the case of Tomasello, about the ontho- and sociogenetic function of co-executing acts or imitating; however, in the case of Scheler, we are dealing with the clearly axiological nature of such a constitution of both the individual and collective subjectivity (axiological ego, axiological communio); 3) collaborative engagement as a driving force behind collective intentionality in one case in form of co-responsibility, a nature of a collective person (Scheler); in the other case in form of collaboration developing intentionality to various units of community life (Tomasello).","PeriodicalId":30403,"journal":{"name":"Argument Biannual Philosophical Journal","volume":"26 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-12-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"86155557","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-12-24DOI: 10.24917/20841043.11.2.12
Paweł Sznajder
{"title":"Dominika Czakon, Zagubienie w interpretacji. Hans-Georg Gadamer wobec kultury i sztuki współczesnej. Jan Pomorski, Rzecz o wyobraźni historycznej. Ćwiczenia z hermeneutyki","authors":"Paweł Sznajder","doi":"10.24917/20841043.11.2.12","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.24917/20841043.11.2.12","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":30403,"journal":{"name":"Argument Biannual Philosophical Journal","volume":"92 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-12-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"90514035","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-12-24DOI: 10.24917/20841043.11.2.13
Magdalena Reuter
{"title":"Anil Seth, Being you. A new science of consciousness","authors":"Magdalena Reuter","doi":"10.24917/20841043.11.2.13","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.24917/20841043.11.2.13","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":30403,"journal":{"name":"Argument Biannual Philosophical Journal","volume":"76 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-12-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"72937778","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-12-24DOI: 10.24917/20841043.11.2.2
Sebastian Hüsch
Spiritlessness. Reflections on the topicality of Søren Kierkegaard’s construction of the self in the field of tension between immanence and transcendence: One of the most suggestive and provocative concepts developed by the Danish philosopher Søren Kierkegaard is the concept of “spiritlessness”. Spiritlessness is conceived of as a state of mind which cuts out transcendent possibilities at the benefice of reduced immanent probabilities and thus hinders the individual to become a true Self. The present paper asks for the topicality of Kierkegaard’s dialectics of “spirit” and “spiritlessness” for the constitution of the Self in the 21st cntury.
{"title":"Geistlosigkeit. Reflexionen zur Aktualität von Søren Kierkegaards Konstruktion des Selbst im Spannungsfeld von Immanenz und Transzendenz","authors":"Sebastian Hüsch","doi":"10.24917/20841043.11.2.2","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.24917/20841043.11.2.2","url":null,"abstract":"Spiritlessness. Reflections on the topicality of Søren Kierkegaard’s construction of the self in the field of tension between immanence and transcendence: One of the most suggestive and provocative concepts developed by the Danish philosopher Søren Kierkegaard is the concept of “spiritlessness”. Spiritlessness is conceived of as a state of mind which cuts out transcendent possibilities at the benefice of reduced immanent probabilities and thus hinders the individual to become a true Self. The present paper asks for the topicality of Kierkegaard’s dialectics of “spirit” and “spiritlessness” for the constitution of the Self in the 21st cntury.","PeriodicalId":30403,"journal":{"name":"Argument Biannual Philosophical Journal","volume":"24 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-12-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"79754453","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-12-24DOI: 10.24917/20841043.11.2.10
A. Laskowska
The Euclidean ‘Division of the canon’ and Pythagorean harmonics: The article presents the first Polish translation of a short Ancient Greek treatise entitled The division of the canon, which is commonly dated to the 3rd century BC, with a doubtful assumption that the author of the treatise is Euclid himself. It is the oldest surviving text derived from the mathematical school of harmonics, which combined the mathematical theory of proportion with the musical laws of harmony. The main purpose of this Euclidean treatise is to describe the instrument called canon (or monochord), which consists in determining the successive notes of the Greek musical system by means of mathematical principles. The treatise essentially consists of two distinct parts: an introduction and twenty propositions in the style of Euclid’s Elements. To bring this highly esoteric text closer to the modern reader, the translation is preceded by a brief introduction, which deals with the basic issues of the transmission of the text, its structure, and the problem of authorship. The philosophical problems of the treatise and its basic concepts are also discussed. An underlying idea of both the introduction and the work on the translation is that The division of the canon is an eminently Pythagorean text, which both expressed and proved their conviction about the mathematical structure of the universe.
{"title":"Euklidesowy traktat Podział kanonu i pitagorejska harmonika","authors":"A. Laskowska","doi":"10.24917/20841043.11.2.10","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.24917/20841043.11.2.10","url":null,"abstract":"The Euclidean ‘Division of the canon’ and Pythagorean harmonics: The article presents the first Polish translation of a short Ancient Greek treatise entitled The division of the canon, which is commonly dated to the 3rd century BC, with a doubtful assumption that the author of the treatise is Euclid himself. It is the oldest surviving text derived from the mathematical school of harmonics, which combined the mathematical theory of proportion with the musical laws of harmony. The main purpose of this Euclidean treatise is to describe the instrument called canon (or monochord), which consists in determining the successive notes of the Greek musical system by means of mathematical principles. The treatise essentially consists of two distinct parts: an introduction and twenty propositions in the style of Euclid’s Elements. To bring this highly esoteric text closer to the modern reader, the translation is preceded by a brief introduction, which deals with the basic issues of the transmission of the text, its structure, and the problem of authorship. The philosophical problems of the treatise and its basic concepts are also discussed. An underlying idea of both the introduction and the work on the translation is that The division of the canon is an eminently Pythagorean text, which both expressed and proved their conviction about the mathematical structure of the universe.","PeriodicalId":30403,"journal":{"name":"Argument Biannual Philosophical Journal","volume":"36 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-12-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"86747004","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-12-24DOI: 10.24917/20841043.11.2.4
Anna Alichniewicz
Monstrosity has its recognized place in cultural narratives but in philosophical discourse it remains mostly untouched. In my paper I make an attempt at phenomenological inquiry into the experience of the Other’s monstrous body. I am beginning with some remarks concerning Georges Canguilhem and Michel Foucault, the philosophers who devoted some attention to the problem of monstrosity and the monstrous, but my analysis is mainly based on the works of Bernhard Waldenfels, Edmund Husserl and Maurice Merleau-Ponty. Waldenfels emphasizes that the corporeal self is somehow perceived as alien, always somewhat distanced and not totally graspable. He also argues that the closer the Other, the stronger activation of the boundary between the spheres of the ownness and the alienness is caused. A promising framework for the analysis of the ambivalent reaction brought about by the encounter with a monstrous human body can be provided by Husserl’s phenomenological inquiry into the process of pairing, developed in his Cartesian meditations. It seems that in this experience the pairing process is frustrating and deranged because the process of apperception is disturbed by a cluster of untypical or quite unique characteristics of the monstrous body. In result, its sense remains unclear, puzzling and challenging. Interesting light on the experience of the Other’s monstrous body could shed Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology, especially the ideas of flesh and chiasm outlined in his last work. The radical character of the monster, while does not render it something totally different from the own, elucidates, however, the contingency of the order under which the human corporeality is subsumed.
{"title":"Monstrous body: between alienness and ownness","authors":"Anna Alichniewicz","doi":"10.24917/20841043.11.2.4","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.24917/20841043.11.2.4","url":null,"abstract":"Monstrosity has its recognized place in cultural narratives but in philosophical discourse it remains mostly untouched. In my paper I make an attempt at phenomenological inquiry into the experience of the Other’s monstrous body. I am beginning with some remarks concerning Georges Canguilhem and Michel Foucault, the philosophers who devoted some attention to the problem of monstrosity and the monstrous, but my analysis is mainly based on the works of Bernhard Waldenfels, Edmund Husserl and Maurice Merleau-Ponty. Waldenfels emphasizes that the corporeal self is somehow perceived as alien, always somewhat distanced and not totally graspable. He also argues that the closer the Other, the stronger activation of the boundary between the spheres of the ownness and the alienness is caused. A promising framework for the analysis of the ambivalent reaction brought about by the encounter with a monstrous human body can be provided by Husserl’s phenomenological inquiry into the process of pairing, developed in his Cartesian meditations. It seems that in this experience the pairing process is frustrating and deranged because the process of apperception is disturbed by a cluster of untypical or quite unique characteristics of the monstrous body. In result, its sense remains unclear, puzzling and challenging. Interesting light on the experience of the Other’s monstrous body could shed Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology, especially the ideas of flesh and chiasm outlined in his last work. The radical character of the monster, while does not render it something totally different from the own, elucidates, however, the contingency of the order under which the human corporeality is subsumed.","PeriodicalId":30403,"journal":{"name":"Argument Biannual Philosophical Journal","volume":"46 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-12-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"85687530","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-12-24DOI: 10.24917/20841043.11.2.8
Przemysław Szczurek
The paper offers a close examination of the Mahābhārata’s adhyāya 5,70, one of the more interesting and representative chapters to analyse Yudhiṣṭhira’s attitude on the dharma of the king and warfare. In this long chapter addressing Kṛṣṇa (before the latter’s diplomatic mission to Kauravas), the king deprived of his kingdom presents two different attitudes. On one hand, he states that even though peaceful conflict resolution would be the best to regain the kingdom, the war must be accepted if it is inevitable. On the other hand, he expresses his disapproval of war as evil in any form (MBh 5,70.44–66). Yudhiṣṭhira’s ambivalent utterance is analysed against the background of early Buddhist ethics (as represented in the Pāli Canon), totally condemning war, and other passages from the Mahābhārata, especially those glorifying the dharma of kṣatriyas.
{"title":"Dharmarāja and Dhammarāja (II)","authors":"Przemysław Szczurek","doi":"10.24917/20841043.11.2.8","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.24917/20841043.11.2.8","url":null,"abstract":"The paper offers a close examination of the Mahābhārata’s adhyāya 5,70, one of the more interesting and representative chapters to analyse Yudhiṣṭhira’s attitude on the dharma of the king and warfare. In this long chapter addressing Kṛṣṇa (before the latter’s diplomatic mission to Kauravas), the king deprived of his kingdom presents two different attitudes. On one hand, he states that even though peaceful conflict resolution would be the best to regain the kingdom, the war must be accepted if it is inevitable. On the other hand, he expresses his disapproval of war as evil in any form (MBh 5,70.44–66). Yudhiṣṭhira’s ambivalent utterance is analysed against the background of early Buddhist ethics (as represented in the Pāli Canon), totally condemning war, and other passages from the Mahābhārata, especially those glorifying the dharma of kṣatriyas.","PeriodicalId":30403,"journal":{"name":"Argument Biannual Philosophical Journal","volume":"10 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-12-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"80051442","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-12-24DOI: 10.24917/20841043.11.2.7
A. Michalska
It would not be much of an exaggeration to say that the notion of ecological and social embeddedness is one of the most exploited philosophical ideas these days, both in the academia and beyond. The most troublesome about the overall trend is that many proponents of the idea of social embeddedness simplistically consider selfhood as a form of aberration which merely provides vindication for inequality and violence. In this paper, instead of attacking the problem of the individual versus the collective head-on, I approach it by way of a critique of Stephen Turner’s repudiation of transcendental collectivism (Turner, 1994; Turner, 2010). According to Turner, transcendental entities, such as tacit knowledge, presuppositions, or traditions, should be altogether removed from explanatory schemata in the social sciences. I believe that Turner’s razor cuts too deep and the rejection of implicit framing is at best premature. Against the background of the identified shortcomings of Turner’s model of interactive learning, I track the interrelations between social development and the development of the self with an eye to showing that the relationship between individual selves and social reality is an extremely complex and multifactorial matter which we cannot hope to navigate without a proper transcendental frame. The frame is what mediates the relationship between the individual and the collective.
{"title":"Transcendentalism, social embeddeddness, and the problem of individuality","authors":"A. Michalska","doi":"10.24917/20841043.11.2.7","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.24917/20841043.11.2.7","url":null,"abstract":"It would not be much of an exaggeration to say that the notion of ecological and social embeddedness is one of the most exploited philosophical ideas these days, both in the academia and beyond. The most troublesome about the overall trend is that many proponents of the idea of social embeddedness simplistically consider selfhood as a form of aberration which merely provides vindication for inequality and violence. In this paper, instead of attacking the problem of the individual versus the collective head-on, I approach it by way of a critique of Stephen Turner’s repudiation of transcendental collectivism (Turner, 1994; Turner, 2010). According to Turner, transcendental entities, such as tacit knowledge, presuppositions, or traditions, should be altogether removed from explanatory schemata in the social sciences. I believe that Turner’s razor cuts too deep and the rejection of implicit framing is at best premature. Against the background of the identified shortcomings of Turner’s model of interactive learning, I track the interrelations between social development and the development of the self with an eye to showing that the relationship between individual selves and social reality is an extremely complex and multifactorial matter which we cannot hope to navigate without a proper transcendental frame. The frame is what mediates the relationship between the individual and the collective.","PeriodicalId":30403,"journal":{"name":"Argument Biannual Philosophical Journal","volume":"20 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-12-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"87210393","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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